State v. Dimeo

Full title: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTOPHER DIMEO

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport

Date published: Oct 12, 2010

2010 Ct. Sup. 19412 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010)

Opinion

No. CR07-0223089-T

October 12, 2010

CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION IN LIMINE TO TRIFURCATE DEFENDANT'S CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING AND REQUIRE THE JURORS TO RETURN SEPARATE VERDICTS ON: (1) CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(h)'s STATUTORY BARS TO DEFENDANT'S EXECUTION; (2) WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR; AND (3) WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THAT THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING FACTOR AND THAT DEATH IS THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE (#41); AND MOTION TO SCHEDULE PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND/OR TO STRIKE NOTICED AGGRAVATING FACTORS (#40)

ROBERT J. DEVLIN, JR., Judge.

This is a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of capital felony and related charges arising out of a robbery at a Fairfield jewelry store during which the two shopkeepers were shot and killed. The defendant has filed the captioned motions both of which are addressed to the potential penalty phase of this case. For the reasons set forth below, both motions must be denied.

MOTION IN LIMINE TO TRIFURCATE DEFENDANT'S CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING AND REQUIRE THE JURORS TO RETURN SEPARATE VERDICTS ON: (1) CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(h)'s STATUTORY BARS TO DEFENDANT'S EXECUTION; (2) WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR; AND (3) WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THAT THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING FACTOR AND THAT DEATH IS THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE (#41)

In this motion, the defendant seeks to have the penalty phase of his case divided into three separate hearings where the jury would render separate verdicts as to (1) the existence of a statutory bar, 2) the existence of an aggravating factor, and (3) the results of the weighing process. This motion must be denied for two reasons.

First, our capital felony sentencing statute provides as follows: "a person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section." General Statutes § 53a-46a (emphasis added). There is no language in the statute suggesting that the hearing is to be trifurcated.

Second, our Supreme Court has considered and rejected a similar claim addressed to the pre-1995 capital felony statute. In State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 (2003), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to bifurcate the penalty phase of the trial and require two separate hearings, one as to the existence of aggravating factors and another as to the existence of mitigating factors. Id., 129-31. In rejecting this claim, our Supreme Court observed that the statute spoke in terms of a single hearing and further that the court's jury instructions were adequate to guide the jury through the process of properly finding and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. This same reasoning applies to the present motion. As noted above, the statute continues to describe the penalty phase of a capital trial as a "hearing." Moreover, the court will provide detailed jury instructions and a verdict form to guide the jury through the step-by-step process of determining the appropriate sentence.

The motion is denied.

MOTION TO SCHEDULE PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND/OR TO STRIKE NOTICED AGGRAVATING FACTORS (#40)

In this motion, the defendant seeks a hearing at which the state would be required to establish probable cause to support the aggravating factors that it has alleged. This proposed hearing is distinct from a probable cause hearing held pursuant to General Statutes § 54-46a to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decision to charge the defendant with capital felony and murder. The record reflects that the defendant waived a § 54-46a hearing.

In State v. Reynolds, supra, our Supreme Court was requested to exercise its supervisory authority to engraft a probable cause hearing of the type suggested in the present motion onto Connecticut's capital sentencing scheme. Id., 157-59. The Court declined to do so because of a disinclination to amend the comprehensive legislative scheme in this area and also because it did not feel that such a hearing was necessary. Id.

Although the present motion raises grounds beyond those advanced in Reynolds to support the necessity of a separate probable cause hearing addressed to aggravating factors, the Reynolds court determined that such hearings are not properly part of our capital felony jurisprudence. This court is not free to overrule such precedent.

The motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to trifurcate the penalty phase (#41) and the motion to schedule a probable cause hearing regarding aggravating factors (#40) are denied.

So Ordered at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 12th day of October 2010.