Opinion
02-CV-4255(JMR/FLN).
November 2, 2004
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant Geoff Maciejewski's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's motion is granted.
Plaintiff and defendant tell two very different stories. The disputed facts — and there are many — are construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 934 (8th Cir. 1999). The "facts" as stated here are for purposes of this Order. They are not, at this early point in the litigation, binding factual determinations.
As the bars closed in the early morning hours of August 2, 2002, a couple of hundred people, many of whom had been drinking, began to congregate on the streets of Dinkytown. Dinkytown is the Minneapolis area abutting the University of Minnesota ("U of M"). Plaintiff and his roommate — both U of M students — were among the crowd. They had been out all evening celebrating the roommate's birthday, ending up at The Library Bar in Dinkytown.
When plaintiff and his roommate left The Library Bar at 1:00 a.m., they found "a general disturbance" roiling on the street. (Raichert Dep. at 11.) The atmosphere was somewhat hostile. People were fighting, throwing bottles, and blocking traffic. The task of managing this kind of disturbance falls to the U of M's police department, an organization well acquainted with bar-closing time in Dinkytown, and in particular, near The Library Bar. (Id. at 9.) But this evening's crowd was "a little bit more agitated than normal." (Id. at 12.)
Defendant Geoff Maciejewski is a member of the U of M police force and arrived at the scene by squad car. His initial attempts to disperse or control the crowd were unsuccessful. In the process, he noticed an injured person he thought may have been assaulted. He quickly apprehended a young man on suspicion of committing the assault, handcuffed him, and put him in the back seat of his squad car. Thereafter, defendant returned to the fracas to further investigate the assault.
At about this time, plaintiff and his roommate left The Library Bar. Plaintiff's roommate saw a group of his friends in the crowd, so he and plaintiff walked over to join them. As plaintiff walked toward the group, he saw Officer Maciejewski push a woman who was crossing the street. Plaintiff confronted Officer Maciejewski and asked why he had pushed the woman. Officer Maciejewski walked toward plaintiff and said the woman had been obstructing him in his investigation of an assault. Plaintiff told Officer Maciejewski to leave the woman alone and pointed to a fight breaking out down the street. At this point, Officer Maciejewski accused plaintiff of obstructing. Plaintiff asked Officer Maciejewski to explain how he was obstructing, and Officer Maciejewski responded by pushing him and instructing him to go home. Plaintiff started to comply, but after a taking a few steps away, he stopped, turned toward Officer Maciejewski, and asked for his badge number.
Officer Maciejewski claims he merely instructed the woman to get out of the street. He further claims he saw a group of at least four people — including plaintiff — standing on the street near the rear of his squad car. This being August, the car's windows were open. Officer Maciejewski was concerned that items could be passed back and forth through the open windows. He states he feared for the detained suspect's safety and told the people in the group to move away from the squad car or risk being arrested for obstruction.
At this point, according to plaintiff, Officer Maciejewski instantly charged at him, yelling "That's it, you're going to jail!" (Spoo Dep. at 27.) Mr. Spoo claims Officer Maciejewski clothes-lined him and tackled him to the ground. Mr. Spoo shouted, "I'm down. I'm down. My hands are behind my back," and was immediately handcuffed. (Id. at 27-28.) Mr. Spoo claims Officer Maciejewski then held him down and punched him in the head.
Two City of Minneapolis police officers — Officers Quehl and Raichert — were also on the scene and rushed to Officer Maciejewski's aid. Officer Raichert acknowledges administering at least two open-handed slaps to Mr. Spoo's head in order to subdue him long enough to get him handcuffed. (Raichert Dep. at 36.) Mr. Spoo claims he was punched at least ten times as he lay handcuffed on the ground. (Spoo Dep. at 30.)
Although Officers Quehl and Raichert are named defendants in this lawsuit, they have not moved for summary judgment.
