Opinion
Case No. 01-3470-JWL
April 21, 2003.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mr. Leon Stamper, Jr. ("Mr. Stamper") brought this Bivens action asserting multiple constitutional violations. The matter is presently before the court on defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 22 and 24). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants' motions and Mr. Stamper's case is dismissed in its entirety.
Mr. Stamper filed his complaint on December 4, 2001. On January 17, 2003, defendant Richard L. Parsons filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On that same day, defendants John Thomas and Tony Wolfe filed their joint motion for summary judgment (Doc. 24).
Mr. Stamper did not respond to these motions within the time contemplated under D. Kan. Rule 6.1(e)(2). As such, on January 29, 2003, this court ordered Mr. Stamper to respond to defendants' motions for summary judgment on or before February 14, 2003 (Doc. 27). When Mr. Stamper did not file his response by that date, the court, on February 28, 2003, ordered Mr. Stamper to show good cause in writing, on or before March 14, 2003, why the court should not consider and decide defendants' motions for summary judgment as uncontested and grant them forthwith (Doc. 28). In that order, the court specifically informed Mr. Parsons that pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 7.4 "[i]f a respondent fails to file a response within the time required by Rule 6.1(e), the motion will be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily will be granted without further notice."
Mr. Stamper did not respond to defendants' motions on or before March 14, 2003. Thus, the court considers defendants' motions as uncontested and, accordingly, grants the motions. In so holding, the court specifically concludes that certain aggravating factors present in this case outweigh the judicial system's strong predisposition to resolve cases on the merits. Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 611 (10th Cir. 1998) (prior to outright dismissal for failure to comply with local court rules, court must consider the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; the amount of interference with the judicial process; and the culpability of the litigant).
Specifically, the court notes that Mr. Stamper, as of the date of this order, has still not responded to defendants' motions for summary judgment nor has he contacted the court in any way regarding this case. Mr. Stamper's failure to respond to defendants' motions and his failure to contact the court demonstrates that his culpability is quite high. Compare id. (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where plaintiff mailed his response more than three days prior to the deadline, demonstrating "little or no culpability on his part in causing the delay") and Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1396 (10th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff herself was not guilty of any dereliction where plaintiff's counsel overlooked motion and therefore failed to respond, resulting in delay of almost two weeks but, once discovered, responded promptly). Moreover, in such circumstances, denying defendants' motions would prejudice defendants in terms of continued time spent and expenses incurred on a case in which Mr. Stamper has shown no interest even after ample notice from the court. Similarly, denying defendants' motions would interfere with the judicial process in terms of docket management and the need for finality to litigation. In other words, the court should not have to continue to manage this case on its docket when Mr. Stamper himself has taken no initiative to keep the case on the court's docket. Compare Murray, 132 F.3d at 611 (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where plaintiff's response to motion was received one day after the fifteen-day deadline and no prejudice to defendants could have resulted from this delay, nor could it have caused interference with the judicial process") and Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 (where plaintiff's counsel overlooked motion and therefore failed to respond, resulting in delay of almost two weeks but, once discovered, responded promptly, defendant would not have been prejudiced in any legal or equitable sense by court's consideration of response and any inconvenience to the court was not so severe a burden as to justify dismissal).
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment. If Mr. Stamper feels aggrieved by this ruling, he may file a motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60. D. Kan. Rule 7.3(a); Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 (court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration following dismissal as uncontested motion).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 22 and 24) are granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.