Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-30090-KPN
April 9, 2004
This matter is before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) which provide for judicial review of a final decision by the defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"), regarding an individual's entitlement to Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") disability benefits. Emiliano Santiago ("Plaintiff") claims that the Commissioner's decision denying him benefits — memorialized in a November 29, 2001 decision by an administrative law judge — is not supported by substantial evidence and is predicated on errors of law. Plaintiff has moved to reverse or remand the decision and the Commissioner, in turn, has moved to affirm.
With the parties' consent, this matter has been reassigned to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all purposes, including entry of judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs motion will be denied and the Commissioner's motion to affirm will be allowed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may not disturb the Commissioner's decision if it is grounded in substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion. Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Thus, even if the administrative record could support multiple conclusions, a court must uphold the Commissioner's findings "if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support [her] conclusion." Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The resolution of conflicts in evidence and the determination of credibility are for the Commissioner, not for doctors or the courts. Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222; Evangelista v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 141 (1st Cir. 1987). A denial of benefits, however, will not be upheld if there has been an error of law in the evaluation of a particular claim. See Manso-Pizzaro v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). In the end, the court maintains the power, in appropriate circumstances, "to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the [Commissioner's] decision" or to "remand the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, born on April 14, 1963 in Puerto Rico, has a tenth grade education and little work history. (Administrative Record ("A.R.") at 344, 348, 359.) He presently resides in Springfield, Massachusetts. (A.R. at 344.)
A. MEDICAL HISTORY
Plaintiff claims that his disability commenced on July 1, 1995. (A.R. at 344.) The main impairments which he claimed to be disabling at the time of his current application for benefits are mental, i.e., depression, insomnia, nervousness and poor anger management. (A.R. at 37.) Plaintiff also noted in his application that he suffers from back pain, has issues with his "nerves" and drinks "a lot." (A.R. at 353.) In addition, he stated that he was taking four types of medication for pain, nerves and sleep, and asserted that his mental and physical conditions limit his ability to work because he is unable to think clearly, concentrate or focus his attention. (A.R. at 358.) 1. Mental Conditions
Plaintiff subsequently explained that he is unable to attend to his personal hygiene and does not drive because he frequently forgets "places and addresses." (A.R. at 368, 378.) He also indicated that he lives with a woman who takes care of him, drives him to appointments and makes sure he takes his medication. (A.R. at 367-68.) Plaintiff also stated that he does not like to be among other people or in groups and has difficultly controlling his anger in stressful situations. (A.R. at 369.)
On September 18, 1995, Plaintiff underwent psychological testing by Dr. Young Kim, a psychologist. (A.R. at 172-75.) Dr. Kim found Plaintiff to be coherent and oriented with adequate intelligence. (A.R. at 173.) He also noted a great amount of depression and anxiety related to Plaintiff's alcohol and drug abuse and unemployment. (A.R. at 174.) Dr. Kim concluded that Plaintiffs poor coping mechanisms impaired his ability to get along with other people and affected his ability to concentrate, perservere or adequately perform work-related activities, inadequacies which would likely result in frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. (Id.) Nonetheless, Dr. Kim recommended job training and recreational activities as a way to introduce needed structure into Plaintiffs life. (A.R. at 175.) Dr. Kim also recommended individual therapy and substance abuse treatment, including methadone. (A.R. at 174-75.)
Dr. James Smith became Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist and first examined him on September 19, 1995. (A.R. at 176.) On January 31, 1997, and again on May 13, 1997, Dr. Smith indicated that Plaintiff had limited concentration, attention and coping mechanisms. (A.R. at 176-78, 203-05.) Two years later, on February 19, 1999, Dr. Smith described Plaintiff as well-oriented and with adequate intelligence, but noted that his poor control over anger and frustration would prevent him from dealing with stress in a workplace. (A.R. at 388.) Dr. Smith also opined that Plaintiff, although depressed, was capable of handling his own finances. (A.R. at 388-90.) Still later, in an August 11, 1999 letter to Plaintiffs attorney, Dr. Smith reported that he had prescribed Prozac, BuSpar and Xanax, to treat Plaintiff's anxiety and stress, and occasionally directed the use of Motrin to treat his generalized complaints of "aches and pains." (A.R. at 460-61.) Dr. Smith described Plaintiff as needing "considerable external support to maintain himself" and that Plaintiff was "prone to periods of significant helplessness." ( Id.)