Defendants contradict Mr. Spoo's version of this take-down and apprehension. Mr. Spoo claims his hands were behind his back, as he acquiesced in the handcuffing; defendants claim one of Mr. Spoo's arms was underneath his body and he refused to put his hand behind his back. (Maciejewski Dep. at 59; Raichert Dep. at 34; Quehl Dep. at 37.) For these purposes, the Court credits Mr. Spoo's assertion.
Defendant claims there is no evidence to support the inference that he was the officer who punched Mr. Spoo. During his deposition, Mr. Spoo was asked which officer hit him, to which he responded: "They all did." (Spoo Dep. at 29.) Later in the deposition, Mr. Spoo said he didn't see any officer's face during the attack because "once I started getting hit, I buried my nose in the ground and closed my eyes." (Id. at 30.) For purposes of this motion, the Court assumes Officer Maciejewski struck Mr. Spoo.
Once in custody, Mr. Spoo was taken to the U of M Police Station on Washington Avenue by U of M Officer Sergeant Erik Stenemann. Mr. Spoo was issued a citation for Obstruction of Legal Process under Minnesota Statute § 609.50 and released. Though he was woozy and dizzy, he walked home to his apartment.
Sergeant Stenemann was originally named as a defendant in this lawsuit, but the claim against him was dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
Mr. Spoo went to the Fairview University Medical Center emergency room the next day and reported dizzy spells, left eye pain, headaches, and memory problems. (See Hageman Aff. F.) He also had facial lacerations and bruised temples. (Id.) The physician examined Mr. Spoo and obtained a CT scan. The scan revealed no injury. Plaintiff, however, was diagnosed with a concussion and prescribed Tylenol for pain. It was suggested he avoid dangerous activities requiring balance. (Id.)
Mr. Spoo made follow-up visits to the student health center on August 5 and August 8. After these visits, he was told to take Ibuprofen for pain, and was prescribed Halcion to help him sleep. (See Hageman aff. I.)
On September 23, 2002, Mr. Spoo appeared in court on the obstruction charge. The matter was continued for dismissal and ultimately dismissed one year later. Mr. Spoo now sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful arrest and excessive force during arrest. Officer Maciejewski moves for summary judgment claiming qualified immunity.
II. Legal Background
Minnesota Statute § 609.50 provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he intentionally:
(1) obstructs, hinders, or prevents the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense; [or] (2) obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties.
Minn. Stat. § 609.50 subd. 1 (2002).
While the statute is broadly drafted, the Minnesota Supreme Court has narrowly construed it. See State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1988). The Court emphasized that the statute criminalizes only "a particular kind of physical act, namely, physically obstructing or interfering with an officer." Id. at 877. Thus, the law does not criminalize "ordinary verbal criticism directed at a police officer even while the officer is performing his official duties" or "the mere act of interrupting an officer, even intentionally." Id. at 878.
The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution protects such verbal criticism. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987) ("The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.").
But "`fighting words' or any other words that by themselves have the effect of physically obstructing or interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties" remain within the statute's ambit. Id. at 877. Thus:
[T]he statute may be used to punish a person who runs beside an officer pursuing a felon in a public street shouting and cursing at the officer if the shouting and cursing physically obstructs the officer's pursuit and if the person intends by his conduct to obstruct or interfere with the officer.Id.
This means words can fall under the statute, but only when their effect is to physically interfere with an officer's ability to carry out his duties. See id.; State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916-17 (Minn. 2002) (holding that it was plain error not to instruct the jury in accordance with the narrowing construction from Krawsky). In the real world of police work, however, the contours of the "words that have the effect of physically interfering" exception are less than clear. Minnesota's only definitive statement on the issue is that the exception does not allow a person to be arrested for merely telling lies to an officer investigating a crime. State v. Tomlin, 622 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. 2001).
