Opinion
02 Civ. 9530 (SAS).
December 27, 2004
Thomas P. Puccio, Esq., Law Offices of Thomas P. Puccio, New York, NY,
John T. Brennan, Esq., Law Offices of John Brennan, PC, Brooklyn, NY,
Will Aitchison, Esq., Aitchison Vick, Inc., Portland, OR,
Lawrence S. Robbins, Esq., Gary A. Orseck, Esq., Damon W. Taaffe, Esq., Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck Untereiner LLP, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs.
Charles Jackson, Esq., Lorie Elizabeth Almon, Esq., Peter A. Walker, Esq., Edward W. Bergmann, Esq., Brendan Sweeney, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, NY,
Michele Molfetta, Esq., Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs bring this action against the City of New York and its Police Department ("NYPD") (collectively, "defendants") on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the third, fourth and fifth claims of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion is denied.
29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Since the commencement of this litigation, approximately 16,000 former or current police officers and detectives have joined in this collective action pursuant to section 216(b).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are approximately 15,800 current and former police officers and detectives employed by the NYPD. Three of the five violations of the FLSA alleged in the Amended Complaint are the subject of the present motion. The third claim of the complaint alleges that defendants have established work schedules that require plaintiffs to work more than 171 hours in a 28-day period, without adequate overtime compensation. The fourth claim alleges that defendants fail to "includ[e] shift differential and longevity pay in computing the regular rate of pay in many circumstances in which [plaintiffs] have worked overtime. The fifth claim alleges that defendants improperly round down the amount of overtime for which plaintiffs are compensated.
See Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") ¶ 4; Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1. For a brief summary of the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, see Scott v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 2d 371, 373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-31.
Id. ¶ 35.
See id. ¶ 38.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), the court applies "the same standard as that applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)." "Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, '[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Thus, a plaintiff need only plead "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." In short, "Rule 8 pleading is extremely permissive."
Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)).
Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2004).
The task of a federal court in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint prior to the receipt of any evidence is a narrow one. "The fundamental issue at the dismissal stage 'is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleading that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.'" When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. The court may not consider matters outside the pleadings, but may consider documents attached to the pleadings, documents referenced in the pleadings, or documents that are integral to the pleadings.
Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Ziemba, 366 F.3d at 163.
See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the third, fourth, and fifth claims of the Amended Complaint "should be dismissed to the extent that the claims advanced therein rely upon the assumption that plaintiffs' daily one-hour meal periods count as hours worked under the FLSA even if they are not spent predominantly for the NYPD's benefit." In support of their argument, defendants cite Second Circuit authority, the applicability of which plaintiffs do not contest, stating that meal periods are compensable under the FLSA and, therefore, constitute time worked when the "worker performs activities predominantly for the benefit of the employer" during that time. Defendants maintain that once meal breaks are subtracted from the calculation of time worked, it will emerge that many of the individual plaintiffs are not entitled to receive overtime compensation under the FLSA.
Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law ("Def. Reply") at 2.
See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings at 2.
Reich v. Southern New England Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1997).
See Def. Reply at 3.
While defendants correctly identify the controlling authority in regard to the compensability of meal periods, they appear to misunderstand the standard governing motions for judgment on the pleadings. As stated above, to prevail on such a motion, defendants must show that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Yet defendants ask this Court to assume, in effect, that certain individual plaintiffs cannot prove that their meal times were spent predominantly for the NYPD's benefit. However, "'[w]hether time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit . . . is a question dependant on all the circumstances of the case.'" The compensability of meal times under the FLSA turns, therefore, on a factual issue.
Reich, 121 F.3d at 64 (quoting Armour Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944)).
See, e.g., Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 265 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Whether meal time is predominantly for the benefit of the employer is a question of fact.").
Defendants' motion to dismiss certain claims to the extent that they rely on the wrong legal standard cannot prevail because even if one applies the correct standard, a factual issue remains as to whether the meal breaks count as time worked under FLSA. In other words, it is too soon to say whether plaintiffs can or cannot prevail even under the standard clearly set forth in Reich, which is controlling in the Circuit. Only after discovery will it be possible to determine whether the plaintiffs' meal breaks count as time worked for the purpose of calculating overtime compensation. Therefore, while defendants are indeed correct, as plaintiffs concede, that the "predominant benefit" test applies to meal breaks, their motion is premature.
I make no determination at this point whether the third, fourth, and fifth claims state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [No. 138 on the docket sheet].
SO ORDERED.