Opinion
6D23-476
10-20-2023
State of Florida, Appellant, v. Ronald Den Besten, Appellee.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant. Stephen B. Russell, of Ringsmuth, Day &O'Halloran, Fort Myers, for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
Appeal from the County Court for Lee County. Lower Tribunal No. 22-MM-146 Josephine Gagliardi, Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Elba Caridad Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Stephen B. Russell, of Ringsmuth, Day &O'Halloran, Fort Myers, for Appellee.
WHITE, J.
The State of Florida appeals an order granting the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Ronald Den Besten ("Den Besten"). The State argues that the trial court erred because it had personal jurisdiction over Den Besten, and, even if it did not, dismissal of the charges was an inappropriate remedy. We do not address the former because we agree with the latter. Accordingly, we reverse.
This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023.
Background
The State alleges that Den Besten was arrested by a Florida Gulf Coast University police officer in December 2021 and released after signing and receiving a legally sufficient Notice to Appear. Den Besten alleges that the officer detained him, did not arrest him, and gave him a Notice to Appear that did not comply with applicable law. In March 2022, a Notice of Arraignment was mailed to, and received by, Den Besten at his home address in Bonita Springs, Florida. Den Besten did not appear for arraignment.
On April 1, 2022, the State filed an Information charging Den Besten with two counts of battery. Den Besten filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on April 5, 2022. On that date, he also filed a notice of objection to arraignment and lack of personal jurisdiction. The State filed a response to the motion and the notice.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss on May 2, 2022. Den Besten argued that the evidence showed that he was: detained, not arrested; given an invalid Notice to Appear; improperly served by mail with a Notice of Arraignment; and never properly served with a summons. As a result, he contended, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and should dismiss the case. The State agreed that Den Besten was not served with a summons but otherwise disputed his arguments. In any event, the State argued, it would be improper for the trial court to dismiss the Information because of a lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court took the matter under advisement.
On May 5, 2022, the trial court entered its order. The order did not contain any findings of fact or conclusions of law. It stated that the trial court "grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" and ordered that "Defendant's motion is GRANTED." It did not state that the Information was dismissed.
The State filed a motion for clarification or reconsideration on May 5, 2022. Among other things, the State requested that the trial court clarify its order by providing the specific basis for the dismissal of the charges. The next day, the trial court denied the State's motion without elaboration. This timely appeal followed.
Analysis
Although Den Besten does not challenge our jurisdiction, we have an independent duty to ensure that we have it. See Shassian v. Riverwalk Park, LLC, 365 So.3d 484, 486 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023). The Legislature has authorized the State to appeal an order "dismissing an . . . information or any count thereof ...." § 924.07, Fla. Stat. (2022). The Florida Supreme Court has adopted rules that permit the State to appeal such an order, regardless of whether it is final or non-final. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A); 9.130(a)(2). Here, the trial court's order granted the motion to dismiss but did not expressly dismiss the Information. We conclude that the order is appealable, and we have jurisdiction. See State v. Feagle, 604 So.2d 824, 824-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citing State v. Diamond, 188 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1966)); State v. Nessim, 587 So.2d 1343, 1343-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (en banc); see also State v. Saufley, 574 So.2d 1207, 1208-09 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (en banc) (an order granting a motion to suppress but not expressly suppressing evidence is appealable).
Turning to the merits, the State argues that the standard of review is de novo, citing State v. Pasko, 815 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Den Besten does not challenge that argument. We assume, without deciding, that the facts alleged by Den Besten are true and the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Therefore, it is appropriate for us to review de novo the trial court's legal determination that dismissal is a proper remedy.
In Serrano v. State, 64 So.3d 93, 107 (Fla. 2011), Serrano argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he was "illegally kidnapped" in violation of an extradition treaty. The supreme court affirmed the denial of the motion to divest jurisdiction and dismiss the indictment. Id. It noted that "the United States Supreme Court held that 'a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, [does not] thereby acquire[ ] a defense to the jurisdiction of this country's courts.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992)). The supreme court also observed that Alvarez-Machain relied upon Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), which involved a U.S. citizen who was kidnapped in Chicago and brought to Michigan. Serrano, 64 So.3d at 107 . It recognized that, in upholding Frisbie's conviction despite the alleged violations of the due process clause and federal kidnapping statute, the United States Supreme Court declared:
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 [7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886)], that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible abduction." No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.Serrano, 64 So.3d at 107-08 (quoting Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522). Therefore, the supreme court concluded that it was meritless for Serrano to contend that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him. Serrano, 64 So.3d at 108.
Our sister courts have held that an illegal or invalid arrest does not provide a basis for dismissal of criminal charges. See State v. E.T., 560 So.2d 1282, 1283-85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (citing Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522); Darby v. State, 502 So.2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980)); see also State v. Jones, 386 So.2d 804, 804-06 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (citing the "Ker-Frisbie Rule" and affirming conviction despite statute prohibiting prosecution for a crime other than the crime that was the basis for the detainer by which Jones was extradited to Florida). Jurisdictional challenges were rejected in all those cases. See E.T., 560 So.2d at 1284 ("Moreover, an accused person who has been illegally arrested has no justifiable basis to claim that he is immune from any prosecution whatever or that somehow the courts lack personal or subject matter jurisdiction to try him because of the illegal arrest."); Darby, 502 So.2d at 1359 ("The validity of an arrest has no bearing on the guilt or innocence of an accused and is not necessary to the jurisdiction of a court in a criminal case."); Jones, 386 So.2d at 805 ("As a general rule, the court's jurisdiction over a defendant cannot be defeated because of the manner in which he was brought before the court.").
Den Besten fails to cite any authority permitting dismissal of criminal charges for lack of personal jurisdiction. This is not surprising because his position is untenable under the long-standing law discussed above. That law prohibits dismissal where personal jurisdiction is acquired by an illegal or invalid seizure of the defendant. Yet Den Besten asks us to permit dismissal where personal jurisdiction was never acquired because he was never seized or personally served with valid process. We cannot adopt a legal principle that would create such an absurd dichotomy.
The Notice to Appear the officer gave to Den Besten may have sufficed to attach personal jurisdiction over him. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.125. Because the trial court made no findings on those issues, we decline to address them. By his appearance on remand-voluntary or otherwise-Den Besten will resolve any outstanding questions regarding those matters. See § 34.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2023) (authorizing issuance of arrest warrants); § 900.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2023) (authorizing issuance of writs and process); Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 442, 448 (Fla. 2006) ("[T]he circuit courts have personal jurisdiction over residents of Florida and when reached by summons, they become subject to the orders and decrees of the court." (citing Patten v. Mokher, 184 So. 29, 30 (Fla. 1938))).
Conclusion
It was improper for the trial court to dismiss the Information. We reverse the trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
TRAVER, C.J,. and STARGEL, J., concur.