No. 05-99-01907-CR
Opinion issued July 23, 2003 Do Not Publish
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MA99-06168-G. AFFIRMED
Before Chief Justice THOMAS, Justices WHITTINGTON and LAGARDE.
Justice Ed Kinkeade was a member of the original panel before his retirement from the Court on November 18, 2002. Chief Justice Linda Thomas has reviewed the briefs and the record in this case.
The Honorable Sue Lagarde, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Opinion By Justice Lagarde.
The State of Texas appeals the trial court's order granting appellee Louis Antonelli's motion to quash the indictment, which alleged violation of section 255.001 of the Texas Election Code. In an unpublished opinion, we dismissed the case on procedural grounds, concluding the State had incorrectly filed its notice of appeal from a specific order that had been superseded by a later order. The court of criminal appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review and, in its own unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of the State's appeal on the merits. For reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order.
Factual and Procedural Background
In April 1999, the State indicted Antonelli for violating section 255.001 of the Texas Election Code, entitled "Required Disclosure on Political Advertising," by his actions in publishing an anonymous leaflet without the required disclosure urging Cedar Hill residents to vote against three candidates for the office of city council. Antonelli was specifically accused of "knowingly enter[ing] into a contract or other agreement to print or publish political advertising" without (1) indicating that the publication was political advertising, and (2) disclosing either his own identity or the identity of the person he represented. In June 1999, Antonelli filed a motion to quash the indictment wherein he challenged the constitutionality of section 255.001, inter alia, on grounds it violated his right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court heard arguments from both sides in October 1999 and signed a written order granting Antonelli's motion to quash on October 22, 1999. On November 3, 1999, the trial court issued an amended order "reflect[ing] the full ruling of the court," in which it held that section 255.001 violated the First Amendment both facially and as applied to Antonelli. The State filed its notice of appeal contending the trial court erred in granting Antonelli's motion to quash the indictment. In its sole issue, the State argues the trial court erred in granting Antonelli's motion to quash because, contrary to the trial court's order, section 255.001 of the Texas Election Code is not unconstitutional. First, the State contends we should review the constitutionality of the statute by applying intermediate scrutiny or, in the alternative, a "less onerous version of strict scrutiny" if strict scrutiny should apply. Second, the State argues that section 255.001 passes constitutional muster under even "the harshest form of strict scrutiny review" because the State's interests in enforcing the statute are significant and compelling. Specifically, the State points to the following "compelling" interests: (1) deterring and punishing political corruption; (2) providing a method of detecting those expenditures which appear to be from individuals but which in reality come from political action committees or corporations; and (3) informing voters of candidates' constituencies. In Doe v. State, No. 254-02, 2003 WL 21077961 (Tex.Crim.App. May 14, 2003), the court of criminal appeals addressed these identical arguments in a case involving the constitutionality of the statute in question. In Doe, the court of criminal appeals held unequivocally that section "255.001, on its face, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. at *2. Applying the standard of strict scrutiny the court held that although the proffered state interests were compelling, the statute was "not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest without placing an undue burden on constitutionally protected political free speech." Id. at *4, *8. We conclude the court of criminal appeals's decision in Doe v. State compels the same decision in this case: that the trial court did not err in quashing Antonelli's indictment because section 255.001 of the Texas Election Code is unconstitutional on its face. Conclusion
Because authority from the court of criminal appeals squarely addresses each of the State's arguments, we resolve the State's sole issue against it. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order quashing the indictment.