Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2887-14T2
10-26-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CARLOS R. MARROQUIN, a/k/a MARROQUIN, CARLOS RENE MARROQUIN BARRERA, CARLOS RENE, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Solmaz F. Firoz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Ian C. Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Fuentes, Carroll, and Gooden Brown. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 13-01-0016. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Solmaz F. Firoz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Ian C. Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. PER CURIAM
Tried by a jury, defendant Carlos R. Marroquin was convicted of first-degree conspiracy to commit money laundering, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25a, 2C:21-25c, and 2C:5-2 (Count One); second-degree conspiracy to distribute cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1), 2C:35-5b(1), and 2C:5-2 (Count Two); first-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1), 2C:35-5b(1), and 2C:2-6 (Count Three); third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) and 2C:2-6 (Count Four); and first-degree money laundering, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25a, 2C:21-25c, and 2C:2-6 (Count Five). Defendant was indicted with Cesar Perez, Divanis Mendoza, and Juan Roque, all of whom pled guilty and gave damaging testimony against defendant during the five-day trial.
After appropriate mergers, defendant was sentenced to consecutive sixteen-year prison terms with eight-years of parole ineligibility on counts three and five. The judge also imposed appropriate fines, penalties, fees and assessments. The present appeal followed.
In his counseled brief, defendant raises the following issues for our consideration:
POINT I
WITHOUT BEING OFFERED OR QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT, OFFICER FLORA PROVIDED EXPERT TESTIMONY BASED ON HIS SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE TO DRUG TRAFFICKING OF ITEMS SEIZED DURING HIS
INVESTIGATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PURPORTED PATH OF THE NARCOTICS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS WAS INADMISSIBLE AS IT WAS IRRELEVANT AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND A MITIGATING FACTOR APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT, THEREBY RESULTING IN AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE.
The following additional points were raised in defendant's pro se supplemental brief:
We have rephrased defendant's supplemental point headings in the interest of clarity.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED BY NOT PROVIDING THE JURY WITH A PROPER INSTRUCTION REGARDING A JOINT STIPULATON RELATING TO THE AMOUNT OF COCAINE SEIZED. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MONEY LAUNDERING MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE VERDICT SHEET DID NOT REQUIRE THE JURY TO FIND AN "AGREEMENT" CONSTITUTING CONSPIRACY. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
THE VERDICT SHEET WITH RESPECT TO THE MONEY LAUNDERING CHARGE WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT FAILED TO INDICATE THAT THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE AMOUNT INVOLVED TO BE $500,000 OR GREATER. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT A CONVICTION FOR FIRST-DEGREE POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE REQUIRES THE STATE TO PROVE THE QUANTITY OF DRUGS INVOLVED. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A NON-DISCRETIONARY MINIMUM SENTENCE WITHOUT FIRST ESTABLISHING ON THE VERDICT SHEET THAT THE MONEY LAUNDERING CONVICTION QUALIFIED AS A FIRST-DEGREE CONVICTION.
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles. We reject each of the points raised and affirm.
I.
We recount the most pertinent portion of the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt adduced at the July 2014 trial. The State alleged that defendant and Roque were members of a conspiracy in which their role was to transport a substantial quantity of cocaine from California to New Jersey, where they would sell it to Mendoza and Perez. Defendant and Roque would then return to California with the proceeds of the drug transaction, which exceeded one million dollars.
The investigation began in May 2012, when Detective Sergeant Vittorio Flora of the New Jersey State Police received information that a "member of a drug trafficking organization was seeking to obtain a warehouse for the sole purpose of . . . narcotics trafficking activity." Flora was a ten-year veteran of the State Police who had been assigned to a drug-trafficking unit for over five years and had been involved in over two hundred drug investigations.
In July 2012, Flora's unit ascertained that the warehouse was located in Metuchen. Thereafter, the drug trafficking unit installed a pole camera outside the warehouse to conduct remote video surveillance. Additionally, undercover state troopers conducted physical surveillance of the area immediately surrounding the warehouse. Flora testified that the warehouse did not seem to be conducting any sort of "legitimate business." He also noted that there was no consistency concerning when people came or left the warehouse and that this created a stark contrast between the warehouse and other, legitimate businesses in the area.
