Opinion
Civil Action No: 01-0050, Section: "R"(3)
September 18, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendant, Wichita River Oil Corporation, for summary judgment on all claims brought by Marvin Simmons, Tammy Simmons, Michael Perrin, and Lisa Perrin. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion on the issue of the existence of a duty and dismisses plaintiffs' claims.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves a boating accident in Three Bayou Bay, which is located in the inland waters of southeastern Louisiana. Three Bayou Bay contains five oil wells (identified as state leases 2430 #1, 2430 #2, 2707 #1, 2707 #2, and 2707 #3) owned and operated by defendant Wichita Oil Corporation, a company involved in the exploration and production of natural resources in Louisiana. Two of these wells, 2430 #1 and 2430 #2, have been in operation since 1956, although under different ownership until Wichita acquired them in 1992. Wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 are unlit, while 2707 #1, 2707 #2, and 2707 #3 are lit.
At the time of the accident in question, plaintiffs Michael Perrin and Marvin Simmons were commercial fishermen who regularly fished for crabs in the inland waters of southeastern Louisiana. Perrin owned and operated a twenty-four foot aluminum crab boat with a 150 horsepower outboard motor and a two-foot draw. Simmons was Perrin's deckhand, and he had little experience with crabbing at the time of the accident.
On or about January 13, 2000, Perrin and Simmons used Three Bayou Bay as a route to an area of water called St. Joe's Pass. Perrin had worked in the past in the northern part of the Bay as an airboat operator, but he had never used the Bay, which he knew contained oil wells, as a route to St. Joe's Pass. In fact, when Perrin owned a shrimp boat with a three-foot draw several years before, he specifically avoided using Three Bayou Bay because he feared he would run aground.
In the dark hours of the early morning on the day of the accident, Perrin drove the boat into a small channel leading into Three Bayou Bay. Perrin entered the Bay at about twenty-five miles per hour (eleven knots). At the opening of the Bay, Perrin swept his handheld flashlight over the water, which illuminated 150 yards ahead of him. Seeing no obstructions, Perrin proceeded towards the left into the Bay without slowing down and without using his flashlight. Simmons occupied himself with cutting bait in the bow, facing aft.
Perrin navigated at least several hundred yards, perhaps even one-half mile, into the Bay, when he slammed into an unlit oil well. Perrin and Simmons fell violently forward. Right after the allision, Perrin and Simmons checked the well for identifying information. When they found the label affixed to the well to be faded beyond legibility, they checked a nearby well. The label on the second well indicated that Wichita owned it. Simmons noticed lit wells off in the distance towards the middle of the Bay.
Perrin and Simmons filed a report with the U.S. Coast Guard. Approximately a week after the allision, Perrin and Simmons took photographs of well 2430 #1, the one they believed they had hit. This well is not located in a designated lane of navigation in the Bay. About six months to one year later, upon inspection of wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2, Wichita's employee, Michael Santini, found no damage to either one.
Chief Warrant Officer ("CWO") Matt Snyder, a marine investigator for the U.S. Coast Guard, investigated the accident. One of CWO Snyder's tasks was to determine whether the unlit wells in question were required to be lit under applicable U.S. Coast Guard regulations. See Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 67.30-5. Under 33 C.F.R. § 67.30-5, a well structure must have obstruction lights if it is located in depths greater than three feet at mean low water. Based upon his investigation and information provided by the Eighth Coast Guard District office in New Orleans, CWO Snyder determined that the normal water depth in Three Bayou Bay and around wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 is three feet. ( See Snyder Decl., attached to Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H.) Accordingly, CWO Snyder concluded that the wells in question did not require lighting. CWO Snyder's report stated that pilot caused the allision by operating his vessel at an unsafe speed under conditions of darkness when he was unfamiliar with the area. ( See id.)
In addition to CWO Snyder's findings, Wichita's employees, Michael Santini and Steve Wheeler, who were familiar with the Bay and the wells, testified that the water around wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 is less than three feet deep. ( See Dep. of Michael A. Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 13-16; Dep. of Steve Wheeler, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. C at 18, 20.) Santini stated that only a hurricane would cause the water level to rise above three feet. ( See Dep. of Michael A. Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 13-16.) By comparison, he testified that the water level around wells 2707 #1, 2707 #2, and 2707 #3 is about four and one half feet deep. Wheeler also testified that annual U.S. Coast Guard inspections have found wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 to be in nonnavigable waters and therefore to require no lighting. ( See Dep. of Steve Wheeler, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. C at 39.)
