Opinion
Nos. 34533-1-II; 34534-0-II.
May 15, 2007.
Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 05-1-02456-2, Richard A. Strophy, J., entered March 14, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Armstrong and Penoyar, JJ.
Christopher Knoblock and Caleb Tucker appeal their convictions for first degree perjury, claiming insufficient evidence.
Facts I. Underlying Shooting Incident
On June 30, 2005, Travis McEntire met Christopher Knoblock to purchase marijuana. A dispute developed, Knoblock pulled out a handgun, fired multiple shots at McEntire, fracturing his humerus bone, and then drove off.
The Thurston County Sheriff's Office attempted to locate Knoblock and released an "attempt to locate" for a vehicle supposedly associated with Knoblock. On July 3, Lacey Police Sergeant Joe Upton spotted and stopped this vehicle while Detective David Miller assisted. Caleb Tucker was the sole occupant.
Miller arrested Tucker in connection with a separate criminal investigation, transported him to the Lacey Police Department, and offered to release Tucker and assist his case if he helped locate Knoblock. Tucker agreed.
Detectives David Haller and Eric Kolb arrived at the station to interview Tucker. The interview began at about 8:36 p.m. that evening. Tucker made cell phone calls in an alleged attempt to locate Knoblock. Eventually, Tucker identified a Lakewood motel where Knoblock had been staying. Haller and Kolb drove to the motel, arriving at about 10:35 p.m.
After the detectives left, Tucker received a cell phone call from Knoblock. Detective Miller got on the phone, and Knoblock agreed to meet him at a nearby restaurant. Miller arrested Knoblock at the restaurant at 10:47 p.m.
At the Lacey Police Department, the detectives first took Knoblock upstairs, then brought him down to where they were holding Tucker. The detectives allowed Knoblock and Tucker to visit for a short while before they took Tucker to a separate room.
Community Service Officer Carrie Nastansky arrived at the police department at about 11:20 p.m. According to Nastansky, Knoblock and Tucker were in separate rooms at the time.
According to Haller and Kolb, they returned to the police department at about 11:40 p.m., while Knoblock was still in a separate room. Haller read Knoblock his Miranda rights, which Knoblock waived. Knoblock admitted shooting at McEntire on June 30, 2005, but Knoblock insisted that he shot in self defense. When Haller asked about the underlying marijuana transaction, Knoblock invoked his right to remain silent and the interview ended.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1969).
A. CrR 3.5 Hearing
On December 12, 2005, the trial court held a CrR 3.5 hearing in the underlying attempted murder case to determine the admissibility of Knoblock's admissions to the detectives that he had shot McIntire. Haller and Kolb testified that (1) they had allowed Tucker and Knoblock to visit together for a while, but when they interviewed Knoblock, Tucker was in a separate room; (2) Haller read Knoblock his Miranda rights which Knoblock waived; (4) Knoblock admitted having shot at McEntire on June 30, 2005, but claimed he shot in self defense; (5) in response to Haller's questioning about the underlying marijuana transaction, Knoblock invoked his right to remain silent, and the interview ended.
Knoblock testified under oath that (1) on the night of his arrest, he was still in a room with Tucker when Haller and Kolb arrived; (2) while with Tucker, he made calls to his mother, girlfriend, and sister-in-law using Tucker's cell phone; (3) when the detectives entered the room, he told Haller that he had invoked his right to silence and demanded an attorney; and (4) he expressly denied having told Haller that he shot McEntire and asserted instead that Haller's testimony was not accurate.
Tucker reiterates this assertion in his pro se statement of additional grounds (SAG). He raises no additional issues pro se. Counsel's appellate brief sufficiently addresses Tucker's pro se statement. See RAP 10.10.
More specifically, Knoblock testified:
Q. When was the first time you saw Detective Haller that evening?
A. I was sitting in [the room] with Caleb talking, and then I seen [sic] Detective Haller and another Detective walk in, and then I — right then I didn't want to talk because we had past history together, and I didn't have nothing to say to him, so I told him I didn't want to talk, I want to talk to my lawyer. . . .
