Opinion
FA166061216
12-20-2016
Cecilia Singh v. Dinesh Singh
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
Kenneth L. Shluger, J.
The question presented is whether or not the ceremony, which the parties participated in on June 5, 2004, in Danvers, Massachusetts, resulted in a lawful and valid marriage, notwithstanding the fact that no marriage license was ever obtained. The short answer is no.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Plaintiff, Cecelia Singh, initiated this dissolution action with a Complaint dated March 17, 2016. The Defendant, Dinesh Singh, appeared and through counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated May 13, 2016.
The parties appeared before the undersigned on September 19, October 3, 11 and 28 and December 9, 2016 for hearings pertaining to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Both parties were represented by competent counsel and each filed briefs in support of their respective positions.
FACTS
The Court has fully considered the applicable Rules of Practice as well as the evidence, applicable case law, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and arguments of counsel in reaching the decisions reflected in this decision, and finds by a preponderance of the evidence the following facts.
1. The parties met in 1999 in Boston, Massachusetts and within six months they were dating each other exclusively. In February 2003, the parties vacationed in Hawaii and the Defendant proposed to the plaintiff and gave her an engagement ring. In June 2003, the parties moved to Cleveland, Ohio, where the Defendant was beginning his medical residency.
2. Between June 2003 and June 2004, the parties prepared for a lavish and elaborate wedding ceremony, which was held in Danvers, Massachusetts, the home town of the Plaintiff's family and which cost approximately $75,000.
3. Living in Cleveland, Ohio, the parties applied for an Ohio marriage license on May 17, 2004, but allowed the application to expire without ever obtaining an actual marriage license.
4. On June 5, 2004 in Danvers, Massachusetts, the parties participated in an event with all the appearances of a wedding ceremony. As the Defendant acknowledged, " from the outside, it had all the trappings of a traditional wedding."
5. The parties failed to obtain a marriage license as required under Massachusetts law, M.G.L.A. 207 sec. 19, 20, 28, 40.
6. Leading up to the June 5, 2004 ceremony, invitations were mailed to over 200 guests, a hall was rented, flights and hotels were arranged, a Unitarian Minister, duly authorized to perform weddings in Massachusetts was hired, flowers were purchased, a caterer was retained, and a rehearsal dinner was held with all of the appearances of a wedding, except that no license was procured. Due to their frequent arguing, the parties had agreed to go through with the ceremony with no intention to formally marry.
7. The Defendant is of Indian descent and is a practicing Hindu. The Plaintiff is of Cuban descent and is a practicing Catholic. The parties exchanged rings and vows before a Unitarian Minister who thereafter decreed " I now pronounce you husband and wife." The ceremony took place in a large hall with nearly 250 guests. The parties went to great lengths to ensure that both of their cultures were represented during the ceremony. The Defendant was dressed in traditional Hindu garb and arrived at the wedding venue on a regal white horse. They participated in several Indian traditions, including walking seven times around a fire, garlands of flowers on their heads and with the mother of the Plaintiff placing a red mark on the Defendant's forehead. The Plaintiff wore a white wedding dress, was walked down the aisle by her father and afterwards, threw the bouquet. At the end of the ceremony, the parties each stated " with this ring, I thee wed."
8. The Plaintiff testified that at the time of the ceremony, she believed that the marriage was valid and that when they exchanged rings and vows and the minister pronounced them " husband and wife, " that they were legally married. The Court finds this not credible in view of the overwhelming and convincing evidence that she was well-aware that the ceremony was a sham and that the Defendant had repeatedly stated that he was not willing to lawfully marry her at that time. In view of the extensive planning and attention to detail that the parties underwent, it defies logic or common sense that they would simply " forget" to obtain a marriage license if it was actually their intention to marry.
9. The Defendant testified credibly, and the Court so finds, that he was well aware that Massachusetts law required a license to validate a marriage and that he intentionally proceeded without a license because he did not intend to enter into a valid marriage on that date. The Defendant testified credibly that he went through with the ceremony because he did not want to lose face and be embarrassed by cancelling the wedding at the last moment. He testified credibly and the Court so finds that they both hoped that they would engage in a " real wedding" someday.
