Opinion
No. 3-232 / 02-1753.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Lucy J. Gamon, District Associate Judge.
Donna Montgomery appeals from her conviction, following a bench trial, for operating while intoxicated. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Douglas L. Tindal of Tindal Kitchen, P.L.C., Washington, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, and Barbara A. Edmondson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Donna Montgomery appeals from her conviction, following a bench trial, for operating while intoxicated (O.W.I.). We reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
At around midnight on March 25, 2002, Donna Montgomery drove a motor vehicle north on Highway 1, and signaled her intent to turn left (west) on Lexington Boulevard. Officer Shawn Ellingson simultaneously approached the same intersection traveling south on Highway 1 and prepared to turn right onto Lexington. The two vehicles stopped about twenty-five yards apart, after Montgomery's vehicle had crossed partially into the southbound lane of Highway 1. Montgomery flashed her headlights in an attempt to signal the officer to complete his right turn. The officer, by motioning with his arm out the window, directed Montgomery to complete her left turn and then stopped her after she complied with his direction. After the stop, Officer's Ellingson's observations of Montgomery led him to believe she was under the influence of alcohol and he arrested her for O.W.I. and failure to yield on a left turn.
Montgomery filed a motion to suppress evidence of intoxication seized as a result of the traffic stop, claiming Officer Ellingson's stop was illegal. At the suppression hearing, Officer Ellingson testified he stopped his vehicle to avoid a collision. In ruling on the motion, the district court found the collision was avoided in part by the officer's defensive driving. The court found Ellingson "could reasonably have believed" Montgomery's vehicle was approaching so close as to "constitute an immediate hazard" within the meaning of Iowa Code section 321.320 (2001), causing him to stop his vehicle even though he had the right of way. The court found Officer Ellingson thus had reasonable cause to stop Montgomery's vehicle and denied the motion to suppress.
Montgomery waived jury trial and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The district court found her guilty of O.W.I., and sentenced her to thirty days in jail, with all but two days suspended, and a fine. Montgomery appeals, contending Officer Ellingson lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, and that any evidence acquired during the stop should have been suppressed.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
When assessing an alleged violation of a constitutional right, we review de novo the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998). We consider both the evidence presented during the suppression hearing and that introduced at trial. State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1996).
III. Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. Evidence obtained in violation of these provisions is inadmissible, regardless of its relevancy or probative value. State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000).
An officer may stop an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). To justify an investigatory stop, the officer must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906. The evidence justifying the stop need not rise to the level of probable cause. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 642 (Iowa 2002).
The constitutional reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined by an objective standard. See State v. Jones, 586 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Iowa 1998). We assess whether the facts available at the moment of the seizure or the search could cause a person of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was appropriate. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 641. Consequently, the legality of a search and seizure "does not depend on the actual motivation of the individual officers involved." State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996).
IV. Failure to Yield.
The officer's stop of Montgomery's vehicle was based on his belief Montgomery had failed to yield the right of way when beginning her left turn. At the bench trial, he testified Montgomery's vehicle traveled halfway through the intersection before it came to a stop. The officer further testified that he interrupted his right turn, brought his vehicle to a stop, and waved Montgomery through the intersection because he feared a collision would occur if he either completed his turn or continued south through the intersection. Likewise, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Ellingson stated "I thought because of the speed she was going and the speed that I had to take the corner safely, I felt that we were going to come into contact had we both just continued."
The officer's stop of Montgomery's vehicle was based on Iowa Code section 321.320, which provides:
Left turns — yielding. The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road or driveway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching from the opposite direction which are within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, then said driver, having so yielded and having given a signal when and as required by this chapter, may make such left turn.
"Right of way" is defined as the "privilege of the immediate use of the highway." Iowa Code § 321.1(64).
