Opinion
IK00-08-0376-R1, IK00-08-0383-R1 ID No. 0008008225
April 18, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
Dennis Kelleher, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Dover, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.
Philip J. Celatka, pro se.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The defendant Philip J. Celatka, ("Celatka") pled guilty on the day his trial was to begin, December 6, 2000, to one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 775; and one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse, 11 Del. C. § 778. Celatka was facing trial on the above charges along with an additional twelve charges of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree; six additional counts of Continuous Sexual Abuse; seven counts of Unlawful Sexual Penetration in the Third Degree, 11 Del. C. § 770; seven counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree; and one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child 11 Del. C. § 1102. All the charges involved Celatka's young daughter. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Celatka was sentenced to seventeen years incarceration which was the minimum mandatory time, followed by probation. Had Celatka gone to trial and been convicted of all the charges, he would have faced nearly 200 years minimum mandatory time incarcerated. Celatka did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the State Supreme Court, instead he filed the instant motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In his motion, Celatka alleges three grounds for relief:
Ground One: Jurisdiction Abuse. Defendant was arrested and charged with seven counts of incest which is the jurisdiction of Family Court and Defendant asserts that this violates all Family Court proceedings. Ground Two: Double Jeopardy. Defendant asserts that counts 7 and 8 are same, count 9 and 10 are same charge. Ground Three: Due Process Violations. Defendant was arrested and charged with incest but was not giving a hearing in Family Court which violates his due process.
Celatka claimed he did not raise the above grounds earlier because:
Ineffective assistance of Counsel. My counsel did not assume defendant had fair and just hearing and proceedings.
Under Delaware Law this Court must first determine whether Celatka has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of his postconviction relief claim. This is Celatka's first motion for postconviction and it was filed within three years of his conviction becoming final, so the requirements of Rule 61(i) 1) — requiring filing within three years — and 2) — requiring that all grounds for relief be presented in the initial Rule 61 motion — are met. None of Celatka's claims were raised at the plea, sentencing or on direct appeal, therefore, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(3), absent a demonstration of cause for the default and prejudice. All of Celatka's contentions are based on ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, he has alleged cause for his failure to have raised these issues earlier. Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar relief as to these claims at this point should Celatka demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 11 21, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
Celatka's contentions superficially raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel Celatka must meet the two prong test of Strickland v. Washington. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires that a defendant show 1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal. In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable. This standard is highly demanding. Strickland mandates that when viewing counsel's representation, this Court must endeavor to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."
466 U.S. 668 (1984) ("Strickland"); Larson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 200, 1994, Hartnett, J. (June 23, 1995) (ORDER); Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 5 3 (1988), Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Accord Larson v. State, supra at 3-4; Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 18, 1994) (ORDER); Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d at 1172; Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 58.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556; Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., No. 318, 1993, Holland, J. (March 31, 1994) (ORDER).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 689); see also Larson v. State, supra at 4; Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 at 753 (1990).
Id. at 754.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 639.
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly clear that Celatka has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. I find counsel's affidavit, in conjunction with the record, more credible than Celatka's contention that his counsel's representation was ineffective. Celatka was facing trial on numerous charges and risked being sentenced to substantial incarceration. Celatka's counsel was able to negotiate a plea bargain with the State which resulted in the minimum mandatory time for only two of the 29 counts for which he was charged. Celatka and his attorney discussed the case prior to the entry of the plea. The case against Celatka was exceptionally strong given his full voluntary confession to the police. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Celatka. Counsel's representation was certainly well within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Celatka entered his guilty plea he stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, Celatka has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.
Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 18, 1994) (ORDER); Mapps v. State, Del. Supr., No. 3, 1994, Holland, J. (March 17, 1994) (ORDER) (citing Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (1994)).
Even assuming, arguendo that counsel's representation of Celatka was somehow deficient, Celatka must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk dismissal. Celatka simply asserts that his counsel didn't do enough in an attempt to show prejudice. Celatka does not suggest what more counsel could have done. This statement is insufficient to establish prejudice. Celatka has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from counsel's representation.
Larson v. State, supra at 5; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556.
To the extent Celatka alleges his plea w as involuntary, the record clearly contradicts Celatka's allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was constitutionally knowing and voluntary the Court looks to the plea colloquy to determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. At the guilty plea hearing, the Court asked Celatka whether he understood the nature of the charges, the consequences of his pleading guilty and whether he was voluntarily pleading guilty. The Court asked Celatka if he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if he pled guilty, if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the guilty plea form and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Celatka if he had discussed the guilty plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court asked Celatka if he was giving the plea of his own free will because he was in fact guilty. The Court also asked Celatka if he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. The Court asked Celatka if he was in fact, guilty of the charge. Celatka answered each of these questions clearly and affirmatively. Finally prior to the imposition of the sentence, Celatka told the Court that he was sorry for what he had done to his daughter, that it was wrong and that he wanted to make amends for it.
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.C-1 2680, 2687 (1993).
Transcript of plea colloquy at 4-11.
Furthermore, prior to entering his guilty plea, Celatka filled out a Guilty Plea Form in his own handwriting. Celatka wrote that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement. Celatka is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. I confidently find that Celatka entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that this ground for relief is completely meritless.
Hickman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 298, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 11, 1994) (ORDER); Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 465, 1989, Walsh, J. (January 4, 1990) (ORDER). See also Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 938 (1994) (ruling the fact that defendant filled out Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form in defendant's own handwriting supported the Superior Court's conclusion that defendant's decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary).
I find that Celatka's counsel represented him in a competent and effective manner and that Celatka has failed to clearly demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Celatka's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Consequently, I recommend that the Court deny Celatka's motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred.