Opinion
No. 70-739.
October 15, 1971. Rehearing Denied November 11, 1971.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Jas. D. Bruton, Jr., J.
Ralph C. Dell, of Allen, Dell, Frank Trinkle, Tampa, for appellants.
Rood Hapner, and David A. Maney, Tampa, for appellees.
Appellants appeal a final judgment based on a jury verdict in which appellees recovered damages against appellants resulting from a collision one-half hour before sunrise between appellees' automobile and defendant's train.
The trial court allowed the introduction into evidence of Florida Statute § 357.08, F.S.A., which by its terms requires a train which is engaging in a switching operation at a time and place such as involved in the instant case to place lighted fusees or other visual warning devices in both directions from the train. It was conceded by the appellants that there were no fusees or other visual warning devices placed at the intersection where the present accident occurred.
Appellants contend that the statute is wholly inapplicable and that it was reversible error to allow the introduction of the statute into evidence. It is the position of appellants that there is no direct evidence to prove that the train was in the process of a switching operation. Appellees contend that the conductor of the train made an admission against interest to the investigating officer shortly after the collision to the effect that they were engaged in a switching operation.
In the appellees' case in chief, an investigating officer, Jerry D. Feltman, testified that Ralph Gibson, the conductor on the train, told him that the train was switching at the time, that he asked Gibson if they were in the process of a switching operation and he said, "Yes" that "they were." On cross examination Officer Feltman was asked whether or not Gibson told him that the switching was there at that crossing, to which Officer Feltman answered "No, sir. I just asked him if he was in the process of a switching operation." The conductor, Gibson, took the stand and categorically denied telling Officer Feltman that the train was in a switching operation. Several other of the railroad crew members testified that the train was on a straight run and not in a switching operation.
It is well settled that an admission against interest may be introduced into evidence as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter stated. This is so even though the person making the admission against interest subsequently denies making such admission. Therefore, the trial court was eminently correct in admitting into evidence the testimony of Officer Feltman as to the admission against interest made by the conductor, Mr. Gibson. It then became an issue for the jury to decide as to whether or not the train was actually in a switching operation which would require the railroad to conform with the mandates of Florida Statute § 357.08, F.S.A.
The appellants also contend that the appellee driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Upon a review of the record on appeal this issue was properly submitted to the jury.
The appellants' other point on appeal has been carefully considered and found to be without merit.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
PIERCE, C.J., concurs.
MANN, J., dissents with opinion.
Abraham Lincoln is said to have remarked that calling a dog's tail a leg doesn't make it a leg. Judges seeking legislative intent should heed this bit of executive wisdom.
This judgment is supported not by facts, but by words. The facts are not in dispute. Several cars were being moved from the railroad's Uceta yard, on the east side of Tampa, and all but one were dropped off in the area of the Union Station. That one, destined for Swift and Company, at least a mile and half from the site of this accident, was attached to a switch engine taking it more than ten miles from the yard into which it was initially brought.
Viewed as a question of admissibility of the "admission," I can concur with by brother Hobson. During the presentation of the plaintiff's case it was proper to bring out any admissions of facts, and these, under Florida law, may stand for proof of the facts admitted. See Wilkinson v. Grover, Fla.App.3d 1966, 181 So.2d 591. On direct examination, Officer Feltman was asked, "Did he tell you that train was switching at the time?", to which Feltman replied, "Yes, sir." The question was perhaps objectionable, but no objection was made. In any event, it was then no time for the defendant to put on his case. On cross-examination, defendant's lawyer asked Feltman, "Do you recall what it was that the conductor said to you about the train?" "With what respect?" "With respect to anything he had to say to you?" "Yes, sir. I asked Mr. Gibson if this was enroute to St. Petersburg or exactly what the operations were and he said that they were — I asked him if they were in the process of a switching operation and he said yes, that they were."
Here is where the police officer, by suggesting a dichotomy between an inter-city run and a switching operation put into the conductor's mind an affirmative response to the question whether he was engaged in a "switching operation." Gibson's response was natural. He wasn't going to St. Petersburg.
I reject the notion that a train conductor can amend a statute by responding predictably to a leading question asked by a policeman. And any construction of the statute which would make a "switching operation" as defined in the statute out of the conduct of these trainmen would be ludicrous. If there were an obligation to bestow a pair of fusees on every street crossed enroute from the Uceta yard to Gandy Boulevard, the railroad would have to have a man in a hand car precede the train casting out fusees like a flower girl at a wedding. The plain intent of the Legislature was to make it necessary for the railroad to place fusees whenever, at night, it blocks a crossing either by a stationary train or one moving back and forth across the unsignaled grade crossing. The placing of fusees at crossings which the train was merely passing enroute to a "switching operation" would suggest danger where it had passed, and would ultimately condition motorists to ignore the warning where the danger was present.
Fla. Stat. § 357.08(1) F.S.A. (1967):
"Whenever a railroad train shall engage in a switching operation or stop so as to block a public highway, road or street at any time from one half hour after sunset to one half hour before sunrise, the crew of such railroad train shall cause to be placed a lighted fusee or other visual warning device in both directions from such railroad train upon or at the edge of the pavement of the highway, road or street to warn approaching motorists of the railroad train blocking the highway, road or street; provided, this section shall not apply to railroad crossings at which there are automatic warning devices properly functioning or at which there is adequate lighting."
If one examines, in the abstract, the admissibility of an "admission" sufficient on its face, he might be led to affirm this judgment on purely doctrinal grounds. The error came, in my opinion, when the trial judge denied a directed verdict, because any verdict for the plaintiff in this case would be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The plaintiffs' very able lawyer conceded that his sole proof of negligence consisted in the admission of "violation" of the fusee statute. Plaintiffs were at liberty to show that in fact there was an operation in progress which would block Himes Avenue, but they didn't, and couldn't, and they admitted that they couldn't. Thus, a verdict should have been directed for the simple reason that there is absolutely nothing in this record to support a verdict for the plaintiffs once the fusee statute is properly construed and the phrase "switching operation" is shown beyond question to have been used by the conductor in a sense other than that intended by the Legislature. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1972.