During the course of their surveillance, the police observed that a silver Saturn Vue would frequent the warehouse. The Saturn Vue was occasionally left at the warehouse overnight, and it was often accompanied by a Honda Accord that was registered to Perez. After police observed the same silver Saturn Vue at a residence in Hackensack, they also established pole camera surveillance at that location. The police later determined that Perez and Mendoza resided at the Hackensack apartment.
On July 11, 2012, Flora observed Perez drive the Honda Accord from the Hackensack residence to the Metuchen warehouse. The Honda Accord was accompanied by a "bobtail trailer" that entered the warehouse upon its arrival and remained inside for approximately twenty-five minutes. The trailer was printed with the logo of "R.P.J. Transport," which was the employer of defendant and Roque. The bobtail trailer then pulled out of the warehouse followed by the Saturn Vue, and the two vehicles traveled "in tandem." The Saturn Vue had previously been observed traveling in tandem with the Honda Accord, and the police believed both vehicles belonged to members of the drug trafficking organization they were monitoring.
Police noticed that the Saturn Vue was again left at the warehouse on July 22, 2012. The next day, they observed a second, black Saturn Vue at the warehouse that followed the same pattern as the silver Saturn. That is, it was stored by the bay door of the warehouse, it traveled in tandem with the Honda Accord, and it eventually drove to the Hackensack residence.
On July 24, 2012, police noticed the Honda Accord leave the Hackensack residence at about 4:00 a.m. and travel to the Metuchen warehouse. Flora noted that this procedure was substantially similar to what his unit observed on July 11, 2012. The same bobtail truck that was previously observed at the warehouse then arrived and again entered through the bay door, which subsequently closed. Again, the bobtail truck exited the warehouse approximately twenty-five minutes later, at which time members of Flora's unit approached and investigated.
Members of the drug trafficking unit then secured the warehouse and Flora obtained and executed a search warrant. Mendoza was found inside the black Saturn Vue and police removed him before conducting the search. Perez and Mendoza presented New York driver's licenses and defendant and Roque produced California driver's licenses. At least one of the men told police they were in the warehouse to change a tire; however, a search of the warehouse revealed no spare tires or tire-changing equipment.
Flora testified that there was an "overwhelming odor of . . . chemical" inside the black Saturn Vue and that the officers "automatically" began searching for aftermarket, hidden compartments in the vehicle where drugs or currency are typically stored. While searching the vehicle, the police noticed a stray wire that looked like it "wasn't installed professionally," which is characteristic of a trap compartment. The police applied electricity to the stray wire, thereby revealing a hidden compartment. Inside the compartment, police found twenty kilograms of suspected narcotics, which later tested positive for cocaine. The officers then searched the silver Saturn Vue and found a similar hidden compartment containing another twenty kilograms of suspected narcotics, which also tested positive for cocaine.
The police then searched the bobtail truck and found a modified, hidden compartment inside the gas tank. Inside this compartment were thirty-three bundles of cash wrapped in green cellophane. It was stipulated that the cash recovered from the truck's hidden gas tank compartment totaled $1,053,525.
Inside the warehouse, the police found a Ford Excursion SUV and a Ford Econoline van. Both vehicles also had modified, hidden compartments, each of which was empty. Inside the van, police found heat sealers, a money counter, and green cellophane that was identical to the type used to wrap the money found in the gas tank of the bobtail truck. Flora testified that these items are all characteristic of a drug trafficking operation: heat sealing protects the currency and makes it more compact during transportation, and money counters are used to quickly count large amounts of currency. Police also seized multiple cellphones that were in the possession of defendant and the three other men, some of which were unused. The police did not investigate the registration of the phones or their call histories because, in their experience, drug traffickers generally do not use personal identifying information when buying or using cellular devices.
In addition to Flora, Roque, Perez, and Mendoza all provided key testimony linking defendant to the drug operation. Perez and Mendoza testified that they first met defendant at a rest stop near Exit 7 on the New Jersey Turnpike. Mendoza and Perez planned to receive shipments of cocaine from California as arranged by defendant and Roque. The cocaine was to be stored in the Metuchen warehouse, which Mendoza rented for that sole purpose. Upon first meeting defendant, Mendoza and Perez took him to the Metuchen warehouse so that he could familiarize himself with the location and determine whether it would be suitable.