Q. And do you recall if Detective Haller ever read you any rights?
A. I don't.
Q. But do you recall specifically that you requested an attorney?
A. Several times, and I recall Detective Haller walking in while Caleb was next to me, and he said, take off your do-rag, and he made Caleb take off his do-rag, and he told Caleb, you [sic] been identified as the driver who took Chris Knoblock up to the motel.
Q. Did you subsequently speak to Detective Haller and give him a statement?
A. No. I told him I didn't want to talk. I told him, take me to jail, take me to jail. I don't want to say nothing at all about it.
Q. So previously you were sitting at defense table with me, and you heard Detective Haller indicate what information he elicited from you during a statement that he obtained from you?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that accurate?
A. No.
Exhibit (Ex.) 2 at 7-9.
Tucker testified under oath that (1) he had been in a police station room with Knoblock for 10 to 15 minutes; (2) during this time, Haller and another detective came in to question Knoblock; (3) he never heard the detectives read Knoblock his rights; and (4) Knoblock insisted he did not want to say anything, wanted a lawyer, and never admitted that he had shot McEntire.
More specifically, Tucker testified:
Q. Did — any time while you were in that holding cell with Mr. Knoblock, did law enforcement come in to try and question him?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall who that was?
A. Detective Haller. And I think Detective Miller was in there for a little bit and the other detective. I don't know what the other detective's name is.
Q. And do you recall what was said during that time?
A. Yeah. They asked Chris what happened, why — they asked him specifically why did he shoot that guy. He said, I want my lawyer, I didn't do anything. I told, Chris, no, be quiet, you don't have to say anything. They again asked him again, what happened, why don't you explain to us what happened. Chris says, I need my lawyer, and all that.
When I looked at the cop and said, look, he doesn't want to say anything, he's asking for his lawyer, and they kept doing that for a little bit, when I intervened, they uncuffed me and took me out of the room. . . .
Q. Did you ever see any law enforcement review Chris's rights with him? Read him his rights?
A. I heard no rights being read to Chris, no I didn't.
Ex. 1 at 7-8.
Finding Knoblock's and Tucker's testimonies not credible, the CrR 3.5 hearing court ruled that the detectives had properly informed Knoblock about his Miranda rights, that he had waived these rights, and that his statements about having shot McEntire were admissible.
Neither Knoblock nor Tucker testified at Knoblock's subsequent jury trial on his pending criminal charges. The jury found Knoblock guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and second degree assault, with a special verdict that he committed the offense with a firearm.
II. Perjury A. Procedure
The State charged Knoblock and Tucker with first degree perjury, committed while testifying at Knoblock's CrR 3.5 hearing. Knoblock and Tucker waived their rights to a jury trial, and they were tried jointly by the court.
Neither Knoblock nor Tucker filed a motion for a CrR 3.5 or CrR 3.6 hearing before the perjury trial.
Consistent with his CrR 3.5 hearing testimony, Haller testified at trial that (1) he and Kolb had interviewed Knoblock, alone; (2) after waiving his Miranda rights, Knoblock admitted having shot McEntire, claiming self defense; and (3) Knoblock never requested an attorney. Kolb corroborated Haller's testimony. Three additional State witnesses testified that Knoblock and Tucker were in different rooms when Haller and Kolb returned to the police station: Knoblock was in a holding cell, and Tucker was in the report writing room.
Three defense witnesses testified that Knoblock called them on the night of his arrest. Tucker's cell phone records corroborated their testimonies, showing phone calls to those witnesses during the time period from 11:09 to 11:15 p.m. The trial court stated that (1) Tucker's phone records proved nothing more than that Knoblock and Tucker had been together for a slightly longer period than the State's witnesses remembered; and (2) since Haller and Kolb did not arrive at the police department until 11:40 p.m., the phone records did not contradict the evidence that Knoblock and Tucker were in separate rooms later, when Haller questioned Knoblock.
The trial court concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that both Knoblock and Tucker had committed first degree perjury at Knoblock's CrR 3.5 hearing. The trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
A. Findings of Fact
1. On December 19, 2005 in Thurston County Superior Court in a CrR 3.5 Hearing in the prosecution of defendant Christopher Knoblock, defendant Knoblock and defendant Tucker each provided testimony under oath.
