Opinion
H046914
03-10-2021
In re T.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.L. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 18JD025517 & 18JD025518)
On December 7, 2018, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services (Department) filed separate petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), and (c) relative to a boy, T.G., then 10 years old, and a girl, E.L., then 10 months old. (Hereafter, T.G. and E.L. are collectively referred to as the minors.) The petition as to the minor E.L. was also brought under section 300, subdivision (j). The minors' mother is R.L. (mother). Troy G. is T.G.'s father. Manuel L. is E.L.'s father. The Department alleged that the minors needed protection because, inter alia, there was significant domestic violence in mother's relationship with E.L.'s father, Manuel L., and she had allowed Manuel L. to stay in the home for significant periods of time in violation of an active restraining order. The minors were removed from mother's custody and care in January 2019; T.G. was placed with Troy G., and E.L. was placed in the Department's care.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
The juvenile court conducted a contested multiple-day combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing that commenced on April 26, 2019. On May 3, 2019, the juvenile court announced its decision. The court found jurisdiction to be appropriate and declared the minors dependent children under section 300. The court ordered that their removal from the home was required because there would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if the minors were returned to the home and there were no reasonable measures to protect the minors' health without such removal. (See § 361, subd. (c)(1).) It concluded further as to E.L. that placement of the minor with the previously noncustodial parent, Manuel L., would be detrimental to E.L.'s safety, protection, and physical or emotional well-being. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)
Mother and father Manuel L. (collectively, appellants) appeal from the order. We conclude there was substantial evidence in support of the juvenile court's conclusion that the minors were dependent children under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c), and we will therefore uphold the jurisdictional order. We conclude further that the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court, as a reasonable factfinder, could have concluded it was highly probable that (1) removal of the minors from mother's care was proper under section 361(c)(1), and (2) placement of E.L. with the former noncustodial parent, Manuel L., would be detrimental to E.L.'s safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being (§ 361.2, subd. (a)). We will therefore affirm the dispositional order.
"[T]he dispositional order is the adjudication of dependency and is the first appealable order in the dependency process. [Citations.]" (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196.) Mother and Manuel L. may challenge the jurisdictional order in this appeal. (See In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 801 [generally, jurisdictional findings and other pre-disposition orders are reviewable in the appeal of the disposition order].)
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Referrals
1. March 2018 Referral
In March 2018, the San Jose Police Department forwarded police reports concerning two domestic violence incidents involving mother and Manuel L. for investigation to assess the minors' safety. The two incidents, including the accounts of them that were provided by mother and Manuel L. to the police, social workers, and the court, are discussed in detail, post. The first incident, occurring on March 12, involved Manuel L. physically assaulting mother while she was holding their baby, E.L. The second incident occurring on March 21 involved mother assaulting Manuel L. in E.L.'s presence. The Department substantiated the referral for general neglect of the minors by mother and Manuel L. It found a moderate risk to the minors in light of the circumstances that mother and Manuel L. were reportedly no longer together, and he was no longer living in the home.
2. November 2018 Referral
In November 2018, a mandated reporter made a referral because T.G. had "disclosed that there are times when he does not feel safe with his mother because she yells [at] or hits him." T.G. told the reporting party that the problems arose when he would ask to visit his father, who was living in Modesto. T.G. said that the last incident occurred in approximately October 2018, when mother told T.G. to stop asking about his father and then "reportedly slapped him on the face, pinched his arm and pulled his ear." T.G. also reported that in or about May 2018, again when mother had become upset about T.G. asking about his father, reportedly slapped him on the leg, leaving a red mark for the remainder of the day. T.G. said there was another incident in 2017 in which mother, after telling T.G. he had not cleaned out her car well enough to warrant a visit with his father, had slapped T.G.'s face, leaving a bruise. Additionally, the mandated reporter indicated a concern that mother regularly left T.G. in the car unattended for up to an hour while she went to work The reporting party stated that T.G. was "fearful about retaliation from his mother, because he stated that the last time CPS investigated, his mother confronted him about it. She reportedly told him 'why are you telling people that I'm a bad mom?' and [T.G.] is concerned that his mother will no longer allow him to attend counseling services when she finds out."
Approximately one week after the November referral, T.G. told the same reporting party that mother had yelled at him after he admitted to her that he had reported the physical and verbal abuse. T.G. advised that mother had made him feel guilty, saying, for example, " 'Why are you saying this, they are going to place you in foster care and take your little sister, too, you want this to happen?' " and " 'How can you [betray] your own mother?' " Mother continued the verbal abuse the next day, and she told T.G. she was going to lose her job because of T.G.'s disclosure.
During the investigation of the referral by the Department, T.G. told the social worker that mother had pinched him on the arm, pulled his ear, and had slapped him. He confirmed that his mother had hit him on the leg, leaving a red mark; he said it had occurred in 2017 while she was saying negative things about Troy G. T.G. told the social worker that he had gotten into trouble for speaking with the reporting party and mother had said he would be sent to foster care if he told people that she hit him. T.G. said that he felt safe with mother when they did not argue about him seeing Troy G. but was afraid of her when she was mad at him. T.G. told the social worker that "his mother would often hit [Manuel L.]," and that in 2017, T.G. had witnessed mother punching and pushing Manuel L. He also said he would stay with his grandmother when mother and Manuel L. would sometimes "go out and consume alcohol and . . . when [they would] come back to pick him up, they [would be] tired, and [would] 'act weird.' " Troy G. confirmed with the social worker that T.G. had told him that mother "hits him and yells at him when he wants to go with [Troy G.]," and that she had pinched T.G. on one occasion.
Mother told the social worker she had sole physical custody of T.G. and shared legal custody of him with Troy G. She said T.G. had made up the accusations because he wanted to live with his father, Troy G. She denied that she had pinched or slapped T.G. or that she had pulled his ear. Mother said that she and Manuel L. no longer lived together, there was "a peaceful contact restraining order" in place, and that there had been no domestic violence since March 2018. The social worker had a follow-up interview with mother after the Department received a police report indicating that on August 30, 2018, mother had reported an incident of domestic violence in which Manuel L. had physically assaulted her. Mother denied that a physical altercation had taken place.
The August 30, 2018 incident is discussed in detail, post.
Manuel L. told the social worker that mother was short-tempered, had ripped his clothes on one occasion, and had physically assaulted him, resulting in his calling the police. He said there was no active restraining order between mother and him.
The Department evaluated the risk to the minors as high. Its assessment was based upon the minors' exposure to domestic violence, conflicting reports from mother and Manuel L. concerning the August 30, 2018 domestic violence incident, and mother's use of inappropriate physical discipline upon T.G. when he asked to see his father.
B. Initial Proceedings
1. Petitions
On December 8, 2018, the Department filed separate petitions relative to the minors, T.G. and E.L. It was alleged that as a result of the failure or inability of the mother and the minors' respective fathers (Troy G. and Manuel L.) to adequately supervise or protect the minors, they had suffered, or were at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness. (See § 300, subd.(b)(1) (hereafter, § 300(b)(1)).) It was also alleged that the minors were suffering, or were at substantial risk of suffering, serious emotional damage as a result of the conduct of their parents. (See § 300, subd. (c) (hereafter, § 300(c)).) And the Department alleged in the petition concerning the minor E.L. that as a result of mother's use of inappropriate physical discipline upon E.L.'s sibling, T.G., there was a substantial risk that E.L. would be abused or neglected. (See § 300, subd. (j) (hereafter, § 300(j)).)
The Department alleged that mother and Manuel L. were "involved in a high-lethality domestic violence relationship in which [Manuel L. was] the primary aggressor, and they expose the children to that violence." Since March 2018, law enforcement had been called out on three such occasions. On March 12, Manuel L. was arrested after having punched and slapped mother in the face and stomach while she was holding their baby, E.L. On March 21, mother was arrested after she punched Manuel L. in the face. The minor, E.L., was present in the vehicle when the incident occurred. And on August 30, Manuel L. grabbed mother by the neck and by her hair and pushed her into the window of a vehicle multiple times. This contact by Manuel L. was in violation of a criminal protective order. The Department alleged that before March 2018, there had been at least six other incidents of domestic violence in which either Manuel L. or mother had acted as the primary aggressor. The minor T.G. had witnessed "multiple 'fights' between" mother and Manuel L. including an incident in which mother had attempted to strike Manuel L. and throw away his clothes. T.G. had attempted to intervene in some of the incidents. The Department also alleged that mother had continued to allow Manuel L. to stay in the home for significant periods of time despite the existence of an active restraining order.
The Department alleged further that mother had used inappropriate physical discipline against T.G. She had made disparaging comments about T.G.'s father, including telling T.G. that his father did not love him, and in the summer of 2018, she had struck T.G. on the leg with an open palm. And mother had pinched T.G.'s arm and pulled his ear when they argued about her refusal to permit him to visit his father.
In addition, the Department alleged that Troy G. had been aware of mother's use of inappropriate physical discipline upon the minor T.G., with her leaving the minor alone, and with exposing him to domestic violence. Troy G. had failed to take action to ensure the minor T.G.'s safety.
2. Initial Detention Hearing
At the detention hearing on December 11, 2018, the juvenile court ordered that T.G. would remain in the care of his parents, mother and Troy G., and that E.L. would remain in the care of her parents, mother R.L. and Manuel L.
3. Protective Custody Warrant Applications
On January 17, 2019, the Department submitted separate applications for protective custody relative to the minors T.G. and E.L., alleging that the minors were in imminent danger of physical abuse, were suffering severe emotional damage, and there were no reasonable means to protect the minors without their temporary removal from the custody of mother. The social worker had interviewed T.G. on January 10, 2019, and he had advised that mother, Manuel L., and the children had stayed with Manuel L.'s sister recently for three days. T.G. reported that he had not bathed or brushed his teeth for the entire time. T.G. reported that mother and Manuel L. had "consum[ed] alcohol to the point of intoxication during the entire stay," and when T.G. asked for food, none of the adults prepared any food, and he was, instead, given cereal. During the visit, mother sometimes fed E.L., but mother was under the influence of alcohol when she cared for her baby. T.G. stated that E.L. was also cared for at times by Manuel L.'s sister, who was also intoxicated. T.G. reported that at one point, he asked mother to stop drinking, to which she responded, " 'Fuck you.' " Additionally, T.G. told the Department that, during the stay, Manuel L., while reportedly intoxicated, drove mother and the children to the home of Manuel L.'s uncle.
The Department stated that Manuel L. had "provided a sample for a voluntary on[-]demand drug test. A faint line appeared [on the sample] for cocaine; the sample was sent to the lab for further testing which [Manuel L. had] initially refused to consent to, stating that he would like to withdraw his sample. [He] denied using cocaine." The Department advised that, as reflected in several police reports, mother had reported that Manuel L. used cocaine.
It was also reported that T.G. had told his father, Troy G., that mother had pinched T.G., leaving a mark on his stomach. On January 9, 2019, the social worker interviewed the minor T.G. in the presence of mother and a San Jose Police officer. T.G. was reluctant to say how his stomach was injured, stating, " 'My mom said it was an accident.' " Mother later denied that she had intentionally harmed T.G.
The Department in its application stated further that mother and Manuel L. had "been uncooperative and evasive" in refusing several attempts by social worker Erinn McGrady to schedule appointments. Mother met with McGrady on January 4, but mother refused to answer questions and claimed she was too busy to address the Department's concerns. On January 11, Manuel L. met with social work intern Sandra Gregory at the Department's office, but Manuel L. was uncooperative and walked out of the meeting. The Department also advised in the application that mother and Manuel L. had refused to engage in services that had been offered them.
The Department also reported that it appeared that the T.G. had been coached by mother concerning what he told the Department. The minor told the social worker on January 10 that mother had "instructed him not to speak with Department social workers, telling him that he would be removed from her care and placed into foster care." T.G. also said that Manuel L. had "made comments to [T.G.] about him 'crying to [his] dad,['] being 'a little girl,' and that '[his] dad was crying to the police.' [T.G.] further stated 'every time I talk to someone I get yelled at.' " Mother took T.G.'s phone so he was unable to report mother's and Manuel L.'s conduct to Troy G. T.G. told the social worker on January 10 and on previous occasions that he did not want to live with mother and Manuel L., and that he wanted to live with Troy G.
The juvenile court signed the warrant on January 17, 2019, temporarily removing the minors from the custody of mother and Manuel L. T.G. was ordered to remain under the temporary care of Troy G., and E.L. was ordered to be placed in the temporary care of the Department.
The Department filed amended petitions relative to the minors on January 22, 2019. It was alleged in the amended petitions that the minors had been placed into protective custody on January 17, 2019, and that when the warrants were served on the mother, Manuel L. was inside the home in violation of the protective order; he was then arrested.
At the detention hearing on January 23, 2019, the juvenile court ordered the minors temporarily detained, and it removed T.G. from the physical custody of mother, and it removed E.L. from the physical custody of mother and Manuel L.
C. Second Amended Petitions; Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports
1. Second Amended Petitions
On February 15, 2019, the Department filed second amended petitions. They contained additional allegations, including that (1) mother and Manuel L. had been "unwilling and/or resistant to participate in services offered on a voluntary basis by the Department"; (2) a criminal court restraining order had issued in May 2018 protecting mother against domestic violence from Manuel L. that would remain in effect until the middle of 2021; (3) mother and Manuel L. had repeatedly disregarded that restraining order in that Manuel L. had continued to spend a significant time in the family home, including overnight visits; and (4) mother and Manuel L., with the minors in their custody, had spent three consecutive days and two nights together at parties, where they consumed alcohol and were under the influence of alcohol for a majority of the time.
2. Jurisdiction Report
The Department submitted its initial jurisdiction report and addendum, both dated January 7, 2019 (prior to the minors' removal from the home). In the jurisdiction report, the Department advised that on December 10, 2018, after the initial detention hearing, mother had made a written request to the school principal to terminate ongoing counseling services for T.G. The Department stated that this action was concerning to it because counseling "was an additional layer of protection for the child and provided the child with an outlet to talk about his fears and frustrations."
The Department provided detail concerning the domestic violence history of mother and Manuel L. in the jurisdiction report and the addendum. For ease of discussion, the reported domestic violence incidents are detailed in our discussion of the hearing testimony, ante.
3. Disposition Report and Addendum Reports
The Department submitted a disposition report in which it advised that E.L. was living with her maternal grandparents, and she appeared to be adjusting well to her placement. The minor T.G. was living with his father, Troy G., in Lathrop. T.G. stated that he was doing well and enjoyed living with his father. Troy G. had voluntarily engaged in services, completed a parent orientation class, had made himself available for interviews, and had participated in voluntary drug testing.
It was reported that both mother and Manuel L. had frequent visitation of their daughter, E.L., under the supervision of the maternal grandmother. She stated that there had been no issues during the parents' visitation, and that the toddler showed attachment to both parents.
Mother received twice weekly two-hour visits with T.G. that were supervised by the Department. There were no reported issues from the visits, and the minor expressed that he enjoyed seeing mother and (on the weekend visits) his sister.
The Department reported that since December 7, 2018, mother and Manuel L. had been uncooperative and evasive with the Department, and they had not responded to numerous efforts by the case worker to schedule appointments. Mother had declined to participate in a parent education program and in random drug testing. She had also missed a parent orientation program on January 31, which necessitated a re-referral. Manuel L. was given information in early January for a substance use treatment assessment and a mental health evaluation; on January 31, he stated he had not contacted the resources because he did not feel he needed the services. Manuel L. was participating in voluntary drug testing and had received negative test results.
The Department concluded that the risk of harm to the minors in the care of mother was high, based upon mother (1) having exposed the children to domestic violence, (2) having used inappropriate physical discipline upon T.G., (3) making inappropriate comments to T.G. about his father, and (4) caring for the minors while being under the influence of alcohol. "[M]other's refusal to participate in services and engage with the Department places the children at risk." The Department also stated that the risk of harm to E.L. in the care of Manuel L. was high because of the domestic violence to which he had exposed her and because he had cared for E.L. while being under the influence of alcohol. The Department opined that both mother and Manuel L. "would benefit from a parenting class, mental health counseling, a Substance Use Treatment Services assessment, and domestic violence services."
The Department recommended that the second amended petitions filed February 15, 2019, be sustained, that mother be offered family reunification services as to T.G. and E.L., that Manuel L. be offered family reunification services as to E.L., and that father T.G. be offered family maintenance services.
As noted in the Department's addendum report, on March 14, 2019, intern Gregory met with T.G. at his school. He said he liked his teacher and classmates and was getting good grades. He responded to the question of what he liked by stating that he liked living with his father and children his age. He said "there was nothing" in response to Gregory's question as to whether there was anything that was not going well. T.G. was receiving weekly counseling at school. The counselor said that T.G. was doing well at school, appeared to be adjusting well with living with his father, and he was a social boy who appeared to be doing well overall. T.G. had bonded with his teacher, and he had not been absent or late on any occasion.
Manuel L. was referred by the Department to a parenting education program. He attended one class on March 6, but then informed intern Gregory that he could not continue attending because of conflicts with his work schedule. The Department reported that Manuel L. had been ordered by the criminal court in May 2018 to take a 16-week anger management class, but he had delayed taking it "until the Department became involved." The Department had also referred Manuel L. several times to schedule a substance use assessment, but he had not scheduled an assessment.
In a second addendum report, the Department advised that, as of April 15, mother was on a waiting list for a parenting without violence class. Mother also informed the Department on April 15 that she was attending weekly Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings. She had not been submitting to voluntary drug testing.
The Department reported that there were several instances in which mother and father were combative with the caseworkers.
The Department advised that Manuel L. had continued to submit to voluntary drug testing with negative results. He advised the Department in April, that he had completed a mental health assessment and a substance use assessment and was attending therapy. He refused intern Gregory's request for signed releases for the Department to obtain information regarding his participation in therapy and in an anger management course.
D. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
The juvenile court conducted a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing commencing on April 26, 2019, which resumed on April 29. The court announced its decision in open court on May 3.
1. Domestic Violence Reports and Testimony
Much of the testimony concerned specific incidents of domestic violence involving mother and Manuel L. Those 14 reported incidents, and mother's and Manuel L. testimony concerning them, are discussed chronologically here.
a. March 2016
Mother reported to a social worker in 2018 that approximately two years earlier, while they were in the kitchen, Manuel L. choked "mother . . . and dragged her by the hair. [Manuel L.] placed both of his hands on her neck, squeezed for about five seconds and she reported that she had trouble breathing. While [Manuel L.] was dragging her by the hair, [mother] reported that she hit her knee on the wall, which caused a lot of pain. When this happened, [Manuel L.] stopped dragging her and apologized to her."
Mother testified that she did not recall telling a social worker about the March 2016 incident. She denied that the incident involving Manuel L. choking her and dragging her by the hair had occurred.
b. Date Unknown
In the same March 2018 interview with the social worker in which mother reported the March 2016 incident, mother stated that on another night in which they had both been drinking (on a date not specified in the social worker's report), Manuel L. had " 'slammed' [mother's] face on the glove compartment."
Mother testified that she did not recall telling the social worker that Manuel L. had slammed her face into the glove compartment of a car. Mother did not respond either affirmatively or negatively as to whether she recalled an incident in which Manuel L. had slammed her face into the glove compartment of a car. She testified, "I recall us having a heavily heated argument while we were both intoxicated. I don't think it's fair for me to say that I can give you facts to that particular incident due to the fact that I was intoxicated."
c. March 2017
In connection with the March 21, 2018 incident (discussed, post), Manuel L. told the police that in approximately March 2017, mother, who had been drinking, punched him in the face while he was sleeping, drawing blood. She then attempted to strangle Manuel L. He reported that mother then stabbed the walls with a knife. Manuel L. stated that he called mother's family, who came over and took control over mother, who, was "acting violently while in a drunken rage."
Manuel L., when asked at the hearing about the March 2017 incident, testified that mother, while she was drinking and while Manuel L. was sleeping, punched him in the face. He testified he did not recall telling the police in March 2018 about the incident. He denied that mother's assault caused him to bleed (as was stated in the police report). He denied further that during the incident mother attempted to strangle him, and that she had stabbed the walls with a knife, requiring intervention from mother's family.
d. May 21, 2017
In her sworn September 2017 request for a domestic violence restraining order, mother stated, in response to a question asking her to disclose prior instances of domestic violence, that on approximately May 21, 2017, Manuel L. while "heavily intoxicated," had been driving mother to their shared home when he became angry. He began yelling at mother and punched her in the face two or three times, causing her eye to swell shut. Manuel L. also struck mother's face against the car door and "pushed [her] out of the slow[-]moving vehicle." Mother attached a photograph of her face to her restraining order request supporting her claim that the assault had "caus[ed] her eye to swell shut."
This appears to be the same incident that mother reported to a social worker in March 2018; mother told the social worker that in May 2017, Manuel L. was driving while intoxicated and punched her in the eye (resulting in her having a black eye) because he was jealous.
Mother testified that she did not recall reporting to a social worker an incident in which Manuel L. had punched her in the face while he was driving under the influence. She also testified that she did not recall such an incident having occurred.
e. May 2017
During a meeting with a social worker in May 2018, Manuel L. advised that approximately one year earlier, mother had stabbed him on the leg with a fork. He stated that the fork had broken the skin and resulted in bleeding.
Manuel L. testified that mother had stabbed him with a metal fork on March 12, 2018, during the incident in which Manuel L. was ultimately arrested. He acknowledged in his testimony that he had discussed with a social worker in May 2018 mother's having stabbed him with a fork, but he denied that the incident (as reported by the social worker) had taken place in approximately May 2017 or that the fork had broken the skin. Mother testified that she had never stabbed Manuel L. with a fork.
f. September 8-9, 2017
Mother detailed incidents occurring on September 8-9, 2017, in her sworn request for a domestic violence restraining order against Manuel L. that she filed on September 14, 2017. Mother alleged that after a dinner party, Manuel L. and mother went to a bar where Manuel L. consumed eight drinks. Mother said that at about 1:00 a.m. as she was driving Manuel L. home, he acted aggressively because she had refused to take him to purchase drugs, repeatedly calling her "a 'fucking bitch.' " Mother "began to fear for the safety of [herself] and her unborn child." When they reached Manuel L.'s residence, she stopped in the middle of the street to let Manuel L. out; Manuel L. reached over and turned off the car, grabbed mother's keys and took them inside the house. He then emerged, leaving the area in his sister's car, thereby stranding mother.
There was no appearance at the hearing on September 27, 2017, on mother's application for a restraining order, and the court ordered the matter off calendar and dissolved any temporary orders.
Elsewhere in her restraining order request, and in apparent contradiction to her lengthy narrative account, mother recounted that Manuel L. " 'had taken control of her vehicle from the passenger seat causing [reckless] swerving on a busy street. He then put my car in park in the middle of flowing traffic and took my keys out of the car before throwing them in a field putting my life as well as my son's life in danger whom [sic] was sitting in the back seat. I fear for my unborn daughter[']s safety because of [Manuel L.'s] exhibited threatening and dangerous behaviors.' "
Mother stated in her request that she went back the next morning to retrieve her car and found it in the driveway. Manuel L. would not give mother her keys. He attempted to forcefully remove mother's cell phone from her purse, causing her to fall. He then grabbed her hair as he successfully took her phone. At one point, mother had again entered her car, and Manuel L. got into the passenger's seat, pinning down mother's arms. Mother indicated in her request that there were scratches on her arms and legs and bruises on her upper arms as a result of the incident. The police ultimately arrived.
Mother testified that the September 9, 2017 incident involved Manuel L. and her "verbally fighting." She denied that Manuel L. had intentionally pulled her hair during a struggle in which he attempted to grab her cell phone; she said her hair had gotten caught in the purse strap during the struggle.
g. December 25, 2017
Mother reported to the police in connection with the March 21, 2018 incident (discussed, post), that on December 25, 2017, Manuel L. told mother he would get her evicted by causing damage to her apartment. Mother said that Manuel L. shattered the glass on the oven door, threw pans at the walls, and punched the walls.
At the hearing, mother denied—contrary to what she told the police—that on Christmas Day 2017, Manuel L. had intentionally broken the glass door of her stove, thrown pans at the walls, or punched holes in the walls.
Manuel L. denied that on Christmas Day, 2017, he had broken the stove door or had made holes in the walls of mother's home.
h. March 12, 2018
Mother reported to the police that on March 12, 2018, she and Manuel L. began arguing when she asked him to leave her home. Mother said that Manuel L., her boyfriend of approximately two and one-half years and the father of her five-week-old child, had become angry and had "pressed his right fist into her left eye." Mother said she had separated from Manuel L. but they had argued further and he had slapped her on the right side of her face with an open palm. She told police that Manuel L. had also punched her in the right side of her abdomen with a closed fist while she was holding the baby, E.L. Manuel L. then left the residence. The police observed bruising and redness to mother's face. The minor T.G. told the police that he was in the apartment but had not witnessed the incident. He said he had heard his mother say " 'Ow,' " as if she had been hurt. He observed, after Manuel L. had left, that mother's had watery eyes and she appeared to be upset.
Mother obtained an emergency protective order on March 12. At the time, she also told the "police that [Manuel L.] had physically hit her in the past, and there were approximately six other incidents of domestic violence between them, with the most recent time in February 2018." She said she had never reported the other incidents to the police.
Manuel L. told the police that it was he who had been the victim of abuse on March 12. He said that he had been sleeping on the living room floor when mother kicked him in the lower back, causing him pain. As he arose, mother cut up Manuel L.'s clothes with scissors. Although mother had hidden his car keys, he ultimately retrieved them and left the apartment. Manuel L. denied that he had touched or struck mother. Manuel L. was arrested and booked into the Santa Clara County Jail.
Mother testified that on March 12, 2018, Manuel L. struck her in the stomach, pressed his fist into her left eye, and slapped her face while she was holding five-week-old E.L.; she obtained an emergency protective order as a result of the incident. She denied that she had cut up Manuel L.'s clothes with scissors during the incident.
Manuel L. testified that he did not slap mother, press his fist into her eye, or punch her in the abdomen on March 12, 2018.
i. March 21, 2018
According to the police report, on March 21, 2018, Manuel L. reported that he had arrived at mother's home unannounced to see mother and E.L. Mother and Manuel L. left together in mother's car to run errands. After their return, they got into an argument, and mother punched Manuel L. in the face with a closed fist, causing redness and slight swelling on the left side of his face. Manuel L. called the police. Manuel L. told the police that "he was afraid of [mother] and that she gets emotional and angry when she is drinking."
Mother denied that there had been a physical altercation. She told the police that Manuel L. took her cell phone when he left, and she said he was fabricating the reported assault to retaliate for her recently having had him arrested. Mother told the police that Manuel L. was "addicted to cocaine and [she had] found several straws in the past in her apartment." Mother also said that Manuel L. had been fired because of his drug use, and that because of drug testing as a commercial driver, Manuel L. had submitted urine samples of others to pass drug tests.
Mother was arrested by the police for domestic violence based upon Manuel L.'s allegations and his physical injuries the officer observed.
Manuel L. testified at the hearing that mother had punched him in the face with a closed fist on March 21, 2018, resulting in Manuel L. having redness, swelling, and a black eye. He testified that they were arguing in the car in E.L.'s presence, but that they were outside the car when mother struck him.
Manuel L. initially testified that mother had assaulted him only once, on March 21, 2018. After being asked whether he had told the police about a second incident in 2017, Manuel L. acknowledged that the 2017 incident occurred. And after being asked whether he told a social worker in May 2018 that mother had stabbed his leg with a fork, Manuel L. acknowledged this incident as well.
At the hearing, mother agreed that Manuel L. had come over to her home unannounced on March 21, 2018, but she denied having punched Manuel L. in the face. Mother recalled telling the police at the time that she thought Manuel L. was using cocaine because she saw straws around the apartment. She testified that "I feel kind of silly saying that now." She also admitted that she told the police Manuel L. had been fired for using drugs and that he would use other people's urine to pass drug tests at work; she thought that was the case "[b]ecause he was testing negative and I thought he was using drugs."
j. April 21, 2018
In a request for restraining order of April 24, 2018, Manuel L. stated that on April 21, upon his returning from the store, mother "became enraged," accused him of infidelity, and called him a number of names. Mother demanded to see Manuel L.'s cell phone, grabbed it from him, and broke it with a screwdriver. Mother put his clothes in a trash bag and yelled at him to leave the apartment.
Manuel L. testified at the hearing that there was no incident on April 21 in which mother called him names, put his clothes in a trash bag, and broke his cell phone with a screwdriver. He testified that. rather, the incident mentioned in his request for a restraining order occurred in March.
Manuel L. in his request for restraining order stated the date of the most recent abuse (involving mother breaking his cell phone) was on April 21, 2018. On the next page of the request, under a separate heading asking about abuse at other times, Manuel L. identified an incident in the middle of March 2018 in which mother "punched [him] in the face in front of [their] daughter. I called the police."
k. August 30, 2018
The Department reported that on August 30, 2018, police responded to a domestic disturbance at Manuel L.'s residence. "Upon arrival, the officer noticed a vehicle parked along the curb with both the driver[']s side door and front passenger side doors wide open. Officers noticed the mother [lying] on the ground near the driver side door[;] she had leaves stuck in her hair. Upon contact with the mother[,] she was crying hysterically, holding her neck, and stated that she was experiencing pain to her neck. The mother had a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from her breath and she was extremely incoherent throughout the interaction with [p]olice. The mother reported to police that she and [Manuel L.] were driving in a vehicle together and they began to fight. The mother wanted to exit the vehicle[,] but [Manuel L.] grabbed her neck with one hand, strangled her for approximately three seconds and then grabbed her by the hair and slammed her head into the window two times." Police determined from a records check that there was an active, three-year criminal protective order, issued May 14, 2018, in which Manuel L. was the restrained party and mother was the protected party.
Mother denied on multiple occasions to the Department that there had been a physical altercation with Manuel L. on August 30, 2018, stating that the last domestic violence incident had been in March 2018.
Manuel L. advised the social worker during investigation of the November 2018 referral that the last incident of domestic violence between mother and him occurred around late August 2018. Mother requested that he pick her up from a softball game; when he arrived, she was intoxicated, " 'swung at [him],' " resulting in him getting a black eye. Manuel L. said that mother also " 'attacked [his] brother,' " who called the police. Manuel L. told the social worker, " 'I'm scared to tell you what is going on' [and] " 'I'm not going to see my daughter.' " Manuel L. said "that he 'learned when to be around her and when not to be around her.' "
Mother testified that she had called the police on August 30, 2018, after another incident involving Manuel L. She denied that she was lying on the ground when the police arrived, stating she was sitting on the curb. Mother agreed that she told the police that, while she and Manuel L. were fighting in the car, he grabbed her by the neck with one hand and strangled her for approximately three seconds; she testified that this was a lie, and that she and Manuel L. had "just had a verbal altercation." Mother said she also had lied to the police when she said that Manuel L. had grabbed her hair and had twice slammed her head into a window. She explained to the court that she had lied because she was intoxicated at the time and was afraid that she would be arrested.
Mother had told a social worker in November 2018 that there had been no physical altercation between Manuel L. and her on August 30, 2018.
Manuel L. denied at the hearing that there was "any sort of altercation" between mother and him on August 30, 2018.
2. Testimony of Manuel L.
Manuel L. and mother began their relationship in 2015. As of the time of the hearing in April 2019, they were no longer in a relationship.
Manuel L. had recently participated in a 16-week domestic violence course. He had been seeing a psychiatrist, who was helping him deal with E.L.'s removal from his custody. At the Department's request, Manuel L. had completed a parent orientation class in February 2019. He also, on his own initiative, had taken and completed a parenting class in January 2019.
Manuel L. testified he had never used controlled substances, including cocaine, and he had never been arrested for drunk driving. His occupation was commercial driver and, as such, he was required to submit to drug and alcohol testing. He stated that he did not drink alcohol to excess. Manuel L. had completed a substance abuse assessment at Kaiser, and he had completed drug testing at the Department's request.
Manuel L. visited regularly with E.L. The number of weekly visits varied depending on his work schedule, but he tried to visit at least three times a week.
When asked whether mother and he had fought during their relationship, Manuel L. testified that there were "some misunderstandings" during his relationship with mother. While mother was pregnant, there were "altercations" that he considered domestic violence in which he was both the aggressor and the victim. Manuel L. identified himself as a victim in that mother (1) subjected him to verbal abuse, (2) destroyed some of his property by ripping up some of his clothes, and (3) filed a false police report falsely stating that Manuel L. had struck her. Manuel L. testified that he felt he was the perpetrator of domestic violence because he had verbally berated her, had called her names, and had taken things from her. Manuel L. said he had never used physical violence against mother or had destroyed any of her property.
Manuel L. testified that he was aware that mother had obtained a three-year restraining order protecting her from him that was valid until 2021. He denied that he had ever violated the restraining order.
3. Testimony of R.L. (Mother)
Mother testified that she and Manuel L. had had a relationship that lasted approximately three years and ended in March 2018. She testified that she was a victim of domestic violence for "one short period" of their relationship. When asked whether she had ever been the perpetrator of domestic violence toward Manuel L., mother testified that she "[had not] inflicted physical violence on [Manuel L.]."
Mother denied that Manuel L. had spent the night in her home on multiple occasions in violation of the restraining order she had obtained protecting her from him. She testified that T.G. was lying about Manuel L. spending the night in her home.
Between August 2018 and the removal of the minors in January 2019, mother and Manuel L. attempted to communicate with each other well and to develop themselves so that they could properly parent the minor E.L. During that time, mother and Manuel L. had had no conflicts.
Mother began seeing a therapist through Gardner Mental Health in late February 2019. Mother and her original therapist had collaborated on a case plan for mother. Mother had not participated in community education classes, parenting education classes, or in any domestic violence group.
Mother testified that she and Manuel L. separately visited the minor E.L. at the maternal grandmother's home. At the time of the hearing, she was visiting three to four times a week, spending time she would use for visiting on other days working on her services. When mother's visits were concluded, E.L. was "devastated. She can't catch her breath because that's how much she's crying and screaming and reaching for [mother]." The maternal grandmother reported that, a few times, after mother left, E.L. vomited and had tremors.
Mother met Troy G. in high school, and the minor T.G. was born when she was 18. Mother testified there were issues of verbal and physical abuse in her relationship with father T.G. She detailed two incidents of physical abuse. Mother testified that she had always felt it was very important for the minor T.G. to maintain a relationship with his father.
Mother testified that she and her son, T.G., are very close. She was aware that T.G. had had behavioral issues that arose at school, including defiance toward authority figures, verbal disputes with other students, and "a couple of fights." Because of the issues, mother had authorized the school to provide counseling to T.G.; in December 2018, she had withdrawn her consent for that counseling because she had wanted T.G. to instead see a licensed therapist. Mother testified that she understood that the school therapist was the one to whom T.G. had disclosed that mother had physically abused him. T.G. had seen his new therapist two or three times.
