Opinion
CIVIL NO: 1:13-CV-02711
06-28-2019
TYRONE SINGLETON, Plaintiff v. LAUREL HARRY, et al., Defendants
(Judge Rambo) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
In this civil rights case, the plaintiff, Tyrone Singleton ("Singleton"), alleges that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania ("SCI Camp Hill"). This court reached a final decision in the defendants' favor on July 20, 2017, which Singleton appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the case to this court for consideration of one remaining issue: whether the defendants violated Singleton's right to due process when they held him in solitary confinement for 402 days. Ultimately, we find that Singleton has adequately pleaded a violation of his right to procedural due process and accordingly recommend that the court deny the defendants' request to dismiss his remaining claim. II. Background and Procedural History.
Because this court has already decided a motion for summary judgment in this case (see doc. 42-43), some of the facts in this section are taken from the defendants' statement of material facts in support of their motion for summary judgment and Singleton's response thereto. See docs. 34, 38. All facts that are not taken from those documents are taken from the factual allegations in Singleton's amended complaint (doc. 19) and are accepted as true for the purpose of this opinion in accordance with the standards for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Krieger v. Bank of America, 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018).
In 2012, Singleton was a parolee from New York state and was living in Pennsylvania under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Doc. 34 ¶ 1; doc. 38 ¶ 1. On December 27, 2012, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole filed a report stating that Singleton had operated a vehicle while intoxicated and had injured another person while doing so. Doc. 34 ¶ 2. As a result of that incident, Singleton was taken into custody in Pennsylvania and incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill. See doc. 19 ¶¶ 5, 10. While incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, Singleton was housed in solitary confinement for 402 days. Id. ¶¶ 15- 17. Singleton was not given a hearing to determine whether his placement in solitary confinement was proper. Id. ¶ 17.
Although Singleton filed a response to the defendants' statement of material facts and responded to many of the paragraphs in the defendants' statement, there are a number of paragraphs to which he did not respond. See generally doc. 38. Under Local Rule 56.1, "[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party." M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Accordingly, because Singleton did not respond to this fact in his response to the defendants' statement of material facts, it is deemed admitted for the purpose of this litigation.
This litigation began on November 5, 2013 when Singleton filed a complaint against three defendants: Laurel Harry ("Harry"), the Superintendent of SCI Camp Hill; Scott Whalen ("Whalen"), a Unit Manager at SCI Camp Hill; and Lisa Peters ("Peters"), a Parole Supervisor at SCI Camp Hill. Doc. 1 at 3. The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated Singleton's rights under the U.S. Constitution while he was incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill. Id. at 4.
On February 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and a supporting brief. Docs. 13-14. The defendants argued that Singleton's complaint should be dismissed as moot to the extent that it complained that his detention was illegal or that his housing assignment violated the Constitution. Doc. 14 at 3. The defendants further argued that Singleton's complaint was barred by the favorable-termination rule under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. "Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. at 487.
We issued a report and recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss on July 29, 2015. Doc. 17. We recommended that Singleton's complaint be dismissed as moot to the extent that it sought injunctive and declaratory relief because Singleton was no longer incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill. Id. at 9. We also construed Singleton's complaint as raising a due process claim (doc. 17 at 6), which we recommended the court dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Singleton had not alleged how much time he had spent in solitary confinement in SCI Camp Hill. Id. at 12-13. Finally, we recommended that Singleton be given leave to file an amended complaint. Id. at 15. Judge Rambo adopted our report and recommendation on September 24, 2015, allowing Singleton to file an amended complaint on or before October 19, 2015. Doc. 18 at 1.
Singleton filed an amended complaint on October 7, 2015. Doc. 19. Singleton's amended complaint again named Harry, Whalen, and Peters as defendants and alleged that they had violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6-8. Singleton alleged that he was illegally incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill because his incarceration was allegedly based on a detainer from New York state, but no such detainer existed. See id. ¶¶ 10-13. Singleton also alleged that he was housed in solitary confinement for 402 days while in SCI Camp Hill without a hearing to determine whether that housing status was proper. See id. ¶¶ 15-17.
The defendants moved to dismiss Singleton's amended complaint on October 22, 2015 and filed a brief in support of their motion on November 5, 2015. Docs. 20-21. The defendants argued that Singleton's illegal detention claim was barred by the favorable-termination rule under Heck. Doc. 21 at 5. The defendants further argued that Singleton's due process claim should be dismissed because Third Circuit case law established that procedural due process protections were not triggered when a prisoner was placed in solitary confinement for 402 days. Id. at 6. Finally, the defendants argued that Singleton had failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 8-9.
