Opinion
No. WD 62579
April 27, 2004
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, The Honorable Byron L. Kinder, Judge.
Patricia Hageman, City Counselor, Edward J. Hanlon, Deputy City Counselor, St. Louis, MO, Attorneys for Respondents.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Robert Presson, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Appellants.
Before Smith, P.J., and Holliger and Hardwick, JJ.
The State of Missouri, the Missouri Attorney General, the Missouri State Treasurer, and the Missouri Commissioner of Administration (collectively referred to as the appellants) appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County's summary judgment for the plaintiffs below on their declaratory judgment action and suit for reimbursement from Missouri's State Legal Expense Fund (SLEF). The named plaintiffs (collectively referred to as the respondents) were the members of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners (collectively referred to as the Board) and certain named officers of the St. Louis Police Department (collectively referred to as the Officers). The respondents' lawsuit against the appellants arose out of various lawsuits that had been filed against the Board and the Officers, acting in their official capacities. In their suit below, the respondents alleged that with respect to the underlying lawsuits, they were covered by the SLEF such that they were entitled to representation by the Attorney General and to reimbursement for any monies expended in defending the underlying lawsuits and for any monies expended in satisfaction of any judgment and/or settlement amounts.
The Board members named as plaintiffs in the petition are Wayman Smith, Jeffrey Jamieson, Edward Roth, Clarence Harmon, and Leslie Bond, M.D. The officers named as plaintiffs in the petition are Sergeant Jim Ousley, Lieutenant Art Ruehl, and Officers Antwan Boyd, Bryan Vickers, Thomas Scanlon, Amy Sprout, James Long, James Joyner, Joseph Crews, Joseph Morici, Joseph Speiss, and William March.
The appellants raise two points on appeal. In Point I, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the respondents, declaring that they were covered by the SLEF as to the underlying lawsuits, because even accepting the facts alleged in the respondents' motion for summary judgment as true, they would not be entitled to judgment thereon, as a matter of law. In Point II, they claim that the trial court erred in ordering reimbursement from the SLEF in the amount of $35,065.35 because such relief is barred by sovereign immunity.
We reverse and remand
Facts
On July 29, 1999, the respondents filed a declaratory judgment action. The petition alleged that the respondents had been named as defendants in various lawsuits arising out of actions, which they had taken in their capacities as either members of the Board or as police officers of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. The petition further alleged that the Attorney General had refused to represent them in these actions, asserting that the SLEF did not apply to the respondents as members of the Board or as police officers. In their petition, the respondents not only sought a declaration of the trial court that the SLEF covered the Board and officers of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, but reimbursement from the SLEF for any monies expended by them in defending the underlying lawsuits and for any monies expended in satisfaction of any judgment and/or settlement amounts resulting from those lawsuits.
On March 22, 2000, the appellants filed a motion for summary judgment. On April 18, 2000, the respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the trial court to declare, as a matter of law, that the SLEF applies to the members of the Board and to the Officers, while reserving the question of whether the particular lawsuits identified in the petition were covered. On June 23, 2000, the trial court granted the respondents' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the SLEF applies to and provides coverage to members of the Board and its officers and employees; that the Attorney General was required under the SLEF to defend the Board and its officers and employees; and that the State of Missouri, the State Treasurer and the Commissioner of Administration are required under the terms of the SLEF to pay any judgments which might result from such lawsuits.
The appellants appealed the partial summary judgment to this court, which reversed. The case was then transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court, which, in Smith v. State , 63 S.W.3d 218 (Mo. banc 2001), dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial court's judgment was not final for the purposes of appeal because it did not dispose of all the issues raised in the respondents' petition, nor was it properly certified for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b). Specifically, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the trial court's judgment did not resolve the respondents' claim, raised in the petition, that they were entitled to reimbursement for any judgments rendered against them, as well as for any monies expended in defending the underlying lawsuits.
