Opinion
No. 42786.
May 12, 1952.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LACLEDE COUNTY, CLAUDE E. CURTIS, J.
J. W. Grossenheider, Lebanon, for appellant.
W. I. Mayfield, Edgar Mayfield, Lebanon, for respondents.
Quo warranto. Crisp (defendant below) appeals from a judgment of ouster from the office of school director. As title to an "office under this state" is involved, the appeal is properly here. Sec. 3, Art. V, Const., 2 V.A.M.S. p. 31; State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Zeliff v. Whitford, 361 Mo. 184, 233 S.W.2d 694.
The information was filed (on the day after Crisp paid the taxes hereinafter mentioned) by the prosecuting attorney of Laclede County at the relation of resident taxpayers of a Laclede County common school district. It alleged Crisp's election but denied his right to hold the office in that: at the time he attempted to qualify by taking the oath of office, he did not and could not legally qualify because at that time he was not a resident taxpayer of the district and had not paid a state and county tax within the year next preceding his election. Crisp's answer was that he was a duly elected and qualified director under state law.
Crisp moved into the district in September, 1950, from Texas County, where, for three years previously, he had resided and owned personal property. He was elected on April 3, 1951. He testified that: he took the oath April 4 or 5 and "took the office"; when he was "sworn in," he had theretofore neither been assessed for or paid any taxes in Laclede County nor any taxes, current for 1950 or delinquent for any prior year, in Texas County "or any other county"; prior to the election, he had endeavored to be assessed for and pay 1950 taxes in Texas County; after being "sworn in," he had had the Texas County officials make an assessment, and, on April 20, 1951, had paid a delinquent 1950 personal property tax in Texas County. A witness for Crisp, who had examined the "back tax books of" Texas County on April 4, testified that Crisp's name did not appear on those books.
Section 165.207 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., provides that a common school district director must be a resident taxpayer of the district who "shall have paid a state and county tax within one year next preceding his * * * election". In State ex inf. Mitchell ex. rel. Goodman v. Heath, 345 Mo. 226, 227, 132 S.W.2d 1001, 1005, relied upon by both parties here, we held that the intent of such statutes as Sec. 165.207 was "to state special qualifications of eligibility for holding office"; that the reasonable construction of that section was that the time fixed for qualifying was not the election, but the "commencement of the term and of taking possession of the office"; and that one elected a common school district director, who had paid the taxes after the election but before being "sworn in," was qualified.
In that case, the taxes were paid after the election but before taking the oath. In the cases discussed therein, the taxes were paid before the election. In all, the taxes were paid before the official was "sworn in."
In the instant case, Crisp urges a "liberal construction of statutes imposing qualifications for elective offices, one in favor of the right of the people to exercise freedom of choice in the selection of officers." He argues that, even though he did not pay the taxes before being sworn in, his payment about two weeks after being sworn in was "substantial compliance" with Sec. 165.207.
However, the section's language is clear and express — "shall have paid". We cannot ignore such unambiguous language. State ex inf. Kamp ex rel. Rodgers v. Pretended Consolidated School District No. 1, 359 Mo. 639, 223 S.W.2d 484, 488. While payment after taking the oath was not involved in State ex inf. Mitchell ex rel. Goodwin v. Heath, supra, the rationale of that decision (together with the plain language of Sec. 165.207) impels this holding: In order to qualify for the office of director of a common school district, the director must have paid the taxes before he takes the oath.
The judgment is affirmed.
VAN OSDOL and COIL, CC., concur.
The foregoing opinion by LOZIER, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
All concur.