Opinion
01 Civ. 9993 (SAS)
August 5, 2002
Alonzo Sims, Malone, NY, Pro Se.
Beth J. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, New York, NY, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Alonzo Sims, proceeding pro se, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Petitioner alleges that he "did not understand the charges against him or the consequences" of his guilty plea. See Petition of Alonzo Sims for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") ¶ 12(A). For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
I. FACTS
On March 29, 2000, Sims pled guilty before Justice Ronald Zweibel in New York County Supreme Court. See 3/29/00 Sandoval/Plea Hearing ("Plea"), Ex. A to Affidavit of Beth Thomas in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Thomas Aff."), at 37. The plea was taken after Sims entered into an agreement with the Government which reduced his pending charge from third-degree to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. See id. at 34. Justice Zweibel asked petitioner the following questions during the allocution:
THE COURT: Do you understand the charge you're pleading guilty to; is that correct?
MR. SIMS: Yes.
THE COURT: Has anyone . . . forced you or threatened you to enter this plea of guilty?
MR. SIMS: No.
THE COURT: The indictment charges you with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree — rather, in the third degree, but you're being permitted to plead guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.
The indictment alleges that [you] . . . knowingly and unlawfully possessed a narcotic drug, to wit: Cocaine with the intent to sell the same.
Do you admit to that charge?
MR. SIMS: Yes.
Id. at 36. Petitioner also told the court that he discussed the plea with his attorney and that he was "in fact guilty of this crime." Id. at 35. In sum, the court reminded petitioner of the charge — criminal possession in the fifth degree — four times during the allocution. See id. at 34, 36, 37. Each time, petitioner assured the court that he understood the charge to which he was pleading. See id.
On April 17, 2000, petitioner was sentenced to a term of two to four years in prison. See 4/17/00 Sentencing of Alonzo Sims ("Sentencing"), Ex. A to Thomas Aff., at 1. Before Sims was sentenced, his attorney requested the court's permission to withdraw the guilty plea. See id. at 2. The court denied the request after petitioner expressed his wish to proceed to trial. See id. Petitioner then explained to the court that he thought he had pled guilty to criminal sale of narcotics. See id. at 2-3. Petitioner further stated that he had not possessed narcotics at the time of his arrest and that he believed the possession charge had been dismissed. See id. at 3.
Petitioner was originally charged with both possession and criminal sale of narcotics at his arraignment. See Sentencing at 3. The indictment, however, was only for criminal possession in the third-degree. See id. at 4.
The court then reviewed petitioners's indictment. See id. at 3-5. Petitioner continued to argue that the possession charge was dismissed. See id. After allowing defense counsel time to confer with petitioner, the court sentenced petitioner to the prison term set out in the plea agreement. See id. at 4-6. Neither petitioner nor his attorney made any further requests to the court regarding withdrawal of the plea. See id. at 5-6.
Petitioner then appealed his sentence to the Appellate Department, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. See People v. Sims, 724 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 2001). The Court of Appeals denied petitioner leave to appeal the decision. See Court of Appeals Certificate Denying Leave, Ex. G to Thomas Aff., at 1. Sims now brings his petition before this Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2254 of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") provides a federal remedy for state prisoners if "their continued custody is in violation of federal law." Murray v. McGinnis, No. 00 Civ. 3510, 2001 WL 26213, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). The AEDPA states, in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in a State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("section 2254").
A state court decision is "contrary to" established federal law if the state court either "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision will be an "unreasonable application of" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. at 407-08. A state court's decision is not an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court's analysis was merely "erroneous" or "incorrect." Id. at 411. Instead, a state court's application of a federal rule must be "objectively unreasonable" in order to justify habeas relief under section 2254. Id. at 409. See also Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000). "A state court determination of a factual issue is, moreover, presumed to be correct." Overton v. Newton, No. 01 Civ. 2436, ___ F.3d ___, 2002 WL 1466827, at *3 (2d Cir. Jul. 9, 2002). The state court's determination "is unreasonable only where the petitioner meets the burden of `rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.'" Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
Because petitioner is proceeding pro se, his petition will be "liberally construed in his favor." Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). A court must then "`review habeas petitions with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed.'" Murray, 2001 WL 26213, at *3 (quoting Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner alleges that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a plea of guilty be knowingly and voluntarily entered." Murray, 2001 WL 26213, at *7 (citing cases). "A plea is made knowing[ly] when made `with [an] understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Reyati v. Johnson, No. 99 Civ. 3251, 2001 WL 1098003, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2001) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). "The purpose of the `knowing and voluntary' inquiry . . . is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n. 12 (1993). "`[T]he standard for determining the validity of guilty pleas [is] whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Murray, 2001 WL 26213, at *4 (quoting Ventura v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 1048, 1058 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Petitioner wishes to withdraw his plea because "he did not understand the charges against him or the consequences." Petition ¶ 12(A). Petitioner thus argues that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. To support this claim, petitioner refers the Court to the statements he made at sentencing. See id. During that proceeding, petitioner moved to withdraw his plea, and stated that he believed the possession charge was "dismissed." Sentencing at 3. Petitioner further asserted at the sentencing that he was not guilty of criminal possession because he "didn't have [cocaine] on [his] person." Id.
During the allocution, however, Sims told Justice Zweibel that he understood the charges against him no less than four times. See Plea at 34, 36, 37. Sims admitted that he was guilty of criminal possession. See id. at 36. Sims further acknowledged the consequences of his plea — imprisonment for two to four years. See id. at 37. Finally, Sims stated that he was not "forced" or "threatened" into pleading guilty. Id. at 36. Sims's statements during the allocution thus demonstrate that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.
When petitioner moved to withdraw his plea, Justice Zweibel initially denied the motion because the only ground petitioner presented was his desire to proceed to trial. See Sentencing at 2. When Sims claimed that the charge he pled guilty to had been dismissed, the state court allowed him to present further reasons in support of his motion — primarily his innocence of the crime of possession. See id. at 2-3. After an inquiry into the indictment and further discussion with counsel, the state court was satisfied that petitioner had no reasonable grounds for withdrawal. See id. at 3-5. Petitioner alleges that his motion required further investigation. Due process, however, requires only that Sims have "`the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Hines v. Miller, 156 F. Supp.2d 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that the state court's decision constituted an unreasonable application of federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. He repeatedly cites section 2254 and argues that the state court's refusal to permit him to withdraw his plea was an "unreasonable determination of the facts." Traverse of Alonzo Sims ("Traverse") ¶¶ 2-4. Petitioner claims that the state court's decision was "abrupt" and its inquiry was "insufficient" to determine whether his plea was made knowingly. Id. See also Petition ¶ 12(A) (stating that the lower court "denied petitioner's motion without making sufficient inquiry"). Justice Zweibel, however, heard petitioner's arguments at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner during the sentencing. As noted above, petitioner's alleged misunderstandings about a dismissed charge and the charge he pled guilty to were investigated by the court. After discussion with petitioner and his counsel, and upon review of the indictment and consideration of the allocution, Justice Zweibel made a reasonable determination of the facts when he decided that petitioner knowingly entered his plea to the possession charge. Moreover, that determination does not represent an unreasonable application of federal law that would warrant habeas relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Sims's petition is denied. Further, because Sims has failed to make a substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right and this Court has rejected his claims "on the merits", a certificate of appealability will not be issued. Rudenko v. Costello, 286 F.3d 51, 79 (2d Cir. 2002). The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.