Opinion
E081871
04-25-2024
In re N.A. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. D.J., Defendant and Appellant. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Nos. J286397, J286398, J286399 Steven A. Mapes, Judge. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON ACTING P. J.
In her third appeal, D.J. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order on July 28, 2023, terminating parental rights to her three children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends that, once again, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) and the juvenile court failed to comply with their duties to inquire under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and California Indian Child Welfare Act (§ 224 et seq.), referred to collectively as ICWA.
Fathers A.M. and T.A. are not parties to this appeal.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Because ICWA uses the term "Indian," we do so on occasion as well, not out of disrespect, but because of the need for clarity and consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as "Native American" or "indigenous" are preferrable.
We conclude Mother forfeited her objection in this appeal to ICWA inquiry compliance, because it was raised in her previous, second appeal, with a conditional remand to correct the ICWA deficiencies, and Mother failed to object again to ICWA compliance in the lower court during the most recent remittitur hearing. We therefore affirm the finding that ICWA does not apply and the order terminating parental rights.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts and procedural background before the second appeal are taken from the second appeal opinion (In re N.A. (Oct. 14, 2022, E078838) [nonpub. opn.]).
A. First Appeal
On August 21, 2020, Mother was in a car accident. Her blood alcohol level was above the legal limit. Mother's three children, Ne. (1 year old), Ti. (3 years old), and Ni. (4 years old) (Children) were in the car during the accident. The Children sustained abrasions and scrapes and were transported to the hospital. The car reportedly flipped over four times. CFS received an emergency response referral alleging severe neglect of the Children and the caretaker's absence/incapacity. Mother was arrested. She claimed that T.A. was the father of the three Children. Mother and T.A. had criminal histories. Because T.A. could not be located and there were no relatives available to care for the Children, CFS detained the Children.
Later it was determined that T.A. is the biological father of only Ti and Ne., and A.M. is the biological father of Ni.
On August 25, 2020, CFS filed dependency petitions on behalf of the Children (Petition). The Petition alleged that T.A. was not a member of Mother and the Children's household, and his whereabouts were unknown (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (g)). The court ordered the Children detained and ordered visitation. During the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in September 2020, the court sustained the Petition allegations, declared the Children dependents, and ordered reunification services for Mother. The court found T.A. was the alleged father of the Children and was not entitled to reunification services. On December 25, 2020, the Children's caretaker, their maternal great grandmother (MGGM), died in the Children's presence. The Children were placed with their maternal grandmother (MGM), and then in the foster home of Ms. N. on January 6, 2021.
On December 30, 2020, Ni.'s biological father, A.M., contacted CFS, claiming to be Ni.'s father. He had just been released from prison and informed of the juvenile dependency matter. Mother denied A.M. was Ni.'s father. CFS filed a section 342 petition in September 2021, on behalf of Ni, alleging that A.M. had an unresolved history of substance abuse, engaged in domestic violence in Ni.'s presence, and failed to protect her, thus placing her at risk of neglect and abuse.
Ms. N. was willing to provide a concurrent family home for the Children and adopt them. At the 12-month hearing on September 23, 2021, the court set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. Parents appealed by writ petition (first appeal) and the petition was dismissed based on a lack of any justiciable issue. (In re D.J. (E077811) [dismissed].)
B. Second Appeal
During A.M.'s interview in September 2021, he stated that his contact with Ni. had been sporadic because of his multiple incarcerations. In September 2021, A.M.'s probation officer reported A.M. had been arrested and was incarcerated, but as of November 2021, A.M. was no longer in custody. During the combined section 342 jurisdiction/disposition hearing and section 366.26 hearing on April 12, 2022, the juvenile court found that the section 342 petition allegations were true. The court also found that A.M. was Ni.'s biological father, terminated parental rights to the Children, and freed them for adoption by Ms. N.
Parents appealed the April 12, 2022, order (second appeal), based in part on inadequate ICWA inquiry compliance. (In re N.A., supra, E078838.) On October 14, 2022, this court conditionally reversed the April 12, 2022, order terminating parental rights, and directed the juvenile court on remand to ask A.M. about his paternal Native American ancestry and to ensure CFS investigated further the Children's paternal Native American ancestry.
C. Third Appeal
Upon remand from the second appeal, the juvenile court investigated and inquired further about the Children's Native American ancestry. During the hearing on remittitur on July 28, 2023, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply, found the remittitur was satisfied, and reinstated the order terminating parental rights. Mother appealed the order reinstating termination of parental rights (her third appeal) based on noncompliance with ICWA's inquiry requirements.
