Opinion
No. C2-97-1854.
Filed June 2, 1998.
Appeal from the District Court, Washington County, File No. K597483.
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, (for respondent)
Richard D. Hodsdon, Acting Washington County Attorney, Eric C. Thole, Assistant County Attorney, Washington County Government Center, (for respondent)
Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Davies, Judge, and Harten, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence offered to support his conviction of first-degree arson. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 1997, fire destroyed Phillip Johnson's mobile home. After the fire, investigators discovered that several guns were missing from the home. Appellant Jeremy John Janshen was charged with first-degree arson in connection with the blaze. The state's evidence included the following testimony:
(1) Antonio Rice testified that appellant visited him at his home a few hours before the fire and asked him if he wanted to "jack" (burglarize) some nearby homes. Rice declined, and appellant left. The next day, Rice saw appellant at Chris Armstrong's home, where appellant boasted about having several stolen guns to sell. The following weekend, appellant showed Rice and Armstrong an old British rifle he said he had stolen. Appellant also admitted burning down Johnson's home by turning on the gas.
(2) Cassandra Schmeig testified that appellant told her that he had "been doing some bad things lately * * * like fires and stuff." Appellant told Schmeig that he was selling some guns, but would not tell her where he obtained them.
(3) Vincent Killen and Christeen Rewey testified that appellant told them he had stolen guns from Johnson's home and burned it down by turning on the gas and lighting a match because his accomplice had not worn gloves and might have left fingerprints.
The jury found appellant guilty of first-degree arson. He was sentenced to six years and two months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the state failed to corroborate his self-incriminating admissions. See Minn. Stat. § 634.03 (1996) (confession is insufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that charged offense has been committed); State v. McLarne , 128 Minn. 163, 167-69, 150 N.W. 787, 789 (1915) (reversing arson conviction when only evidence of defendant's guilt was his uncorroborated admission); s ee also State v. Sellers , 507 N.W.2d 235, 235-36 (Minn. 1993) (vacating conviction of keeping ferrets without permit when defendant's uncorroborated self-incriminating statements to animal control officers and "ambiguous" refusal to consent to search of home provided only evidence of guilt).
First-degree arson involves (1) the intentional destruction, (2) by means of fire or explosives, (3) of "any building that is used as a dwelling." Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (1996). The state must substantiate appellant's admissions "`by independent evidence of attending facts or circumstances from which the jury may infer the trustworthiness of the [admission].'" In re Welfare of M.D.S. , 345 N.W.2d 723, 735 (Minn. 1984) (quoting Smoot v. United States , 312 F.2d 881, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1962)). The state is not required, however, to independently corroborate each element of the charged offense. Id.
In this case, Antonio Rice's testimony adequately corroborated appellant's repeated admissions that he intentionally set fire to Johnson's home. Rice saw appellant near the scene of the fire shortly before it was discovered and then, less than a week later, saw appellant holding a rifle that resembled one stolen from Johnson's home. Rice's testimony allowed the jury to infer , from appellant's admissions, that appellant set the fire.
An "admission" is, after all, a statement, direct or implied, of facts tending to establish guilt. It does not necessarily constitute an acknowledgement of guilt but of facts and circumstances, which, if taken in connection with proof of other facts, may permit an inference of guilt.
State v. Weber , 272 Minn. 243, 254, 137 N.W.2d 527, 535 (1965).
Appellant's admissions to Killen and Rewey also support the jury's inference that he acted with the requisite intent. See State v. Koskela , 536 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Minn. 1995) (affirming felony murder conviction of defendant whose self-incriminating admissions provided evidence of necessary intent).
Appellant argues that, if there is any evidence corroborating his admissions, it is circumstantial. But because the criminal act of arson, if successful, destroys most tangible evidence, circumstantial evidence frequently provides the only basis for an arson conviction. State v. Jacobson , 326 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. 1982). Here, the circumstantial evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient for the jury to convict appellant. See State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989) (when sufficiency of evidence is challenged, appellate court must determine whether evidence, viewed in light most favorable to conviction, supports jury verdict).
Affirmed.