On October 30, 2002, on remand to the circuit court, the respondents filed an amended motion for summary judgment, which differed from their original motion in that it specified the amount of reimbursement that they were seeking from the SLEF, including monies for the settlements that had been entered into in the underlying lawsuits in the interim. On January 27, 2003, the trial court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, finding that the SLEF covered the Board and its officers and employees; that the Attorney General is required under the terms of the SLEF to provide a defense to members of the Board and its officers and employees when they are named as defendants in lawsuits arising out of actions taken by them in their official capacities; and that the State of Missouri, the State Treasurer and the Commissioner of Administration are required under the terms of the SLEF to pay any judgments which might result from such lawsuits. In addition, the trial court ordered that the respondents were to be reimbursed by the SLEF in the amount of $35,065.35 for settlement amounts, costs, and attorney's fees related to the lawsuits specified in the respondents' petition.
This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment:
[o]ur review is essentially de novo. The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law. As the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment.
ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993) (citations omitted). Summary judgment will be upheld on appeal if: (1) there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 380.
When considering appeals from summary judgments, the [c]ourt will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party's motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion. We accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.
Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
I.
In Point I, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the respondents, declaring that they were covered by the SLEF as to the underlying lawsuits, because even accepting the facts alleged in the respondents' motion for summary judgment as true, they would not be entitled to judgment thereon, as a matter of law. We agree.
To be entitled to summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts on which he relies for summary judgment; and (2) on those facts, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04; Block Properties Co. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co. , 998 S.W.2d 168, 173 (Mo.App. 1999). A movant's right to judgment as a matter of law differs significantly depending upon whether that movant is a "claimant" or a "defending party." ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. , 854 S.W.2d at 381. A claimant must establish that there is no genuine dispute as to those material facts upon which the claimant would have had the burden of persuasion at trial, entitling the claimant to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Thus, as claimants, the respondents, to be entitled to summary judgment on their petition, were required to allege undisputed facts proving each and every element of their claim.
In their petition for declaratory judgment and reimbursement by the SLEF, the respondents alleged that they were covered by the SLEF and thus, were entitled to being defended by the Missouri Attorney General with respect to various lawsuits filed against them for actions taken in their official capacities, and to be reimbursed for any judgments entered against them, as well as for legal fees and other costs incurred in defending and settling those lawsuits. In support of their motion for summary judgment, they alleged facts, which they contend demonstrate that for purposes of the SLEF, the Board was a state agency and the Officers were state officers. On appeal, the appellants do not challenge the material facts on which the respondents relied for summary judgment. Rather, they contend that those facts do not entitle the respondents to judgment as a matter of law.
In determining the issue presented in this point, we necessarily have to interpret §§ 105.711 and 105.716, governing the SLEF. Section 105.711 provides, in pertinent part:
1. There is hereby created a "State Legal Expense Fund" which shall consist of moneys appropriated to the fund by the general assembly and moneys otherwise credited to such fund pursuant to section 105.716.
2. Moneys in the state legal expense fund shall be available for the payment of any claim or any amount required by any final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction against:
(1) The state of Missouri, or any agency of the state, pursuant to section 536.050 or 536.087, RSMo, or section 537.600, RSMo;
(2) Any officer or employee of the state of Missouri or any agency of the state, including, without limitation, elected officials, appointees, members of state boards or commissions and members of the Missouri national guard upon conduct of such officer or employee arising out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on behalf of the state, or any agency of the state, provided that moneys in this fund shall not be available for payment of claims made under chapter 287, RSMo;
. . .
4. All payments shall be made from the state legal expense fund by the commissioner of administration with the approval of the attorney general.
Section 105.716 provides, in pertinent part, that: "Any investigation, defense, negotiation, or compromise of any claims covered by sections 105.711 to 105.726 shall be conducted by the attorney general."
Statutory interpretation is purely a question of law, which we determine de novo. Pavlica v. Dir. of Revenue , 71 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Mo.App. 2002). In interpreting a statute we are to determine the intent of the legislature, giving the language used its plain and ordinary meaning. Baxley v. Jarred , 91 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Mo.App. 2002). If the intent of the legislature is clear and unambiguous, giving the language used its plain and ordinary meaning, then we do not resort to statutory construction. Id. In determining the legislature's intent, we are to read the statute as a whole and in pari materia with related sections. Preston v. State , 33 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Mo.App. 2000).