On July 11, 2012, defendant and Roque drove an R.P.J. Transportation truck to the Metuchen warehouse where they met Mendoza and Perez. Roque testified that defendant was in charge of their narcotics operation and that their employer, R.P.J. Transportation, had no involvement in it. Once inside the warehouse, defendant and Roque delivered forty kilograms of cocaine to Perez and Mendoza. Roque testified that money was exchanged on July 11; however, Mendoza testified there was no payment on that date.
The four men met again at the warehouse on July 24, 2012. Perez and Mendoza arrived there around 4:30 a.m. for the purpose of receiving a cocaine delivery from defendant and Roque. Roque testified that, prior to the July 24 meeting, he contacted Perez and Mendoza using a phone that was not his personal phone. Defendant and Roque arrived in the same truck, pulled into the warehouse, and removed the cocaine from the hidden compartment in the gas tank. Mendoza and Perez then paid over $1,000,000 in cash to defendant and Roque, and loaded the cocaine into the hidden compartments of the silver and black Saturn Vues. The men then left the warehouse and were immediately apprehended by members of the state police.
II.
At trial, without objection, Flora testified in pertinent part as follows:
Q: And will you please tell me, based on your training and experience, if [] at all is there any significance to [the heat sealer]?
A: Yes. [I]n narcotics investigations oftentimes narcotics traffickers [] utilize food savers and food saver bags to heat seal United States currency for . . . transport purposes. So [] the bundles of United States currency are counted, stacked [] in denominations, and then they're heat sealed in — utilizing like a food saver heat sealed for various reasons to — to make it smaller, for protection of [] inclement weather as they're being transported . . . . So it's just for [] various reasons they use heat sealers specifically to [] make the items a lot smaller and fit into confined spaces hidden.
. . . .
Q: Can you please explain to me the significance of this money counter?
A: Ok. Based on my training and experience in conducting narcotics and money laundering investigations, members of organizations purchase these for efficiency in counting bulk currency. The amount of money that is — stacks of money it's very time consuming, and this is a more efficient way to count large amounts of money, as opposed to small amounts of money you could count by hand.
When you're dealing with a large amount of bulk currency, they like to count it with the money counter, then package it through the heat sealer and wrap [a] rubber band around it, and secure that their money is efficiently counted. It's just an expedited and more accurate method of counting money.
. . . .
Q: Just one last thing, Detective. Taking you back to the scene of the warehouse in Metuchen, when you confiscated all these items, did you also confiscate cell phones?
A: [T]here [were] several cell phones that were amongst the individuals' persons. However, there was, I believe, three cell phones that were located within the cab portion of the tractor, the bobtail.
Q: Okay. And did you get the call history on these cell phones?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Why not?
A: [] I believe in this investigation there was over — I would say over ten cell phones that were . . . recovered and seized . . . . And, again, in doing narcotics investigations, more often than not narcotics traffickers purchase multiple cell phones, and they purchase them from like a Boost Mobile Metro PCS and they purchase it, and when they [] register that phone or they activate that phone, it's more often than not done in a fictitious identity or no identity at all . . . and they do that so law enforcement when we attempt to obtain the subscriber information, it's going to show either the default the subscriber information, or a fictitious name. So we did not do that for this investigation.
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that, without being qualified as an expert witness, Flora improperly testified to the significance of the heat sealers, money counter, and cell phones. Accordingly, he contends that Flora's testimony about the role these items play in drug trafficking operations constituted impermissible opinion testimony. The State asserts that the lay testimony was proper and was based on Flora's personal observations and experience.
As defense counsel did not object when Flora's testimony was presented, we review defendant's argument pursuant to the plain error standard. R. 2:10-2. Under that standard, a conviction will be reversed only if the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result[,]" that is, if it was "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached[.]" State v. Taffaro, 195 N.J. 442, 454 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant must prove that a plain error was clear and obvious and that it affected his substantial rights. State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 82 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052, 120 S. Ct. 593, 145 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Boretsky, 186 N.J. 271, 284 (2006). A defendant's failure to object leads to the reasonable inference that the issue was not significant in the context of the trial. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333 (1971).
N.J.R.E. 701 states, "[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it (a) is rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue." "Lay opinion testimony, therefore, when offered either in civil litigation or in criminal prosecutions, can only be admitted if it falls within the narrow bounds of testimony that is based on the perception of the witness and that will assist the jury in performing its function." State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 456 (2011).
