Opinion
No. CV 10-6001607-S
October 6, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #127.00
FACTS
The plaintiff, Mark Schneider, commenced the present action against Jason Picano and Travelers Insurance Company by way of a complaint filed April 28, 2010. The two-count complaint alleges that on April 25, 2008, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle owned by his employer in a Northerly direction on Route 83 in Vernon, Connecticut when a vehicle driven by defendant, Jason Picano, caused his vehicle to cross the center lines of the roadway into the southbound lanes, collided with a vehicle preceding in the left southbound lane and then forced that vehicle to collide with the plaintiff's vehicle. As a result of that collision, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered personal injuries and other losses.
The first count of the complaint is a negligence claim against Picano. The Second Count is a claim against Travelers Insurance Company for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. In his claim against Travelers, the plaintiff alleges that the coverage provided by his motor vehicle liability insurance policy has been exhausted and is inadequate to fully compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and losses. The plaintiff seeks to recover under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by Travelers to Gale Godfrey, a woman with whom the plaintiff lives.
The defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment, a memorandum of law in support thereof and exhibits on May 24, 2011. The defendant's exhibits include an affidavit from the keeper of records for Travelers (Ex. A), a copy of the Traveler's motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued to Gale Godfrey (Ex. B); excerpts from the sworn deposition testimony of Gale Godfrey (Ex. C) and excerpts from the sworn deposition testimony of the plaintiff (Ex. D). The plaintiff in turn filed an objection to Traveler's motion for summary judgment and attached as exhibits the transcript from Ms. Godfrey's deposition (Ex. A) and the transcript from the plaintiff's deposition (Ex. B). On July 5, 2011, the court heard oral arguments on the defendant's motion and the plaintiff's objection.
DISCUSSION 1. Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). "However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 282, 464 A.2d 57 (1983). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way . . . [A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party . . . [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
"In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.
As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court . . ." Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
The defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff is not an insured under Ms. Godfrey's policy and therefore not entitled to uninsured/underinsured benefits under that policy. The plaintiff has objected to Traveler's motion claiming that he is a "family member" as defined in the policy and is therefore able to avail himself of coverage under Ms. Godfrey's policy. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that he is related to Ms. Godfrey by marriage and is therefore a "family member" within the meaning of the policy.
The Traveler's policy at issue provides information that is relevant to the defendant's motion and the plaintiff's objection. The policy indicates that on or about October 17, 2007, Travelers, through a Connecticut insurance agency located in Rockville, Connecticut, issued a personal automobile liability insurance policy to Gail A. Godfrey. Ms. Godfrey is the only named insured on the policy. Under the section "information used to rate your policy," Ms. Godfrey's date of birth is listed as well as her marital status which is listed as "single." The policy further states that it was important that the aforementioned information was correct "to insure that [the] policy [was] properly rated." The policy also stated that if there were errors or changes to this information, Ms. Godfrey was to "notify [her] Traveler's representative immediately." The only vehicle insured under the policy is a 2002 Ford Taurus SES. The policy period, which includes the date of the plaintiff's accident, April 25, 2008, is from December 8, 2007 to June 8, 2008.
The policy contains several coverages, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to which there is a Connecticut uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage endorsement. The Connecticut uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage endorsement in Ms. Godfrey's policy defines an insured as:
1. You or any "family member";
"You" and "your" are defined in the Policy as:
1. The `named insured" shown in the Declarations; and
2. The spouse if a resident of the same household.
2. Any other person "occupying" "your covered auto";
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of "bodily injury" to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above.
The plaintiff is not a named insured on Ms. Godfrey's policy. At his deposition, the plaintiff testified that at the time of his accident, he was in a Ray Seraphin Ford which is not an insured auto under the policy. Accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled to coverage under paragraph 1 as a "named insured" or under paragraph 2 as a person "occupying" a "covered auto."
The question before the court is whether Mr. Schneider is entitled to coverage under the "family member" provision of the policy. The policy defines "family member" as a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or a foster child." Ms. Godfrey and Mr. Schneider are not related by blood or adoption. The sworn testimony of Ms. Godfrey and Mr. Schneider reveals that at all times relevant, including the date of the accident, Ms. Godfrey and Mr. Schneider resided together in Vernon, Connecticut.
The plaintiff claims that he and Ms. Godfrey are related by "marriage" for the purposes of the policy. The policy, however, does not specifically define "marriage" and there does not appear to be a choice of law provision indicating what state law applies to the determination of the respective rights of the parties. "[I]n the absence of an effective choice by the parties . . . [t]he rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties . . ." Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 243 Conn. 401, 409 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 252 Conn. 774, 782 (2001) (adopting the choice of law analysis set forth in the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 188 and 193). Here, the evidence shows that the policy at issue was issued by a Connecticut insurance agency to Ms. Godfrey, a Connecticut resident. The plaintiff, also a Connecticut resident, seeks coverage under Ms. Godfrey's policy under the Connecticut uninsured/underinsured endorsement attached to Ms. Godfrey's policy for an accident that occurred in Connecticut. The Court finds that Connecticut has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. Therefore, Connecticut law shall govern this court's evaluation of the respective rights and duties of the parties herein.