The State concedes the motion to suppress should have been sustained if Montgomery's crossing over the center line under the circumstances of this case did not constitute a failure to yield pursuant to section 321.320. Conversely, if we conclude that by crossing the center line before the officer completed his right turn, Montgomery violated section 321.320, the State argues the motion to suppress was without merit. This appeal thus requires us to address a discrete legal question, i.e. whether the investigatory stop was justified because Montgomery violated Iowa Code section 321.320. If we conclude she did fail to yield at the intersection, then the officer had sufficient cause to stop her vehicle and we must affirm.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude Montgomery's actions did not constitute a violation of Iowa Code section 321.320, and that officer Ellingson was not justified in stopping Montgomery's vehicle. Officer Ellingson's stated intent was to turn right at the intersection. Indeed, the outward manifestation of that intent — his right turn signal — disclosed this to Montgomery who brought her vehicle to a stop at a location that would have allowed the officer to safely complete his right turn. He disclaimed at trial any intent to proceed through the intersection in a southerly direction on Highway 1 through the intersection. Thus, when viewed objectively, we conclude the position of Montgomery's vehicle when it came to a rest partially across the center line of the roadway posed no hazard to the officer.
Officer Ellingson's fear of a potential collision appears to have been based in part upon the prospect of his vehicle traveling straight ahead through the intersection of Highway 1 and Lexington. Ellingson testified:
Had I not been turning at that intersection, if I was going to continue straight or I had not made that corner, she would have been right in my lane. I felt she didn't yield to me.
The officer's fear was thus in part a product of speculation based on a hypothetical set of facts incompatible with the intent and actions of both drivers. Such hypothetical facts, although perhaps specific and articulable, do not provide a reasonable basis for the intrusion upon Montgomery's liberty.
We believe the propriety and reasonableness of the stop of Montgomery's vehicle can only be analyzed based on the assumption, as manifested in his actions prior to the stop and his testimony at trial, that Officer Ellingson intended to turn right at the intersection. No reasonable motorist observing the turn signal and movement of the officer's vehicle would have anticipated that it would proceed through the intersection without turning. The facts clearly indicated that Montgomery did allow Officer Ellingson to occupy and use the entirety of the roadway necessary for him to complete his right turn. Montgomery did not, before coming to a stop, enter into any portion of the roadway the officer would utilize to complete a right turn. Moreover, Montgomery did not complete her left turn until directed to do so by Officer Ellingson.
As noted above, the officer's vehicle slowed and then stopped before Montgomery completed her left turn consistent with the officer's direction.
As noted, we evaluate the reasonableness of the stop against an objective standard. Jones, 586 N.W.2d at 382. There is no indication Montgomery was exceeding the speed limit when approaching the intersection or that she was driving dangerously or erratically. She slowed her vehicle to a turning speed, signaled her intent to turn left, and came to a stop before entering that portion of the intersection required for the completion of the officer's right hand turn. By the officer's own testimony, the two vehicles came to a stop approximately twenty-five yards apart. We conclude Montgomery's actions did not cause any physical hazard to the officer or his vehicle, and only elicited unrealized fears of the officer himself. While Officer Ellingson may have subjectively feared contact, the objective facts do not support this fear.
The district court focused on the "immediate hazard" language of section 321.320 ("the driver . . . shall yield . . . to all vehicles . . . which are in the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard . . . ."). An
objective view of the facts leads us to conclude the officer's vehicle presented no immediate hazard to Montgomery. She was not speeding or driving erratically, she signaled her intended left turn, and stopped her vehicle before it entered that portion of the roadway necessary to the completion of the officer's right turn. Officer Ellingson testified "I felt that we were going to come into contact had we both just continued." The reality of the situation was that Montgomery did not continue and they did not collide. The court also found a collision was averted because of Officer Ellingson's defensive driving. We disagree. Montgomery stopped twenty-five yards from the officer's car which had commenced its turn. There was accordingly no risk of collision even if the officer had continued with his intended turn. The officer's fears were thus unrealized and unreasonable. The facts and circumstances of each case dictate whether or not cause exists to justify stopping a vehicle for investigation. See State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1997). On our de novo review of the record, the facts here did not justify the stop.
In conclusion, we conclude Montgomery's actions provided Officer Ellingson the uninterrupted use of the portion of the roadway required for completion of a right turn. Thus there were no reasonably specific and articulable facts which warranted the investigatory stop of Montgomery's vehicle. The trial court should have suppressed all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
REVERSED AND REMANDED.