N.J.R.E. 701 does permit lay opinion evidence under certain circumstances. Examples in which lay opinion has been deemed permissible include testimony about: the speed of a car, State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471-72 (1999); the distance of a car from an intersection at the scene of an accident, State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649 (1993); and behavior indicative of a person's state of intoxication, State v. Guerrido, 60 N.J. Super. 505, 509-11 (App. Div. 1960).
Limitations have been placed on testimony offered by lay witnesses. "The Rule does not permit a witness to offer a lay opinion on a matter 'not within [the witness's] direct ken . . . and as to which the jury is as competent as he to form a conclusion[.]'" McLean, supra, 205 N.J. at 459 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
In contrast, an expert witness may testify in the form of an opinion provided that it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]" N.J.R.E. 702. "[T]o be admissible, expert testimony should relate[] to a relevant subject that is beyond the ordinary experience, education, and knowledge." State v. Sowell, 213 N.J. 89, 99 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, expert testimony may "'embrace[] an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact[.]'" Id. at 100 (quoting N.J.R.E. 704).
In McLean, a police officer witnessed the defendant engage in behavior believed to be a narcotics transaction, and the officer subsequently testified about this belief. McLean, supra, 205 N.J. at 445. The Court found the officer's testimony was inadmissible as a lay opinion, because it was an expression of a belief in the defendant's guilt and offered an opinion on matters that were not beyond the understanding of the jury. Id. at 463.
The Court described "the boundary line that separates factual testimony by police officers from permissible expert testimony" as follows:
On one side of that line is fact testimony, through which an officer is permitted to set forth what he or she perceived through one or more of the senses. Fact testimony has always consisted of a description of what the officer did and saw . . . . Testimony of that type includes no opinion, lay or expert, and does not convey information about what the officer "believed," "thought" or "suspected," but instead is an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness with first-hand knowledge.Only if a police officer is properly qualified as an expert witness may he or she give opinion testimony explaining the implications of observed behaviors that may be beyond the understanding of a juror. Id. at 460-61.
[Id. at 460 (citations omitted)].
We agree with defendant that the challenged portions of Flora's testimony exceeded the bounds as outlined for lay witnesses in McLean. This testimony instead fell within the scope of the expert opinion rule, N.J.R.E. 702, because it was "specialized knowledge" based on Flora's "experience, training, [and] education." See State v. Kittrell, 279 N.J. Super. 225, 236 (App. Div. 1995); McLean, supra, 205 N.J. at 462.
Nonetheless, for a confluence of reasons, we find that introduction of the opinion evidence was harmless. R. 2:10-2. First, Flora clearly possessed sufficient experience to qualify as an expert witness in drug trafficking. Where a witness possesses sufficient qualifications to have testified as an expert, any error in allowing the lay opinion may be deemed harmless. Kittrell, supra, 279 N.J. Super. at 235-236.
Second, at the trial, Special Agent Matthew Ryan of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency was qualified as an expert in narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Ryan opined, among other things, about the use and significance of money counters, heat sealing equipment, rubber bands, heat sealed bags, plastic wrap, and vehicles equipped with hidden compartments. Defendant concedes that the jury was properly instructed at the end of the trial regarding the manner in which it should weigh this opinion testimony. Moreover, Perez also testified that he used the money counter to count the currency, green cellophane to wrap it, and a food saver to package it.
Third, given the wealth of far more incriminating evidence, such as the forty kilograms of cocaine, over one million dollars in cash, and the vehicles' secret compartments, a new trial is not warranted under the plain error standard. In view of the overwhelming evidence in the record demonstrating defendant's involvement in the drug distribution scheme, we find admission of Flora's opinion testimony about the money counter, food saver, and cell phones to be harmless.
III.
Defendant next argues that a portion of Agent Ryan's expert testimony was: (1) irrelevant to the crimes he was charged with; (2) unduly prejudicial because it suggested he was involved with an international drug cartel; and (3) improper N.J.R.E. 404(b) "other crimes" evidence. Because defendant failed to object to the testimony at trial, we again view defendant's contentions through the prism of the plain error standard.
The testimony at issue came in response to a hypothetical posed to Ryan that tracked the facts of the case and pertained to the origin of the seized drugs:
A: It's my opinion that the cocaine questioned would have arrived from Colombia and smuggled from Colombia into Mexico, and then from Mexico across into the U.S. along the southwest border, almost like they're into California. And from California it was brought to a stashed location.
