Opinion
(11466)
The state, with the permission of the trial court, appealed from that court's judgment acquitting the defendant of operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension and reckless driving. The defendant had been convicted by a jury and had begun serving his sentence when the trial court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. Held that the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal after the start of his sentence violated the common law rule that a court is without jurisdiction to modify its judgment in the absence of enabling legislation, and nothing in the statute ( 53a-39) authorizing sentence reduction or any other statute confers upon a trial court the jurisdiction to entertain a motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced.
Argued May 5, 1993
Decision released July 13, 1993
Information charging the defendant with the crimes of operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension and reckless driving, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number eight, and tried to the jury before Moran, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty; thereafter, the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal of the charge of operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension, and rendered judgment thereon, from which the state, on the granting of permission, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Philip Scarpellino, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Barry N. Silver, for the appellee (defendant).
The state, with permission of the trial court, appeals from the judgment of acquittal rendered after the defendant had commenced service of a sentence imposed following conviction by a jury. The state claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's motion for acquittal because he had already commenced serving his sentence. The state further claims that even if the court had jurisdiction, it improperly granted the defendant's motion for acquittal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
General Statutes 54-96 provides: "Appeals from the rulings and decisions of the superior court, upon all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme court or to the appellate court, in the same manner and to the same effect as if made by the accused."
The defendant was charged in a two count information with operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes 14-215 (c) and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes 14-222. On March 31, 1991, the defendant was found guilty by a jury on both counts. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of one year, execution suspended after nine months, with two years probation, 200 hours of community service and a $750 fine on the operating under suspension count. On the reckless driving count, the defendant was sentenced to a term of thirty days, consecutive to the operating under suspension sentence, and a $300 fine, for a total effective sentence of one year and thirty days imprisonment, execution suspended after ten months, with two years probation, 200 hours of community service and $1050 in fines.
The execution of the defendant's sentence was stayed until April 7, 1992, at which time the trial court heard and subsequently denied the defendant's posttrial motions, including a motion for judgment of acquittal. Shortly thereafter, the defendant began serving his sentence. On May 19, 1992, nearly six weeks into that sentence, the defendant filed a motion to reargue his previously denied motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court granted reargument and, following a hearing on May 22, 1992, granted the defendant's motion for acquittal on the operating under suspension conviction only.
The defendant claimed in his motion for reargument that his discovery after trial of previously unknown case law justified an acquittal on the operating under suspension conviction. The state contests this claim but because our decision on the jurisdictional question is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach this question.
The state first claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal after he had commenced service of the sentence. The defendant counters by claiming that General Statutes 53a-39 and Practice Book 934 provided the trial court with the necessary jurisdiction to grant the defendant's motion for acquittal.
General Statutes 53a-39 provides: "At any time during the period of a definite sentence of three years or less, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which he could have been originally sentenced."
Practice Book 934 includes the same provisions as General Statutes 53a-39 except that it refers to the "judicial authority" instead of the "sentencing court or judge."
"In a criminal case the imposition of sentence is the judgment of the court." State v. Moore, 158 Conn. 461, 463, 262 A.2d 166 (1969). "`When the sentence is put into effect and the prisoner is taken in execution, custody is transferred from the court to the custodian of the penal institution. At this point jurisdiction of the court over the prisoner terminates. . . .'" State v. Walzer, 208 Conn. 420, 424-25, 545 A.2d 559 (1988). Once jurisdiction over the prisoner terminates, the sentencing "court may no longer take any action affecting the sentence unless it has been expressly authorized to act." State v. Tuszynski, 23 Conn. App. 201, 206, 579 A.2d 1100 (1990); State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 123, 445 A.2d 304 (1982); Kohlfuss v. Warden, 149 Conn. 692, 695-96, 183 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 298, 9 L.Ed.2d 235 (1962). The legislature has conferred on trial courts continuing jurisdiction to act on their judgments after the commencement of sentence under a limited number of circumstances. See, e.g., General Statutes 53a-29 through 53a-34 (permitting the trial court to modify terms of probation after sentence is imposed); General Statutes 52-270 (granting jurisdiction to trial court to hear a petition for a new trial after execution of original sentence has commenced); General Statutes 53a-39 (allowing the trial court to modify sentences of less than three years provided a hearing is held and good cause shown).
On reargument, the defendant cited, with the trial court's approval, Practice Book 6 as the source of the court's jurisdiction to grant his motion for acquittal. In an apparent abandonment of that argument, however, the defendant now contends that General Statutes 53a-39, the sentence modification statute, confers such jurisdiction. The defendant's position is unavailing in either case.
Practice Book 6 provides: "The design of these rules being to facilitate business and advance justice, they will be interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice."
See footnote 3, supra.
The court's reliance on Practice Book 6 was misplaced because "Practice Book rules do not ordinarily define subject matter jurisdiction." State v. Carey, 222 Conn. 299, 307, 610 A.2d 1147 (1992). Moreover, General Statutes 51-14 (a), which authorizes judges of the Superior Court to promulgate rules "regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings," explicitly states that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any courts." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes 51-14 (a). Accordingly, the defendant's argument must fail.
The defendant is similarly mistaken in his claim that General Statutes 53a-39 confers the necessary jurisdiction. Section 53a-39 grants authority to a sentencing court to reduce sentences of less than three years, provided a hearing is held and good cause is shown. State v. Walzer, supra, 430. It is inapplicable in the present case because the defendant did not seek modification of his sentence. What the defendant sought was an acquittal or nullification of his conviction based on an insufficiency of the evidence claim. Nothing in 53a-39 nor any other statute confers on a trial court the jurisdiction to entertain a motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. The defendant's remedy was by way of appeal.
We therefore hold that the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion of acquittal after the start of his sentence violated the common law rule that a court is without jurisdiction to modify its judgment in the absence of appropriate enabling legislation. Because our discussion of the first claim is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the second claim.