We addressed the defendants' motion to dismiss in a report and recommendation on August 4, 2016. Doc. 24. We found that it was premature to dismiss Singleton's illegal detention claim under Heck because it was not clear from the face of Singleton's complaint whether his parole was ever revoked in New York. Id. at 14. We found that Singleton had failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief could be granted because solitary confinement did not per se violate the Eighth Amendment and Singleton had not alleged facts from which an Eighth Amendment violation could be reasonably inferred. Id. at 17. We found that Singleton's due process claim should be construed as a procedural due process claim because he was "complaining about being confined without a hearing." Id. at 19. We found that Singleton's due process claim should be dismissed because he had neither an independent nor a state-created liberty interest in being housed in general population rather than restricted housing. Id. at 22, 25. We accordingly recommended that the court grant the defendants' motion to dismiss as to all of Singleton's claims other than his illegal detention claim. Id. at 26. Judge Rambo adopted our report and recommendation on September 13, 2016. Docs. 31-32.
On October 28, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a supporting brief. Docs. 33, 35. The defendants provided documentation that Singleton's parole had been revoked in New York state and therefore renewed their argument that Singleton's remaining claim was barred by Heck. Doc. 35 at 5-9. We recommended that the motion for summary judgment be granted on May 5, 2017, finding that Singleton's parole had been revoked and that his illegal detention claim was therefore barred by Heck. Doc. 40 at 16-17. Judge Rambo adopted our report and recommendation on July 20, 2017, granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Singleton's remaining claim. Docs. 42-43.
Singleton appealed this court's decision to the Third Circuit on August 16, 2017. See Singleton v. Superintendent Camp Hill SCI, No. 17-2780 (3d Cir. filed Aug. 16, 2017). The Third Circuit issued a decision in the case on August 27, 2018. Singleton v. Superintendent Camp Hill SCI, 747 F. App'x 89 (3d Cir. 2018). The court upheld this court's judgment as to all of Singleton's claims except his claim that his due process rights were violated when he was housed in solitary confinement without a hearing. Id. at 92. The court determined that Singleton was a pretrial detainee when he was held in solitary confinement and reasoned that "[w]hile 'pretrial detainees do not have a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population, they do have a liberty interest in not being detained indefinitely in disciplinary segregation without explanation or review of their confinement." Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 375 (3d Cir. 2012)). The court determined that this court had not addressed Singleton's procedural due process claim and accordingly vacated and remanded for consideration of that issue. Id.
After the Third Circuit remanded the case to this court, we issued an order for additional briefing on October 22, 2018, requiring Singleton to file a brief "detailing whether and how his procedural due process rights were violated when he was placed in solitary confinement as a pretrial detainee." Doc. 51. Singleton filed his brief on November 26, 2018. Doc. 52. The defendants filed a brief in opposition on February 19, 2019. Doc. 60. We address the parties' arguments below.
III. Discussion.
In his November 26, 2018 brief, Singleton argues that he was placed in solitary confinement without a hearing on whether he should be placed in solitary confinement and that this placement was arbitrary. Doc. 52 at 1-3. The defendants argue that Singleton's due process claim should be dismissed. Doc. 60 at 1. The defendants raise three arguments for dismissal. Specifically, the defendants argue (1) that Singleton's claim should be dismissed because Singleton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) that Singleton's claim should be dismissed because his amended complaint does not allege that any of the defendants were personally involved in denying Singleton due process; and (3) that Singleton is a parole violator rather than a pretrial detainee, and that under the standards applicable to parole violators, his procedural due process rights were not violated. Id. at 5-7. We address these arguments for dismissal seriatim.