Minnesota's Court of Appeals has touched the issue twice. Each case upholds convictions by applying the exception for words that have a physical effect. In State v. Occhino, 572 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997), the court found the jury could have reasonably concluded that the exception applied where defendant refused four separate requests to leave an officer's office, and instead, peppered the officer with questions about a closed investigation. Id. The court found defendant's "intentional repeated verbal interruptions exceeded ordinary verbal criticism of the police and rose to the unlawful level in which his words had the effect of physically interfering" with the officer's duties. Id. at 320-21.
In State v. Hanson, police broke up an underage drinking party in a barn. No. C3-00-1986, 2001 WL 1117681 (Minn.Ct.App. Sept. 25, 2001). Defendant owned the premises and objected loudly to the police presence. Id. at *1. The officers attempted to keep him out of the barn, but he kept returning to tell them to leave. Id. at *3. This distraction allowed some of the underage drinkers to escape and forced the police to modify their tactics. Id. The court decided the jury could reasonably have found that defendant's outbursts were "repeated, deliberate, and physically obstructed the deputies' ability to perform their official duties." Id. at *4.
Though this case is unpublished, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals takes a broad view of the legal sources that are relevant when considering whether law was "clearly established" for qualified immunity purposes. Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 677, 683 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing unpublished case).
b. Summary Judgment Qualified Immunity
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the allegations set forth in its pleadings, but must produce significant probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1992). If the opposing party fails to carry that burden or fails to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment should be granted. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary judgment is also appropriate where the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Qualified immunity shields police officers from suit for official acts as long as their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court is to resolve qualified immunity questions "at the earliest possible stage of litigation." Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1989).
When evaluating a qualified immunity claim, a court first decides whether "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a violation is established, the court must determine whether the right violated was clearly established under the law at the time the violation occurred. Id. A right is clearly established only if "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202;Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines."). Thus, unless the conduct was objectively unreasonable, the officer is afforded qualified immunity. Gorra, 880 F.2d at 97.
III. Discussion
a. The Illegal Arrest Claim
The Fourth Amendment clearly bars arrest without probable cause. See, e.g., Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 2003). Police officers are shielded from suit, however, unless they "knowingly violate[d] the law" or were "plainly incompetent." Gorra, 880 F.2d at 97 (alteration in original) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Thus, an officer's decision to arrest is not objectively unreasonable unless the officer lacked even "arguable probable cause." See id. Here, the Court finds defendant had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing legal process under Minnesota Statute § 609.50. As such, Officer Maciejewski's actions were not objectively unreasonable, and he is entitled to qualified immunity.
1. Actual Probable Cause
Before making this finding, however, the Court first considers whether Mr. Spoo has alleged a violation of his right to be free from arrest without probable cause. Probable cause to arrest exists "when facts known to the officer are sufficient to make a reasonably prudent officer believe that the suspect is committing or has committed an offense." Kiser v. City of Huron, 219 F.3d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court has been explicit: a court cannot simply assume a constitutional violation and skip to the question of whether the conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. This forces courts to "set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established." Id.
Considering the facts and circumstances in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Officer Maciejewski lacked probable cause to arrest him for obstruction. Mr. Spoo was certainly allowed to inquire as to why Officer Maciejewski pushed the woman in the crowd, and he did leave the scene when the Officer instructed him to do so. He arguably crossed the line, however, by redirecting Officer Maciejewski toward another fight down the street and by returning — contrary to Officer Maciejewski's direction — to distract the Officer by demanding to know his badge number.
But after a calm reflection upon Minnesota's case law, far removed from the hurley-burley of August 2, 2002's early hours, the Court perceives that plaintiff's foolish verbal interruptions did not physically prevent Officer Maciejewski from performing his duties. As a result, based on the facts as the Court must construe them, there was not actual probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstruction. Plaintiff has, therefore, alleged a constitutional violation of his right to be free from unlawful arrest.