10. The Defendant testified credibly that on occasion, he referred to the Plaintiff as " my wife" to avoid embarrassing and cumbersome explanations in social interactions when he might have suggested to a colleague " please have your wife call my wife."
11. After June 5, 2004, the parties lived together as if they were husband and wife, but frequently reminded each other that they were not actually married.
12. On December 30, 2007, the Plaintiff gave birth to a child. The Defendant is the father of this child. On January 5, 2007 the parties prepared an acknowledgment of paternity document, a form only used for unmarried parents of children.
13. Throughout their relationship, the parties filed separate tax returns under the status of either " single" or " head of household, " both of which are available only to unmarried persons.
14. The parties, both of whom are employed by Yale-New Haven Hospital, maintained separate health insurance policies. Although a family plan would have been less expensive, it required proof of marriage.
15. The parties reported to Dr. Morton Klein, the mental health professional with whom the parties engaged in couple's counseling that they had been together for 11 years, since 1999, but " they are not legally married." While engaged in couple's therapy in 2010, the Plaintiff argued with the Defendant that their relationship would never work unless the Defendant married her. She even offered to give him a prenuptial agreement if he would agree to marry her.
16. In numerous e-mails, the Plaintiff acknowledged that they were not married and the Court finds this to be so.
17. On April 26, 2010 the Plaintiff wrote " . . . stop calling me your wife . . . I am not your legal wife . . ." On Nov. 22, 2010 she wrote " I can't believe I am a 41-year-old single mom in this position, but I am . . . I of course want to be married one day . . . always have."
18. In an e-mail from the Plaintiff to the Defendant, dated January 2, 2013, the Plaintiff referred to the fact that their daughter had perhaps been subjected to " adult influence" and told that perhaps, they were not actually married. The Plaintiff stated " . . . I would take that secret to my grave protecting her of the same illegitimate fate that I have."
19. In an e-mail from the Plaintiff to the Defendant dated May 9, 2013 regarding the Defendant introducing a girlfriend to their daughter, the Plaintiff wrote " this is the 3rd woman I think that Shalani has met--not going to collude with changing partners, etc. and confusing her more. Would be happy to do so when you are married--not before."
20. On August 30, 2014, the Defendant entered into a marriage with another woman in Tennessee. The Plaintiff escorted Shalani, the daughter of the parties, to the Tennessee wedding so that she could participate in her father's wedding. The Plaintiff never objected to the Defendant entering into this marriage, never claimed that the Defendant was already married and in fact, encouraged and enabled their daughter to participate in the August 30, 2014 wedding. It's not plausible that this mother would permit and encourage her young daughter to participate in the 2014 marriage if, in fact, the parties were married to each other.
21. Since the Defendant's August 2014 wedding, the Plaintiff has referred to the Defendant's wife, both orally and in writing as " your wife" or as " Shalani's stepmom."
22. In an e-mail from the Plaintiff to the Defendant dated November 11, 2014, the Plaintiff wrote " I have no problems with your wife as I know she is good with Shalani but your mother can be quite inappropriate."
23. In an e-mail from the Plaintiff to the Defendant dated September 6, 2015, the Plaintiff wrote " she will know one day all that you have done to me, the abuse, the taking my gold jewelry that was to be given to her and giving it to your wife . . ."
24. In an e-mail from the Plaintiff to the Defendant dated November 10, 2015, referring to child care, the Plaintiff wrote " I have not been told that Shalani has babysitters/nannies that are staying with her when you and your wife are away."
25. In an e-mail from the Plaintiff to the Defendant dated December 21, 2015 the Plaintiff wrote " you and your wife have to stop minimizing my role as a parent."
26. In an e-mail from the Plaintiff to the Defendant dated February 17, 2016, the Plaintiff wrote " thank you for informing me of your wife's intent/interest in going with Shalani . . ."
27. Robert Moore owned the tax preparation office which prepared tax returns for the parties from 2005 until approximately 2015. The parties had completed an intake form and responded to the question " Are you married?" as " no." They were then directed to complete and did complete individual tax returns. In 2014 and 2015, the Defendant completed " married filing jointly" returns as he had become married in Tennessee on Aug. 30, 2014 to Shanthi Mogali.