A. Motion to Dismiss and Pleading Standards.
Because the defendants' brief argues for the dismissal of Singleton's remaining claim, we turn to a discussion of the legal standards governing dismissal of complaints. A federal court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
In deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal court "must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Krieger v. Bank of America, 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. County of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. In practice, this leads to a three-part standard:
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must: 'First, take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Complaints brought pro se are afforded more leeway than those drafted by attorneys. In determining whether to dismiss a complaint brought by a pro se litigant, a federal district court is "required to interpret the pro se complaint liberally." Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018). "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
B. It Is Not Clear from the Face of Singleton's Amended Complaint that He Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
In their first argument for the dismissal of Singleton's remaining claim, the defendants argue that the claim should be dismissed because Singleton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at 5. In his amended complaint, Singleton alleged that he had fully exhausted his administrative remedies and stated that he had appealed his grievance to final review. Doc. 19 at 1.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." The exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory under § 1997e. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
Section 1997e requires "proper exhaustion" of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). In other words, it requires more than simple exhaustion, i.e., more than there being no further process available to the prisoner within the grievance system. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-31 (3d Cir. 2004). An inmate must comply with all procedural requirements of the grievance system made available to him to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.
The procedural requirements of the prison in which an inmate is incarcerated determine whether the inmate has properly exhausted his administrative remedies. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) ("The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion."). "Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to 'properly exhaust.'" Id.
"Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff." Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 216-17); see also Robinson v. Superintendent SCI Rockview, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that [the defendant] must plead and prove." (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 212)). Accordingly, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for the plaintiff's failure to exhaust is appropriate only where it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Thomas v. Brinich, 579 F. App'x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215-16).
The defendants argue that Singleton's remaining claim "can be dismissed for failing to properly exhaust available administrative remedies based on the existing record consisting of the admissions in both the complaint, the amended complaint and [the] attachments to the complaint." Doc. 60 at 5. The defendants note that Singleton asserted in both his complaint and amended complaint that he exhausted his administrative remedies and attached grievance records to his complaint. Id. at 4. The defendants also note that Singleton admitted in both his complaint and his amended complaint that "his appeal to final review was denied and dismissed." Id. at 5.
At the outset, we note that we cannot rely on allegations and attachments in Singleton's original complaint in determining whether to dismiss an amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. "It is the complaint which defines the nature of an action, and once accepted, an amended complaint replaces the original." Bamat v. Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., No. 4:18-CV-01898, 2019 WL 1125817, at *1 n.4 (quoting Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 706 n.2 (1982) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002) ("An amended complaint supercedes the original version in providing the blueprint for the future course of a lawsuit."). Since we cannot rely on the documents that Singleton attached to his original complaint, we find it is not apparent from the face of his amended complaint that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Singleton alleges that he fully exhausted his administrative remedies, including pursuing an appeal to final review (doc. 19 ¶ 1), and there are no documents on which we can rely that would establish otherwise. We accordingly find that Singleton's amended complaint should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
We recognize that the documents attached to Singleton's original complaint (see doc. 1 at 8-13) indicate a strong possibility that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that our above conclusion seems to place form over substance. Accordingly, we will recommend that the court allow a period of expedited discovery on the issue of whether Singleton exhausted his administrative remedies such that the defendants can file a motion for summary judgment on that basis. See, e.g., Small, 728 F.3d at 271 n.5 ("It would make sense from an efficiency standpoint that exhaustion determinations be made before discovery, or with only limited discovery." (citing Pavey 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008))).
C. Singleton's Amended Complaint Sufficiently Pleads the Defendants' Personal Involvement.
In their second argument, the defendants argue that Singleton's remaining claim should be dismissed because he does not plead that the defendants were personally involved in any violation of his due process rights. Id. at 5-6.
Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be liable a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct. In other words, defendants "are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct." Barkes v. First Corr. Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015). "[A] defendant in a civil rights case cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved." C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2000).
"A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant's personal involvement by describing the defendant's participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct." Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). "Although a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding the case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive." Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Here, Singleton alleges that Harry, Whalen, and Peters knew that Singleton was in solitary confinement and allowed him to remain there for 402 days. Doc. 19 ¶¶ 15-17. This is sufficient to allege the defendants' personal involvement in a violation of Singleton's constitutional rights. See Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 ("A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant's personal involvement by describing the defendant's participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct."); see also Abu-Jamal v. Kerestes, No. 3:15-CV-00967, 2018 WL 2166052, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 10, 2018) (finding that prisoner plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded medical defendants' personal involvement in allegedly unconstitutional lack of treatment for hepatitis C where he pleaded that defendants were aware that he had tested positive for the disease but did not test him "to see if his hepatitis C was chronic or whether his hepatitis C was the cause of his skin condition"); Camacho v. Dean, No. 1:14-CV-01428, 2017 WL 3140914, at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2017) (finding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged supervisory defendant's personal involvement where he alleged that the defendant was aware of a prior pattern of abuse by another defendant, failed to correct that pattern, and allowed the other defendant to remain in a position of authority over prisoners), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-01428, 2017 WL 3129800 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2017). We accordingly find that Singleton's remaining claim should not be dismissed for a failure to allege personal involvement.
