Opinion
Case No.: 3:13-CV-192
12-11-2013
LIA SMITH-HUTCHINSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ITS FINANCIAL LLC, et al., Defendants.
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman
(Consent Case)
ORDER
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Defendant Shelley Franz. Doc. 47. Defendants have not filed an opposition, so the motion is unopposed.
Plaintiffs' motion provides both that "Plaintiffs have concluded that the claims against Defendant Shelley Franz should be dismissed with prejudice" and that "Plaintiffs pray this Court enter its Order dismissing all claims against Defendant Shelley Franz without prejudice." Doc. 47.
Plaintiffs do not identify the specific Rule on which they rely. "The Sixth Circuit has suggested, without conclusively deciding the issue, that the dismissal of all claims against less than all defendants should be pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 as opposed to Rule 41." Terry v. City of Columbus, No. 2:06-cv-720, 2008 WL 2697312, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2008) (citing Letherer v. Alger Grp., L.L.C., 328 F.3d 262, 265-66 (6th Cir. 2003)); see also NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, No. 1:11-cv-451, 2011 WL 6751459, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2011) (striking a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) that purported to remove an individual party from the case because dismissal of a party required leave of court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, "[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party." See Sutherland v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 612-13 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal of an individual defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21). A district court enjoys wide discretion in determining whether it is proper to dismiss an individual party in a civil action. See Letherer, 328 F.3d at 266-68 (construing the district court's dismissal of an individual party as an action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 and affirming the ruling because the party dismissed was "neither seeking relief nor having relief sought from it").
The Court construes Plaintiffs' motion as seeking to dismiss Defendant Franz with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. In support of the motion, Plaintiffs state that Defendant Franz "is not necessary for full and complete adjudication of the matters in this case." Doc. 47. For good cause shown, Plaintiffs' unopposed motion (doc. 47) is GRANTED and Defendant Shelley Franz is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Michael J. Newman
United States Magistrate Judge