Opinion
No. 1D21-3201
03-09-2022
Robert SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Robert Smith, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Robert Smith, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
Robert Smith appeals an order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Smith argues that his prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentences are illegal because the trial court, not a jury, found that he qualified for such a sentence. Finding no merit in Smith's argument, we affirm.
In 2005, Smith was convicted of robbery with a firearm, aggravated battery with a firearm, and burglary while armed with a firearm. The trial court found that Smith qualified for sentencing as a PRR. And it imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment on counts one and three and a concurrent term of fifteen years in prison on count two. This Court affirmed Smith's judgment and sentence on direct appeal. Smith v. State , 930 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (unpublished table decision).
In 2021, Smith challenged the legality of his PRR sentences in a rule 3.800(a) motion, arguing that the trial court rather than a jury determined a fact that increased his sentence. The trial court concluded that it was unnecessary for a jury to determine whether a defendant qualifies for PRR sentencing. And so, it denied Smith's motion and his motion for rehearing. This timely appeal follows.
We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a motion to correct sentencing error. Ray v. State , 68 So. 3d 346, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Smith argues on appeal that his PRR designation violates Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), because the trial court, rather than a jury, determined that he committed the charged offense within three years of his release from prison. But the Florida Supreme Court has already rejected this argument. See Robinson v. State , 793 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2001) (rejecting the argument that Apprendi requires a jury to determine whether a defendant qualifies for PRR sentencing). And this Court has explained that Alleyene does not require a jury to make the PRR factual determination because whether a defendant committed the charged offense within three years of being released from prison was a fact about a prior conviction, not an element or ingredient of the charged offense. Williams v. State , 143 So. 3d 423, 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). For these reasons, the trial court did not err when it denied Smith's postconviction motion.
We also write to warn Smith against filing future frivolous appeals or petitions in this Court. Smith has filed five appeals from orders denying postconviction motions: 1D07-6289, 1D08-3218, 1D15-0651, 1D15-1746, and 1D17-3187. These cases reveal a history of filing repetitious and frivolous postconviction motions. Smith has not obtained relief in any of these cases, and his current appeal is frivolous. Smith is thus warned that future frivolous appeals or petitions may result in the Court imposing sanctions against him, including a prohibition on further pro se filings in this Court related to the judgment and sentence in Alachua County case number 2002-CF-667-A. This Court may also make a referral to the Department of Corrections for disciplinary action under section 944.279, Florida Statutes.
AFFIRMED .
Rowe, C.J., and Jay and Long, JJ., concur.