In the stashed location it was then placed in a concealed compartment within the tractor trailer and the gas tank. And then
from there individuals drove it and transported it to New Jersey where it was brought into a warehouse and the trap was accessed, the cocaine was removed, currency was then replaced, and the tractor trailer was headed back to California to turn over the currency to the trafficking organization which then would have smuggled it most likely back into Mexico.
We conclude that defendant's argument warrants little discussion. The expert evidence was relevant and probative with respect to the scope of the alleged drug distribution and money laundering conspiracies. Additionally, the path of the drugs and money was intrinsic to those alleged conspiracies. Evidence that is "intrinsic" to the charged crime is not "other crimes" evidence, and therefore not subject to N.J.R.E. 404(b). As the evidence pertained to the charged crimes, it was intrinsic and, therefore, N.J.R.E. 404(b) did not apply. Evidence is intrinsic if it directly proves the charged offense. State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 180 (2011). In Rose, the Court instructed that the "threshold determination under [N. J.R.E.] 404(b) is whether the evidence relates to 'other crimes,' and thus is subject to continued analysis under [N. J.R.E.] 404(b), or whether it is evidence intrinsic to the charged crime, and thus need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly [N. J.R.E.] 403." Id. at 179.
Here, not only did defense counsel not object, at trial he conceded:
The issue with regard to the cocaine coming from Col[o]mbia, then Mexico, through California, that's fine. That's all appropriate background to illustrate for the jury [] how drugs are certainly moved, the use of the trucks is fine, the use of warehouses, stash houses, cars, that's all fine and appropriate as long as it's based on an appropriate hypothetical question that is posed to the expert.The failure to object to the testimony suggests that defense counsel did not believe it was unduly prejudicial or improper. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136, 151 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2001).
In short, the challenged testimony was admissible as it related directly, and was intrinsic to, the crimes for which defendant was being tried, and it painted a complete picture of the scope of the drug trafficking and money laundering operations. Therefore, we see no error, let alone plain error, in the introduction of the testimony.
IV.
Defendant argues that the court's failure to find mitigating factor eleven resulted in an excessive sentence. Specifically, defendant cites the hardship to his wife and children resulting from his lengthy incarceration, and his risk of being deported as a consequence of his conviction, as warranting imposition of a lesser sentence.
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11) ("The imprisonment of the defendant would result in excessive hardship to himself or his dependents."). --------
Our review of sentencing determinations is limited. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984). We will not ordinarily disturb a sentence imposed which is not manifestly excessive or unduly punitive, does not constitute an abuse of discretion, and does not shock the judicial conscience. State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215-16, 220 (1989). In sentencing, the trial court "first must identify any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) that apply to the case." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014). The court must then "determine which factors are supported by a preponderance of [the] evidence, balance the relevant factors, and explain how it arrives at the appropriate sentence." O'Donnell, supra, 117 N.J. at 215. We are "bound to affirm a sentence, even if [we] would have arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court properly identifie[d] and balance[d] aggravating and mitigating factors that [were] supported by competent credible evidence in the record." Ibid.
Here, the judge provided an adequate factual basis for finding aggravating factors five and nine, and mitigating factor seven. See Case, supra, 220 N.J. at 66 (citing State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2014) (noting that a sentencing court must state a factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting the sentence)). Despite defendant's contention, the judge expressly considered mitigating factor eleven, but declined to apply it. While the judge noted that "most people going to prison have a hardship," he rejected defendant's contention that he would experience an excessive hardship. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 220 ("Although we appreciate the hardship that would result from defendant's incarceration, [he] is not the truly extraordinary defendant whose imprisonment would represent the 'serious injustice' envisioned by the Criminal Code.") (citing Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 358).
We thus find no reason to second-guess the trial court's application of the sentencing factors, nor any reason to conclude that the sentence, while harsh, "shocks the judicial conscience." Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 364; see also State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 612 (2010) (reiterating that appellate courts must accord deference to trial judges in sentencing decisions). We also note defendant's concession that imposition of a consecutive sentence for the money laundering conviction was mandatory. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(c).
V.
We have carefully considered the points raised in defendant's pro se supplemental brief in light of the record and applicable legal standards. We conclude these arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION