Summary
finding no undue delay where discovery was ongoing and depositions had yet to be taken
Summary of this case from Mattson v. Quicken Loans, Inc.Opinion
CV-00-1038-ST
May 17, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs allege claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq, the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), and the Equal Pay Act, 28 U.S.C. § 206 et seq, and parallel state law, ORS 650.030 and 652.230, against their employer, defendant Home Depot USA, Inc. ("Home Depot"). This court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The original seven plaintiffs filed their Complaint on July 28, 2000. Without opposition, plaintiffs amended their Complaint three times on August 29, 2000, October 20, 2000, and January 19, 2001, to add a total of four new plaintiffs with no change in the legal claims. They now seek leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint to add claims under Title VII and the ADEA based on a disparate impact theory of liability (docket #37). For the reasons stated below, that motion is granted.
STANDARDS
Amendment of the complaint is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 15, which provides that, after a responsive pleading has been filed, "a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." In general, whether to grant or deny a motion to amend the pleadings is a matter of the court's discretion. Sweeney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir 1997). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given." Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Federal policy strongly favors determination of cases on their merits. Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir 1973). Therefore, the role of pleadings is limited, and leave to amend is freely given. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. "Liberality in granting a plaintiff leave to amend is subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile." Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir 1999); see also Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1051 (1996) (factors considered in determining whether to grant a motion to amend under FRCP 15 include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice to the opposing party, whether the party has previously amended his pleadings, and futility of amendment).
DISCUSSION
After a preliminary review of nearly 10,000 pages of discovery, plaintiffs now believe that they have claims under Title VII and the ADEA based on a disparate impact theory of liability, in addition to a disparate treatment theory of liability currently alleged in the Third Amended Complaint. Specifically, the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint alleges that "Home Depot's qualification and employee evaluation standards disparately impacted female employees, causing them to be passed over for promotions, and to be denied training and pay increases because of their sex, in violation of Title VII and ORS 659.030." Fourth Amended Complaint, ¶ 68. In addition, the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint alleges that:
Home Depot had a storewide practice of selecting inexperienced employees for promotion over those with greater relevant experience. Home Depot likewise had a storewide practice of paying inexperienced workers more upon hire and/or after yearly monetary reviews that it did more experienced employees in the same or similar job. Said practices disparately impacted older employees at Home Depot, in violation of the ADEA and ORS 659.030.
Id, ¶ 81.
Home Depot opposes plaintiff's Motion, arguing that it is both untimely and prejudicial. Primarily, Home Depot asserts that if the proposed new claims are allowed, it then will have to invest in a great deal of additional discovery.
Despite Home Depot's, argument, this court is hard pressed to find undue delay in this case. Although this case was filed nearly 10 months ago, on February 22, 2001 this court set April 20, 2001, as the date by which amendments to pleadings were due and June 22, 2001, as the date to complete discovery. Plaintiffs filed the pending motion before the expiration of the deadline for amending pleadings and discovery is ongoing, with the depositions of plaintiffs yet to be taken. Thus, this case is quite different than Coleman v. The Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir 2000), in which the plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to add new claims in their motion for summary judgment after the close of discovery.
This court is equally hard pressed to find evidence that Home Depot will be unduly prejudiced by the new claims. These claims have arisen because of information plaintiffs recently obtained during discovery from Home Depot. Plaintiffs could not seek to file these claims until they had a factual predicate to do so. Plaintiffs' proposed new claims likely will require Home Depot to develop entirely different defenses and to seek additional, albeit as yet unidentified, discovery. "A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings supports a district court's finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the complaint." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir 1999). However, discovery does not close until June 21, 2001, with dispositive motions due July 16, 2001, providing ample time for Home Depot to conduct any discovery that it believes may be necessary. If Home Depot requests, discovery may even be extended for a short time without undue prejudice since the trial date is not until December 4, 2001. Delay must be substantial before it can be said to unduly prejudice a party. See e.g., Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1294-95.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Filing of Fourth Amended Complaint (docket #37) is GRANTED. The Fourth Amended Complaint shall be filed by May 31, 2001.