Mother denied having ever struck the minor T.G. She specifically denied that there were any incidents in which she had struck him on the thigh, or had pinched or grabbed his ear.
Mother also denied that she had ever instructed T.G. not to speak with social workers about what was taking place in the home. There were times that T.G. would go with her in the car to work. Sometimes he would go inside with her; other times, at his request, he would stay in the car. The longest period of time T.G. stayed in the car was 15 minutes. Mother testified that T.G. had lied when he reported to the social worker that he had been left in the car for one hour or one and one-half hours. She said that T.G. is "just a horrible liar." Mother testified that on a scale of 10, with one being the most truthful, T.G. was a "[s]ix."
Mother testified that she had not been treated fairly by the social workers, McGrady and Gregory. Mother said she had been "loaded with an overwhelming amount of services to complete, and I feel that I'm being set up to fail because I'm trying to juggle everything with my full-time . . . work and my schooling,"
4. Testimony of Sandra Gregory
Sandra Gregory was a social work intern for the Department. She had worked with the case worker McGrady on the case involving the minors since early December 2018.
Gregory participated in January 2019 when the warrants resulting in the removal of the minors were executed. While she was in the home speaking with T.G. in his bedroom, mother told T.G., " 'You don't have to say anything to them.' " T.G. told Gregory afterward that he was concerned his mother would be mad at him and he was worried about what would happen to his sister, E.L. He went over to E.L., who was in mother's arms, and told E.L., " 'I'm sorry. I'm sorry.' "
The minor T.G. reported to Gregory that he liked living with his father, and T.G. said he was doing well at his new school. He was receiving counseling through school. The school principal reported to Gregory that T.G. was adjusting well to the new school and had a good bond with his teacher. The counselor reported that T.G. had expressed no concerns about living with his father. Gregory testified that there was significant improvement in that T.G.'s reported bullying behavior from his prior school had not recurred at his new school.
Gregory had in the past received specialized training as a domestic violence counselor. The juvenile court qualified Gregory to opine as an expert witness concerning domestic violence assessment, services, and the impact of domestic violence on children.
Gregory provided an opinion concerning domestic violence generally, describing it as "a pattern of behavior wherein one intimate partner attempts to assert power and control over another." Domestic violence might manifest itself through physical violence; sexual abuse; verbal abuse; economic or financial control, including limiting a person's access to money or the ability to earn or spend money; attempts to isolate the other partner; stalking behaviors, including following the partner or looking at the partner's text messages or e-mails; using children living in the home to the disadvantage of the other partner; using the legal system against the partner, such as filing false police reports, filing restraining orders, or otherwise attempting to control the partner; or other harassing behaviors.
It was Gregory's opinion that mother and Manuel L. had a domestic violence relationship, and that their testimony at the hearing reinforced her opinions concerning the domestic violence present in their relationship. Gregory noted that mother and Manuel L. both testified to instances of violence perpetrated upon the other, and that their denial or minimization of instances of domestic violence in their testimony reinforced the Department's assessment that mother and Manuel L. minimized the severity of domestic violence in their relationship. She stated that there was also concern about substance use by mother and Manuel L. that had contributed to domestic violence in their relationship. Gregory testified that the fact that mother and Manuel L. were no longer together did not resolve the domestic violence situation. Because they have a child together, without intervention to address their issues, the threat of domestic violence remained.
Gregory testified that the Department recommended that mother and Manuel L. receive a domestic violence assessment and the services recommended in that assessment. Such assessment and services were appropriate given the parties' conflicting accounts of past violence that had occurred so that recommendations for services could be made to address the issues in their relationship.
Gregory opined that T.G. had been negatively impacted by domestic violence between mother and Manuel L. in the home. T.G. told Gregory that he would feel safe in the home if mother and Manuel L. were not fighting, thus suggesting that the violence between mother and Manuel L. "compromise[d T.G.'s] feelings of safety in the home." T.G. reported to Gregory one incident in which he had returned home with his grandmother and observed that there were mirrors smashed, drawers that were pulled out, and clothes strewn about. T.G. reported another incident in which "he heard his mother say 'ow' " from another room, and when he came out to see what was happening, he observed that "mother [was] terrified and upset." T.G. also said he had attempted to intervene during one or more of the arguments between mother and Manuel L. T.G.'s report of these occurrences increased Gregory's level of concern about the impact of domestic violence as it demonstrated an increased risk to T.G. that he would be harmed physically or emotionally. Without services to address the domestic violence issues, a return of T.G. to mother's care would expose him to an ongoing risk of harm.
Gregory opined further that there would be a risk of harm to the minor E.L. if she were returned to the custody of mother or Manuel L. Gregory testified that without services to address the domestic violence issues of mother and Manuel L., the risk of further violence would still be present.
5. Court Decision
After hearing argument, and after considering the evidence, including witness testimony, the Department's reports, and exhibits submitted on behalf of mother and Manuel L., the court announced its decision from the bench on May 3, 2019. The court found the allegations of the second amended petitions true, found that the minor T.G. was a child described under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), and found that the minor E.L. was a child described under section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), and (j). In its disposition orders of May 6, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the minors' welfare required that the minors T.G. and E.L. be removed from the physical custody of mother, because there was a substantial risk to the minors' physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being that could not be protected without such removal. The court found further by clear and convincing evidence as to E.L. that placement of the minor with Manuel L., as the previously noncustodial parent, would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. It ordered reunification services for mother as to the minors T.G. and E.L., and for father Manuel L. as to the minor E.L.
In so ruling, the juvenile court, in its comments from the bench, observed, inter alia, that (1) "[mother] tried to convince the Court that everybody else is lying . . . in some fashion," including Manuel L., Troy G., and the minor T.G. himself; (2) "[mother] is herself not a truthful person"; (3) mother and Manuel L. had "spent much more time together than she's admitted"; (4) mother's action of filing a false police report—as she admitted in her testimony to have done on August 30, 2018—was itself a type of domestic violence; (5) there was "overwhelming evidence" of all different forms of domestic violence between mother and Manuel L.; (6) there was also "overwhelming evidence" that there were negative effects upon the minor T.G. from his exposure to domestic violence; (7) the court was "very concerned" about mother's testimony that her relationship with Manuel L. was one that consisted of domestic violence for only a short time; (8) both mother and Manuel L. "significantly minimize[d] the amount of domestic violence that was in this case"; and (9) because the court had "trouble giving any credibility to [mother]," it concluded there was "ample significant evidence that support[ed] all of the allegations in this case." The court was also critical of mother's testimony concerning the minor T.G.: "She opined that on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being falsehood, he would be a 6, which means that if he were to tell us anything it is more likely than not [untrue]."
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dependency Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings
The court at a jurisdictional hearing must first determine whether the child, by a preponderance of the evidence, is a person described under section 300 as coming within the court's jurisdiction. (§ 355, subd. (a); see Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) The juvenile court may adjudicate the child to be a dependent on any of the grounds provided in section 300, subdivisions (a) to (j). (See In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [where agency alleges multiple grounds in its petition, jurisdictional finding establishing dependency court's jurisdiction may be affirmed by reviewing court "if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence"].) The agency bears the burden of proving the allegations of the petition. (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.)
As relevant here, the Department alleged in the second amended petitions that the minors T.G. and E.L. were dependent children under subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of section 300, and that E.L. was also a dependent under subdivision (j). A child may be found to be a dependent under section 300(b)(1), inter alia, if he or she "has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child." The California Supreme Court has held that this statutory element of parental "failure or inability" is one that "does not require parental culpability. [Citation.]" (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.)
A child is a dependent if "[t[he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse." (§ 300(b)(1).)
A child may be found to be a dependent under section 300(c) where he or she "is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian." " 'The statute thus sanctions intervention by the dependency system in two situations: (1) when parental action or inaction causes the emotional harm, i.e., when parental fault can be shown; and (2) when the child is suffering serious emotional damage due to no parental fault or neglect, but the parent or parents are unable themselves to provide adequate mental health treatment. [¶] In a situation involving parental "fault," the petitioner must prove three things: (1) the offending parental conduct; (2) causation; and (3) serious emotional harm or the risk thereof, as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior.' [Citation.]" (In re Roxanne B. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 916, 921.)
And a child may be determined to be a dependent under section 300(j) if "[t]he child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in [section 300,] subdivision . . . (b), . . . and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions."