A. Is the Board a State Agency for purposes of §§ 105.711.2(1) and 105.716.1?
We first address whether under the facts alleged in the respondents' motion for summary judgment the Board would be considered, as a matter of law, a "state agency" for purposes of the SLEF. In that regard, the respondents contend on appeal, as they did in their motion, that the Board is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF because it has been previously recognized as a state agency by the Missouri Supreme Court, citing State ex rel. Sayad v. Zych , 642 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. banc 1982). The appellants, however, argue that the Court's determination that the Board was a state agency in Zych is limited to the context in which the determination was made.
In Zych , the Court was confronted with the limited issue of whether the St. Louis Police Board was a state agency for purposes of article X, section 21, of the Missouri Constitution, commonly referred to as the Hancock Amendment. The Hancock Amendment, which was enacted to "rein in increases in governmental revenue and expenditures," Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden , 959 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Mo. 1997), prohibits state agencies from requiring increased activity of cities or other political subdivisions without an attendant state appropriation to cover the increased cost. Zych , 642 S.W.2d at 911. In holding that the Board was a state agency for the purposes of the Hancock Amendment, the Court relied on the fact that it was performing a state function. Id. at 910. The state function to which the Court was alluding was the fact that the state, which the Court recognized has having the power to compel municipalities to create and fund a police force, had delegated that power to the Board. Id. Given the fact that the Board was exercising the state's power to compel the City of St. Louis to appropriate city funds for a specific purpose, the Court logically concluded that for purposes of the Hancock Amendment, the Board stood in the shoes of the state. That, of course, is a different context than the context of our case. Thus, unless the respondents are correct in their assertion that once declared a state agency by the Court, the Board was a state agency for all purposes, including for purposes of the SLEF, Zych is not controlling.
In contending that the Court's holding in Zych should be limited to the particular context involved, the appellants cite Cates v. Webster , 727 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. banc 1987). In that case, the Missouri Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether the bailiff of an associate division of the circuit court, who was under the control of the presiding associate circuit judge, a state employee, but was paid by the county, was an "employee of the state or any agency thereof," for purposes of the SLEF, such that he was covered by the fund, with respect to an underlying tort action filed against him. Noting that § 105.711.2(2) did not define the phrase "employee of the state of Missouri or any agency thereof," the Court stated that "[t]o determine the intent and meaning of the words they must be considered in their context." 727 S.W.2d at 905. In contending that the bailiff was a state employee, the respondent urged the adoption of a "control test" and pointed to the fact that the bailiff was under the control of a state employee, the associate circuit judge. In contending that the bailiff was not a state employee, the appellant urged the adoption of a "payment test" and pointed to the fact that the bailiff was paid by the county. In holding that the record and the law supported the fact that the bailiff was a county employee for purposes of the SLEF, not a state employee, the Court found that the "classification of employees as state and nonstate employees within the judicial system for purposes of [ § 105.711.2(2)] turns upon `who pays the employee.'" Id. In holding as it did, the Court stated that "the term `employee' may have different meanings in different connections" and "[w]e need not decide whether appellant might be considered a state employee for other purposes." Id. at 906. From this, we conclude, as argued by the appellants, that the Court was clearly recognizing the fact that whether an employee is a state employee depends on the particular context in question. As the Court said in Cates , "[t]o determine the intent and meaning of the words [of a statute] they must be considered in their context." Id. at 905.
Logically, the Court's rationale in Cates would apply to agencies as well as employees such that whether an agency is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF would depend on the specific context in question. See also Butler v. Mitchell-Hugeback, Inc. , 895 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Mo. banc 1995) (stating that the meaning of a statutory term "must depend to some extent on the context in which it appears"). Hence, as the appellants contend, the mere fact that the Court in Zych determined that the St. Louis Police Board was a state agency for purposes of the Hancock Amendment is not conclusive on whether it is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF.