28. The Court finds the Plaintiff generally not credible. The Plaintiff attempted to explain away her tolerating the Defendant's asserting that they were unmarried as a way to pacify him and to remove some of the turmoil in their relationship. She testified that she was dominated, controlled and abused throughout the relationship and that the Defendant frequently critiqued the Plaintiff's parenting, personal hygiene and all aspects of her life. She testified that she simply did not want to fight with him on the question of whether or not they were not legally married and acquiesced to his position. She further testified about being locked inside of the car in the passenger seat with the heat on high and being unable to escape from the Defendant. The Court did not credit her testimony.
29. The Plaintiff's claims of abuse and being controlled by the Defendant are exaggerated and undermined by the fact that she continued to refer to his new wife as his " wife" and acknowledging to others that they were not married, long after they had separated and were engaged in a heated custody dispute. The Plaintiff is a Professor of Psychology at Yale and was educated at UMASS, Boston College, North Eastern University, Harvard and Yale. She claims that she acquiesced to the alleged abusive behavior by the Defendant because she did not want to engage the Defendant in an argument regarding their marital status. The Court does not credit the Plaintiff's testimony.
30. The parties separated sometime in December 2010 and on January 24, 2011, the Defendant instituted custody proceedings pertaining to their minor child (docket number FA 11-4045300). This case is presently pending as the result of the mother having filed a Motion for Modification (relocation) dated May 25, 2016. On October 7, 2011, during a custody hearing, both parties' attorneys confirmed on the record in the presence of both parties that the parties were not married. While the Plaintiff corrected the attorney who referred to her as " Ms. Singh" rather than " Dr. Singh, " she did not correct the assertion that the parties were not married.
31. On January 13, 2016, the parties entered into a custody agreement and regarding their marital status, the box on the agreement form " never married" was checked. On February 17, 2016, the parties entered into another custody agreement and regarding their marital status, the box on the agreement form " never married" was again checked.
32. In February 2016, it became apparent that the Plaintiff's Motion to Relocate with the minor child of the parties was being vigorously contested by the Defendant father and on March 17, 2016, the Plaintiff instituted the present action for dissolution. The Plaintiff requested orders of alimony and property distribution, relief not available in the then pending custody action.
33. On June 29, 2016, while being interviewed by Allison Kaas, a Family Relations Officer assigned to the custody case, the Plaintiff stated that " she was aware that that they were not married--not legally married . . . that it was not her intention to stay with somebody not being married." Additionally, she stated to Ms. Kaas that every time she tried to force him to marry her, he had refused and had punished her. Ms. Kaas testified that the Defendant stated that " it was not his intention to be married at the time of the ceremony." The Court credits the testimony of Ms. Kaas recollecting the representations of the parties to her.
34. On June 5, 2004, the date of the ceremony, the Defendant did not intend to enter into a marriage and the Plaintiff knew this to be the case; she was hoping that someday, perhaps he would change his mind. The Court finds the evidence more persuasive and more credible that the parties never intended to enter into a lawful marriage and that the Plaintiff's explanations of why she acquiesced to the Defendant's behaviors are not credible.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
" [I]t is well established that the validity of marriage is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the ceremony was performed." State v. Nosik, 44 Conn.App. 294, 301, 689 A.2d 489 (1997), aff'd, 245 Conn. 196, 715 A.2d 673 (1998). In the present case, the ceremony took place in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and so it is the law of Massachusetts which controls. Like Connecticut, Massachusetts courts " [h]ave never recognized common-law marriage." See, Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass. 615, 617-18, 631 N.E.2d 1016 (1994) (finding that cohabitation, in Massachusetts, did not create the relationship of husband and wife in the absence of a formal solemnization of marriage). See also, Davis v. Misiano, 373 Mass. 261, 366 N.E.2d 752 (1977). As in Connecticut, the formalities of marriage in Massachusetts include obtaining a license and solemnization. See Massachusetts General Laws ch. 207, § § 19-20 (notice of intention), 28 (certificate of intention), 40 (solemnization), 49 (penalty for failure to obtain a license), 57 (fine for performing a marriage after 60 days from notice of intention). The Massachusetts General Laws do not provide a governing statute declaring that the absence of a license deems a marriage invalid.
