Opinion
A22-1371
05-16-2023
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jason Michael Anderson, Appellant.
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69VI-CR-20-246
Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Denise Reilly, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In February 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jason Michael Anderson with failing to register as a predatory offender in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1) (2018). At the time, Anderson resided in Florida and the state extradited him to Minnesota to face the charge. Anderson pleaded guilty under a plea agreement with the state. At the plea hearing, Anderson's counsel covered the factual basis for his plea. Counsel asked Anderson if he was "subject to the predatory registration requirements that were laid out because of prior convictions," and Anderson responded, "Yes." Counsel asked whether Anderson was "subject to those requirements until 2027" and Anderson responded, "Yes." Counsel asked if Anderson "failed to fulfill [his] obligations under that registration statute" in January 2020, and Anderson responded, "Yes." Counsel asked if Anderson was "in complete compliance" with the predatory registration statute for "the last ten months or so" and Anderson responded, "Yes, sir, yup." Finally, counsel asked, "But there was a period of time that you were not, is that right?" Anderson responded, "Yes."
2. The district court found there was an adequate factual basis for Anderson's plea and deferred accepting the guilty plea pending the presentence investigation (the PSI). The PSI report submitted following the plea hearing noted that the St. Louis County Sherriff's Office was requesting restitution in the amount of $2,755.44 for the cost of extraditing Anderson from Florida to St. Louis County. The PSI recommended a stayed 18-month sentence with conditions, including that Anderson pay restitution in the amount of $2,755.44.
3. Before sentencing, Anderson moved to withdraw his guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard. At the motion hearing, Anderson stated that he felt "railroaded" into taking the plea bargain. The state argued that Anderson could not meet his burden to show that withdrawing his plea is fair and just and argued that plea withdrawal would prejudice the state because multiple witnesses had since moved or retired. The district court denied Anderson's motion to withdraw his plea, finding that Anderson provided sufficient testimony to support his guilty plea, that Anderson was informed of his rights, and that Anderson knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. The district court sentenced Anderson to 18-months' imprisonment stayed with three years of probation. Among other conditions, the district court ordered that Anderson pay $2,755.44 in restitution. Anderson appeals.
4. In this appeal, Anderson is seeking to withdraw his guilty plea under the manifest-injustice standard. A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). Yet a court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time, even after sentencing, if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. "A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid." State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A valid guilty plea is "accurate, voluntary, and intelligent." State v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 2021). "For a guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established." Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d at 603; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1 (setting forth the requirements that must be established before the district court accepts a defendant's guilty plea). The adequacy of the factual basis of a guilty plea is usually established by the defendant explaining the circumstances surrounding the crime. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). We review the validity of a plea de novo. Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 2015).
5. The state concedes that the record contains insufficient facts to support Anderson's guilty plea. We, too, agree that Anderson has a right to withdraw his plea under the manifest-injustice standard for the reasons below.
6. Anderson pleaded guilty to violating predatory offender registration requirements. Under the relevant statute, a person required to register as a predatory offender who "knows, or reasonably should know" of their duty to register and who "knowingly commits an act or fails to fulfill a requirement" may be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1). "Knowledge of the law at the time of the violation is an element of the offense of knowingly violating a provision of the predatory-offender-registration statute." Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d at 604.
7. The factual basis at the plea hearing established that Anderson was subject to the predatory registration requirements and that Anderson was not in compliance with the registration statute in January 2020. But at no point in the plea hearing did counsel or the district court ask Anderson if he knew he had a duty to register and knowingly violated the law by failing to register. And no other statements or evidence in the record can establish an inference that Anderson possessed the requisite mens rea element of the offense. Thus, the factual basis on record for Anderson's guilty plea is insufficient to establish that Anderson knew or reasonably should have known of his duty to register and knowingly failed to fulfill the registration requirement. Anderson has a right to withdraw his guilty plea under the manifest-injustice standard. Because we reverse and remand to the district court to allow Anderson to withdraw his plea, we do not decide whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is reversed and remanded.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.