Having determined that the Missouri Supreme Court's prior determination in Zych that the Board is a state agency for purposes of the Hancock Amendment is not conclusive on the issue of whether it is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF, we now turn to analyzing that issue. In that regard, while acknowledging that the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the SLEF was to extend coverage to the three branches of government, citing In re 1983 Budget for the Circuit Court of St. Louis County , 665 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Mo. banc 1984), the appellants contend in their brief that the history of the SLEF suggested that it never intended to extend its coverage "beyond the traditional understanding of what constitutes state government." In that vein, the appellants further contend that the Board does not have the characteristics of the executive branch and should, therefore, not be considered a state agency, in that it does not have statewide responsibilities and is not funded by the state. The appellants further contend that in interpreting the extent of the coverage of the SLEF, weight should be given to the fact that the Attorney General has consistently interpreted it as not extending coverage to the Board, citing Linton v. Missouri Veterinary Medical Board , 988 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. banc 1999) for the proposition that great weight is to be given to the executive official charged with the primary responsibility of carrying out the statutory provision in question. The respondents counter the appellants' contention with the fact that there are specific instances in the statutes extending SLEF coverage to employees who do not have statewide responsibilities and are not paid by the state.
In concluding that the Board is a state agency, the trial court relied not only on Zych , but also on Bittner v. St. Louis Police Board of Commissioners , 925 S.W.2d 495 (Mo.App. 1996). Bittner is of no consequence in determining the issue presented. There, the appellate court merely concluded that the Board was entitled to sovereign immunity. Inasmuch as sovereign immunity extends to many governmental entities that are not covered by the SLEF, see, e.g., Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Smith , 991 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Mo.App. 1999), the fact the Board would be entitled to sovereign immunity sheds no light on whether it is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF.
In contending as they do, the respondents point to the fact that the legislature expressly provides for coverage by the SLEF in instances where the individuals in question are not paid by the state or who do not have statewide responsibilities, circumstances the appellants assert as being indicative of a state employee for purposes of the SLEF. As to the first instance, the respondents point to the fact that pursuant to § 105.711.2(3) and (4), certain health care practitioners and staff employed by the juvenile division of a circuit court are expressly covered by the fund, even though they are not paid by the state. As to the second instance, they point to the fact that members of the judiciary and their employees are covered by the SLEF, yet do not have statewide responsibilities. While the respondents are correct in their assertion of these facts, we do not agree with their assertion that these facts demonstrate that these factors are not to be considered in determining whether the Board is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF.
The respondents cite § 105.711.2(3)(b) (physicians employed by or under contract with a city or county health department); § 105.711.2(3)(c) (physicians employed by or under contract with a federally funded community health center); § 105.711.2(3)(d) (physicians, nurses, physician's assistants, dental hygienists or dentists who provide services at a city or county health department or nonprofit community health center); § 105.711.2(3)(e) (physicians, nurses, physician's assistants, dental hygienists or dentists who provide services to students at public, private or parochial elementary or secondary schools); § 105.711.2(4) (staff employed by the juvenile division of a circuit court).
It goes without saying that the legislature is free to extend the coverage of the SLEF as it sees fit. While it saw fit, for whatever reason, to expressly extend coverage to certain health care practitioners and juvenile division staff who are not paid by the state, it failed to expressly extend coverage to the Board, which is also not paid or funded by the state. Common sense tells us that the legislature, in extending coverage to a specified group of individuals, who are not paid by the state, did not intend to extend coverage to all government employees who are not paid by the state. In fact, an argument could be made that in specifying one group of government employees, who are not paid by the state, for coverage, but not specifying the Board, that the legislature intended to exclude the Board from coverage. See McNally v. St. Louis County Police Dep't , 17 S.W.3d 614, 616 (Mo.App. 2000) (stating that when a statute enumerates certain persons affected, it is to be construed as excluding all those not expressly mentioned). In other words, the named class of employees for coverage represented the exception, not the rule. Furthermore, as § 105.711.2(3) and (4) clearly express the Legislature's intent to extend coverage to certain individuals who are not employees or officers of the state or a state agency, as those terms are used in § 105.711.2(2), there is no logical inconsistency with any criteria which might be applied to determining who is an employee or officer of the state or a state agency for the purposes of § 105.711.2(2).
