Opinion
CAUSE NO. 3:01-CV-2659-K
April 21, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are both Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the motions, the summary judgment evidence, and all related filings, this Court concludes no genuine issues of material fact exist. This Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Factual Background
Mariah Hill Scott was employed by Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a Parkland Health and Hospital System ("Parkland") for over eight years. After holding a position as a senior buyer for seven years, she was promoted to Procurement Manager. Scott sued Parkland, claiming she was paid less than her male counterparts for the same job in violation of the Equal Pay Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Scott moved for summary judgment on liability and damages; Parkland responded and filed its own motion for summary judgment.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54. Once a movant makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted; the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings, but must support his response to the motion with summary judgment evidence showing the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial. Id. at 321-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14 (1986). All evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962).
On cross-motions for summary judgment, we review each party's motion independently, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994).
Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment
Parkland first argues that the Equal Pay Act cannot constitutionally be applied to it because, as a governmental unit of the State of Texas, it enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by private parties. The Fifth Circuit, however, has recently held that sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is not a defense to the Equal Pay Act. Siler-Khoder v. Univ. of Texas Health Science Center of San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001) (Congress did not exceed its authority when it abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Equal Pay Act); Siler-Khoder v. Univ. of Texas Health Science Center of San Antonio, 292 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2002) (denying petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 694 (2002). In light of Siler-Khoder, the Hospital District's jurisdictional argument is without merit.
Regimented Merit Pay System
The Equal Pay Act (the "EPA") demands equal pay for equal work. See Siler-Khoder, 261 F.3d at 545 (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 18, 195 (1974)). Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of an EPA violation by showing that an employer compensates employees differently for equal work, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the wage differential is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set forth in the EPA: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) any factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1); Siler-Khoder, 261 F.3d at 545.
In its motion for summary judgment, Parkland first argues Scott cannot establish a prima facie case on her equal pay claims. Parkland also argues that, assuming Scott can establish a prima facie case as to one or more of her alleged comparators, the summary judgment evidence establishes that Parkland has a statutory defense to her claims of disparate wages. This Court agrees with Parkland, and concludes the summary judgment evidence establishes Parkland's statutory defense as a matter of law.
Proof that the plaintiff and her asserted comparators were paid pursuant to a merit system is one of the defenses that acts as a bar to wage discrimination claims under the EPA. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1); Siler-Khoder, 261 F.3d at 545. The employer must show that its merit system is administered systematically and objectively. Brennan v. Victoria Bank Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974). Here, Parkland presented evidence through the affidavit of Ron Van Iderstine, the Director of Employment/Employee Relations for Parkland, regarding the manner in which Scott and her comparators were compensated. Van Iderstine testified that Parkland's employees are compensated according to a mechanical and mathematical compensation matrix administered at the same time every year. According to Van Iderstine, employees are "evaluated systematically" on an annual basis, and are assigned annual numerical performance grades "according to predetermined criteria." Once each employee is assigned an annual numerical performance grade, the resulting change in compensation is derived mathematically through the compensation matrix.
Van Iderstine testified that Scott was compensated and received regular merit raises according to the compensation matrix. According to Van Iderstine, John Barnes, Scott Kendall, Robert Erwin, and Hugo Partida, Scott's comparators, were also compensated according to the compensation matrix.
In response, Scott presents no evidence that she or her comparators were paid according to anything other than the compensation matrix. Scott conceded in deposition testimony she did not have any evidence that any of her four comparators had been paid more than was allowed under Parkland's compensation formula, or that Parkland had departed from its mechanical procedures in setting her own compensation.
The summary judgment evidence establishes the existence of a systematic and objective merit system that was applied to Scott and her comparators. See Brennan v. Victoria Bank Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974). Because the establishment of this statutory defense operates to bar Scott's claim of disparate pay, see 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1); Siler-Khoder, 261 F.3d at 545, this Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Parkland.
Conclusion
Having considered the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court determines that Defendant Parkland is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff Scott's claims for violation of the EPA.
It is therefore ORDERED that Parkland's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. In addition, it is ORDERED that Scott's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.