Opinion
Case No. 00-73535
January 26, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Before me are defendants' motion for fees and costs and plaintiff's motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For reasons that follow, both motions are denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is based on alleged state and federal claims arising out of plaintiffs arrest by defendants. I denied plaintiffs motion to amend and dismissed the state claims of his complaint in an opinion and order dated December 8, 2000. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which I denied in an order dated January 10, 2001. On November 6, 2001 I granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed this case in its entirety. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which I denied in an opinion and order dated, January 7, 2002.
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [section 1983], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonably attorney's fee as part of the costs." In Wayne v. Village of Sebring, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated that "a prevailing defendant should only recover upon a finding by the district court that `the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.'" Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994) (denying fees to individual defendants who won summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because plaintiffs suit for injunctive relief was neither frivolous nor groundless). The Sixth Circuit has also noted that "An award of attorney's fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action is an extreme sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct." Jones v. The Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986) 1986) (holding that award of attorney fees against plaintiff who presented tenable claim of disparate treatment was improper). The Supreme Court, furthermore, has cautioned, "[I]t is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). Plaintiff could not prevail on his claims because of his failure to sue the defendants in their individual capacities, and because he could not then meet the burden for establishing a claim against the defendants in their official capacity. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that plaintiff's claim was frivolous. The filing of this action is not the kind of egregious misconduct that warrants the imposition of fees and costs on an ultimately unsuccessful civil rights plaintiff
III. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
The Sixth Circuit has enunciated the test for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions as "whether the attorney's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances." Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1997). Granting of such sanctions is within the judge's discretion. See id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)). Sanctions may be imposed when an attorney fails to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b):
By presenting to the court . . . a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney . . . is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, — (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; . . . .
Plaintiff argues that because defendants are not entitled to attorney fees, their filing of the motion was in contravention of the Rule 11 requirements. He implies that defendants were unreasonable in their filing of such motion because plaintiffs claim was tenable and not frivolous. Though it is true, that plaintiff's claim was not frivolous and does not justify imposition of attorney's fees and costs, there is no necessary inference that the filing of such a motion is unreasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since plaintiff's case was not frivolous, defendants' motion for fees and costs is denied. Since defendants' act in filing of their motion was not unreasonable, plaintiff's motion for sanctions is also denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.