2. The testimony of defendant Knoblock was set forth in Trial Exhibit 2 and the testimony of defendant Tucker is set forth in Trial Exhibit 1, both of which are incorporated herein by reference.
3. In that same hearing, prior to the testimony of defendants Knoblock and Tucker, Detective Dave Haller testified regarding statements defendant Knoblock had made on July 3, 2005. Detective Haller's testimony is set forth in Trial Exhibit 6, which is incorporated herein by reference.
4. Detective Haller testified that he had interviewed defendant Knoblock on the evening of July 3, 2005 at the Lacey Police Department, that he was accompanied by Detective Eric Kolb, that defendant Knoblock had been given his Miranda rights and then been interviewed about the robbery and assault with a firearm of Travis McEntire on June 30, 2005 at the residence of Knoblock's father.
5. Detective Haller testified that during that interview, defendant Tucker was not present and that defendant Knoblock had admitted being in possession of a firearm and discharging that firearm at the victim, Travis McEntire.
6. When defendant Knoblock testified at the hearing, he told the Court that he had been locked up with Caleb Tucker on the evening of July 3, 2005, at the Lacey Police Department, that when Detective Haller and Detective Kolb entered the room, defendant Knoblock immediately requested a lawyer, and the defendant Knoblock had not made the incriminating statements set forth by Detective Haller in Detective Haller's testimony.
7. When defendant Tucker testified, he also told the Court that he had been locked up with defendant Knoblock on the evening of July 3, 2005 at the Lacey Police Department, that when Detective Haller and Detective Kolb entered the room, defendant Knoblock immediately requested a lawyer, and that defendant Knoblock made no statement to Detective Haller and Detective Kolb.
8. On July 3, 2005, defendant Tucker was questioned at the Lacey Police Department about the location of defendant Knoblock, who was a fugitive at that time.
9. At about 10:15 p.m. on July 3, 2005, defendant Tucker told Detective Haller and Detective Kolb that defendant Knoblock was in a motel in Lakewood. The two detectives then went to Lakewood to investigate.
10. At about 10:30 p.m. on July 3, 2005, defendant Knoblock spoke with Lacey Detective Dave Miller and made arrangements to turn himself in at a nearby McDonalds [sic].
11. At 10:47 p.m. on July 3, 2005, defendant Knoblock was placed under arrest, after which time he was allowed to smoke a cigarette and say goodbye to his family members.
12. At about 11:10 p.m. on July 3, 2005, the defendant was allowed to hug defendant Tucker at Lacey Police Department for several minutes.
13. Defendant Knoblock was then placed in the Lacey Police Department holding room and defendant Tucker was separated and sat in the report writing room.
14. At 11:40 p.m. on July 3, 2005, Detective Haller and Detective Kolb entered the Lacey Police Department holding room where they spoke with defendant Knoblock. Defendant Tucker was not in the room when the two detectives interviewed defendant Knoblock.
15. In speaking with defendant Knoblock, Detective Haller read defendant Knoblock his Miranda rights, defendant Knoblock agreed to speak with the detectives and defendant Knoblock admitted possessing a firearm and discharging that firearm at Travis McEntire on June 30, 2005.
16. When Detective Haller started asking the defendant about the details of the underlying marijuana transaction, defendant Knoblock stopped answering questions.
17. At 12:19 a.m. on July 4, 2005, defendant Knoblock was taken to the Thurston County Jail.
18. At no time between defendant Knoblock's arrest on July 3, 2005 at 10:47 p.m. and his transport to the Thurston County Jail on July 4, 2005 at 12:19 a.m., were defendant Knoblock and defendant Tucker interviewed together nor placed in the holding room together.
19. The testimony of Detective Haller, Detective Miller, Detective Kolb, Officer Ed McClanahan, CSO Carrie Nastansky, and CSO Emily Logsdon was credible.
20. The testimony of defendant Knoblock was not credible.
21. The testimony of defendant Knoblock and defendant Tucker on December 19, 2005 was perjurious[.]
Clerk's Papers (Knoblock) (CP) at 13-15.
B. Conclusions of Law
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
2. The above findings of fact are incorporated herein as conclusions of law.
3. The State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Knoblock and defendant Tucker, on December 19, 2005, each made false statements, that they knew were false, that were material, that were made in an official proceeding, that were made under oath as authorized or required by law, and were made in the State of Washington.