Michael Perrin and Marvin Simmons sued Wichita for injuries they allegedly sustained as a result of the allision. Lisa Perrin and Tammy Simmons, their spouses, sued Wichita for loss of consortium. Wichita moves for summary judgment on the asserted grounds that (1) plaintiffs have not established that the defendant owed plaintiffs Michael Perrin and Marvin Simmons a duty of care because plaintiffs cannot show that the well allegedly involved in the accident was required to have an obstruction light under U.S. Coast Guard regulations; (2) plaintiffs have failed to establish that a well owned and/or operated by Wichita was involved in the accident; (3) plaintiffs' conduct was the sole cause of the accident; and (4) plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any non-pecuniary damages and/or damages for loss of consortium under the general maritime law.
For the following reasons, this Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of duty.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Duty of Care Under U.S. Coast Guard Regulations
To establish a negligence claim under general maritime law, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; that defendant breached that duty; that plaintiff sustained an injury; and that defendant's conduct caused plaintiff's injuries. See In re Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991). In the Fifth Circuit, federal regulations governing maritime conduct establish the applicable standard of care if the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the regulation is designed to protect and the statute intends to protect against the risk of harm that occurred. See Pennzoil Producing Co., et al. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1471-72 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1874)); Reyes v. Vantage Steamship, Inc., et al., 558 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 334 F.2d 131, 134 (5th Cir. 1964)) (holding that applicable U.S. Coast Guard regulations supplied the standard of care); Tidewater Marine, Inc. Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc. v. Sanco Int'l, Inc., et al., 113 F. Supp. 987, 997-98 (E.D. La. 2001). See also Prosser, Torts § 34, at 161 (2d ed. 1955). When such a regulation exists and is complied with, the defendant can be said to have satisfied its standard of care. See China Union Lines, Ltd., et al. v. A.O. Andersen Co., 364 F.2d 769, 785-86 (5th Cir. 1966).
In Marshall, the court found that the U.S. Coast Guard regulation at issue was not intended to protect against the risk of the harm that in fact occurred. Nevertheless, the court held that the regulation was still "relevant" to an analysis of the defendant's duty of care, even though it did not satisfy the class of persons, class of risks test which would convert it into a negligence per se standard. Marshall, 334 F.2d at 136.
The U.S. Coast Guard is authorized to "administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters not specifically delegated by law to some other executive department." 14 U.S.C. § 2 (West 2002). Accordingly, the U.S. Coast Guard has promulgated regulations establishing requirements for aids to navigation on artificial islands and fixed structures. 33 C.F.R. § 67.30-5 (West 2002). "Class C" requirements apply to all structures on the shoreward side of the secondary line of demarcation, an area that includes the navigable waters of Jefferson Parish (and therefore Three Bayou Bay). These structures are called "Class C" structures. 33 C.F.R. § 67.50-25.
The Coast Guard regulations require that a "Class C" well structure have an obstruction light if the well is "erected in depths of water greater than three feet at mean low water." 33 C.F.R. § 67.30-5. This regulation is designed to protect maritime traffic from the safety hazard of unmarked fixed structures in navigable waters. The regulation establishes the standard of care for owners of fixed structures in the area covered by "Class C" requirements. The defendant argues that it owed no duty to light the well because this "Class C" well was not in water greater than three feet. The plaintiffs do not argue that the defendant would have a duty if the water were three feet or below. Rather, the plaintiffs dispute the depth of the water. The Court finds that the Coast Guard regulations impose no duty to light "Class C" structures in three feet or less of water, and as no other source of a duty has been identified, the Court finds that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if there are no fact issues that the water is three feet or less.
The issue of whether Wichita owed a duty of care thus revolves around a single question: the depth of water surrounding the well that plaintiffs allegedly struck. If the water depth at mean low water was greater than three feet, then Wichita violated its duty to Perrin and Simmons by not lighting the well. Perrin and Simmons, however, offer no competent evidence to raise a genuine issue that the water depth around wells 2430 #1 or 2430 #2 (the two unlit wells) is, or ever has been, greater than three feet.
