Opinion
No. 4-506 / 03-1544.
September 9, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Douglas McDonald, District Associate Judge.
The State seeks discretionary review of a ruling in an operating while intoxicated prosecution which sustained the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, William Davis, County Attorney, and Alan Havercamp, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Jonathan Bethard, Moline, Illinois, appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.
In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges a district court ruling that granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence which the defendant claimed was obtained after a traffic stop that "lacked probable cause." We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On June 6, 2003, the State filed a trial information charging Jonathan Bethard with operating while intoxicated. Bethard filed a motion to suppress contending a police officer had stopped his vehicle without probable cause. Bettendorf Police Officer Jeremy Salsberry gave the only testimony offered at the evidentiary hearing regarding the motion. According to the officer, he was patrolling in his car near the Traveler's Motel in Bettendorf at approximately 8:00 p.m. on May 8, 2003, when he observed a car pull out of the motel's center courtyard and make an immediate right turn onto Brown Street. The vehicle had working headlights, but its rear license plate light was not working. Officer Salsberry further testified that the headlights of his own vehicle were on, and that he believed the use of headlights was warranted.
According to Officer Salsberry, he intended to pull the other vehicle over to inform the driver that his license plate light was not functioning; however, before he had the opportunity to activate his emergency lights and stop the vehicle, the driver pulled into a parking space facing the motel and stopped. The officer then walked up to the side of the vehicle to inform the driver that the vehicle's license plate light was out. At that point, the officer apparently discovered that Bethard, the driver of the vehicle, was intoxicated.
The record before us on appeal does not reveal the details of what occurred after the officer approached Bethard's vehicle, and Bethard's motion to suppress did not challenge any of the officer's actions after he approached Bethard's vehicle.
Immediately following the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court orally granted the defendant's motion. In doing so, the court expressed its belief that the officer "confronted" the defendant because of the officer's concerns about criminal activity at the Traveler's Motel and not because of a traffic violation. In its subsequent written ruling sustaining the motion the court concluded that "sufficient cause did not exist for the officer's confrontation (seizure) of the defendant." The State filed an application for discretionary review, which our supreme court granted.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Where a constitutional right is involved, our scope of review is de novo. State v. Washburne, 574 N.W.2d 261, 263 (Iowa 1997). We conduct an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Astello, 602 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
III. Merits.
On appeal, the State finds fault with the district court's ruling in several respects. It contends Bethard was not unconstitutionally stopped, confronted, or seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The State also contends the court improperly based its factual and credibility conclusions, and ultimately its decision, on information outside the suppression hearing record. The defendant has not filed a responsive brief addressing the State's claims on appeal.
It is appropriate to begin our analysis by addressing the State's contention that, in evaluating the defendant's motion to suppress, the district court considered and impermissibly relied upon facts which are not part of the record. See State v. Blanford, 306 N.W.2d 93, 98 (Iowa 1981) (noting it is always error to consider facts outside of the record, and applying a prejudice analysis to determine if the consideration constitutes reversible error). Upon our review of the record, we conclude this contention has merit.
The district court concluded the officer had impermissibly "confronted" the defendant because of the officer's concern about criminal activity at the Traveler's Motel. However, the record reveals that neither the State nor the defendant offered evidence regarding the nature of the motel or any prior police activity at that location. The district court also mentioned that officers normally explain equipment violations to defendants and that defective lights are normally viewed by both parties at the scene. The court cited the fact that this procedure was not followed in this case in support of its conclusion that the officer's testimony was not credible. Again, we find nothing in the record which establishes whether or not this procedure was followed in the instant case. Finally, the court concluded the officer's claim that the headlights of Bethard's vehicle were on lacked credibility, as "it is known that it does not become dark at that time of year until somewhere around 9:00 p.m." However, the only evidence as to light conditions, beyond the officer's testimony, was an almanac entry that stated sunset on May 8, 2003, occurred at 8:07 p.m.
The district court's credibility determinations were improperly based on matters outside the record. Nothing within the record itself indicates the officer's testimony was lacking in credibility, or that the court's credibility assessments were based upon something unique to the district court process, such as the court's observation of the officer's testimony. Accordingly, we decline to give weight to the court's credibility determinations. In assessing the State's contention that there was no proof of an illegal stop, seizure, or confrontation, we confine our review to the record made during the hearing on the motion to suppress. See State v. Orozco, 573 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1997).
When this court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress, we typically consider not only the record made at the suppression hearing, but also evidence introduced at trial. See id. Here, however, a trial has yet to occur.
Iowa Code section 321.388 (2003) requires illumination of the rear license registration plate on an automobile. Pursuant to section 321.388, an equipment violation occurs if the registration plate lamp fails to turn on when a vehicle's headlights are on. It is well-settled that observation of a traffic violation, however minor that violation might be, gives an officer probable cause to stop a motorist. See State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004). However, "[t]o justify such a stop, an officer need only have reasonable, not probable, cause to believe the traffic violation has occurred." State v. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1996). Probable cause exited in this matter if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe Bethard had committed or was committing a violation. Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201. Reasonable cause existed if the officer had "specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, [led the officer] to reasonably believe criminal activity may have occurred." Id. at 204. In either event, the legality of the stop is not dependent on the officer's actual motivations. Id. at 201, 204.
At the suppression hearing Officer Salsberry testified that, at approximately 8:00 p.m., both his headlights and the defendant's headlights were on, and that the defendant's rear license plate lamp was not illuminated. This testimony is unrebutted in the record. The officer's testimony is buttressed by the undisputed fact that sunset occurred only minutes later. See Iowa Code § 321.384 (requiring use of headlights from sunset to sunrise). To the extent a stop in fact occurred in this matter, it was supported by adequate cause.
Moreover, there is simply no evidence in the record that would support a finding that Officer Salsberry unconstitutionally seized or "confronted" Bethard. See U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV. Not every contact between police and a citizen will constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Iowa 2004). Even where an officer has no reason to suspect a particular individual, the officer may approach that individual and ask questions without violating the amendment. Id. at 546-47.
The only testimony offered regarding the circumstances preceding the defendant's arrest came from Officer Salsberry. The officer testified that, after observing a traffic violation and watching Bethard park his vehicle, he merely approached Bethard to inform him his license plate light was not functioning. There is no evidence in the record that his ultimate contact with Bethard involved any display of authority or any submission to such a display.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court erred in sustaining the defendant's motion to suppress. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.