4. Defendant Knoblock and defendant Tucker are each guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Perjury in the First Degree.
CP at 15.
Knoblock and Tucker appeal.
Analysis
Knoblock and Tucker argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their first degree perjury convictions. We disagree.
I. Standard of Review
The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). The reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State and interpret them most strongly against the defendant. State v. Craven, 67 Wn. App. 921, 928, 841 P.2d 774 (1992). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences the court can draw therefrom. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
After a bench trial, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and, in turn, whether the findings support the conclusions of law. State v. Stevenson, 128 Wn. App. 179, 193, 114 P.3d 699 (2005). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal; we review conclusions of law de novo. Stevenson, 128 Wn. App. at 193. "When findings of fact in reality pronounce legal conclusions, they may be treated as such." State v. Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 659, 719 P.2d 576 (1986). We treat improperly labeled conclusions of law as findings of fact. State v. Evans, 80 Wn. App. 806, 820 n. 35, 911 P.2d 1344 (1996).
The proof requirements in a perjury case are more stringent than for any other crime except treason. State v. Olson, 92 Wn.2d 134, 136, 594 P.2d 1337 (1979). To prove perjury, the State must present (1) the testimony of at least one credible witness that is positive and directly contradictory to the defendant's statements under oath, and (2) another such direct witness or independent evidence of corroborating circumstances. State v. Stump, 73 Wn. App. 625, 627-28, 870 P.2d 333 (1994). Witness credibility, however, is a question for the trial court, which we will not review on appeal. State v. Dial, 44 Wn. App. 11, 16, 720 P.2d 461, rev. denied, 106 Wn.2d 1016 (1986).
II. Perjury
A person is guilty of first degree perjury if in any official proceeding he makes a materially false statement, which he knows to be false, under an oath that the law requires or authorizes. RCW 9A.72.020(1). A statement is material only if it can affect the outcome of the proceeding. Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wn.2d 756, 772, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000).
Here, to convict Knoblock and Tucker of first degree perjury, the State had to show that: (1) on or about December 19, 2005, Knoblock and Tucker made false statements, (2) they knew their statements were false, (3) the statements were material, and (4) they made the statements at an official proceeding, under an oath or authorized required by law. RCW 9A.72.020. The State has met its burden.
A. Knoblock's Appeal 1. Findings of fact
Knoblock assigns error to the trial court's findings of fact nos. 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, and 21, and conclusions of law 2-4.
Finding of fact no. 5 states:
Detective Haller testified that during that interview, defendant Tucker was not present and that defendant Knoblock had admitted being in possession of a firearm and discharging the firearm at the victim, Travis McEntire.
CP at 14. This is an accurate summary of Haller's testimony at the CrR 3.5 hearing and the perjury trial. Thus, substantial evidence supports this finding.
Finding of fact no. 6 states:
When defendant Knoblock testified at the hearing, he told the Court that he had been locked up with Caleb Tucker on the evening of July 3, 2005, at the Lacey Police Department, that when Detective Haller and Detective Kolb entered the room, defendant Knoblock immediately requested a lawyer, and that defendant Knoblock had not made the incriminating statements set forth by Detective Haller
in Detective Haller's testimony.
CP at 14. Knoblock's testimony at CrR 3.5 hearing supports this finding. Knoblock testified that Tucker was in the room when Haller came in to speak with Knoblock and that he (Knoblock) refused to answer questions, demanded an attorney, and did not make any of the statements Haller attributed to him. Substantial evidence supports finding no. 6.
Finding of fact no. 13 states:
Defendant Knoblock was then placed in the Lacey Police Department holding room and defendant Tucker was separated and sat in the report writing room.
CP at 15. The perjury trial testimonies of Detective Miller, Officer Emily Logsdon, and Officer Ed McClanahan are substantial evidence supporting this finding.
Contested finding of fact no. 14 states:
At 11:40 [p.m.] on July 3, 2005, Detective Haller and Detective Kolb entered the Lacey Police Department holding room where they spoke with defendant Knoblock. Defendant Tucker was not in the room when the two detectives interviewed defendant Knoblock.
