Opinion
No. 2014AP554–CR.
2014-10-30
STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. James P. ABBOTT, Defendant–Appellant.
Young, 212 Wis.2d at 423–24, 569 N.W.2d 84 (some citations omitted). In other words, when viewed objectively, the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts must be sufficient for an officer to reasonably conclude, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: Jonathan D. Watts, Judge. Affirmed.
Before LUNDSTEN, HIGGINBOTHAM and KLOPPENBURG, JJ. ¶ 1 PER CURIAM.
The State charged James Abbott with possession of a firearm as a felon, as a repeater. The circuit court denied Abbott's motion to suppress the firearm, and Abbott entered a guilty plea. Abbott appeals, arguing that the court erred in denying his suppression motion. We conclude that the stop that yielded the firearm was justified by reasonable suspicion, and we therefore affirm.
¶ 6 Before or as Abbott fell, Officer Mrozinski exited his vehicle. Mrozinski approached Abbott and asked if he was all right. As Abbott began to stand up, Officer Rittner told Officer Mrozinski that he believed that Abbott had discarded an object on the ground. Mrozinski then looked and saw a black semiautomatic handgun at Abbott's feet.
¶ 7 The question before the circuit court was whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion supporting a temporary investigative stop when Officer Rittner directed the men to “Stop.” The circuit court found that the officers were trained, experienced, and familiar with the area, and that their testimony was highly credible. The court found that the seizure was supported by the reasonable suspicion that the men might have been involved in committing the previously reported robberies nearby, and might break into the closed school. The circuit court denied Abbott's motion to suppress the firearm.
The circuit court also found that the stop was justified because the officers had probable cause to arrest the men for violation of the municipal ordinance that prohibits loitering and prowling. Because we affirm the court's determination that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, we do not address Abbott's challenge to the court's alternative basis for denying his motion to suppress. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶ 1 n. 1, 268 Wis.2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (declining to consider alternative arguments where resolution of one issue disposes of the appeal).
For the same reason, we do not address Abbott's argument that, because the stop was unlawful, the discovery of the firearm must be suppressed because Abbott did not voluntarily abandon the firearm.
DISCUSSION
¶ 8 “In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Whether those facts satisfy the constitutional requirement of reasonableness is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Young, 212 Wis.2d 417, 424, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct.App.1997).
¶ 9 The law governing the legality of a temporary investigative seizure is well established.
A brief investigatory stop is a seizure and is therefore subject to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution that all searches and seizures be reasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). To execute a valid investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer must reasonably suspect, in light of his or her experience, that some kind of criminal activity has taken or is taking place. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. The standard is the same under Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience.
Young, 212 Wis.2d at 423–24, 569 N.W.2d 84 (some citations omitted). In other words, when viewed objectively, the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts must be sufficient for an officer to reasonably conclude, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
¶ 10 In this case, the key facts, as found by the circuit court and not disputed by the parties, are that the police, while patrolling in a defined area that had in the previous one to two weeks seen numerous robberies and burglaries by a group of five to six black men wearing all dark clothing (as described by the victims of those crimes), saw a group of five to six black men wearing all dark clothing near a closed school in that area. One of the men had a hairstyle that resembled the hairstyle reported by the victims. The police then saw the men split into two groups as they passed the school, after the men noticed the police presence. It was as the men reunited and continued into the neighborhood, that Officer Rittner stopped the group to investigate what they were doing. From these facts, a reasonable officer could infer that the men may be the men described by crime victims and, thus, that the men had committed or were about to commit a robbery or burglary. “[A] reasonable police officer who is charged with enforcing the law as well as maintaining peace and order cannot ignore the inference that criminal activity may well be afoot.” State v. Anderson, 155 Wis.2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990).
¶ 11 Abbott argues that “the facts do not provide reasonable suspicion that the men were committing or about to commit a robbery or burglary,” because to so conclude would justify the police stopping any group of black men dressed in dark clothing. Abbott's argument ignores the additional clarifying and narrowing facts that justify the stop here: the pre-defined circumscribed area; the very recent spate of robberies and burglaries in that area; the victims' descriptions of the perpetrators of those crimes as a specified number of black men dressed in dark clothing, which closely resembled the number and dress of the group observed by the police on the night of December 18; the resemblance in hairstyle to one of the perpetrators, as reported by the victims; the group's presence on school property after hours; and their splitting up upon noticing the police. These specific and articulable facts, along with rational inferences from those facts, sufficed to reasonably support Officer Rittner's conclusion, based on his experience, that criminal activity might be afoot, so as to warrant his investigative stop.
¶ 12 The circumstances do not, as Abbott suggests, involve the impermissible practice of simply stopping black men in a high-crime area in hopes of detecting something incriminating. Rather, this is an instance where people living in this area had reported crimes, and there were articulable reasons to think that these particular men might be the perpetrators.
CONCLUSION
¶ 13 Because the stop that led to the discovery of Abbott's firearm was supported by reasonable suspicion, the circuit court properly denied Abbott's motion to suppress, and we affirm his conviction.
Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. RuleE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2011–12).