Opinion
Case No. 20050998-CA.
Filed November 24, 2006.
Fourth District, Heber Department, 051500014, The Honorable Derek P. Pullan.
J. Bruce Savage, Park City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant Robert Ingram was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (2003). He appeals his conviction claiming there was insufficient evidence to establish that he acted with the intent to arouse or gratify a sexual desire. We affirm.
This court will reverse a jury verdict "when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that `the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, ¶ 19, 999 P.2d 565 (citation omitted). This standard is "highly deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 29, 122 P.3d 639. "We will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only if we determine that `reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.'" Id. (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ¶ 74, 28 P.3d 1278). "A person commits sexual abuse of a child if, under circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, . . . the actor touches the . . . genitalia of any child . . . or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child . . . with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(2). Defendant claims that his conviction should be overturned because there was insufficient evidence to show he intended to arouse or gratify a sexual desire. Defendant argues instead that he accidentally touched S.G. in her vaginal region. Additionally, he points out that the State "failed to provide evidence that [the investigating officer] asked [Defendant] what his mental state was at the time of the accidental incident."
Sexual abuse of a child becomes aggravated if, "in conjunction with the offense," one of several factors are "charged and admitted or found true in the action for the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4) (2003). Defendant's conviction was aggravated because the jury unanimously found that he had been previously convicted of a misdemeanor or felony involving a sexual offense. See id. § 76-5-404.1(4)(e). Because of this finding, we need not reach Defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was viewing pornography while touching S.G. See id. § 76-5-404.1 (4)(d).
Although the State never provided direct evidence of Defendant's mental state, no such evidence is required. "Specific intent need not be proved by direct evidence, and . . . [t]he factfinder . . . is entitled to draw all reasonable inferences from the facts and from the actions of the defendant." State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979) (finding an inference of intent to arouse or gratify a person sexually after the defendant admitted to touching a three-and-a-half year old girl's vagina to satisfy his curiosity). If the State were required to "`prove directly what was in the defendant's mind relative to doing harm to the victim[,] . . . it would lie within the power of a defendant to defeat practically any conviction which depended upon his state of mind.'" Id. (quoting State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 P.2d 696, 697 (1969)).
Here, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant rubbed S.G.'s stomach, that he touched S.G.'s vaginal region for a short period of time, and that he knew his conduct was wrong but failed to stop immediately for fear of alarming S.G. This, coupled with the fact that at some time during the event Defendant asked S.G. if Defendant's touching felt good, and upon her saying yes, Defendant said, "Well, that's wrong. You shouldn't be enjoying it," supports an inference that Defendant acted with intent to arouse or gratify a person sexually. Consequently, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we affirm Defendant's conviction because the evidence is not "`completely lacking or . . . so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" Heaps, 2000 UT 5 at ¶ 19 (citation omitted).
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge and Gregory K. Orme, Judge.