Opinion
No. CV-01-016835S
March 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a decision on the plaintiff's motion to set aside and for new trial, dated February 23, 2004.
The plaintiff, Rosa Santiago, instituted the present action seeking to recover monetary damages for personal injuries as a result of an automobile accident which occurred on June 5, 2000, on East Main Street in the city of Waterbury. She claimed that the defendant, Neftali Castellano was negligent and as a result, she sustained neck, back and ankle injuries.
The defendant, in his amended answer dated January 15, 2004, admitted that he failed to keep a proper and reasonable lookout for other motor vehicles upon the roadway, however, the defendant claimed that he lacked sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief regarding the remaining allegations in the complaint, including allegations regarding proximate cause and damages.
Trial commenced on February 19, 2004. The jury heard testimony from the plaintiff, the plaintiff's treating chiropractor, Dr. Randall Howe, the defendant, and the plaintiff's former landlord. Prior to the jury's deliberation, the court submitted both a defendant's and plaintiff's verdict form to the jury, over plaintiff's objection. On February 20, 2004, the jury returned a defendant's verdict. The plaintiff claims the court improperly submitted both a plaintiff's and defendant's verdict form to the jury where the issue of liability had been admitted. The plaintiff also claims that the jury could not have reached a defendant's verdict based upon the evidence.
For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.
I.
It is with some hesitancy that the court approaches a motion to set aside a jury verdict because of the gravity of the issues involved. "Litigants have a constitutional right to have factual issues determined by the jury. This right embraces the determination of damages when there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded persons as to the amount that should be awarded . . . This right is one obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as to which there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the jury and not by the court . . . The amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact, in this case, the jury . . . Similarly, [t]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony lie within the province of the jury." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallace v. Haddock, 77 Conn. App. 634, 636-37 (2003).
II.
The plaintiff claims that the court should not have submitted a defendant's verdict form to the jury as the issue of liability had been admitted. The plaintiff cites Riccio v. Abate, 176 Conn. 415, 418-19 (1979):
[t]he court was wrong, however, in submitting the two separate verdict forms on the issue of damages to the jury for their consideration. The issue of liability had been previously decided by the court when it granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and, therefore, the jury had before them only a hearing in damages. The defendants were found liable by the court and the effect of their liability was to establish the fact that a technical legal injury had been done by them to the plaintiff, and this entitled the plaintiff to at least nominal damages.
The court believes that this case and Riccio are distinguishable by their facts. In Riccio, a summary judgment motion was granted as to liability, and the issue before the jury was solely damages. "Our Supreme Court has noted that the rendition of summary judgment as to liability establishes `the fact that a technical legal injury ha[s] been done . . . to the plaintiff, and this entitle[s] the plaintiff to at least nominal damages.'" Clay v. Teach, 37 Conn. App. 556, 560 (1995), citing Rubin v. Rios, 186 Conn. 754, 756 (1982). In this matter, the defendant admitted in his amended answer that he failed to keep a proper and reasonable lookout; however, the defendant lacked sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief regarding the remaining allegations in the complaint, including the plaintiff's allegations regarding causation and damages.
"The elements in a negligence cause of action are duty, breach of that duty, causation and damages . . . To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct was the legal cause of the injuries." (Citations omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Ass'n, 57 Conn. App. 12, 16 (2000). "Proximate cause is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact, but it becomes a question of law when the mind of a fair and reasonable person could reach only one conclusion . . . Recovery is barred in a negligence action where there is a lack of causal connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and a plaintiff's injury." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 17. While the defendant admitted in his answer that he was negligent, the issue regarding causation was still contested and the plaintiff was left to her proof regarding the issue.
