Opinion
No. MV 04-0018086
March 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Before this court are the defendant's Motions to Suppress. The critical issue is whether or not the warrantless arrest of the defendant, while he was in the "threshold" of his front doorway, precludes the introduction of evidence obtained subsequent to the defendant's arrest.
The facts introduced during the suppression hearing were largely uncontroverted. The defendant was in his home when the Guilford Police arrived following a call to the department reporting a reckless driver. The license plate number obtained from the caller led the police to the defendant's doorsteps. When the police arrived at the defendant's home an officer knocked on his door. The defendant opened the front door to his home in answer to the knock. While he stood in his open doorway talking to the officer(s), one officer smelled the odor of alcohol. The defendant remained in the doorway for a period of time, answering questions of the police, after which one officer requested that the defendant step outside his doorway in order to obtain a misdemeanor summons from one of the police cars. When the defendant refused, one of the officers placed him under arrest. The officers, at no time prior to the arrest, entered the defendant's home. There is a question as to whether or not the defendant's residence had a screen door. There is no question that his residence had a front door, which the defendant opened when the police arrived and which remained open during the period leading up to the defendant's arrest.
The defendant argues that the police action of arresting him violated his constitutional rights because he was in his home at the time of the arrest and the police had not obtained an arrest warrant. Relying on both United States Supreme Court and Connecticut Supreme Court cases, the State maintains that the arrest was proper and the evidence obtained subsequent to it was legal because the defendant was standing in "public view" at the time of his arrest.
United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), requires that the police obtain a warrant prior to executing an arrest for a routine felony within a defendant's home, when the defendant does not consent to the entry of the officers. This case would seem to support the defendant's position. But, a review of the pertinent case law discloses that the cases cited by the State are more directly on point. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 494 (1993).
In State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed a very similar fact pattern to the one in this case. The defendant in Santiago was in his home when the police knocked on his front door. Defendant Santiago opened the door, and spoke with the police officer. Defendant Santiago remained in the doorway for a period of time. And, the police officer, after consulting with his supervisor, arrested defendant Santiago for threatening while he stood in his doorway without an arrest warrant. In State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme Court, adopted the rule issued by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Santana 427 U.S. 38 (1976) and held that the warrantless arrest of the defendant, while he stood in the threshold of his doorway did not violate his constitutional rights. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that defendant Santiago was in public view. It held that a defendant relinquishes his constitutionally guaranteed expectation of privacy when he voluntarily opens his front door; stands directly in the doorway for a period of time; and is in public view so that he can be plainly seen and heard by the public.
Defendant Lablanca argued during the suppression hearing that the holding in United States v. Santana is not applicable because the defendant in Santana was entering her home from the public streets when the police followed her, and stopped her from gaining full ingress. This position was rejected by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Santiago. The Supreme Court in Santiago concluded that the language in United States v. Santana, stating that the threshold of the defendant's home was not protected by a zone of privacy because "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection," was applicable to situations in which the defendant answers his door when police arrive. State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 494, 499-500.
The holding by the majority in Santiago, clearly applies to the fact pattern in this case. Yet, the reasoning in the dissent by Justice Borden in State v. Santiago, when read together with the clear and consistent Connecticut case law describing the more expansive protections afforded under the Connecticut Constitution, provides a compelling argument for revisiting the issue of whether or not warrantless arrests of defendants, standing in the threshold of their residential doorways, for misdemeanors should continue to be deemed constitutionally authorized. That is not the issue for this court to decide.
Justice Borden questioned whether the mere acts of answering one's door, in response to a knock by police and briefly conversing with an officer, at that officer's request, "in and of itself . . . mean[s] that [the defendant] thereby surrendered his reasonable expectation of privacy in his home." State v. Santiago, at 514-15. Justice Borden went onto assert that "[w]e answer our doorbells under a variety of circumstances, ranging from the situation where we expect a visit . . . to the unexpected and unwanted attempted intrusion . . . We open the door in a variety of ways and to a variety of degrees . . . When we open the door, we may stand just inside the threshold or may place ourselves squarely thereon. In all of these situations, however, we do not abandon our right to close the door and exclude the person at the door simply because we have opened it and are standing there briefly. By opening the door . . . we do not abandon our heightened expectation of privacy in our homes and place ourselves in a public place. See United States v. Berkowitz, supra." Id. at 515.
"We have also, however, determined in some instances that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." (Citations omitted.) State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684 (1992).
Based upon the applicable precedents, this court denies the motions to suppress. There was probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant; and the facts and circumstances giving rise to the arrest have been deemed appropriate by the Connecticut Supreme Court.
Robinson, A.J.