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1999, Plaintiff was seen at Baystate Medical Center where he reported that he was having suicidal thoughts and hearing voices. (A.R. at 397-98.) Plaintiff was referred to a psychiatric crisis unit as a low to moderate threat to himself. (A.R. at 398-99.) Later that month, Plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Kim, who reported that Plaintiff exhibited adequate intelligence and, while clearly depressed, was neither delusional nor incoherent. (A.R. at 458.) Dr. Kim recommended that Plaintiff continue with group and individual therapy for substance abuse and depression. (A.R. at 457-59.)
Also in May of 1999, Dr. Jose Pons, a psychologist with the Disability Determination Services ("DDS"), conducted a psychological examination of Plaintiff. (A.R. at 402-06.) Dr. Pons noted that Plaintiff appeared healthy and displayed normal gross motor functioning. (A.R. at 403.) Dr. Pons also observed that Plaintiff was cooperative but that he performed significantly below his estimated potential in nonverbal intelligence testing. (A.R. at 404-05.) Dr. Pons attributed Plaintiffs poor performance to depression, low self-esteem or a deliberate attempt to present a greater impairment. (A.R. at 405.) Dr. Pons stated that Plaintiff's complaints could be due to his recently ended drug and alcohol abuse and his history of head trauma. (A.R. at 405-06.) Unlike Dr. Smith, Dr. Pons believed that Plaintiff was incapable of handling his finances. ( Id.)
On June 3, 1999, Dr. Menachem Kasdan, another DDS psychologist, reviewed Plaintiffs medical records and concluded that he had an affective disorder (dysthymia) and a substance addiction. (A.R. at 410, 413.) In a Mental Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") Assessment, Dr. Kasdan found no "marked" limitations and only "moderate" limitations in a few categories, e.g., Plaintiff's ability to understand and concentrate, which could affect his ability to complete a normal work week and interact with others. (A.R. at 416-19.)
On January 5, 2000, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Moris Pardo, a psychiatrist, upon referral by DDS. (A.R. at 427-29.) Dr. Pardo noted that Plaintiff showed "difficulties" in presenting his symptoms and repeated "learned statements." (A.R. at 427.) Plaintiff reported to Dr. Pardo that he was in a methadone program but still drank alcohol and used heroin two or more times each week. (A.R. at 428.) Plaintiff acknowledged getting angry easily and having past legal difficulties due to ongoing drug use. ( Id.) Dr. Pardo noted that Plaintiff's attitude was "partially cooperative" but "somewhat evasive," that Plaintiff had a history of suicidal gestures involving superficial cuts on his arms, that Plaintiff was of average intelligence — with fair insight, concentration and attention — but with poor judgment, and that he had no memory or cognitive defects. (A.R. at 428-29.) Dr. Pardo believed that Plaintiff's main problems were "severe substance abuse" and "characterological traits," along with an unspecified personality disorder. (A.R. at 429.)
On January 26, 2000, Plaintiff's medical records were reviewed again, this time by Dr. Brian O'Sullivan, another DDS psychologist. (A.R. at 436-48.) Dr. O'Sullivan concluded, as had Dr. Kasdam, that Plaintiff had dysthymia and substance addiction and suffered from a personality disorder as well. (A.R. at 439, 441-42.) In his Mental RFC Assessment, Dr. O'Sullivan found no marked limitations, but moderate limitations similar to those found by Dr. Kasden. (A.R. at 445-48.) In Dr. O'Sullivan's view, the record evidenced symptom exaggeration and, therefore, cast doubt on the believability of Plaintiff's more extreme claims. (A.R. at 447.)
Also in January of 2000, Dr. Smith, Plaintiffs psychiatrist, completed his own written evaluation of Plaintiff. (A.R. at 430-32.) Dr. Smith reported that Plaintiff had difficulty concentrating and symptoms of anxiety and depression that restricted his adaptive functioning and that Plaintiff could not deal with the public. (A.R. at 430-31.) Dr. Smith noted, however, that Plaintiff was alert and oriented with no evidence of psychotic behavior, possessed good long term memory, did not require excessive supervision, and was capable of traveling alone in public. (A.R. at 430-31.) Still, a follow-up letter from Dr. Smith to Plaintiffs attorney on July 21, 2000, opined that "it is unlikely that [Plaintiff] is going to be able to function effectively in a the work environment." (A.R. at 450.)
