Opinion
CIVIL 20-CV-01556-WJM-GPG
01-19-2021
JOSHUA SIMPSON and LUKE-IRVIN CHRISCO, Plaintiffs, v. MATT LEWIS, Sheriff of Mesa County, Colorado, in his official capacity, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
Gordon P. Gallagher, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Matt Lewis's uncontested motion to dismiss. (D. 37). The motion has been referred to this Magistrate Judge for recommendation. (D. 41). The Court has reviewed the pending motion and all attachments. The Court has also considered the entire case file, the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. Oral argument is not necessary. This Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends that the motion be GRANTED for the reasons specifically set forth below.
“(D. 37)” is an example of the stylistic convention used to identify the docket number assigned to a specific paper by the Court's case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). This convention is used throughout this Report and Recommendation.
Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service hereof to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
I. FACTS
On May 29, 2020, Plaintiffs Joshua Simpson and Luke Chrisco, pro se inmates who were temporarily held at the Mesa County Detention Facility (MCDF), filed a civil complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D. 1). Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief and raised four claims: (1) the MCDF's “COVID-19 framework” denied plaintiffs due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the MCDF's “COVID-19 framework” denied Simpson due process of law by subjecting him to punishment while a pre-trial detainee in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the MCDF's deficient “bio-defense framework” unreasonably subjected Chrisco to substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the MCDF's deficient “bio-defense framework” unreasonably denied Plaintiffs of substantive due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id., pp. 10-22). Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. (D. 3).
On August 28, 2020, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff Chrisco lacked standing to obtain the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint because he was no longer an inmate within the MCDF. (D. 37, pp. 2-4). On September 2, 2020, Defendant moved the Court to hold the motion to dismiss in abeyance until Plaintiff Simpson was transferred to the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC), which would render the civil action moot due to lack of standing. (D. 43, p. 2). On October 11, 2020, Plaintiff Chrisco filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, moving the Court to dismiss him as a plaintiff in the instant case. (D. 49, p. 9). On December 30, 2020, Defendant filed a status report noting that Plaintiff Simpson was transferred, on December 23, 2020, to the CDOC and was no longer in the custody of the MCDF. (D. 52, p. 2).
II. ANALYSIS
This Court construes a pro se plaintiff's pleadings liberally. Hammons v. Saffle, 348 F.3d 1250, 1254 (10th Cir. 2003). Article III of the United States Constitution restricts the decision-making power of the federal judiciary to cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996). Because federal courts can only adjudicate actual controversies, a case becomes moot “when it is impossible to grant any effectual relief.” Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 446 Fed.Appx. 964, 967 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Chihuahuan Grasslands All. v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 891 (10th Cir. 2008)). The Tenth Circuit has further held that “an inmate's claim for prospective injunctive relief regarding conditions of confinement becomes moot due to the inmate-plaintiff's release from confinement.” McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999).
Here, Plaintiff Simpson's claim against Defendant pertains to alleged violations of his constitutional rights at the MCDF, where he is no longer incarcerated. Thus, an award of injunctive relief in favor of Plaintiff Simpson would have no effect or benefit for him. Moreover, Plaintiff Simpson cannot maintain an action for injunctive relief “unless he . . . can demonstrate a good chance of being likewise injured in the future.” Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991). The Tenth Circuit in McAlpine made clear that “the inmate's parole or supervised release status does not, absent some exceptional showing, bring that claim under the narrow ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception to the mootness doctrine.” McAlpine, 187 F.3d at 1215. Plaintiff Simpson has not made any showing to trigger this exception to the mootness doctrine.
“Where the prisoner's claims for declaratory or injunctive relief relate solely to the conditions of confinement at the penal institution at which the prisoner is no longer incarcerated, courts have concluded that they are unable to provide the prisoner with effective relief.” Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1027 (10th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff Simpson complained of the MCDF's COVID-19 protocols and requested injunctive relief, whereby, the MCDF would be required to replace the jail's ventilation systems; create a tent city in the parking lot or outdoor area of the jail; provide inmates with gloves, masks, and humidifiers; and implement training for inmates and staff regarding social distancing, cleaning, and the nature of COVID-19. (D. 1, pp. 22-23). However, because Plaintiff Simpson is no longer held at the MCDF, his claims for injunctive relief are moot. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Since he is no longer a prisoner . . . the entry of . . . judgment in Green's favor would amount to nothing more than a declaration that he was wronged, and would have no effect on the defendants' behavior towards him.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge respectfully RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED. (D. 37). It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED in its entirety.