Summary
denying without prejudice to renewal motion for taxation of fees brought during pendency of appeal
Summary of this case from Toliver v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr.Opinion
No. 00 Civ. 6286 (RWS).
January 27, 2005
LAUREN SHAPIRO, Bronx, NY, Plaintiff Pro Se.
HONORABLE MICHAEL CARDOZO, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Attorneys for Defendants, New York, NY, By: JANE R. GOLDBERG, ESQ., Of Counsel.
OPINION
By an opinion and order entered on November 30, 2004, familiarity with which is presumed, summary judgment in this matter was granted dismissing the amended complaint of plaintiff Lauren Shapiro ("Shapiro") "in its entirety with costs." Shapiro v. Kronfeld, No. 00 Civ. 6286 (RWS), 2004 WL 2698889, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2004) (the "Opinion"). Judgment was entered by the Clerk of Court in accordance with the Opinion on December 1, 2004.
On December 21, 2004, Shapiro, proceeding pro se, filed a motion seeking an order pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the judgment be without costs. On that same date, Shapiro filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered on December 1, 2004.
On December 23, 2004, defendants Julie Kronfeld, John Harte, the Board of Education of the City of New York, Edwounie Fleury, Dorothy Baker, Audrey Eadey, Nicholas Scoppetta, the Administration for Children's Services of the City of New York ("ACS"), and the City of New York (collectively, the "Defendants") filed an amended motion for an order pursuant to Rule 54, Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 54.1 of the Local Civil Rule of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and 28 U.S.C. § 1921 granting fees and costs.
Following receipt of further submissions by both parties, the two motions were deemed fully submitted on January 19, 2005. For the reasons set forth below, Shapiro's motion, construed as a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., is denied, and Defendants' motion is stayed pending final disposition of Shapiro's appeal.
Discussion A. Shapiro's Motion Is Denied
The filing of a notice of appeal ordinarily ousts a district court of jurisdiction as to those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Camacho, 302 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (observing that "the filing of a notice of appeal normally `divests the district court of [jurisdiction] over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal'") (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). Certain motions, including motions for reconsideration made pursuant to Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., have the effect of holding an appeal in abeyance. See generally Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4). A district court may entertain and deny other motions, such as motions brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and filed during the pendency of an appeal, without disturbing the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. See Camacho, 302 F.3d at 36; Toliver v. County of Sullivan, 957 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Ryan v. United States Line Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir. 1962). The Court of Appeals for our circuit has made plain, however, that "the district court maygrant a rule 60(b) motion after an appeal is taken only if the moving party obtains permission from the circuit court."Toliver, 957 F.2d at 49 (emphasis in original); accord Camacho, 302 F.3d at 36; King v. First American Investigations, Inc., 287 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2002).
Although not designated as such, Shapiro's motion will be construed as a motion for reconsideration or relief from judgment, as the relief sought consists of an amendment of the judgment entered on December 1, 2004 excising the grant of costs set forth therein. As Shapiro's motion was filed more than ten days after entry of judgment, it may not be considered as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., and will instead be construed as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. See Phillips v. Corbin, 132 F.3d 867, 869 (2d Cir. 1998); Assoc. for Retarded Citizens of Connecticut, Inc. v. Thorne, 68 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1993); Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1991). The decision to construe Shapiro's motion under Rule 60(b) rather than Rule 59(e) is of little import, as the standards applied under either motion are, for the purposes relevant here, the same. See, e.g., Maalouf v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4770 (SAS), 2004 WL 2782876, at *1 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2004); Fields v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8363 (SHS), 2004 WL 626180, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004).
In view of her pro se status, Shapiro's papers are being held "`to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . .'" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Nonetheless, the Court is mindful that pro se status "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (quotation marks omitted).
Rule 60(b) provides, in pertinent part, that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged . . . or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). In view of the nature of the relief sought and the grounds for that relief identified in Shapiro's papers, subsection (6) of Rule 60(b) is the relevant provision here.
