Opinion
No. CR07-0223089-T
October 19, 2010
BACKGROUND
The defendant, Christopher DiMeo, stands accused of capital felony and related charges arising out of the murder of two proprietors of a Fairfield jewelry store on February 2, 2005. The state is seeking the death penalty. Two days after the crime, on February 4, 2005, the defendant was arrested in Atlantic City, New Jersey. He subsequently waived extradition to New York where he was prosecuted and convicted in a separate murder case and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Governor of Connecticut made a request to the Governor of New York to deliver the defendant to Connecticut for prosecution. The defendant challenged his extradition to Connecticut by way of habeas corpus. The trial court denied his petition and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed. People ex rel. DiMeo v. Artus, 36 A.D.3d 1091, 828 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App.Div.3d Dept.) (2007), leave to appeal denied, 8 N.Y.3d 907, 865 N.E.2d 1245, 834 N.Y.S.2d 79 (2007). The defendant was returned to Connecticut on March 29, 2007.
In connection with the extradition, the governors of Connecticut and New York agreed that, unless the defendant was sentenced to death, he would be promptly returned to the New York State Department of Correctional Services. In the present motion, the defendant asserts that this agreement was in violation of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) because such Act only authorizes a demanding state to obtain temporary custody of a fugitive.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Although the defendant claims violation of both the UCEA and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, there is no evidence that he was transferred to Connecticut pursuant to a detainer. To the contrary, it is clear that he was extradited. The defendant's claims will therefore be considered only under the UCEA.
DISCUSSION
The United States Constitution provides for the transfer of persons who are charged in one state and flee from justice to another state. U.S. Const. Article IV, § 2, clause 2. The purpose of this so-called Extradition Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice from another state and thus "balkanize" the administration of criminal justice among the several states. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978). Both federal and state statutes provide procedures to implement the constitutional provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 and General Statutes §§ 54-157 to 54-185 (UCEA).
One fundamental principle underlying all of these provisions is that the right to extradition is the sovereign right of the state and is not a right that attaches to the prisoner. 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Procedure, (14 Ed 2005) § 6.12, p 6-78. Over one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court observed:
When the governor of one state voluntarily surrenders a fugitive from justice of another state to answer for his alleged offenses, it is hardly a proper subject of inquiry on the trial of the case to examine into the details of the proceedings by which the demand was made by one state and the manner in which it was responded to by the other.
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 441 (1886).
While this court does not accept the defense assertion that the UCEA prohibits agreements between state governors such as the one involved here, that is not the point. Given the above legal principles, even if the defendant's interpretation of the UCEA is correct and only temporary custody of fugitives is authorized, it would still not be a basis to dismiss the charges in the present information.
Indeed, given the liberal interpretation accorded extradition laws in order to effectuate their important purpose, it is highly likely that such agreements are permissible. See Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 380, 394 (2007) (noting the liberal interpretation accorded extradition laws).
The motion is denied.
So Ordered at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 19th day of October 2010.