From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Shotts v. Doe

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit
Jun 7, 1977
347 So. 2d 318 (La. Ct. App. 1977)

Summary

In Shotts, supra and Schlumbrecht, supra, it was established that a tort action against an individual defendant not joined until one year after prescription had expired was barred when in the timely original petition only a fictitious name was used to designate the defendant.

Summary of this case from Templet v. Johns

Opinion

No. 8186.

June 7, 1977.

APPEAL FROM TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION H, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE THOMAS C. WICKER, JR., J.

Wendell H. Gauthier, Robert M. Murphy, Gauthier Murphy, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.

William F. Bologna, McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz Hoffman, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.

Before REDMANN, GULOTTA and BEER, JJ.


Plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal on exception of prescription of their tort action against persons not joined as defendants until after the tort prescription period of one year.

In their timely original petition, plaintiffs listed admittedly fictitious names, and no others, as defendants. Plaintiffs did describe the fictitious defendants as their decedent's fellow-employees of Continental Grain Company, and plaintiffs argue that this naming of Continental in the petition served to interrupt prescription against Continental and therefore against all persons solidarily liable with Continental. Further arguing that the other employees later joined would be solidarily liable with Continental, plaintiffs conclude that the demands against those employees were timely. We disagree.

La.C.C. 3552 only provides for interruption against co-debtors in solido by "citation served upon one" of them (or his acknowledgement). Continental was not here cited.

La.R.S. 9:5801 provides for interruption by "commencement of a civil action" but only "as to all defendants" and Continental was not a defendant. Continental was only mentioned in describing the fictitious defendants.

Plaintiffs also argue that C.C. 21 obliges us to "decide equitably" because the law is silent (and further argue they should prevail because defendants' true identity was deliberately obscured). But the law is not silent: C.C. 3536 expressly provides a prescription of one year for actions for damages "from offenses or quasi offenses."

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Shotts v. Doe

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit
Jun 7, 1977
347 So. 2d 318 (La. Ct. App. 1977)

In Shotts, supra and Schlumbrecht, supra, it was established that a tort action against an individual defendant not joined until one year after prescription had expired was barred when in the timely original petition only a fictitious name was used to designate the defendant.

Summary of this case from Templet v. Johns
Case details for

Shotts v. Doe

Case Details

Full title:RUTH BROCKHOFF SHOTTS ET AL. v. JOHN DOE ET AL

Court:Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit

Date published: Jun 7, 1977

Citations

347 So. 2d 318 (La. Ct. App. 1977)

Citing Cases

Templet v. Johns

However, the use of a fictitious name in a pleading does not interrupt prescription when subsequent thereto…

Schlumbrecht v. Executive Officers

Finally, since there were no real persons named as defendants in the only pleading that was timely filed,…