Once there has been a jurisdictional finding, the juvenile court at a dispositional hearing must hear evidence to decide the child's disposition, i.e., whether he or she will remain in, or be removed from, the home, and the nature and extent of any limitations that will be placed upon the parents' control over the child, including educational or developmental decisions. (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) If at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court determines that removal of the child from the custody of the parent or guardian is appropriate, such removal order must be based upon clear and convincing evidence establishing the existence of one of the five circumstances identified under section 361, subdivision (c) (hereafter, § 361(c)(1)). As is relevant here, the juvenile court may determine that removal of the child is appropriate if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody (§ 361(c)(1); see In re A.E. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 820, 825.) An order by the juvenile court removing a child at the dispositional hearing "is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and proof of a potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous[,] and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.]" (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on other grounds in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
Where the juvenile court orders removal of the child from the custodial parent's care, it is then required under section 361.2, subdivision (a) (hereafter, § 361.2(a)) to "first determine" whether there is a noncustodial parent willing to assume custody, and, if so, whether such custody is appropriate. Under that statute, the previously noncustodial parent agreeing to assume custody shall be granted custody of the child "unless [the court] finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (Ibid.) The trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that placement of the minor with a previously noncustodial parent would be detrimental to the child. (In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827-1829.)
B. Standard of Review
A jurisdictional order is reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) In doing so, the reviewing court "view[s] the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and orders. Issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court and [the reviewing court] neither reweigh[s] the evidence nor exercise[s its] independent judgment. [Citation.] But substantial evidence 'is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on appeal. [Citation.] . . . "The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
The appellate court also reviews a dispositional order for substantial evidence. (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328 [appellate court considers entire record in reviewing dispositional findings for substantial evidence].) But a removal order at a disposition hearing must be founded upon clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361(c)(1).) Accordingly, as the California Supreme Court recently explained, where a trial court's determination was founded upon a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, a substantial evidence review of that decision is a nuanced one. "[A]n appellate court must account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under this standard. When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence." (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.)
C. The Jurisdictional Order
Mother asserts that the jurisdictional order was erroneous based upon several grounds. She contends that there was no substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional finding under section 300(b)(1) that the minors had suffered, or were at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness requiring intervention by the juvenile court. She argues, inter alia, that because there was no evidence that the domestic violence alleged in the second amended petitions was ongoing and likely to recur, there were no current circumstances that warranted intervention by declaring the minors dependents under section 300(b)(1). Mother argues further that there was no substantial evidence to support the allegations under section 300(c). She asserts that the evidence did not support a finding that the minors had suffered serious emotional damage, or that they were at risk of such damage, as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior. (See In re Roxanne B. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 916, 921.) And mother contends that the court's jurisdictional finding under section 300(j) in the second amended petition as to E.L. was erroneous, because there was no evidence, as required by statute, that E.L.'s sibling, T.G. had previously suffered serious physical harm or illness.
Manuel L. also challenges the jurisdictional order as to the minor E.L. He contends that although there were past incidents of domestic violence, the most recent incident was more than a year before the hearing. Manuel L. argues therefore that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that E.L. was, at the time of the hearing, at risk of harm due to potential exposure to domestic violence of substance abuse involving her parents. He contends that the juvenile court did not need to assert jurisdiction over the minor, and the court should have dismissed the second amended petition. Manuel L. argues that "[a]t most, this case called for a plan of informal supervision."
Manuel L. indicates in his opening brief that his appeal concerns only his daughter, E.L., and does not address the orders concerning the minor T.G.
1. Jurisdictional Finding Under Section 300(b)(1)
As noted by the Department's counsel in closing argument, the central allegations of the second amended petitions concerned the domestic violence history of mother and Manuel L. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, as we are required to do, there were numerous instances of domestic violence, as reported at various times by the participants, mother and Manuel L. And the record shows that the minors were present for a number of the incidents, thereby increasing the risk of danger to their physical and emotional well-being.
The record shows that over a two-year period—with nearly all incidents concentrated in a one-year period—there were at least 14 domestic violence incidents as reported at some time by the participants. According to reports by mother, there were at least eight incidents of domestic violence in which Manuel L. was the perpetrator, six of which involved physical assaults upon mother. According to reports by Manuel L., there were at least six incidents in which mother was the perpetrator, five of which involved physical assaults upon him. Alcohol was a prominent factor in a number of the incidents.
As discussed, ante, the reported incidents of domestic violence in which Manuel L. was the perpetrator were in March 2016, on a date unknown, on May 21, 2017, September 8, 2017 (no physical assault), September 9, 2017, December 25, 2017 (no physical assault), March 12, 2018, and August 30, 2018.
As discussed, ante, the reported incidents of domestic violence in which mother was the perpetrator were in March 2017, May 2017, March 12, 2018, March 21, 2018, April 21, 2018 (no physical assault), and August 30, 2018.
As the juvenile court specifically found, mother and Manuel L. "significantly minimize[d] the amount of domestic violence that was in this case." Mother testified that she had been a victim of domestic violence for "one short period" of their relationship. The wealth of reports of physical assaults between the two of them notwithstanding, mother admitted to only one incident (i.e., the March 12, 2018 occurrence) in which Manuel L. physically assaulted her, and she denied in her testimony that she had ever "inflicted physical violence on [Manuel L.]" Manuel L. testified that there had been "some misunderstandings" during his relationship with mother, and that while she was pregnant, there had been "altercations." While he acknowledged some of the events in which mother had assaulted him, he testified, contrary to his prior reporting, that there were only two instances in which mother had physically harmed him. And Manuel L. denied that he had ever physically assaulted mother or had destroyed any of her property.
The Department's domestic violence expert, Gregory, testified that mother and Manuel L. had a domestic violence relationship. This conclusion was based upon evidence of physical violence, verbal abuse, destruction of property, filing of false police reports—all of which Gregory described as "clear actions of one or the other attempting to exert power and control over the other." She also opined that substance use or abuse can be a factor to look at in evaluating domestic violence because it can escalate or fuel domestic violence in a relationship. Gregory testified that substance use or abuse was of concern in this instance because of the reports that one or both of the appellants were under the influence during various incidents. And Gregory testified that the fact that appellants in their respective testimony had denied or minimized past instances of domestic violence reinforced the Department's assessment that appellants had continued to downplay the severity of domestic violence in their relationship.
The record also shows that some of the incidents were witnessed by one or both of the minors. E.L. was present during at least two of incidents in which physical violence was involved, most notably, the incident on March 12, 2018, when Manuel L. pressed his fist into mother's eye, slapped her face, and punched her in the abdomen while she was holding baby E.L. Gregory testified that E.L. was negatively impacted as a result of her presence during multiple domestic violence incidents.
Additionally, there was significant evidence that the minor T.G. witnessed a number of instances of domestic violence between mother and Manuel L. T.G. reported to social workers in interviews at various times that (1) mother would often hit Manuel L.; (2) T.G. had on occasion tried to intervene during fights between mother and Manuel L.; (3) on one occasion after coming home from his grandmother's house, T.G. found mother with a bleeding lip, a mirror that had been shattered, drawers that had been pulled out, and clothes that had been strewn on the floor; (4) on another occasion, mother had tried to throw away Manuel L.'s clothes, and Manuel L. pushed her into a wall; (5) he had witnessed a fight in which mother had tried to strike Manuel L. and had thrown out his clothes; (6) he had witnessed mother punching and pushing Manuel L. in a 2017 incident; (7) he had witnessed mother pushing Manuel L. in a 2018 incident; (8) he was present when mother was arrested on one occasion when she and Manuel L. had fought; (9) when they fought, mother and Manuel L. would throw things in the house and damage the walls; and (10) on one occasion, Manuel L. locked himself in the bathroom and mother kicked a large hole in the door attempting to get in. T.G. also told the police on March 12, 2018, that while he was in his room, he heard mother say " 'Ow' " as if she had been hit and later (after Manuel L. had left) observed that mother had watery eyes and was upset.
There was substantial evidence that the repetition of disputes between mother and Manuel L. and their ongoing domestic violence had an impact upon T.G.'s emotional well-being. T.G. told the Department about an incident in which mother and Manuel L. were fighting and he had become afraid. Mother went into T.G.'s room to get away from Manuel L., but he pushed his way into the room and continued to yell at mother. Manuel L. testified that T.G. witnessed some of the fights between Manuel L. and mother, and that T.G. had "look[ed] scared." Manuel L. also testified that T.G. was "always nervous." T.G. told the Department in December 2018 that he felt safe with mother as long as she and Manuel L. were not fighting, and as long as she and T.G. were not having disagreements about Troy G.
Additionally, T.G. reported to the Department in January 2019, after mother and Manuel L. had spent three days together in which, according to T.G., they were frequently drinking to excess, that he did not feel safe with mother when she was drinking.
Social work intern Gregory opined that T.G. had been negatively impacted by the domestic violence present in the home. He had personally witnessed several incidents of domestic violence. And, Gregory testified, the fact that T.G. had intervened or witnessed some of the incidents between mother and Manuel L. "certainly increase[d] the risk to [T.G.] that he [would] be harmed emotionally and or physically." And it was Gregory's opinion that T.G.'s statement that he would feel safe with mother as long as she and Manuel L. were not fighting suggested that the violence between mother and Manuel L. had "compromise[d T.G.'s] feelings of safety in the home."