While we might agree with the assertion that payment by the state is not necessarily conclusive on the issue of determining whether the Board is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF, it certainly is a relevant inquiry. Despite the respondents' assertion to the contrary, this proposition is supported by the Court's decision in Cates. In Cates , as discussed, supra, the Court reasoned that the bailiff was a county employee, not a state employee, because he was not paid by the state. In doing so, the Court noted that when "determining whether [an individual] is an employee of the state or agency thereof, it is significant that elsewhere the legislature has made the designation of certain judicial personnel as state employees dependent on their being paid by the state." Cates , 727 S.W.2d at 905. What we learn from Cates and the express language of § 105.711.2(3), extending coverage to certain health and dental care professionals not paid by the state, is that, in the absence of express statutory language, while payment by the state is not conclusive on the issue of whether an agency is a state agency for purposes of the SLEF, it is a relevant inquiry.
As to an employee or agency having statewide responsibilities being indicative of a state employee or agency, for purposes of the SLEF, logic suggests that this would be true, in the absence of statutory language to the contrary. In pointing to the fact that the judiciary is included as being covered by the SLEF, the respondents overlook the fact that it is paid by the state, which the Court found in Cates was sufficient for extending coverage. Thus, the judiciary cannot be used as an example for contending that the lack of a statewide function can never be indicative of state status for purposes of the SLEF.
In the absence of any express language in the implicated statutes that would indicate the legislature's intent with respect to whether the Board was covered under the SLEF, we must look to the overall context of the phrase, "state agency." In that regard, inasmuch as the Board is not funded by the state and does not perform a statewide function, we cannot find any reasonable basis on which to classify it as a state agency for purposes of the SLEF.
The respondents make no real challenge on appeal to the appellant's contention that the duties of the Board are local, and not statewide. Section 84.090 provides that the duties of the Board exist "within the boundaries of" the St. Louis metropolitan area. The Board performs the local function of protecting the municipality's own citizens and their property. See, Turner v. Kansas City , 191 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Mo. 1945). And, it is clear from the relevant statutory provisions that the Board and its functions are not funded by the state, but by the municipality. Section 84.160.4 provides that "[i]t is the duty of the municipal assembly or common council of the cities to make the necessary appropriation for the expenses of the maintenance of the police force[.]" Section 84.210.1 requires the City of St. Louis to appropriate, out of its own revenues, the amount of the yearly operating budget certified by the Board. See also, Am. Fire Alarm Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Kansas City , 227 S.W. 114, 117 (Mo. 1920), abrogated on other grounds by Reifschneider v. City of Des Peres Pub. Safety Comm'n , 776 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1989) (noting that "the expense of the police systems, including the board of police of the cities, is borne entirely by the municipalities, is paid out of their treasuries"). Thus, the Board obtains almost all its funds for its operations from the City of St. Louis, supplemented (as noted in § 84.210.1) by governmental and private grants and forfeitures. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, on the facts alleged in the respondents' motion for summary judgment the Board is a "state agency" for the purposes of the SLEF. Thus, there was no proper basis for the trial court to conclude that the Board is a "state agency" covered by the SLEF.
B. Are the Officers state officers for purposes of §§ 105.711.2(1) and 105.716.1?
Having determined that the Board is not a "state agency" for purposes of the SLEF, we now turn to the question of whether the Officers are state officers for purposes of § 105.711.2(2). The respondents contend that the Officers are covered under the SLEF on two bases: (1) they are employees of a state agency, the Board; or (2) they are expressly named as state officers in § 84.330. Having already found that the Board is not a state agency, only leaves the second basis for finding coverage for the Officers. Thus, the issue is whether on the facts pled in their motion, the Officers are considered, pursuant to § 84.330, state officers for purposes of the SLEF.
Section 84.330, provides:
The members of the police force of the cities covered by sections 84.010 to 84.340, organized and appointed by the police commissioners of said cities, are hereby declared to be officers of the said cities, under the charter and ordinances thereof, and also to be officers of the state of Missouri, and shall be so deemed and taken in all courts having jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of this state or the ordinances of said cities.
