Opinion
No. 2D21-63
02-16-2022
William SEIRACKI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Charalampos G. Demosthenous of the Demosthenous Law Firm, Tampa, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chelsea N. Simms, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and Allison C. Heim, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
Charalampos G. Demosthenous of the Demosthenous Law Firm, Tampa, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chelsea N. Simms, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and Allison C. Heim, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
STARGEL, Judge.
William Seiracki appeals his judgment and sentences for stalking and resisting an officer without violence. We affirm the stalking conviction without further comment. However, because we conclude that Seiracki is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of resisting an officer without violence, we reverse in part.
Heather Schneider testified that she lived next door to Seiracki for approximately four years. During her testimony, she recalled multiple incidents occurring between December 2018 and August 2020 in which Seiracki would stand naked in the doorway to his apartment and stare at her as she pulled into her driveway. Schneider filed police reports after the December 2018 incident and another incident in early August 2020, but neither resulted in an arrest.
On August 25, 2020, Schneider pulled into her driveway and Seiracki was once again standing in his doorway naked. Schneider stayed in her car and called the police. Officer Joaquin Gonzalez responded to the scene and observed that Seiracki's front door was still open. However, as Officer Gonzalez approached the residence to speak with Seiracki, the door quickly closed. Officer Gonzalez knocked, announced his presence, and asked Seiracki to open the door. Seiracki briefly poked his head out before shutting the door again.
Seiracki eventually called police dispatch and said that he was fearful of an officer being outside his door. After an hour and a half, Seiracki opened the door and Officer Gonzalez instructed him to step outside because they were conducting an investigation. When he refused, Officer Gonzalez and another officer grabbed him by the wrist and brought him outside. Officer Gonzalez testified that as they tried to detain Seiracki, he "continued to tense up his arms and try to ... retreat into his residence." At the time, Officer Gonzalez acknowledged that they did not have enough for an arrest and stated that they were detaining Seiracki "for his safety and ours." Seiracki was ultimately placed in handcuffs and arrested for resisting an officer without violence. After the State rested at trial, Seiracki moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing that the officers were not engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty when he resisted. In opposition, the State argued that Officer Gonzalez developed probable cause to arrest Seiracki for obstruction of justice because he refused to exit his residence and kept Officer Gonzalez waiting outside. The trial court denied the motion, and Seiracki was found guilty.
"A trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo to determine solely if the evidence is legally sufficient." Durousseau v. State , 55 So. 3d 543, 556 (Fla. 2010). "Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction which is supported by competent, substantial evidence." Pagan v. State , 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). "If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction." Id.
To establish the offense of resisting an officer without violence, "the State must prove two elements: (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty and (2) the defendant's action constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty." C.W. v. State , 76 So. 3d 1093, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citing J.P. v. State , 855 So. 2d 1262, 1265-66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ). This appeal involves the first element; Seiracki argues that Officer Gonzalez was not engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty because he violated Seiracki's rights under the Fourth Amendment.
"It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 477-78, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ). Indeed, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich. , 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ; see also Kutzorik v. State , 891 So. 2d 645, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("The home is where a person enjoys the highest expectation of privacy." (citing Payton , 445 U.S. at 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371 )).
This court is bound by the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court regarding search and seizure issues. See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; Bernie v. State , 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988).
The Supreme Court has recognized that "the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to be reasonable." Payton , 445 U.S. at 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (citing Beck v. Ohio , 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) ). "In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the officers violated Seiracki's Fourth Amendment rights by physically removing him from his residence. In Nieves v. State , 277 So. 3d 745, 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), this court explained that "it is unlawful for the police to make a warrantless entry into a place protected by the Fourth Amendment for the purpose of arresting a suspect unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies." (citing Payton , 445 U.S. at 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371 ). Here, the officers involved made no efforts to secure a warrant, and the record does not support the existence of any exception to the warrant requirement. Simply put, there was no legal justification for the intrusion into Seiracki's home.
The State contends that the intrusion was justified because Officer Gonzalez developed probable cause to arrest Seiracki for obstructing the investigation based on his failure to obey his commands to come outside and speak with him. However, this argument is contradicted by Officer Gonzalez's testimony that he did not have probable cause to arrest Seiracki when the officers removed him from the apartment. Moreover, although Seiracki's reluctance to exit the residence to speak with police may have inconvenienced Officer Gonzalez, this conduct was entirely consistent with Seiracki's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See, e.g. , J.H.M. v. State , 945 So. 2d 642, 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (determining that once an individual told deputies who did not have a warrant she did not want to speak to the officers or allow them into the apartment, "at that point the deputies had no legal right to further pursue the interview and were required to permit J.H.M. to close the door"); Robinson v. State , 550 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) ("The defendant's failure to cooperate—his refusal to answer questions—cannot itself be criminal consistent with fourth and fifth amendment protections." (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) )).
Even if Officer Gonzalez did have probable cause to arrest Seiracki prior to removing him from the apartment, that would still not be enough to justify entering his home to conduct a warrantless arrest absent exigent circumstances or any other exception to the warrant requirement. See Nieves , 277 So. 3d at 748 (explaining that the legal principle that police cannot make a warrantless arrest in a place protected by the Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies "is true even where the police otherwise have probable cause to arrest the suspect and could make the arrest without a warrant were he, for example, just out on the street").
The State also claims that because Seiracki was arrested outside his apartment before he could retreat inside, his arrest does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. However, the State's implication that Seiracki voluntarily exited his apartment before attempting to retreat is inconsistent with Officer Gonzalez's testimony that once Seiracki opened the door, "we gave him instructions to ... exit his residence, to step outside, which he refused. And we ended up grabbing him and bringing him outside." (Emphasis added.) In circumstances such as these, allowing the police to forcibly remove someone from their home before arresting them as a means of sidestepping the warrant requirement would render the chief safeguard of the Fourth Amendment essentially meaningless.
Because the evidence clearly demonstrates that the officers violated Seiracki's Fourth Amendment rights by physically removing him from his residence without legal justification, the State failed to establish that the officers were engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty when Seiracki resisted their efforts to detain him. Accordingly, Seiracki is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of resisting an officer without violence.
Based on this determination, we need not reach Seiracki's second issue regarding the jury instructions for this charge.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
CASANUEVA and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.