2. Arguable Probable Cause
Notwithstanding this finding, the Court holds that Officer Maciejewski had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff. In light of plaintiff's conduct in contravention of the Officer's instructions, and considering the unsettled nature of Minnesota's law, a reasonable officer could have concluded that plaintiff's verbal conduct constituted a physical obstruction. As a result, Officer Maciejewski's actions were not objectively unreasonable and he is entitled to qualified immunity on the illegal arrest claim.
The undisputed facts describe a tense and dangerous situation, which was getting riskier as the crowd coalesced. Officer Maciejewski was investigating an assault in this chaotic, highly fluid environment. A suspect was handcuffed in the back of his squad car and the windows were open. Officer Maciejewski had reason to fear for his own safety and that of his detainee.
Though plaintiff objects to defendant's characterization of the circumstances as a "riot," he does not dispute the facts underlying that characterization — namely that a large crowd was milling about the street and spawning fights.
Plaintiff injected himself into the Officer's work. His repeated interference, amid this dangerous environment, badgered the Officer and impeded his efforts at protecting his detainee and maintaining crowd control. Plaintiff would neither leave the scene nor leave Officer Maciejewski alone, despite the Officer's requests to do so.
Considering these facts and Minnesota's unsettled case law, the Court cannot find it "obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded" there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. A reasonable officer could well have considered plaintiff's refusal to follow orders to leave the scene, coupled with his pestering, created a physical interference with Officer Maciejewski's ability to investigate the assault and control the crowd. Cf. Hanson, 2001 WL 1117681 at *3-4. On these facts, the Court cannot find that Officer Maciejewski was "plainly incompetent" or "knowingly violate[d] the law." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. Therefore, Officer Maciejewski is entitled to qualified immunity on the illegal arrest claim.
b. The Excessive Force Claim
To survive the claim of qualified immunity, plaintiff must first allege facts that describe a violation of the constitutional right to be free from excessive force during arrest. In other words, plaintiff must be able to survive the motion for summary judgment on the merits of his case. Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 597, 601 (8th Cir. 2003). The second step of the qualified immunity inquiry "is to ask whether the constitutional right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case." Id. at 601. Here, the Court finds plaintiff has made the initial showing that his constitutional right was violated, but the right violated was not clearly established in the specific context of this case. Accordingly, Officer Maciejewski is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well.
1. A Violation of a Constitutional Right?
The Fourth Amendment clearly protects individuals from excessive force during arrest. See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. At the same time, however, an arrest "necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). An excessive force claim, therefore, requires the Court to balance the intrusion on the individual against countervailing governmental interests. Id.
To show a violation of a constitutional right, plaintiff must present "enough proof in support of his claim that a jury could properly find that the degree of force used against him was not `objectively reasonable.'" Kuha, 365 F.3d at 597; see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. In determining whether the force was objectively reasonable, a court looks closely at the facts and circumstances of the case, "including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Here, Mr. Spoo was arrested for Obstruction of Legal Process, a misdemeanor. He claims he was charged, driven to the ground, and immediately handcuffed. He denies resisting the arrest or trying to flee. He claims Officer Maciejewski held him down and punched his head as he lay handcuffed on the ground.
To the contrary, plaintiff was arrested in large part for refusing to leave.
Compelling evidence supports Officer Maciejewski's statement that he was working in a tense and unpredictable situation fraught with danger. But if a jury credited plaintiff's version of the facts, it could properly find Officer Maciejewski used unreasonable and excessive force to arrest plaintiff by striking him in the head. Cf. Kelly v. Bender, 23 F.3d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995). As such, plaintiff has alleged facts to support his claim of a constitutional violation.
Defendant claims plaintiff's injuries are constitutionally insufficient to support his excessive force claim. The Court cannot agree. Courts have found concussions, bruises, and scrapes — while not serious or permanent — to be "actual injuries" which can support an excessive force claim. See Lambert, 187 F.3d at 936 (finding that a "single small cut of the lateral right eyelid and small scrapes of the right posterior knee and upper calf" were sufficient injuries); Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding each of three plaintiffs had sufficient injuries where one sustained bruises and a facial laceration, another bruised knees and elevated blood pressure, and the third claimed posttraumatic stress disorder).