Appellate courts have affirmed jurisdictional findings under section 300(b) in many instances where those findings were based upon the child's exposure to parental domestic violence. (See, e.g., In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941-942; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1010, fn. 7; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169, superseded by statute on another point, as stated in In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239-1242.) " '[D]omestic violence in the same household where children are living . . . is a failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.' [Citation.] Children can be 'put in a position of physical danger from [spousal] violence' because, 'for example, they could wander into the room where it was occurring and be accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or leg . . . .' [Citation.]" (In re E.B., supra, at p. 576.) And "[d]omestic violence impacts children even if they are not the ones being physically abused." (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134; see also In re Sylvia R. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 559, 562 [recognizing harm to children from parental violence even if they do not witness it].) Here, the domestic violence history between mother and Manuel L., along with the exposure of the minors to that domestic violence, constituted substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's find under section 300(b)(1) that the minors "[have] suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child[ren] will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child[ren]."
Mother and Manuel L. contend that domestic violence did not serve as a basis for jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1) because the violence was in the past, mother and Manuel L. were no longer together, and therefore there was no substantial risk of ongoing harm to the minors.
Appellants, using March 2018 as their benchmark, argue that the domestic violence did not serve as a basis for jurisdiction because it was remote in time because the last incident was more than one year before the hearing. But the premise of this argument is flawed because the last reported incident of violence—notwithstanding the fact that mother later denied its occurrence—was August 30, 2018, less than seven months before the hearing.
Both appellants rely heavily on In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713 (Daisy H.) in support of their position. In Daisy H., the juvenile court sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). (Daisy H., supra, at pp. 715-716.) It was alleged in the petition in support of the claim under section 300, subdivision (b) that the father had on prior occasions choked the mother and pulled her hair, had threatened to kill mother, made derogatory statements about her in front of the children, and that he had " 'mental and emotional problems.' " (Daisy H., supra, at p. 715.) The incident of domestic violence had occurred, according to two different accounts by the mother to the agency, two or seven years before the filing of the petition, and there was no evidence the children had ever witnessed domestic violence. (Id. at p. 717.) The appellate court observed that while a petition under section 300, subdivision (b) could be based upon domestic violence, the claim could be sustained "only if there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or likely to continue and that it directly harmed the child physically or placed the child at risk of physical harm. [Citations.]" (Daisy H., supra, at p. 717.) Given the age of the violence and the absence of exposure of it to the children, the appellate court reversed the jurisdictional order, concluding that "[t]he evidence was insufficient to support a finding that past or present domestic violence between the parents placed the children at a current substantial risk of physical harm." (Ibid.)
Plainly, Daisy H. is distinguishable. Here, rather than involving one isolated incident remote in time from the petition's filing, the domestic violence consisted of as many as 14 incidents, with the most recent one occurring less than four months before the filing of the petitions. And unlike in Daisy H., the minors witnessed some of the incidents of domestic violence. Daisy H. offers no support for the appellants' position
Further, the argument that the juvenile court could not reasonably find that there was a substantial risk of ongoing harm to the minors because mother and Manuel L. were no longer together lacks merit. There was substantial evidence that mother and Manuel L. had maintained significant personal contact long after March 2018 when they reported they were no longer living together. T.G. told the Department in December 2018 that Manuel L. continued to have a regular presence in the home, coming there approximately three times a week and sometimes spending the night. These contacts occurred notwithstanding their being violations of the existing restraining order issued by the criminal court. In January 2019—in what constituted an extended violation of the restraining order—mother and Manuel L., drinking to excess, spent three days together with the minors at the home of Manuel L.'s sister.
The Department's expert, Gregory testified that, even if mother and Manuel L. were no longer in a relationship together, there was still a domestic violence concern because they were still spending time together around the children and had not addressed the issues that had resulted in domestic violence in their relationship. The juvenile court itself observed that it had "no doubt that [mother and Manuel L.] spent much more time together than she[] admitted." Gregory stressed that a domestic violence assessment was needed. She also testified that Manuel L. had not taken full accountability for his actions that constituted domestic violence. Gregory opined that without intervention to address appellants' issues, including provision of services, the threat of domestic violence remained.
The juvenile court found, based upon appellants' extensive history of domestic violence and the exposure of T.G. and E.L. to it, that the minors were dependents under section 300(b)(1). In doing so, the court, while required to have found a present risk of harm to the minors, properly "consider[ed] past events to determine whether the child[ren were] presently in need of juvenile court protection." (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289.) The record provided ample justification for the court's conclusion that there was "overwhelming evidence" "of all [aspects of domestic violence] in this case." Further, it was within the province of the court, in evaluating the credibility of the witnesses (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 103), to conclude that mother's testimony, particularly regarding domestic violence, was entirely untrustworthy and that both she and Manuel L. had significantly downplayed the frequency and severity of their domestic violence, as well as the potential future risks to the minors of exposure to that violence. (See In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 721 [concluding that juvenile court's jurisdictional finding "that domestic violence was an ongoing problem" was supported by fact that mother attempted to minimize that violence in later interviews with agency and in her testimony].) The present risk of harm to the minors as a result of appellants' domestic violence history was well-supported, inter alia, by the evidence of the past domestic violence incidents and the testimony of the Department's expert, Gregory. The juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300(b)(1) based upon the domestic violence relationship between mother and Manuel L. was supported by substantial evidence.
The second amended petitions included allegations under section 300(b)(1) other than those concerning the domestic violence history of mother and Manuel L. and the risk of harm to the minors related thereto. These additional allegations—which were not specifically addressed in the juvenile court's ruling from the bench—included those related to appellants being unwilling or resistant to participate in services, mother's use of inappropriate discipline upon T.G. and her making hurtful remarks to T.G about his father, Troy G., and appellants' having been together for three days consuming alcohol and having provided little care or supervision to the minors. Since we have concluded that the juvenile court did not err in its jurisdictional finding under section 300(b)(1) based upon the domestic violence allegations, we are not required to consider, and do not consider here, the challenges to the juvenile court's findings as to these other statutory grounds asserted in the second amended petitions. (See In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [if substantial evidence supports jurisdictional finding on one of multiple grounds alleged in petition, "reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence"]; see also In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [if "there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate"].)
2. Jurisdictional Finding Under Section 300(c)
The Department alleged that the minors were dependents under section 300(c) because they were "suffering, . . . or [were] at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others" as a result of the conduct of the parents. The allegations under section 300(c), like those under section 300(b)(1), included the domestic violence history of mother and Manuel L. and the minors' exposure to it.
Jurisdiction under section 300(c), in situations where there is parental fault, requires a showing of the parent's offending conduct, causation, and either serious emotional harm to the child or the risk thereof. (In re Roxanne B., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.) The third element does not require proof of actual serious emotional harm to the child. Section 300(c) "applies to a child who is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage even when there is insufficient evidence of actual harm. [Citations.]" (In re D.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 911, 919; see also In re A.J. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1104.)
There was substantial evidence of parental offending conduct—the history of domestic violence between mother and Manuel L.—as discussed in detail, ante, with respect to the jurisdictional finding under section 300(b)(1). We need not repeat that evidence here.
The Department does not argue that there was evidence of actual serious emotional harm suffered by T.G. or E.L. Rather, it contends that the jurisdictional finding under section 300(c) was proper because there was a substantial risk of serious emotional harm to the minors as a result of appellants' repeated instances of domestic violence, some of which having occurred in the minors' presence. We agree.
As noted above, the acts of domestic violence as reported by mother and Manuel L. included instances of great violence, included multiple cases where Manuel L. choked or strangled mother, pulled her by the hair, punched her in the face, or slammed her face into a stationary object. There was the notable episode of March 12, 2018, in which Manuel L. slapped mother, pressed his fist into her eye, and punched her in the abdomen while she was holding their five-week-old infant. And there were two instances in which mother punched Manuel L. in the face, and one instance in which she tried to choke him.
T.G. witnessed some of the incidents and tried to intervene in one or more of them. He told the Department about an incident in which appellants were fighting that made him afraid. According to Manuel L., T.G. "look[ed] scared" when he witnessed some of the fights. And T.G. told the Department—a statement that the juvenile court characterized as "really a cry for help"—that he would feel safe if mother and Manuel L. were not fighting.
Further, as noted, the fact that it was not established that the minors had, in fact, suffered serious emotional harm as a result of their exposure to domestic violence does not render the jurisdictional finding infirm. In In re D.P, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pages 919 to 920, a panel of this court considered whether there was substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional finding under section 300(c) that the child, although not displaying symptoms of emotional damage, was at risk of future harm from exposure to constant arguments and domestic violence. This court—noting, inter alia, that the mother had minimized the domestic violence, failed to recognize the risks, and continued her relationship with the father—concluded that the juvenile court had not erred in finding the child to be at risk of serious emotional harm. (Id. at p. 920.)