The jury was charged as follows: "In his answer to his complaint, Neftali Castellano admitted that he was negligent, so the issue of negligence has been resolved, and that is not before you. Therefore, the main issues that you must decide are whether the plaintiff suffered the injuries and losses she claims and whether they are causally connected to the accident of June 5, 2000, and what is fair, just and reasonable compensation for those injuries, if any, which you conclude were proximately caused by that accident. Now I use the phrase proximate cause; I must explain that to you. Proximate cause is direct cause. It is also sometimes referred to as a substantial factor. It is an act or failure to act followed in its natural sequence by a result. You are to determine if the negligence of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the resulting injury to the plaintiff without the intervention of any other superseding or intervening cause. Unless the plaintiff proves this, she cannot recover . . . In an ordinary case like this, the plaintiff must prove the following elements to you. Now, the defendant has acknowledged that he was negligent. But the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's act of negligence proximately caused her injuries and damages; and, also, she must prove what the resulting injuries and damages were."
The causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the claimed injuries was a disputed issue in this case. The accident involved what was described as a minor impact between the two vehicles. The defendant described the impact at less than 5 miles per hour and was "like a tap." The defendant observed no damage to either vehicle after the accident. The plaintiff did not complain of any injury at the scene, and none of the other occupants of her vehicle were injured. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Randall Howe, testified that the plaintiff sustained a 5% permanent partial impairment to the cervical spine, and 4% permanent partial impairment to the lumbar spine as a result of the accident. However, Dr. Howe was unaware that the plaintiff was treated and was rated by another chiropractor as having a 10% permanent partial impairment to the cervical spine as a result of an automobile accident which occurred in 1998. There was further testimony that the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against her landlord in 1996 claiming personal injuries resulting from a fall, and that she made another claim for personal injury as a result of an automobile accident in 1995.
Since the issue of the causal connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and a plaintiff's injury was a factual issue, the court believes that the jury should have been given both a plaintiff's and defendant's verdict form. However, the court acknowledges that the defendant has indicated in his brief that Riccio is controlling. Even in that event, if it is thus found that the defendant was liable, and the effect is to establish that a technical legal injury had been done to the plaintiff, then this entitles the plaintiff to at least nominal damages, see Riccio v. Abate, 176 Conn. at 418-19. "Nominal damages means no damages. They exist only in name and not in amount . . . Ordinarily, we will not grant a new trial in order to entitle a plaintiff to recover merely nominal damages . . . The circumstances of this case do not furnish an exception to this general rule." (Citations omitted.) Kelley v. Montesi, 14 Conn. App. 104, 107 (1988). See also, Expressway Assocs. II v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 218 Conn. 474, 479 (1991).
The court does not find that the jury's having a defendant's verdict form was misleading or caused any confusion. However, even if the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages as a result of the defendant's liability, the failure of the jury to award them does not entitle the plaintiff to a new trial.
III.
The plaintiff also claims that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached a defendant's verdict based upon the evidence. "In considering a motion to set aside the verdict, the court must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 449 (2003). "The trial court should not set a verdict aside where there was some evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have based its verdict, but should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that [the jurors] or some of them were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) American National Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 774 (1992).
"[T]he court should not act as the seventh juror with absolute veto power. Whether the court would have reached a different [result] is not in itself decisive . . . The court's proper function is to determine whether the evidence, reviewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Chaves, 78 Conn. App. 342, 347 (2003).
In the present case, the jury heard testimony and viewed other evidence regarding the slight impact, her prior, recent personal injury claims, and her prior injuries resulting from those claims, as discussed in part II above. In addition, the jury heard testimony from the plaintiff which directly contradicted her deposition testimony from a month earlier. At her deposition in January 2004, she had claimed that her back and neck injuries had completely cleared up by the time that she stopped treating with Dr. Howe in December of 2000. However, at trial on February 19, 2004, the plaintiff repeatedly repudiated her deposition testimony and claimed that she had residual symptoms and lasting effects from her accident in June 2000.
Therefore, there being some evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have based its defendant's verdict, the court will not set the verdict aside. In addition, in viewing the evidence presented, the court does not believe that the jury's verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.
CONCLUSION:
The plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for new trial is denied.
Matasavage, J.