2. Unreasonable Under Clearly Established Law?
This determination does not, however, resolve the qualified immunity question. The Supreme Court requires courts to "allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Given such pressures, courts must "acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. As a result, unless the law "put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful" in the situation he confronted, "summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. at 202; see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding that while it is not required that the official action in question have previously been held unlawful, "the unlawfulness must be apparent").
According to plaintiff, Officer Maciejewski should have known the force used here was unlawful under Graham v. Conner. He is incorrect. Graham explicitly instructs lower courts to pay "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Id. at 396. And Saucier v. Katz emphasizes that an officer's "mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances" entitles him to qualified immunity if the mistake was reasonable.Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Under these precedents, Officer Maciejewski's alleged mistake was not unreasonable.
The Court has described in detail the fluid and rapidly developing conditions Officer Maciejewski faced. Under these circumstances, Officer Maciejewski needed to swiftly arrest and remove Mr. Spoo from the scene. As in Saucier, "[i]t cannot be said there was a clearly established rule that would prohibit" Officer Maciejewski from tackling Mr. Spoo and striking him to accomplish these legitimate goals. Id. at 208-09; see also Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir. 2001).
The Court's finding that Officer Maciejewski ultimately lacked actual probable cause to arrest Mr. Spoo does not affect the objective reasonableness of the force the officer used to make the arrest. Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 299 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he objective reasonableness of the use of force does not depend on whether the arrest was based on actual or arguable probable cause.").
Plaintiff offers Maynard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997), to advance his contrary view. That case is simply not on all fours. In Maynard, the Eighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment on a claim of excessive force. There, the plaintiff's claim was similar; she claimed she was slapped in the face and punched in the chest while handcuffed. Id. at 1227. But the circumstances were entirely different: the plaintiff was already in the squad car — firmly secured by a "hobble restraint" — and being transported to the police station when the alleged conduct occurred. Id. Whatever happened to plaintiff clearly happened in the heat of his arrest and prior to his transport to the station house. The distinction is not trivial.
Similarly, the circumstances presented in Kelly v. Bender are easily distinguished. 23 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1994). There, the plaintiff claimed he "put up no resistance, yet the officers tackled him, hit him over the head with a flashlight, choked him, and shoved his face into the ground while arresting him for a simple misdemeanor." Id. at 1331. Those officers responded that "they used only the force necessary to overcome [plaintiff's] resistance to their efforts to arrest him." Id. On those facts, the Eighth Circuit found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers used excessive force. Id. There is, however, no suggestion that Kelly occurred while the officers were surrounded by an incendiary crowd of over one hundred drunk and agitated people. This distinction is crucial, because the need to use force in making a swift arrest is magnified when the officer is surrounded by a hostile crowd.
Considering all of the undisputed facts and circumstances of this case, and resolving those which are disputed in favor of plaintiff, the Court concludes that the force Officer Maciejewski used was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. As a result, Officer Maciejewski is entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim.
III. Conclusion
Police officers have a hard job. Like the Navy, they are called upon to sail into harm's way. Faced with tense, uncertain situations — where a show of weakness or indecision can fuel an explosive outburst — we ask them to make difficult judgment calls in real time. The confrontation between Officer Maciejewski and Mr. Spoo took a mere instant — far less time than needed to read a page of this Opinion. Under such circumstances, officers will make mistakes. But the community confers qualified immunity upon police officers to ensure that they cannot be sued for every mistake they make. They are properly made to answer only for their unreasonable mistakes, the kind that demonstrate "plain incompetence" or "knowing" violations of the law. Officer Maciejewski's alleged mistakes do not fall into this category. He is entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
Defendant Maciejewski's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity [Docket No. 15] is granted as to both the unlawful arrest claim and the excessive force claim.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.