CP at 15. Both Haller's and Kolb's perjury trial testimonies are substantial evidence supporting this finding. Miller, Logsdon, and Nastansky also provided corroboration.
Contested finding of fact no. 15 states:
In speaking with defendant Knoblock, Detective Haller read defendant Knoblock his Miranda rights, defendant Knoblock agreed to speak with the detectives and defendant Knoblock admitted possessing a firearm and discharging that firearm at Travis McEntire on June 30, 2005.
CP at 15. Both Haller and Colb testified at the perjury trial about Knoblock's behavior in custody, including that Knoblock waived his Miranda rights and admitted shooting at McEntire. Their testimonies are substantial evidence supporting this finding.
Contested finding of fact no. 18 states:
At no time between defendant Knoblock's arrest on July 3, 2005 at 10:47 [p.m.] and his transport to the Thurston County Jail on July 4, 2005 at 12:19 [a.m.], were defendant Knoblock and defendant Tucker interviewed together nor placed in the holding room together.
CP at 15. Miller's perjury trial testimony, corroborated by Logsdon and Nastansky, is substantial evidence supporting this finding. Miller testified that Knoblock and Tucker visited briefly before detectives separated them. The visit may have been longer than some State's witnesses remembered, but this fact provided no support for Knoblock's and Tucker's claim that they were together when Haller and Kolb arrived at 11:40 p.m. and when the detectives interviewed Knoblock.
Finding of fact no. 19 states:
The testimony of Detective Haller, Detective Miller, Detective Kolb, Officer Ed McClanahan, CSO Carrie Nastansky, and CSO Emily Logsdon was credible.
CP at 15. And finding of fact no. 20 states: "The testimony of defendant Knoblock was not credible." CP at 15. The trial court makes credibility determinations, which are not subject to appellate review. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 875, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). We note, however, that (1) substantial evidence in the record shows material discrepancies between the other witnesses' testimonies and the testimonies of Knoblock and Tucker, and (2) it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Knoblock and Tucker lied under oath at Knoblock's CrR 3.5 hearing in an attempt to thwart the State's use of Knoblock's admission to having shot McEntire at Knoblock's trial on the criminal charges arising from the shooting.
In sum, we hold that substantial evidence supports each of the trial court's findings of fact and that more than one witness corroborated each finding, as the perjury statute requires.
2. Conclusions of law
The trial court's finding of fact no. 21 states:
The testimony of defendant Knoblock and defendant Tucker on December 19, 2005 was perjurious[.]
CP at 16. This finding of fact is actually a conclusion of law, which we treat as such. Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. at 659. The trial court's findings of fact, including its credibility determinations, clearly support this conclusion of law, which by its nature is dependent on the trial court's finding of fact that the defendants lied under oath.
The trial court concluded that Knoblock presented false testimony at his CrR 3.5 hearing on December 19, 2005, and that the State proved each element of first degree perjury, as charged against Knoblock, beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law.
First, Knoblock falsely testified at his CrR 3.5 hearing that Tucker was in the room with him when Haller and Kolb arrived. Based on the corroborated testimonies of other witnesses, the trial court found that Tucker was in a different room at the time. Second, Knoblock falsely testified that he immediately refused to answer questions and demanded an attorney. Based on the corroborated testimonies of other witnesses, the trial court found that Knoblock had answered questions and never requested an attorney. Third, Knoblock falsely denied that he had made the statements Haller attributed to him. Based on the corroborated testimonies of other witnesses, the trial court found that Knoblock had admitted to the detectives that he had fired a gun at McEntire.
The trial court further found that Knoblock knew his statements were false. The trial court's findings of fact also support this conclusion. Knoblock testified in direct contradiction to every one of the State's witnesses and to what the trial court found to be the truth. Knoblock's CrR 3.5 testimony was a direct attempt to exclude his confession (to having shot McEntire) from his trial on his criminal charges arising from the shooting. It defies logic to argue that Knoblock could have given such contradictory exculpatory testimony unwittingly. The record supports the trial court's finding that Knoblock was aware that his statements were false.
