Opinion
ID. No. 0008001802
Submitted: November 21, 2002
Decided: February 26, 2003
PK-00-09-0030-R1
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion For Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 DENIED
John R. Garey, Esq., Dover, Delaware. Attorney for the State.
James E. Knox, Pro se.
ORDER
Upon consideration of defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief, the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, the defendant's Appeal From Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, and the record in this case, it appears:
1. The defendant pled guilty to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 774 as a lesser-included offense of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree. The defendant was sentenced on February 20, 2001 to 20 years incarceration, suspended after ten years minimum mandatory, followed by various levels of probation.
2. The defendant failed to appeal his conviction or sentence to the Delaware Supreme Court. Rather, he filed the pending motion for postconviction relief. In his motion the defendant raised the following grounds for relief: 1) Ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) Unfulfilled plea agreement; 3) Coerced confession; 4) Coerced guilty plea; 5) Illegal arrest; and 6) Denial of counsel during interrogation.
3. The Motion for Postconviction Relief was referred to the Court Commissioner Andrea M. Freud for proposed findings and recommendation pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
4. After a careful review of the record and affidavit from counsel, the Commissioner was satisfied that counsel's representation was more than adequate and that the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. In addition, the defendant failed to state what more counsel could have done or to present any prejudice suffered by counsel's representation. The Commissioner also found that the remaining grounds for relief were all similarly barred for failing to allege sufficient facts to substantiate each claim. It was the Commissioner's recommendation that the Court deny the defendant's motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3).
5. A copy of the Commissioner's report dated November 8, 2002 is attached hereto. The defendant filed an Appeal from the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:
a. Having conducted a de novo review of the proceedings I adopt the well-reasoned Commissioner's Report and Recommendation;
b. The defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is denied.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 FREUD, Commissioner November 8, 2002
The defendant James E. Knox, ("Knox") pled guilty on February 20, 2001, to one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 774, as a lesser included offense of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree. Knox was facing trial on the above charge along with an additional count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child, 11 Del. C. § 1102. Knox was also facing similar charges in State v. Knox ID No. 0008001802 November 8, 2002 Sussex County including the same victim. Both charges involved Knox's then nine year old stepdaughter. Pursuant to the Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea agreement, Knox was sentenced to twenty years incarceration, suspended after serving ten years minimum mandatory for probation. Knox did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the State Supreme Court, instead he filed the instant motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In his motion, Knox alleges five grounds for relief, in a subsequent amendment Knox added a sixth ground for relief. Knox's grounds are as follows: 1) Ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) Unfulfilled plea agreement; 3) Coerced confession; 4) Coerced guilty plea; 5) Illegal arrest; and 6) Denial of counsel during interrogation.
Under Delaware Law this Court must first determine whether Knox has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of his postconviction relief claim. This is Knox's first motion for postconviction and it was filed within three years of his conviction becoming final, so the requirements of Rule 61(i)(1) — requiring filing within three years — and 2) — requiring that all grounds for relief be presented in the initial Rule 61 motion — are met. None of Knox's claims were raised at the plea, sentencing or on direct appeal, therefore, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(3), absent a demonstration of cause for the default and prejudice. Only Knox's first contention is based on ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, he has alleged cause for his failure to have raised this issue earlier. Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar relief as to this claim at this point should Knox demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions. Knox has not supplied any reason for failing to have raised his remaining arguments earlier and they are clearly barred by Rule 61(i)(3) and should be dismissed.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
To prevail on his first ground for relief, ineffective assistance of counsel, Knox must meet the two prong test of Strickland v. Washington. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires that a defendant show 1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal. In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable. This standard is highly demanding. Strickland mandates that when viewing counsel's representation, this Court must endeavor to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."
466 U.S. 668 (1984) ("Strickland"); Larson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 200, 1994, Hartnett, J. (June 23, 1995) (ORDER); Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53 (1988), Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Accord Larson v. State, supra at 3-4; Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (Oct. 18, 1994) (ORDER); Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d at 1172; Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 58.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556; Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., No. 318, 1993, Holland, J. (March 31, 1994) (ORDER).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 689); see also Larson v. State, supra at 4; Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 at 753 (1990).
Id. at 754.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 639.
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly clear that Knox has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. I find counsel's affidavit, in conjunction with the record, more credible than Knox's contention that his counsel's representation was ineffective. Knox was facing trial on serious charges. Knox's counsel w as able to negotiate a plea bargain with the State. Knox and his attorney discussed the case prior to the entry of the plea. The case against Knox was strong given his statements to the police. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Knox. Counsel's representation was certainly well within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Knox entered his guilty plea he stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, Knox has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the Strickland test. To the extent any of his remaining five grounds for relief can be in any obtuse way be seen as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel they are similarly barred based on the same analysis stated for ground one.
Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (Oct. 18, 1994) (ORDER); Mapps v. State, Del. Supr., No. 3, 1994, Holland, J. (March 17, 1994) (ORDER) (citing Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (1994)).
Even assuming, arguendo that counsel's representation of Knox was somehow deficient, Knox must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk dismissal. Knox simply asserts that his counsel didn't do enough in an attempt to show prejudice. Knox does not suggest what more counsel could have done. This statement is insufficient to establish prejudice. Knox has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from counsel's representation.
Larson v. State, supra at 5; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556.
To the extent Knox alleges his plea was involuntary, the record clearly contradicts Knox's allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was constitutionally knowing and voluntary the Court looks to the plea colloquy to determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. At the guilty plea hearing, the Court asked Knox whether he understood the nature of the charges, the consequences of his pleading guilty and whether he was voluntarily pleading guilty. The Court asked Knox if he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if he pled guilty, if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the guilty plea form and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Knox if he had discussed the guilty plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court asked Knox if he was giving the plea of his own free will because he was in fact guilty. The Court also asked Knox if he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. The Court asked Knox if he was in fact, guilty of the charge. Knox answered each of these questions clearly and affirmatively.
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.C-1 2680, 2687 (1993).
Tr. of guilty plea at 3-9.
Furthermore, prior to entering his guilty plea, Knox filled out a Guilty Plea Form in his own handwriting. Knox wrote that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement. Knox is bound by the statements he mad e on the signed Guilty Plea Form unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. I confidently find that Knox entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that this ground for relief is completely meritless.
Hickman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 298, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (Oct. 11, 1994) (ORDER); Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 465, 1989, Walsh, J. (Jan. 4, 1990) (ORDER). See also Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 938 (1994) (ruling the fact that defendant filled out Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form in defendant's own handwriting supported the Superior Court's conclusion that defendant's decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary).
I find that Knox's counsel represented him in a competent and effective manner and that Knox has failed to clearly demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Knox's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Consequently, I recommend that the Court deny Knox's motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3).
Additionally, as clearly noted in both Defense Counsel's affidavit and the State's reply, each of Knox's claims are also entirely meritless.