As was the case in In re D.P., mother and Manuel L. maintained regular contact with one another, sometimes in violation of the criminal protective order, minimized the frequency and severity of their domestic violence, and apparently did not appreciate the risk to the minors that flowed from their maintaining regular contact. Based upon what the juvenile court termed as "overwhelming" evidence of domestic violence, the severity and ongoing nature of it, and the fact that the minors were exposed to it, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that appellants' conduct had caused the minors to be at substantial risk of serious emotional harm. (In re D.P., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) This conclusion was supported further by evidence of fear and anxiety expressed by T.G., and by expert testimony from social intern Gregory opining that T.G. had been negatively impacted by his exposure to domestic violence and that both minors were at risk. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300(c) based upon the domestic violence allegations was supported by substantial evidence.
Since we have concluded that the juvenile court did not err in its jurisdictional finding under section 300(c)) based upon the domestic violence allegations, we are not required to consider, and do not consider here, any challenges to the juvenile court's findings as to other statutory grounds asserted in the second amended petitions. (See In re Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.) Additionally, since we have concluded that the court did not err in assuming jurisdiction over the minor E.L. under both subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of section 300, we do not address appellants' challenges to the juvenile court's finding that jurisdiction was also appropriate under section 300(j). (See In re Alexis E., supra, at p. 451.)
D. The Dispositional Order
Mother argues that no substantial evidence supported the dispositional order removing E.L. from mother's custody. The juvenile court, she argues, could not have reasonably found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a present and substantial danger to the physical health and emotional well-being of the minors if they were returned to the home. Mother argues further that the court erred in finding that placement of the minor E.L. with Manuel L., as the previously noncustodial parent, would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child under section 361.2(a).
Manuel L. argues (erroneously) that the juvenile court erred in removing E.L. from his custody under section 361(c)(1). In fact, at the time of the removal of E.L. in January 2019, the minor was residing solely with mother; Manuel L. was the noncustodial parent. His status as such was reflected in the court's dispositional order determining, under section 361.2(a), that placement of the minor E.L. with Manuel L., as the previously noncustodial parent, would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. Because mother makes the argument of error based upon the correct premise that the juvenile court determined that Manuel L., as the previously noncustodial parent, should not receive custody of E.L. pursuant to section 361.2(a), we will address that claim here.
1. Substantial Evidence Supported Removal
The juvenile court, in ordering removal of the minors, was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody." (§ 361(c)(1).) Removal is appropriate if there is "proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and proof of a potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.]" (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.)
Here, there was ample "proof of parental inability to provide proper care." (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) The Department presented evidence that, due to appellants' history of domestic violence, mother was unable to provide proper care to T.G., and mother and Manuel L. were unable to provide proper care to E.L. (See In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 170 [juvenile court in determining whether removal is proper "may consider a parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances"].) Proof of this inability was well-established by the ongoing pattern of domestic violence, including many instances of physical violence, in the relationship between mother and Manuel L. This domestic violence history was discussed in detail, ante, in connection with our review of the dispositional finding under section 300(b)(1).
There was also significant evidence to support a finding of "potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.]" (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) This evidence was also discussed in detail in our review, ante, of the jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1). Mother and Manuel L., as demonstrated in the record and as the juvenile court found, "significantly minimize[d]" the extent and severity of domestic violence in their relationship. This was a factor of considerable importance to the Department's expert, Gregory. The minors were witnesses to some of the incidents, and T.G. had attempted to intervene in some instances. There was evidence that the domestic violence had negatively impacted the minors, and T.G. had expressed concerns about feeling safe. Gregory stressed that mother and Manuel L. had not addressed their domestic violence issues, there was a need for an assessment, and there was an ongoing threat of domestic violence . Moreover, the fact that mother and Manuel L., according to their own reports, were no longer in a relationship together did not preclude a finding of potential detriment. To the contrary, it was evident that they continued to maintain regular contact—often in apparent violation of a criminal protective order—that included a three-day visit in January 2019 that involved the regular consumption of alcohol. These circumstances led Gregory to opine that, notwithstanding appellants' claim that they were no longer together, there was still a domestic violence concern.
In determining the propriety of removal, the juvenile court could have also considered, as evidenced in the record, the extent of appellants' unwillingness to cooperate with the Department to permit it to adequately assess what was needed to address the issues that had led to the filing of the petitions. (Cf. In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 212. [juvenile court may consider "defiant behavior or failure to engage in services" in determining appropriateness of removal].)
We conclude, viewing the record as a whole in a light most favorable to the Department, and giving proper deference to the juvenile court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, resolution of conflicting evidence, and the drawing of reasonable inferences from the evidence, that "the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable" that removal of the minors from mother's care was proper under section 361(c)(1). (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.)
As to the issue of Manuel L., the previously noncustodial parent of E.L. seeking custody of the minor, the juvenile court was required to grant custody, unless the juvenile court, by clear and convincing evidence, found "that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 361.2(a).) A determination under section 361.2(a) "does not require that the court find the noncustodial parent might fail to protect the child." (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.) Rather, the juvenile court is required to "weigh all relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net harm. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Here, based upon an analysis parallel to the one we have employed in concluding that removal of the minors from mother's custody was appropriate, we conclude that the court did not err in finding that placement of E.L. with Manuel L. would be detrimental to the child under section 361.2(a). The same issues pertaining to mother—such as the history of substantial domestic violence between mother and Manuel L., their minimization of that domestic violence, the fact that E.L. had witnessed some instances of violence, the fact that mother and Manuel L. had not yet addressed their domestic violence issues, the lack of an assessment, and the ongoing threat of domestic violence due in part to appellants' ongoing regular contact—were substantial relevant matters that the juvenile court weighed in determining that "that placement with [Manuel L.] would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of [E.L.]." (§ 361.2(a); see In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1490 [a finding that placement with the previously noncustodial parent "would impair the emotional security of the child" may be "all that might be required" in an appropriate case].) We conclude that "the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable" that placement of E.L. with Manuel L. would be detrimental to her safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.)
2. The Court's Findings Were Sufficient
Mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred because it failed to make findings in support of the dispositional order as required by statute. Under section 361, subdivision (e), the juvenile court "shall state the facts on which the decision to remove is based." Likewise, when the juvenile court determines that placement of a child with a previously noncustodial parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child, it must make a finding on the record, or in writing stating the basis for the determination. (§ 361.2, subds. (a), (c).)
Mother's claim of error ignores the procedural circumstances of the hearing below. The juvenile court made it plain to the parties that it would hear evidence simultaneously on the questions of jurisdiction and disposition, noting that there would be a good deal of overlap in the evidence that made the approach a practical one. After the evidence phase of the hearing concluded, counsel for the parties presented argument on both jurisdiction and disposition. And when the juvenile court announced its decision from the bench, it is clear that its comments reflected its reasoning as to both jurisdiction and disposition. The court's concerns included the fact that mother and Manuel L. had minimized the nature and extent of domestic violence in their relationship, and that mother had mischaracterized the criminal protective order that Manuel L. had violated "as a peaceful-contact order, which it is not." The juvenile court was particularly concerned that mother had testified that there was no domestic violence issue "except for a short period of time" in the relationship. And the juvenile court concluded that the fact that the relationship had come to an end, "or at least hav[ing] a pause, . . .doesn't mean that it's not a domestic violence relationship."
The findings recited on the record, reasonably construed, were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the specification of the basis for removal under section 361, subdivision (e). They were also sufficient under section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (c).
E. Challenge to Case Plan
Mother contends that reversal is required because the juvenile court in its disposition order did not adequately state the services that would be provided to the parents. The Department contends that mother forfeited this challenge by failing to object below.
"[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]" (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted, superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) "The forfeiture doctrine has been applied in dependency proceedings in a wide variety of contexts, including cases involving failures to obtain various statutorily required reports [citation]; failure to object to the adequacy of an adoption assessment [citations]; failure to request an alternative placement [citation]; and failure to require expert testimony and to make the required findings using the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard as mandated by ICWA [citation]." (In re G.C. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1398-1399.) The doctrine has been applied to preclude a challenge to a case plan where the appellant failed to object to its adequacy in the lower court. (See In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476.)
Based upon our review of the record, mother did not assert the objections to the case plan below that she raises here. We will therefore deem those challenges forfeited. (In re Precious J., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1476.)
Mother makes the general argument that to the extent her trial counsel's failure to object permitted the court to require her "to do unnecessary services," she received ineffective assistance of counsel because there could have been no tactical reason for the absence of an objection. An appellate court has no obligation to "develop the appellants' arguments for them" (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1), and arguments in briefs raised in a perfunctory fashion will be deemed by the appellate court to be abandoned (Nisei Farmers League v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1018). We will not consider this cursory undeveloped argument mother asserts here.
III. DISPOSITION
The order after the combined jurisdiction and disposition is affirmed.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
GROVER, J.