2. Physical Conditions
On March 17, 1999, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Vincent Giustolisi, a DDS physician, who reported that Plaintiff had lower back pain but no objective findings. (A.R. at 391-93.) According to Dr. Giustolisi, Plaintiff could bend forward from 0-90 degrees without complaining of pain, was able to sit comfortably, and showed no signs of difficulty getting on or off the examination table. (A.R. at 392.) Dr. Giustolisi stated that he did not believe Plaintiff was disabled and should be able to go back to work. ( Id.)
Dr. Giustolisi examined Plaintiff again on January 26, 2000, at which time he noted Plaintiffs complaints of constant back pain which radiated into his legs and caused him to use a cane. (A.R. at 433-35.) Dr. Giustolisi observed, however, that Plaintiff did not seem to use his cane for support while walking and even departed the office without it. (A.R. at 435.) Dr. Giustolisi felt that Plaintiff's cane was merely an "embellishment" of his claim of severe back problems. ( Id.) Dr. Giusstolisi again noted that Plaintiff showed no signs of discomfort when sitting or getting off the examining table, and no signs of neurosensory deficit or clinical tenderness to palpation. He concluded that Plaintiff could return to full-duty work. (A.R. at 434-35.)
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his initial application for SSI benefits dated January 9, 1997, Plaintiff claimed he had been disabled from depression and back pain since July of 1995. (See A.R. at 226.) That application was denied on January 15, 1998, and Plaintiff did not seek further review. (See A.R. at 226-33.) Plaintiff filed a second application on January 14, 1999, still maintaining that he had been disabled since July of 1995. (A.R. at 344-47, 352-61.) This application too was denied both initially and on reconsideration, as well as after a September 6, 2002 hearing before an administrative law judge. (A.R. at 240-51, 279-93.) After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on March 16, 2001, (A.R. at 306-08), Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 4, 2001.
On August 8, 2001, upon motion of the Commissioner, Senior Judge Frank H. Freedman, to whom this action was originally assigned, remanded the matter for a new hearing because the tape of the administrative hearing had been lost. (A.R. at 326-28.) A new hearing was held on October 11, 2001. (A.R. at 44-58.) In a written decision dated November 29, 2001, the administrative law judge (hereafter the "ALJ") determined that Plaintiff was not disabled because he could perform a significant number of low-stress, unskilled jobs in the national economy. (A.R. at 35-43.) Over one year later, on March 22, 2003, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, (A.R. at 5-6), thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1455, 416.1481 (2004).
III. DISCUSSION
An individual is entitled to SSI benefits under the Social Security Act ("the Act") if, among other things, he is needy and disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a and 1382c(a)(3). Plaintiff's financial need is not challenged. The question, therefore, is whether he suffers from a disability.
A. DISABILITY STANDARD AND THE ALJ's DECISION
An individual is considered disabled if he is unable to participate in "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered disabled under the Act:
only if his physical of mental impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). See generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-49 (1987).
In determining disability, the Commissioner follows the five-step protocol described by the First Circuit as follows:
First, is the claimant currently employed ? If he is, the claimant is automatically considered not disabled.
Second, does the claimant have a severe impairment? A "severe impairment" means an impairment "which significantly limits the claimants physical or mental capacity to perform basic work-related functions." If he does not have an impairment of at least this degree of severity, he is automatically considered not disabled.
Third, does the claimant have an impairment equivalent to a specific list of impairments contained in the regulations' Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. If the claimant has an impairment of so serious a degree of severity, the claimant is automatically found disabled.
Fourth,. . . . does the claimant's impairment prevent him from performing work of the sort he has done in the past? If not, he is not disabled. If so, the agency asks the fifth question.
Fifth, does the claimant's impairment prevent him from performing other work of the sort found in the economy? If so, he is disabled; if not, he is not disabled.Goodermote v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982).
In the instant case, the ALJ, on remand, found as follows with respect to these questions: that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his disability (question one); that he had an impairment that was "severe," although not severe enough to be listed in Appendix 1 (questions two and three); that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, so a determination of whether he was unable to perform such work was not possible (question four); and that Plaintiff was able to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy which involve "light unskilled work," such as janitor, assembler or packer (question five). (A.R. at 36-43). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not suffer from a disability.
B. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF'S CHALLENGE TO ALJ's DECISION
Plaintiff makes essentially three arguments in support of his assertion that the ALJ's decision is not based on substantial evidence and is predicated on errors of law. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's conclusion that his impairments did not equal a listed impairment is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ impermissibly discounted his subjective complaints regarding the limitations imposed by his impairments. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinions of his treating physicians and, conversely, relied too heavily on DDS reviewers. For her part, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ's decision is based on substantial evidence and not predicated on errors of law. In the court's view, the Commissioner has the stronger argument.
1. Listed Condition
In order to receive disability benefits at step three of the sequential analysis, a claimant must prove that his condition meets or equals a listed impairment. See Torres v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 870 F.2d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 1989). "An impairment meets the listings only when it manifests the specific findings described in the set of medical criteria for a particular listed impairment." Martinez Nater v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 933 F.2d 76, 77 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "An impairment equals a listed impairment when the set of symptoms, signs and laboratory findings in the medical evidence supporting the claimant are at least equivalent in severity to the set of medical findings for the listed impairment." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff claimes that his condition met or equaled Listing 12.04, which covers affective disorders. In order to be successful on this claim, Plaintiff had the burden of showing that his condition results in at least two of the following: marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.04 (2004). These are often called "Part B" criteria.
Since Plaintiff claims that "depression" was the type of affective disorder from which he suffered, he also had to prove, by medical documentation, at least four of the following "Part A" criteria: anhedonia or pervasive loss of interest in almost all activities; appetite disturbance with change in weight; sleep disturbance; psychomotor agitation or retardation; decreased energy; feelings of guilt or worthlessness; difficulty concentrating or thinking; thoughts of suicide; or hallucinations, delusions or paranoid thinking. Id. Although Plaintiff claims, without citation to the record, that his major depression "easily satisfies" these Part A criteria, the court questions whether Plaintiff has actually sustained his burden in this regard. See Torres, 870 F.2d at 745. In any event, as described infra, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of at least two of the Part B criteria delineated in the text.
After considering all the evidence, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proof. After review, the court concurs. The ALJ determined from the record that Plaintiff experienced only a "slight" restriction of activities of daily living and only "moderate" difficulties in maintaining social functioning. (A.R. at 39.) Although the ALJ also acknowledged that Plaintiff suffered some deficiencies of concentration, persistence and pace, he determined that there was no indication that Plaintiff's difficulties in this regard were "marked." ( Id.) This was consistent with the views of Drs. Kasden and O'Sullivan, both of whom described Plaintiffs concentration limitations as "moderate" only. (A.R. at 416, 445.) In addition, the ALJ found that Plaintiff never experienced an episode of decompensation, let alone repeated episodes of extended duration. (A.R. at 39.)
To be sure, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinions of his treating and examining physicians. (See discussion, infra.) However, at least two examining doctors — Dr. Smith, Plaintiff's treating physician, and Dr. Pardo, a psychiatrist — gave Plaintiff a GAF score of around 60. (A.R. at 388, 429, 430.) This score, apparently, indicates that Plaintiff was functioning fairly well, with only mild to moderate symptoms that would cause only some difficulty in social or occupational functioning. (See A.R. at 37-38.) In addition, Plaintiffs psychologist, Dr. Kim, in fact, recommended that Plaintiff take part in a job-training program. In short, the court concludes that the ALJ had substantial evidence that Plaintiff's impairment, while severe, did not equal a listed impairment.
"A GAF score represents `the clinician's judgment of the individual's overall level of functioning.' The GAF score is taken from the GAF scale, which `is to be rated with respect only to psychological, social, and occupational functioning.' The GAF scale ranges from 100 (superior functioning) to 1 (persistent danger of severely hurting self or others, persistent inability to maintain minimal personal hygiene, or serious suicidal act with clear expectation of death)." Munson v. Barnhart, 217 F. Supp.2d 162, 164 n. 2 (D. Me. 2002) (quoting American Psychiatric Ass'n Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32, 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000)).
2. Plaintiff's Subjective Complaints
As his second argument, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to give full weight to his subjective complaints of mental disorder and pain which, he claims, were supported by the findings of his treating physicians. This argument can be disposed of in relatively short order.
The First Circuit has long acknowledged that an administrative law judge is not required to take a claimant's subjective allegations at face value. See Bianchi v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 764 F.2d 44, 45 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Burgos Lopez v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 747 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1984)). It is also well established that the court must generally defer to credibility determinations made by an administrative law judge. See Frustaglia v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st Cir. 1987); Brown v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 740 F. Supp. 28, 36 (D. Mass. 1990).