Wichita's evidence of water depth establishes without contradiction that the water was not greater than three feet. Chief Warrant Officer ("CWO") Matt Snyder, a marine investigator for the U.S. Coast Guard who investigated the alleged allision, determined that the normal water depth in Three Bayou Bay and around wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 is three feet. He based his finding upon his own investigation and information provided by the Eighth Coast Guard District office in New Orleans. Accordingly, CWO Snyder determined that the wells in question were not required to be lit. Moreover, CWO Snyder determined that the cause of the allision was not the lack of lighting, but the pilot's operating his vessel at an unsafe speed when it was dark and he was unfamiliar with the area. ( See Snyder Decl., attached to Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H.)
Additionally, Wichita's employees, Michael Santini and Steve Wheeler, testified from their own knowledge of the Bay and the wells that the water around wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 is less than three feet deep. ( See Dep. of Michael A. Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 13-16; Dep. of Steve Wheeler, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. C at 18, 20.) Santini testified that "nothing short of a hurricane" would cause the water level to rise above three feet. By comparison, he testified that the water level around wells 2707 #1, 2707 #2, and 2707 #3 is about four and one half feet deep. (Dep. of Michael A. Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 13-16.) Wheeler also testified that annual U.S. Coast Guard inspections have found that wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 are in nonnavigable waters and therefore do not require lights. ( See Dep. of Steve Wheeler, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. C at 39.)
Santini regularly monitors Wichita's Three Bayou Bay wells, and he explained that he does not run aground in Three Bayou Bay because he knows where he is going. ( See Dep. of Michael Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 25). He stated that he has run aground when approaching wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2, but over time, he has created paths to these wells that, with his engine trimmed up, permit him to avoid running aground. (Dep. of Michael Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 27-28.) Wheeler testified that he has run aground in the water around wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2. ( See Dep. of Steve Wheeler, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. C at 28, 30.) He also testified that, in his experience, the water level around wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 was less than two feet every time he visited them and that, in the wintertime, the water level is usually far too low for his boat to reach the wellheads. ( See Dep. of Steve Wheeler, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. C at 20-21.)
In response, Perrin and Simmons depend solely upon statements by Santini and Wheeler that are clearly taken out of context or reported inaccurately. Without acknowledging Santini's testimony that the water depth around wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 is three feet or less ( see Dep. of Michael A. Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 13-16), plaintiffs quote Santini as estimating the depth of Three Bayou Bay to be four and one half feet. ( See Pls.' Opp'n Mem. at 4; Dep. of Michael Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 33.) Santini expressly clarified this statement, however, explaining that while certain parts of Three Bayou Bay have depths of about four and one half feet, such as where lit wells 2707 #1, 2707 #2, and 2707 #3 are located, the depth of the Bay around unlit wells 2430 #1 and 2430 #2 is definitely not four and one half feet. ( See Dep. of Michael Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 38-39.)
Plaintiffs also quote Santini as admitting that boats larger than plaintiffs' crabbing boat, with deeper drafts, regularly navigate through Three Bayou Bay without running aground. ( See Pls'. Opp'n Mem. at 4; Dep. of Michael Santini, attached to Pls.' Opp'n Mem. Ex. B at 32-33.) Three Bayou Bay measures about two miles north to south and about one and one-half miles east to west, with varying depths. ( See Dep. of Michael Perrin, attached to Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 52.) Plaintiffs do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the water depth around the wells in question simply by offering testimony that other areas of Three Bayou Bay have depths greater than three feet.
Plaintiffs alternatively theorize that Wichita's Three Bayou Bay oil wells have been shut-in and "plugged and abandoned," which, they contend, triggers Wichita's obligation as a mineral lessee to remove the wells from the water. Plaintiffs do not, however, produce any evidence of Wichita's leasehold obligations. Further, although plaintiffs cite testimony that the well in issue is not currently producing, they have not produced evidence that the well was "plugged and abandoned" as that term may be used in the relevant mineral lease or in the oil and gas industry. Plaintiffs fail to raise an issue of fact on the question of whether the defendant owed them a duty to remove the well from the water.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiffs and GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment. For this reason, the Court need not reach the defendant's other arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment.