Opinion
No. 54361-0-I
Filed: August 8, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: -1-83100-. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/07/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Donald D Haley.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Nielsen Broman Koch Pllc, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Eric Broman, Nielsen Broman Koch PLLC, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122-2842.
Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, Ste 300, 705 2nd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-1723.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Robin Elizabeth Fox, Attorney at Law, King Co Pros Atty # W554, 516 3rd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-2385.
Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
When an individual is acquitted of a felony by reason of insanity, he may be committed for a period of time that does not exceed the maximum possible sentence for that felony. Donald Hayden was acquitted by reason of insanity of a charge of first degree assault. This crime carried a maximum sentence of life in prison. Because the maximum sentence was life, Hayden is subject to commitment for life. We affirm the trial court's ruling.
FACTS
Donald Hayden was charged with one count of first degree assault. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity in 1977 and was conditionally released into the community. In 1984, Hayden's release was revoked and he was committed at Western State Hospital. The hospital received information from the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office that Hayden's maximum possible penal sentence was life in prison.
Hayden petitioned for release and final discharge on October 29, 2003. He argued that because the trial court did not set a maximum term under the criminal statutes, his maximum should be 20 years. He contended that the 20 years having expired, he should finally be discharged. The trial court denied this motion. Hayden appeals.
DISCUSSION
Hayden contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for release and final discharge. He argues that the maximum term of his commitment was 20 years, because the trial court did not set a maximum term after his acquittal and conditionally released him, and because the maximum sentence for the crime charged was not less than 20 years. We review this question of law de novo.
Tenore v. ATT Wireless Serv., 136 Wn.2d 322, 329-30, 962 P.2d 104 (1998).
Chapter 10.77 of the Revised Code of Washington addresses procedures controlling the criminally insane. Among those statutes in effect at the time of the crime, former RCW 10.77.020(3) (1993) stated that: Whenever any person has been committed under . . . this chapter, or ordered to undergo alternative treatment following his acquittal of a crime charged by reason of insanity, such commitment or treatment cannot exceed the maximum possible penal sentence for any offense charged for which he was acquitted by reason of insanity. (emphasis added).
Under former RCW 9A.20.020 (1981), the maximum term of imprisonment upon conviction of a class A felony such as first degree assault was a term of not less than 20 years. And former RCW 9.95.010 (2001) stated that: When a person is convicted of any felony [including first degree assault], [t]he maximum term . . . may be for any number of years up to and including life imprisonment but . . . not less than twenty years. (emphasis added).
Hayden argues that because the trial court did not set a maximum sentence after his acquittal and released him into the community, logic, common sense, and the rule of lenity compel the conclusion that his maximum sentence was the 20 years stated as the shortest maximum sentence allowed. Because that term has elapsed, he contends that the trial court no longer has jurisdiction to commit him, and requests release. We disagree.
Each statute pertinent to this case is clear and unambiguous: the maximum term of commitment after acquittal by reason of insanity for first degree assault is the maximum possible sentence Hayden could have received for the assault under the terms of the statute, not the maximum sentence the trial court may have imposed had he been convicted. As Division Two of this court concluded in State v. Sunich, where an individual is acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity, the statute `directs us to the maximum possible sentence at charging, not upon conviction.'
76 Wn. App. 202, 884 P.2d 1 (1994).
Sunich, 76 Wn. App. at 206.
The trial court's failure to impose a maximum sentence does not mean, as Hayden argues, that the lowest possible maximum would have been imposed and must be used. Because Hayden was not convicted, the maximum sentence the trial court may or may not have imposed upon conviction is irrelevant. The maximum possible sentence set by the pertinent statute is controlling. Hayden is subject to commitment for life after his acquittal by reason of insanity because that is the maximum possible sentence for first degree assault. The trial court did not err in denying Hayden's motion for release and final dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
BAKER, GROSSE and APPELWICK, JJ., Concur.