D. Singleton's Remaining Claim Should Not Be Dismissed on the Merits.
In their final argument, the defendants argue that the Third Circuit erred in considering Singleton a pretrial detainee rather than a parole violator, and that because Singleton is a parole violator his due process rights were not violated. Doc. 60 at 6-7. The defendants argue that Singleton should be considered a parole violator because "by his own statement in the amended complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated as an out of state parole violator." Id. at 6. The defendants further argue that even if Singleton were a pretrial detainee, his due process rights were not violated because he "was not being held indefinitely." Id. at 7.
The defendants do not cite to where in his amended complaint Singleton states that he was being held at SCI Camp Hill as a parole violator, nor do they offer any support for their argument beyond Singleton's amended complaint. Our review of the amended complaint shows two allegations which could be construed as speaking to his incarceration status. In paragraph 10 of the amended complaint, Singleton alleges that he informed Harry via an inmate's request to staff member that he "was in SCI Camp Hill on an interstate Parole Violation from New York." Doc. 19 ¶ 10. In paragraph 12, Singleton alleges that he communicated with "Ms. Leonard" from the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and told her "that I was being held here at Camp Hill [in] disciplinary segregation on a detainer from New York, or I need to make bail on my untried charges." Id. ¶ 12. Given Singleton's statement that he needed to make bail on his untried charges, we liberally construe these allegations as stating that Singleton was being confined in SCI Camp Hill both because of his parole violation and because of his then-pending charges in Pennsylvania for driving a vehicle while intoxicated. Singleton's amended complaint therefore does not support the defendants' argument that he should not be considered a pretrial detainee.
Furthermore, the defendants' argument is based on the premise that the Third Circuit erred in determining that Singleton was a pretrial detainee, but the Third Circuit's determination is binding on this court under the law of the case doctrine.
"The law of the case doctrine 'limits relitigation of an issue once it has been decided' in an earlier stage of the same litigation." Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 786 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2002)). "The law of the case doctrine, however, acts to preclude review of only those legal issues that [were] . . . actually decided, either expressly or by implication; it does not apply to dicta." In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 414, 429 (3d Cir. 1993)). In addition, the law of the case doctrine does not apply "when (1) new evidence is available; (2) a supervening new law has been announced; or (3) the earlier decision was clearly erroneous and would create manifest injustice." Roberts v. Ferman, 826 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pub. Interest Research Grp. Of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997)).
The Third Circuit's determination that Singleton was a pretrial detainee was not dicta. The determination was essential to the court's holding that this court erred by not addressing Singleton's procedural due process claim. In analyzing the case, the court stated that Singleton was a pretrial detainee and thus had a "liberty interest in not being detained indefinitely in [disciplinary segregation] without explanation or review of [his] confinement." Singleton, 747 F. App'x at 92 (quoting Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 375). The court remanded the case to this court for consideration of whether Singleton's procedural due process rights were violated as a pretrial detainee. Id. at 92-93. Accordingly, this court is bound by the Third Circuit's decision that Singleton was a pretrial detainee under the law of the case doctrine. If the defendants believed that the Third Circuit committed a legal error, their recourse was to appeal the Third Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court, not to argue that the court erred on remand to the district court. We will therefore treat Singleton as a pretrial detainee in conformity with the Third Circuit's prior determination in this case. See Id. at 92.
"While 'pretrial detainees do not have a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population, they do have a liberty interest in not being detained indefinitely in [disciplinary segregation] without explanation or review of their confinement.'" Id. (quoting Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 375). "Thus, procedural due process requires prison officials to "provide detainees who are transferred into more restrictive housing, for administrative purposes only, an explanation of the reason for their transfer as well as an opportunity to respond." Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 375 (alterations omitted) (quoting Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 70 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Singleton alleges that he was housed in solitary confinement for 402 days without a hearing. See doc. 19 ¶ 17. This is sufficient to state a violation of his procedural due process rights as a pretrial detainee. See Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 375. Thus, his remaining claim should not be dismissed on this basis.
IV. Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that the court deny the defendants' request to dismiss Singleton's remaining claim. We also recommend that the court allow expedited discovery on the issue of whether Singleton exhausted his administrative remedies.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 28th day of June, 2019.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge