Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:00cv895
May 24, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
On November 28, 2000, Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed suit seeking money damages from the Defendant, a federal judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, for alleged violations of his rights under the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Plaintiff, however, has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted because Judge Morgan is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for these alleged violations. Accordingly, the Court hereby dismisses Plaintiff's claims with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6).
I. Background
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on November 28, 2000. On January 29, 2001, Judge Morgan filed a motion to dismiss in which he claimed absolute judicial immunity. By February 14, 2001, the motion to dismiss was fully briefed and ready for a decision. Nevertheless, on February 22, 2001, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which he reiterated his earlier allegations and included additional claims. Judge Morgan again moved to dismiss this action on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity.
Plaintiffs claims relate to rulings Judge Morgan made during the course of presiding over two in a series of lawsuits brought by Mr. Scott against his former employer, Norfolk Southern Corporation, and many of its employees, agents, and attorneys (collectively, the "Norfolk Southern Defendants"). The parties refer to these cases as "Scott X" and "Scott XIII" because they are Mr. Scott's tenth and thirteenth civil actions against the Norfolk Southern Defendants to have been either brought in or removed to federal court.
Scott v. Norfolk Southern Corp., Civil Action No. 2:98cv180 (E.D. Va.).
Scott v. Norfolk Southern Corp, Civil Action No. 2:99cv1814 (E.D. Va.).
Plaintiff's allegations against Judge Morgan fall into two categories: (1) that Judge Morgan improperly assumed the authority of a federal prosecutor by holding Mr. Scott in contempt of court on two occasions during the course of the Scott X litigation; and (2) that Judge Morgan, through ex parte communications, combined and conspired with the Norfolk Southern Defendants to deprive Mr. Scott of access to state courts by refusing to remand and by dismissing the Scott XIII case. The Court shall address below the application of judicial immunity to each of these allegations.
Judge Morgan denies these allegations and objects to Plaintiffs characterization of the facts. Judge Morgan recognizes, however, that for purposes of considering the pending motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the facts alleged in the original and amended complaint.
II. Discussion
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true. Advanced Health Care Serv. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 1990). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears to a certainty that Plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proven in support of his claim. "Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages."Mireless v. Waco 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Accordingly, it is impossible for Plaintiff to state a claim for which relief can be granted with respect to any of Judge Morgan's actions that fall within the broad ambit of judicial immunity, and any such claim must be dismissed.
"The absolute immunity from suit for alleged deprivation of rights enjoyed by judges is matchless in its protection of judicial power."McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972). As early as 1872, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that it was "a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). For this reason, "a federal judge may not be held accountable in damages for a judicial act taken within his court's jurisdiction." Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199, 106 S.Ct 496, 500, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). Such immunity applies "however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff" Id. at 200, quoting Bradley, 13 Wall. at 347. "Nor can this exemption of judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed." Id; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) ("immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly").
A judge's absolute immunity from suit is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, "a judge is not immune from liability for non judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11. Factors relevant to evaluating whether a judge has acted within his judicial capacity are (1) whether the act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct space, such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy related to a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1986). These factors are to be construed broadly in favor of immunity.Malina, 994 F.2d at 1124. Second, "a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction"Id., at 12. A judge, however, cannot be held liable for merely acting in excess of his authority. "If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge `will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, or was in excess of his authority.'" Mireless, 502 U.S. at 12.
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to each of Plaintiffs allegations to determine whether the doctrine of judicial immunity shields Judge Morgan from liability for the claims contained in the amended complaint.
A. Criminal Contempt Citations
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Morgan first held him in criminal contempt during a hearing on July 10, 1998, when Judge Morgan fined him $100. Plaintiff also alleges that the following year, on July 8, 1999, Judge Morgan caused a United Service Marshal to serve Mr. Scott with an order requiring him to appear in court to show cause as to why he should not be held in criminal contempt of court for having filed a post-judgment motion in Scott X. Plaintiff alleges that during the August 26, 1999 hearing on this show cause order, Judge Morgan intimidated him into testifying. Plaintiff further asserts that Judge Morgan held a second hearing on October 1, 1999, in which the Plaintiff was required to answer charges that he committed perjury and practiced law illegally. Judge Morgan allegedly combined and conspired with the Norfolk Southern Defendants to formulate these charges and to improperly subpoena a witness to testify during the October 1, 1999 hearing.
Ultimately, Judge Morgan found Plaintiff in contempt of court in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and Plaintiff was sentenced to probation. Plaintiffs conviction and sentence, however, were vacated on appeal. In overturning Plaintiffs conviction, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[t]he procedures attendant to the prosecution of a criminal contempt charge depend largely upon whether the conduct constitutes direct or indirect contempt." United States v. Scott, 2000 WL 779069, *1 (4th Cir. June 19, 2000), quoting United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1996). Direct contempt, which involves conduct that occurs in open court and in the presence of the judge, may be punished summarily, without some of the procedural safeguards that attend a criminal prosecution. If, however, a defendant is alleged to have committed indirect contempt, which involves conduct outside of the presence of the court that must be proved through the testimony of third parties, then more normal adversary procedures are required. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the fall 1999 contempt charge against Mr. Scott was of the indirect variety, and, accordingly, Judge Morgan should have assigned an independent prosecutor to prosecute the charges Id.
There is no question that citing a litigant for contempt is a normal judicial function within the jurisdiction of district court judges. See, e.g., Malina, 994 F.2d at 1124. Both instances in which Plaintiff was found in contempt took place in open court while Judge Morgan was on the bench and acting in his official capacity as a judge by presiding over the Scott X litigation pending before him. It is fundamental that "courts possess an inherent power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates" and that they are vested with the power to initiate contempt proceedings to ensure that the judiciary is not utterly dependent upon the other branches of government to vindicate judicial authority." Neal, 101 F.3d at 996 (quotations omitted). The July 1998 contempt citation appears to have involved direct contempt, the summary punishment of which was well within Judge Morgan's authority. See, Scott, 2000 WL 779069, at *1; Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). With respect to the fall 1999 conviction, even though the Fourth Circuit found that Mr. Scott was not afforded all of the procedural protections to which he was entitled, Judge Morgan cannot be held civilly liable for the error. "A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1106, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Malina, 994 F.2d at 1124-25 (judge immune from claims related to the procedurally flawed issuance of a contempt citation and imposition of jail sentence).
Mr. Scott's claims directly implicate the core rationale underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity — i.e., that "judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted must be able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation." McCray, 456 F.2d at 3. "[A judge's] errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption." Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. Accordingly, Judge Morgan is immune from liability for his actions related to holding Plaintiff in contempt of court and sentencing him, and all such claims must be dismissed.
B. Conspiracy with the Norfolk Southern Defendants
Plaintiff also seeks to hold Judge Morgan liable for engaging in ex parte communications with the Norfolk Southern Defendants in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of access to the state courts in connection with the Scott XIII litigation. Plaintiff initiated the Scott XIII case against the Norfolk Southern Defendants by filing suit in Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia on October 5, 1999. In Scott XIII, Plaintiff alleged harassment and discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as an assortment of state law claims. The Norfolk Southern Defendants removedScott XIII to federal court, and Plaintiff twice sought to have the case remanded. On April 7, 2000, Judge Morgan denied Plaintiffs motions to remand and dismissed Scott XIII on several grounds, including res judicata and frivolousness.
Plaintiff acknowledges, as he must, that Judge Morgan's decisions against remanding Scott XIII and in favor of dismissing that action are judicial in nature. Citing the Ninth Circuit case, Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), Plaintiff argues that Judge Morgan, nevertheless, can be held liable for these decisions because he is alleged to have conspired with the Norfolk Southern Defendants to fix the outcome of the Scott XIII litigation. In Rankin, the Ninth Circuit held that "[a]lthough a party conniving with a judge to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding may deal with him in his `judicial capacity,' the other party's expectation, i.e., judicial impartiality, is actively frustrated by the scheme. In any event, the agreement is not `a function normally performed by a judge.' It is the antithesis of the `principled and fearless decision making' that judicial immunity exists to protect." Rankin, 633 F.2d at 847 (citations omitted).
Mr. Scott's reliance on Rankin, however, is misplaced. The Ninth Circuit has reconsidered and expressly overruled Rankin, and its rationale for doing so illustrates the importance of insulating judges from liability for the sort of claims Mr. Scott asserts in this case. Courts of appeals had severely criticized Rankin for permitting "judges, on mere allegations of conspiracy or prior agreement, [to be] hauled into court and made to defend their judicial acts, the precise result judicial immunity was designed to avoid." Id., at 1077, quoting Dykes v. Hoseman, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The Fifth Circuit, in rejecting Rankin, reasoned that:
It requires little skill or imagination to convert many allegations that a judge has ruled in "bad faith" into allegations that he conspired to do so or was bribed; thus the threat to disinterested decision-making is similar. An embittered, losing party is just as likely to allege bribery or conspiracy as any other malevolent motive of a judge. The possibility that judges will be driven to wasteful and distracting selfprotective measures is just as great where liability could flow from conspiracy or bribery charges as from a charge of "bad faith."Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 1985). Acknowledging this criticism, the Ninth Circuit in Ashelman concluded that Rankin had "construed the immunity doctrine too narrowly by focusing on underlying actions instead of looking to the ultimate acts." 793 F.2d at 1078. Accordingly, "a conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges" Id., at 1078.
Judge Morgan's decisions related to the disposition of Scott XIII were quintessential judicial acts out of which no liability on the part of Judge Morgan can flow, whether or not those decisions were the product of some conspiracy against Mr. Scott's interests. Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that the presence of ex parte communications or other irregular procedures cannot serve to strip a judge of immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988), citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 363 n. 12 ("the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge's lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character"). For these reasons, the Court finds that Judge Morgan's actions with respect to his disposition of the Scott XIII matter were judicial in nature. Judge Morgan, accordingly, is immune from suit to the extent that there existed some jurisdictional basis for these decisions.
The Court now turns to whether Judge Morgan acted in "complete absence of all jurisdiction" in denying Plaintiffs motions to remand and in dismissing Scott XIII. Clearly, he did not. The federal removal statute provides that "[a]ny civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Further, "[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the [federal question] jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). District courts possess, as they obviously must, the jurisdiction necessary to determine whether removal of a case from state court was proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 and 1448.
Plaintiff argues at length that the removal of Scott XIII was so improper that Judge Morgan lacked the jurisdiction to arrive at any conclusion other than that in favor of remand. This argument is nothing other than an expression of Plaintiffs disagreement with Judge Morgan's rulings. In accordance with the jurisdiction conferred by the above-referenced statutes, Judge Morgan ruled that the Norfolk Southern Defendants' removal of Scott XIII was proper and that dismissal of that case was warranted. Whether Judge Morgan's decisions in this regard were correct is irrelevant to the determination this Court must make with respect to the applicability of the doctrine of judicial immunity. It would be entirely improper for this Court to accept Plaintiffs invitation to review Judge Morgan's rulings for error. Indeed, "[j]udicial immunity apparently developed, in medieval times, as a device for discouraging collateral attacks and thereby helping to establish appellate procedures as the standard system for correcting judicial error." Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225. Judge Morgan did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction in making his rulings in Scott XIII, and, accordingly, he is immune from this lawsuit. Plaintiff should direct any argument that Judge Morgan erred in the exercise of his discretion to the Court of Appeals.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Individual Federal Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint hereby is GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against Judge Morgan are DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk is REQUESTED to send copies of this Opinion and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to the United States Attorney's Office in Norfolk, Virginia.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he may appeal from this final order by forwarding a written notice of appeal to the Clerk of the United States District Court, 600 Granby Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. This written notice of appeal must be received within sixty (60) days from the date of this order.