Here, the ALJ relied on the reports of three examining physicians which raised doubts about Plaintiff's credibility. Dr. Giustolisi noted the mismatch between the severity of Plaintiff's claimed back pain symptoms and medical findings and the presence of symptom embellishment. (A.R. at 433-35.) Dr. Pons, addressing Plaintiff's psychological problems, also noted a believability problem due to a possible attempt on Plaintiff's part to make his condition appear worse than it was. (A.R. at 404-05.) Finally, Dr. Pardo noted that Plaintiff was evasive, unable to provide specifics when discussing his symptoms, and presented "learned" responses. (A.R. at 427-28.)
Similarly, Dr. O'Sullivan, a DDS psychologist who reviewed Plaintiff's case, concluded that his medical records indicated "behavior . . . consistent with exaggerating or making up limits not otherwise verified." (A.R. at 447.) Based on these reports and the ALJ's own observations of Plaintiff, this court has little choice but to conclude that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to discount Plaintiff's credibility — and, hence, his subjective complaints — and to rely instead on the various medical reports of record.
3. Treating Physicians
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ substituted his own opinion for that of Plaintiff's treating physicians, particularly that of Dr. Smith, his primary psychiatrist. Concomitantly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly gave controlling weight to the opinions of the non-examining physicians. The court disagrees.
Plaintiff's argument to the contrary, the ALJ did not fail to give proper weight to the opinions of Drs. Smith or Kim. While it is true that Dr. Smith ultimately opined that Plaintiff was "unlikely to be able to function effectively in a work environment," that conclusion, as Plaintiff is well aware, is reserved to the Commissioner, not the treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(1) (2004) (" We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . . A statement by a medical source that you are `disabled' or `unable to work' does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.") (emphasis added). Granted, "[t]he ALJ may not `substitute his own layman's opinion for the findings and opinion of a physician.'" Chelte v. Apfel, 76 F. Supp.2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting Gonzalez Perez v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 812 F.2d 747, 749 (1st Cir. 1987)). Here, however, the ALJ relied not on his own opinion but on the reports of Drs. Pons, Pardo and Giustolisi, all of whom examined Plaintiff and found that he had only moderate limitations in his ability to function in social and occupational settings.
The ALJ also noted some inconsistencies in Dr. Smith's evaluations over time, and these inconsistencies are clear in the record. In 1999, for example, Dr. Smith described Plaintiff as depressed but well oriented, adequately intelligent and able to handle his own finances. (A.R. at 388-90.) Similarly, in January 2000, Dr. Smith said Plaintiff was alert and oriented with no evidence of psychotic behavior, possessed good long-term memory, did not require excessive supervision, and was capable of traveling alone in public. (A.R. at 430-32.) In contrast to these specific reports, Dr. Smith's July 21, 2000 letter to Plaintiff's attorney simply makes the conclusory statement that Plaintiff was "unlikely . . . to be able to function effectively in a work environment." (A.R. at 450.) This is obviously too speculative to be of much assistance.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ "seem[ed] to primarily focus" on the opinion of Dr. O'Sullivan, one of the DDS psychologists who reviewed Plaintiff's medical records. (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 23.) Granted, the ALJ stated that he had "adopted the opinion" of Dr. O'Sullivan. (A.R. at 40.) However, the ALJ also discussed nearly all of the other medical evidence before him. It is this court's view that the ALJ's so-called "adoption" of Dr. O'Sullivan's opinion, if that in fact did occur, was appropriately based on the ALJ's analysis of the record as a whole.
Plaintiff's case is not helped by his history of drug addiction. The Act provides that "an individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addition would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(J). See also Brown v. Apfel, 71 F. Supp.2d 28, 35 (D.R.I. 1999), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1347 (1st Cir. 2000).
IV. CONCLUSION
The ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled might not have been the only possible result. Plaintiff has barely survived on the economic edge of society for quite some time and his eligibility for benefits would no doubt have eased his plight. Nonetheless, for the reasons described, the court finds that the Commissioner's decision is based on substantial evidence and not predicated on errors of law. See Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (a court must affirm the administrative decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the record could arguably justify a different result); Weller v. Shalala, 922 F. Supp. 689, 694 (D. Mass. 1996) (similar). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to reverse or remand is DENIED and the Commissioner's motion to affirm is ALLOWED.IT IS SO ORDERED.