The plaintiff argues that there is ample evidence to support a common-law marriage. The plaintiff references Ms. Godfrey's and his testimony in which they testified that they have lived together for the past twenty-three years and conducted themselves as husband and wife. The plaintiff claims that he and Ms. Godfrey and are known by friends and acquaintances as Mark and Gale Schneider and that Ms. Godfrey has the plaintiff covered under her health insurance policy.
In Connecticut, "marriage" is defined as the "legal union of two persons." Conn. Gen. Stats. § 46b-20. There are two types of regulations concerning the validity of a marriage: 1) Substantive requirements determining those eligible to be married; and 2) The `formalities prescribed by the state for the effectuation of a legally valid marriage.' Carabetta v. Carabetta, 182 Conn. 344, 347 (1980). The formality requirements are of two sorts: 1) a marriage license; and 2) solemnization." Ross v. Ross, No. FA97 0162587 S (Ct. Super. J.D. Stamford-Norwalk, Aug. 10, 1998), 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 637. Although other jurisdictions may recognize common-law marriage or accord legal consequences to informal marriage relationships, Connecticut definitely does not. McAnerney v. McAnerney, 165 Conn. 277, 285, 334 A.2d 437 (1973); Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588, 592-93 (1972); State ex rel. Felson v. Allen, 129 Conn. 427, 432, 29 A.2d 306 (1942). It follows that although two persons cohabit and conduct themselves as a married couple, our law neither grants to nor imposes upon them marital status. McAnerney v. McAnerney, 165 Conn. at 285. The plaintiff's cohabitation with Ms. Godfrey in this state does not, as a matter of law, constitute a "marriage."
The plaintiff further argues that even if Connecticut does not recognize the relationship that the plaintiff has with Ms. Godfrey in Connecticut as a "marriage," coverage is still warranted under Ms. Godfrey's policy because he and Ms. Godfrey were "married in some fashion in Canada which does recognize common law marriages." The plaintiff and Ms. Godfrey, however, both acknowledge that they have never been officially married by someone licensed to perform marriages in any state in the United States or any other territory or foreign country. They have also not produced any evidence or case law to establish that the ceremony that they had in Canada resulted in a valid marriage that this court must recognize. Plaintiff's claim that he is married to Ms. Godfrey is further undermined by his own testimony in which he testified that Ms. Godfrey is his "fiancée" and the policy under which the plaintiff seeks benefits which expressly identifies Ms. Godfrey's marital status as "single."
Indeed, there are certain formalities that must be complied with in order for Connecticut to recognize a marriage performed in a foreign country. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-28. A mere assertion that the plaintiff and Ms. Godfrey were married "in some fashion" in a foreign country does not, without more, give validity to this alleged union and is not sufficient to establish the existence of a material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
Conn. Gen Stat. Sec. 46b-28 provides, in relevant part, that "All marriages in which one or both parties are citizens of this state, celebrated in a foreign country, shall be valid, provided: (1) Each party would have legal capacity to contract such marriage in this state and the marriage is celebrated in conformity with the law of that country; or (2) the marriage is celebrated, in the presence of the ambassador or minister to that country from the United States or in the presence of a consular officer of the United States accredited to such country, at a place within his consular jurisdiction, by any ordained or licensed clergyman engaged in the work of the ministry in any state of the United States or in any foreign country."
The plaintiff further argues that he and Ms. Godfrey "have lived in Rhode Island and Canada", places where the plaintiff claims recognize common law marriages, and suggests that their cohabitation in Rhode Island and Canada is sufficient to constitute a common law marriage which should be recognized under Connecticut law. There is no evidence, however, that plaintiff and Ms. Godfrey lived in either Rhode Island or Canada. The plaintiff has also failed to establish that the plaintiff's and Ms. Godfrey's conduct or contacts with Rhode Island or Canada satisfy the common law marriage requirements in those jurisdictions. Without evidence to establish what the law of Canada and Rhode Island is, it is presumed to be like our own law. McLoughlin v. Shaw, 95 Conn. 102, 106 (1920); American Woolen Co. v. Maaget, 86 Conn. 234, 235, 85 A. 583 (1912). Moreover, for this court to recognize the validity of a marriage or relationship entered into in another state or jurisdiction, that marriage or relationship must be recognized as valid by such other state or jurisdiction. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-28a. The plaintiff has failed to present evidence to this court of a valid common law marriage in either Canada or Rhode Island.
Although Ms. Godfrey testified that she and the plaintiff had gone to various places together, there was no evidence presented to establish that she and the plaintiff actually lived in either Rhode Island or Canada.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-28a provides, in relevant part, "A marriage, or a relationship that provides substantially the same rights, benefits and responsibilities as a marriage, between two persons entered into in another state or jurisdiction and recognized as valid by such other state or jurisdiction shall be recognized as a valid marriage in this state, provided such marriage or relationship is not expressly prohibited by statute in this state."
In light of the foregoing and after reviewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact with regard to the plaintiff's claim against Travelers. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment and overrules the plaintiff's objection thereto.
SO ORDERED.