A discussion of cases on the validity of a marriage absent a license as required by statute is collected in Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 847 (1958), and Cum.Sup. (2016). Generally, the cases collected therein stand for the proposition that a defect in the licensing process alone will not invalidate an otherwise consensual marriage.
Neither the Court nor the attorneys are able to find any Massachusetts case law directly on point with the facts of the instant case. Both sides point to two Connecticut decisions for authority, Carabetta v. Carabetta, 182 Conn. 344, 346, 438 A.2d 109 (1980), and Garrison v. Garrison, 190 Conn. 173, 460 A.2d 945 (1983). Both cases, however, are distinguishable in many significant ways. In Carabetta, the husband and wife were married in a church, but did not obtain a marriage license. Thereafter they lived together as husband and wife for 25 years, raising a family of four children, all of whose birth certificates listed the husband as their father. Only when the wife sought a divorce, did the husband even mention the legality of the marriage, arguing for the first time that a marriage license did not exist. The Court in Carabetta, supra, recognized that while a marriage license is generally required, equally critical is that the parties intended to be married.
" As this court has indicated in Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588, 592-93, 316 A.2d 379 (1972), this substantive condition [a marriage license] is not necessarily exclusive; lack of consent to a marriage, for example, would also be a substantive defect, derived from the common law, sufficient to avoid a marriage." Carabetta v. Carabetta, 182 Conn. 344, 347, 438 A.2d 109, 111 (1980).
In Garrison v. Garrison, 190 Conn. 173, 460 A.2d 945 (1983), both parties manifested an intent to be married although the completed marriage license was never filed. There was sufficient evidence to support that the parties intended to be married when the ceremony was performed. Id., 176.
It is the lack of intent to marry on the part of the parties in the instant case which compels the Court to conclude that the marriage is not valid. " If neither party had intended to be married, their lack of mutual consent would render the marriage contract void." Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 201-03, 175 A. 574 (1934).
" The making of a contract does not depend upon the secret intention of a party . . . but upon the intention manifested by his [or her] words or acts, and on these the other party has a right to proceed." Garrison v. Garrison, 190 Conn. 173, 175, 460 A.2d 945, 946-47 (1983) .
In Garrison, supra; the parties intended to be married and the only defect was the failure to file the completed license with the recording authority after the fact. In the instant case, there was a complete lack of intent by the parties to enter into a valid marriage coupled with the lack of a marriage license. The failure by the parties to obtain a license is evidence which, when taken with other evidence offered at trial, shows that the parties never intended to be married. The marriage ceremony was simply a sham.
Although there is strong public policy favoring otherwise valid marriages, in the instant case, the parties themselves knew that they were but actors in an elaborately orchestrated play and never intended that their ceremony constitute a valid marriage.
CONCLUSION
" Pursuant to the rules of practice, a Motion to Dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " In general, a Motion to Dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted.
The Defendant's request for attorneys fees is denied. It cannot be said that the Plaintiff's claim was devoid of merit or that she acted in bad faith. The court in Munro v. Munoz, 146 Conn.App. 853, 857-58, 81 A.3d 252 (2013), held that: " [T]he common law rule in Connecticut, also known as the American Rule, is that attorneys fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berzins v. Berzins, 306 Conn. 651, 661, 51 A.3d 941 (2012). " Th[is] rule does not apply, however, where the opposing party has acted in bad faith . . . It is generally accepted that the court has the inherent authority to assess attorneys fees when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons . . . This bad faith exception applies, not only to the filing of an action, but also in the conduct of the litigation . . . Moreover, the trial court must make a specific finding as to whether counsel's [or a party's] conduct . . . constituted or was tantamount to bad faith, a finding that would have to precede any sanction under the court's inherent powers to impose attorneys fees for engaging in bad faith litigation practices." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834, 844-45, 850 A.2d 133 (2004)."