(Emphasis added.) As the appellants point out in their brief, § 84.330 provides that St. Louis police officers are officers of both the City of St. Louis and the State of Missouri. Thus, the declaration of the statute goes both ways when it comes to determining the issue presented. This is consistent with long-standing case law which observes that St. Louis police officers are state officers "for some purposes," and officers of the city for others. Carrington v. City of St. Louis , 1 S.W. 240, 241 (Mo. 1886). Given this dual status, the question of which status is applicable in this case is, as in the case of the Board, a matter of context. Cates , 727 S.W.2d at 905.
When we considered, supra, whether the Board is a state agency for the purposes of the SLEF, we determined that, where the relevant statutory language does not express the intent of the legislature on this matter, there is no reasonable basis for classifying the Board as a state agency because it is not funded by the state and does not perform a statewide function. It is logical that the same analysis would apply in the case of the Officers. Consequently, if the Officers are not paid by the state and do not perform a statewide function, there would be no reasonable basis for the trial court to conclude that they are officers of the state for the purposes of the SLEF.
It is undisputed that the Officers are paid by the city and not by the state. Their compensation is provided for in the St. Louis police department's annual budget, and § 84.210.1 requires the City of St. Louis to appropriate, out of its own revenues, the amount of the yearly operating budget certified by the Board. It is undisputed that the Officers are paid by the city. In fact, in their response to the appellants' request for admissions, the respondents admitted that "[n]one of the plaintiffs are paid by the State of Missouri for their service on behalf of the St. Louis Police Department or the Board of Police Commissioners."
It is also clear that the Officers' duties are local, rather than statewide. The Officers enable the Board to perform the duties imposed on it, § 84.100, and those duties exist "within the boundaries of" the City of St. Louis. § 84.090. Thus, the Officers perform a local function, which is protecting the municipality's own citizens and their property. See, Turner , 191 S.W.2d at 616.
The respondents argue that the Officers perform a statewide function because § 84.090(10) authorizes St. Louis City police officers to make arrests anywhere in the state. Section 84.090(10) provides:
In case they shall have any reason to believe that any person within said cities intends to commit any breaches of the peace, or violation of the law or order beyond the city limits, any person charged with the commission of crime in said cities and against whom criminal process shall have issued, may be arrested upon the same in any part of this state by the police force created or authorized by sections 84.010 to 84.340; provided, however, that before the person so arrested shall be removed from the county in which such arrest is made he shall be taken before some judge, to whom the papers authorizing such arrest shall be submitted; and the person so arrested shall not be removed from said county, but shall forthwith be discharged, unless such judge shall endorse and approve said papers.
Giving the language of § 84.090(10) its plain and ordinary meaning, it authorizes St. Louis City police officers, under certain circumstances, to arrest anywhere in the state, a defendant charged for a crime that occurred within the city. Hence, while this section authorizes St. Louis City police officers to arrest statewide, it confines itself to crimes committed within the city. Thus, the extent of enforcement of the laws remains a local function. This limited extension of the powers of arrest does not convince us that the Officers are state officers for purposes of the SLEF.
For the reasons stated, we find that under the undisputed facts alleged in the respondents' motion for summary judgment and the applicable law, the Officers were not state officers for purposes of the SLEF and thus, the trial court erred in granting them summary judgment, requiring us to reverse. And, because we are reversing, we need not address the appellants' second point on appeal, in that it is now moot.
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, we normally would remand for further proceedings. However, in some cases involving cross-motions for summary judgment, as here, in reviewing and reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, we necessarily conclude that on the undisputed facts and the applicable law, the court should have granted the competing motion. Stotts v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co. , 118 S.W.3d 655, 668 (Mo.App. 2003). In such cases, to reverse and remand without ordering the trial court to enter summary judgment for the adverse party would be illogical. Id. Such is the case here, as our conclusion that, as a matter of law, the respondents are not covered by the SLEF, leads to the conclusion that the appellants' motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Hence, in accordance with Rule 84.14, we reverse and remand for the trial court to enter the judgment it ought to have given in the first instance, which was to have sustained the appellants' motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
The summary judgment of the circuit court for the respondents is reversed and the cause is remanded to the court with directions for it to grant the appellants' motion for summary judgment.
Holliger and Hardwick, JJ., concur.