On appeal, Knoblock argues he never denied that the detectives read his Miranda rights to him, rather, he simply does not remember. This assertion, even if true, does not disrupt the trial court's perjury verdict. At his CrR 3.5 hearing, Knoblock made other false statements under oath about other material facts, such as testifying that he was with Tucker when Kolb and Haller arrived, that he immediately demanded an attorney, that he never gave the officers any statement, and, in particular, that he never admitted to the detectives that he had shot McEntire.
Knoblock next argues his statements to the detectives were not material because they supported his claim of self-defense. This argument lacks merit. Knoblock's false statements — that he refused to answer the detectives' questions, requested a lawyer, and never admitted having shot the victim — went to the heart of the CrR 3.5 hearing: The court had to determine whether Knoblock waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily spoke to the police such that his confession could be admissible at trial on the charges stemming from the shooting incident. Moreover, Knoblock's admission of guilt was clearly material to the outcome of his criminal trial. We find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Knoblock's statements were material.
Finally, the trial court concluded that Knoblock made false statements under oath, as required or authorized by law, at an official proceeding. An official proceeding includes testimony before a judicial officer authorized to hear evidence under oath. RCW 9A.72.010(4). Knoblock's CrR 3.5 hearing met these criteria.
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, which in turn support its conclusions of law, including its conclusion that Knoblock is guilty of first degree perjury beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Tucker's Appeal
Tucker assigns error to the trial court's findings of fact nos. 5, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 21, and conclusions of law 2-4. We incorporate by reference our analysis of findings 5, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, and 21 in the previous section addressing Knoblock's challenge to these findings.
Again, we hold that the evidence supports these findings. Thus, we separately address only findings of fact nos. 7, 16, and 17 as they pertain to Tucker's appeal. Finding of fact no. 7 states:
When defendant Tucker testified, he also told the Court that he had been locked up with defendant Knoblock on the evening of July 3, 2005 at the Lacey Police Department, that when Detective Haller and Detective Kolb entered the room, defendant Knoblock immediately requested a lawyer, and that defendant Knoblock made no statement to Detective Haller and Detective Kolb.
CP at 14. Tucker's testimony at the CrR 3.5 hearing — that Knoblock requested a lawyer and made no statements to the detectives — supports finding of fact no. 7.
On appeal, Tucker argues his testimony that he "heard no rights being read to [Knoblock]" was true. Ex. 1 at 8. The State concedes this point but disputes its relevance. The State's witnesses testified and the trial court found that Tucker was not in the same room when the detectives informed Knoblock of his rights; thus, Tucker could not have heard them give Knoblock his Miranda warnings. That this one portion of Tucker's testimony was true does not, however, undercut his perjury conviction. Tucker made other statements under oath that were false. For example, Tucker falsely testified that he was in the room when the detectives questioned Knoblock and that Knoblock repeatedly refused to answer questions and demanded an attorney.
Finding of fact no. 16 states:
When Detective Haller started asking the defendant about the details of the underlying marijuana transaction, defendant Knoblock stopped answering questions.
CP at 15. Haller's testimony at trial supports this finding, and Kolb provided corroboration.
Finding of fact no. 17 states:
At 12:19 [a.m.] on July 4, 2005, defendant Knoblock was taken to Thurston County Jail.
CP at 15. Tucker presents no argument about why he claims this finding is incorrect. Therefore, we do not further consider it. RAP 10.3(g); See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
The trial court made no specific finding of fact about Tucker's credibility, as it did for Knoblock. But we review findings of fact for evidentiary support, no matter how they are labeled. Evans, 80 Wn. App. at 820 n. 35. In conclusion of law no. 3, the trial court found that Tucker made false statements; this finding is sufficient to establish the falsity element of Tucker's perjury conviction. Additionally, the trial court's findings, when taken in order, show that Tucker's testimony directly contradicted the detectives' testimony, which the court found credible. Thus, according to the trial court's findings and conclusions, Tucker's testimony was false.
Finally, Tucker argues lack of materiality. This argument also fails. Tucker's false statements bore directly on the issue of whether Knoblock's confession to the shooting was admissible. Thus, Tucker's testimony satisfies the materiality element of perjury.
For the same reasons we discussed above with respect to Knoblock's perjury conviction, we hold that the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law that Tucker gave false material testimony under oath and committed first degree perjury as charged.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
Armstrong, P.J.
Penoyar, J.