Opinion
No. 78-802
Decided May 16, 1979.
Mandamus and prohibition — To prevent dissolution of school district — Complaint dismissed, when — Prior court decision res judicata to instant action.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
This appeal by the Bratenahl board of education (Bratenahl) is from a judgment, entered, sua sponte, by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. Bratenahl filed a complaint in prohibition and mandamus in that court on June 28, 1978, seeking to stop the dissolution of the Bratenahl Local School District and to order the State Board of Education (state board) to act on Bratenahl's request for evaluation and accreditation.
The day after the complaint was filed, June 29, 1978, the Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, citing this court's opinion in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., v. State Bd. of Edn. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 173, which held that the Bratenahl Local School District was properly dissolved by the state board on July 1, 1970.
As set forth in this court's opinion in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., supra, this lengthy dispute between the instant parties dates back to 1968, at which time both Bratenahl and the state board agreed by written resolution and order that the Bratenahl Local School District would be dissolved, effective July 1, 1970, because the school district did not have the 12 grades of school required at that time by R.C. 3311.29. Bratenahl did not appeal.
Bratenahl did not request a further postponement of the dissolution date until 1970. Upon the denial of this request, Bratenahl commenced litigation against the state board, and every proceeding since that time has had its origin in the state board's refusal to change its 1968 order.
Bratenahl filed its notice of appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, regarding the state board's refusal to postpone dissolution. The court determined that the action of the state board was not an "adjudication," as the term is used in R.C. Chapter 119, and found that Bratenahl had no right of appeal.
On further appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court held that the action of the state board in 1970 was reviewable and remanded the cause to the Court of Common Pleas. This court denied the state board's motion to certify the record.
As a result of the Court of Appeals' remand, an administrative hearing was eventually commenced. Upon its conclusion, the state board, adopting the findings of the referee, ordered in October of 1974 that the school district be dissolved and merged with the Cleveland City School District.
The Court of Common Pleas affirmed the state board's October 1974 dissolution order. However, the Court of Appeals again reversed the Court of Common Pleas and, in a companion case, issued a writ of mandamus, ordering, inter alia, that the state board determine whether the school district should be granted a charter under R.C. 3301.16.
This court then granted the state board's motion to certify the record and consolidated the cause with the companion mandamus action before the court at that time as a matter of right.
The decision of this court, on March 22, 1978, in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., supra, held that the 1970 refusal of the state board to grant an extension was not "appealable," and that the school district was properly dissolved on July 1, 1970.
Bratenahl has appealed to this court from the June 29, 1978, decision of the Court of Appeals. The cause is now before the court as a matter of right.
Messrs. Arter Hadden, Mr. Thomas V. Koykka, Mr. William S. Burton, Messrs. Chester, Saxbe, Hoffman Willcox and Mr. John J. Chester, for appellant.
Messrs. Alexander, Ebinger, Holschuh, Fisher McAlister and Mr. John D. Holschuh, for appellees.
Bratenahl argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed its complaint sua sponte, by finding that State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., supra, is res judicata to this action. In support of its contention, Bratenahl maintains that this court's decision in that cause dealt only with the narrow issue of whether the 1970 refusal of the state board to grant an additional exception was an "adjudication," whereas here they are attacking the October 1974 dissolution order, issued four years later.
The argument is without merit. This court in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., supra, stated in the syllabus as follows:
"1. The refusal of the State Board of Education to grant a local school district an additional exception to the requirements of R.C. 3311.29 does not constitute an `adjudication' within the meaning of R.C. 119.01 (D).
"2. In the absence of an `adjudication' as defined in R.C. 119.01 (D), the right to notice and hearing does not obtain and, consequently, in such a case the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County lacks jurisdiction under R.C. 119.12 to review actions taken by a state administrative agency ( Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13; M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio St.2d 150, approved and followed.)"
Therefore, since the Court of Common Pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the matter, the decisions of the appellate court, which held that the 1970 refusal of an additional extension was reviewable, were reversed. The majority opinion in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., supra, then concluded, at page 178, "that the Bratenahl Local School District was properly dissolved on July 1, 1970, by the state board."
Even though this court denied certification of the record from the Court of Appeal's initial judgment which found the 1970 refusal to be reviewable, the court was not precluded from reviewing the issue in its decision in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., supra ( 53 Ohio St.2d 173). See paragraph two of the syllabus in Pengelly v. Thomas (1949), 151 Ohio St. 51.
The October 1974 dissolution order was the result of a R.C. Chapter 119 hearing, which was begun in response to the appellate court's decision which found the 1970 refusal to extend the time of dissolution to be an appealable order. However, this court in State, ex rel. Bd. of Edn., supra, clearly held, in reversing the Court of Appeals, that the 1970 refusal was not an appealable order; and, therefore, quite properly concluded that the school district was dissolved as of July 1, 1970, pursuant to the unappealed and agreed upon 1968 order. Appellant's attempt to attack the October 1974 order of the state board through an extraordinary writ is without foundation. There simply was nothing to be dissolved in 1974. The fact that the state board initiated a R.C. Chapter 119 hearing, resulting in the 1974 dissolution order, cannot now be utilized to the prejudice of the state board. The reality of the situation is that it is immaterial whether the 1974 order is valid or invalid. The 1974 order is now nothing but a nullity.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., HERBERT, W. BROWN, P. BROWN and SWEENEY JJ., concur.
LOCHER, J., concurs in the judgment only.
HOLMES, J., not participating because he was a Judge of the Court of Appeals which heard the original case involving the same parties.