Opinion
No. H15N CR 09-0249368-S
May 23, 2011
Memorandum of Decision re State of Connecticut's Motion for Periodic Examination of Defendant as to Competency
This matter comes before the Court on a motion, pursuant to C.G.S. Sec 54-56d(m)(3), for an order requiring periodic examinations of the defendant as to the defendant's competency to stand trial. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Factual Background
The defendant is charged with four counts of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of C.G.S. Sec. 53-21(a)(2), and four counts of Sexual Contact with a Victim Under the Age of Sixteen, in violation of C.G.S. Sec. 53a-71(a)(1). It is alleged that on October 17, 2008, the defendant encountered the minor victim at a dance in New Britain. The minor victim reported to police that she had sexual relations with a person (later identified as the defendant) over the course of a weekend. At the time of the alleged offenses, the minor victim was fourteen years of age, while Mr. Johnson was 20 years old.
The defendant was arraigned on October 7, 2009 and on November 4, 2009, the Court ordered that a Competency to Stand Trial Examination be conducted pursuant to C.G.S. § 54-56d. On December 16, 2009, after a hearing, the Court (Vachelli, J.) found the defendant not competent to stand trial and remanded the defendant to the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Addictive Services for treatment intended to restore him to competence to stand trial. The Defendant was thereafter admitted to Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital for treatment.
On March 8, 2010, Mr. Johnson was examined by a clinical team from the State of Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services Hartford Office of Forensic Evaluations. A "Competency to Stand Trial Report" was generated dated March 9, 2010 (marked as Court Exhibit 2). On March 15, 2010, a hearing was held before the Court (Vachelli, J.). Testimony was heard from Susan McKinley, LCSW. On the basis of the report and testimony, the Court found the defendant not competent to stand trial. The Court further found that there was not a substantial probability that the defendant would regain competence within the maximum period allowed by law. The Court ordered that the defendant be placed in the custody of the Department of Developmental Services for the commencement of civil commitment proceedings.
On October 19, 2010, the Probate Court civilly committed the defendant to the supervision of the Department of Developmental Services (DDS). Since that date, the defendant has been in the care of DDS in a supervised residential setting with clinical and vocational support. Pursuant to an order of the Court, DDS provides periodic status updates as to the defendant's supervision and treatment. The last such report was dated May 13, 2011; the next report is anticipated on or about July 15, 2011.
Discussion
On May 16, 2011, counsel for both parties were heard at argument on the motion. The State argues that C.G.S. Sec 54-56d(m)(3), as amended by Public Act 10-28, effective October 1, 2010, should be applied retroactively to the defendant. The defendant argues that the amendments to the statute are substantive in nature, and should therefore not be applied retroactively.
The Court need not engage in a lengthy analysis of the retroactive application of Public Act 10-28, since the Court is of the opinion that even if the Act were to be retroactively applied, an order for periodic examinations is not appropriate in this case. The Court has examined the record which was the basis for the March 15, 2010 finding that there was not a substantial probability that the defendant would regain competence within the maximum period allowed by law. There is nothing in that record (and no additional evidence has been produced) that would suggest that the defendant's condition — today or at any time in the future — will be any different than it was on March 15, 2010, such that periodic examinations are warranted.
The defendant has significant cognitive limitations that meet the criteria for mild or moderate mental retardation. That condition has been documented since the defendant was five years old. No evidence was produced at the hearing that would reasonably lead this Court to believe that the defendant's cognitive limitations will change in the future. In fact, the March 9, 2010 report states "there were no indications throughout [his] hospitalization that any amount of education or supportive encouragement would improve his understanding of the court system, or help him appreciate his pending legal matters, such that he could effectively assist in his defense." (Exhibit 2; emphasis added.)
The imposition of periodic competency evaluations on a defendant "is not an inconsequential matter, as such a condition constitutes an impingement on the defendant's freedom." State v. Custodio, 126 Conn.App. 539, 551 (2011), citing State v. Curtis, 22 Conn.App. 199, 205 (1990). Under these circumstances, periodic examinations as to the defendant's mental competency would serve no meaningful end, and would impinge on the defendant's freedom for no justifiable reason.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion is denied. This matter will be continued to July 15, 2011 for further proceedings.