"A motion under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Velez v. Vassallo, 203 F. Supp. 2d 312, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Mendell in Behalf of Viacom, Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990)). Nonetheless, the Second Circuit has cautioned that Rule 60(b) provides "extraordinary judicial relief" to be granted "only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Key Pharm., 75 F.3d 815, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) ("A movant under Rule 60(b) must demonstrate `exceptional circumstances' justifying the extraordinary relief requested.").
Shapiro argues that an order should issue "that the judgment of December 1, 2004 be issued without costs" because her claims were brought in good faith, she has been granted in forma pauperis relief and has no money to pay any costs, the Defendants assertedly possess funds to cover such costs, and assessing costs against Shapiro will deter other parents from bringing meritorious claims against ACS. (Affidavit of Lauren Shapiro, sworn to Dec. 17, 2004, at 1.) In opposition, Defendants argue that they have filed a bill of costs and that any opposition to the assessment of costs sought therein is best addressed in the normal course. In reply to Defendants, Shapiro has set forth details concerning her financial circumstances, argued the public importance of her case, and contended that this Court should not assess costs in a decision citing the Family Court's decisions whilst "a Commission, acknowledging that Family Court is Dysfunctional, is holding public hearings on how to remedy the system." (Reply Affidavit of Lauren Shapiro, sworn to on Dec. 28, 2004 ("Reply Aff."), at 3.)
Insofar as Shapiro's arguments pertain to the imposition of costs and the applicability of the normal rule in civil litigation, by which costs are awarded to the prevailing party, under the particular circumstances of this case, those arguments are best addressed by means of opposition to Defendants' motion rather than amendment of the judgment entered on December 1, 2004. No extraordinary circumstances have been presented such as would warrant granting Shapiro's motion to amend the judgment rather than addressing her arguments in the context of Defendants' motion, which motion, for the reasons set forth below, is stayed pending a final disposition of the appeal. Moreover, were this Court to engage in an extended consideration of the propriety of imposing costs in favor of Defendants as the prevailing parties, the interests of judicial economy would be ill served in the event that the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment as the result of Shapiro's appeal. Accordingly, Shapiro's motion, to the extent seeking an order amending the judgment in this matter in light of Shapiro's financial circumstances and the other factors identified in her papers, is denied.
In her reply papers, Shapiro has also "urge[d] this Court to reconsider the credibility it gave to the Family Court Judge and ACS's judgement" in the Opinion (Reply Aff., at 2) in view of proposed legislation concerning reform of ACS and certain hearings assertedly being held by the New York State Matrimonial Commission with regard to the Family Courts and the "public's lack of confidence in the state courts" and in Family Court judges. (Id. at 3). Although Shapiro qualifies as "`lunatic decisions'" the opinions rendered by a Family Court judge in the underlying proceedings discussed in the Opinion (id.), she has offered no new evidence with regard to the proceedings in state court or the decisions reached by ACS in this matter, or otherwise identified any errors in the Opinion or matters overlooked such as might warrant reconsideration. Consequently, her motion, to the extent seeking reconsideration of this Court's consideration accorded the rulings and findings of Family Court judges and ACS's decisions, is denied.
In support of her allegations, Shapiro has submitted a letter from Michael Arsham, M.S.W., Executive Director of the Child Welfare Organizing Project, concerning ACS and the nature of the relationship between the Family Court and ACS generally.
B. Defendants' Motion Is Stayed
In view of the pending appeal, Defendants' motion for an order granting fees and costs is stayed in accordance with Local Civil Rule 54.1. See, e.g., Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 246 F. Supp. 2d 355, 356 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (refraining from awarding costs in light of the automatic stay provided for by Local Civil Rule 54.1). In accordance with Local Civil Rule 54.1, Defendants may renew their motion within thirty (30) days after the final disposition of the appeal. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Shapiro's motion is denied and Defendants' motion is stayed pending final disposition of Shapiro's appeal.
It is so ordered.