III. DISCUSSION
As argued in the second appeal, Mother contends in this third appeal that the juvenile court and CFS again failed to comply with ICWA by not adequately inquiring and investigating the Children's Native American ancestry. Mother argues such deficiencies include the juvenile court not asking A.M. about his paternal Native American ancestry, although the court did not ask him because he was not present at any of the postremand hearings after the second appeal. Mother also asserted that A.M. did not provide a signed ICWA-020 form, and CFS did not make ICWA inquiries of a paternal (T.A.) great aunt or two paternal (T.A.) aunts. CFS argues Mother forfeited her ICWA compliance objection by not raising it in the juvenile court during the remittitur hearing on July 28, 2023, when the court found ICWA did not apply. We agree.
A. ICWA Compliance Background
When CFS interviewed Mother on the day of her car accident on August 21, 2020, Mother denied any Native American heritage. CFS reported in ICWA-010 forms attached to the Petition that CFS asked her about the Children's Native American status and she gave no reason to believe the Children were Native American children.
On August 26, 2020, Mother and T.A. filled out ICWA-020 forms stating "no" to the statement, "I may have Indian Ancestry." They also stated, "I have no Indian Ancestry as far as I know." In addition, Mother and T.A. filled out Family Find and ICWA inquiry forms denying Native American ancestry. They also denied Native American ancestry during the detention hearing. The jurisdiction/disposition hearing report stated that ICWA did not apply, but CFS recommended in the report that the court find ICWA does or may apply. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in September 2020, the court found the Children do or may come under ICWA.
CFS stated in the six-month report filed in March 2021, that Ne. and Ti.'s paternal (T.A.) great grandmother, Brenda F. (PGGM), claimed the Children's great-great grandfather (PGGGF) might have been Cherokee.
In Parents' first appeal by writ petition of the September 23, 2021, order setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, ICWA compliance was not challenged, and the writ petition was dismissed based on a lack of any justiciable issue. (In re D.J., supra, E077811.)
1. ICWA Investigation After First Appeal
In January 2022, Ne. and Ti.'s paternal (T.A.) grandmother (PGM) claimed possible Cherokee and Osage heritage. CFS further reported that in October 2020, MGGM stated she suspected her family may have Blackfoot or Cherokee heritage. CFS also reported that in January 2021, Mother told CFS that she may have Cherokee heritage on her father's side of the family (MGF). PGM reported she might have Cherokee and Osage ancestry on her side of the family. In December 2020, A.M. claimed possible Native American ancestry in the Blackfoot tribe. CFS, however, recommended that the court find ICWA did not apply.
In March 2021, CFS reported that Ni.'s father, A.M., denied Native American ancestry. The court ordered CFS to obtain an ICWA-020 form from him. A.M. again denied Native American ancestry at the 12-month hearing in June 2021. The ICWA-010 form attached to the section 342 petition stated Mother and A.M. gave no reason to believe Ni. was a Native American child. There was no discussion of ICWA at the section 342 detention hearing in September 2021, and it was not addressed at the 12-month hearing in September 2021. At the section 342 jurisdiction/disposition hearing in November 2021, the court stated that CFS had conducted a thorough investigation and that it would be appropriate to notify the tribes and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
CFS reported in its section 366.26 report filed in January 2022, that ICWA did not apply. At the combined section 342 jurisdiction/disposition hearing and section 366.26 hearing on January 20, 2022, the court stated it intended to follow up on the ICWA issue during the continued hearing set on April 12, 2022. However, at the section 366.26 hearing on April 12, 2022, the court terminated parental rights without addressing ICWA.
Mother filed a second appeal challenging ICWA inquiry compliance, which again resulted in a reversal and conditional remand for the purpose of allowing further ICWA compliance. The parties agreed there had not been full compliance with ICWA. On October 14, 2022, this court therefore issued a decision conditionally reversing the April 12, 2022, order terminating parental rights and directing on remand further inquiry, including the court asking A.M. about his paternal Native American ancestry.
2. ICWA Investigation After Second Appeal
After the second appeal and remand, CFS investigated further the Children's Native American ancestry. In May 2022, Ne. and Ti.'s paternal (T.A.) great-grandmother (PGGM) submitted an ICWA-020 form, stating that she is or may be a member or eligible for membership in a Cherokee tribe. Attached to the ICWA-020 form was a death certificate for Glen F., PGGM's father, listing as race, "White, American Indian, Cherokee." PGGM also stated in a section 388 petition filed in June 2022, that ICWA possibly applied, but there was no discussion of ICWA during the hearing on the section 388 petition, which the court denied.
During the permanent plan review hearings on October 7, 2022, and December 2, 2022, ICWA was not discussed. At the conclusion of the January 24, 2023, hearing on one of PGGM's section 388 petitions, the juvenile court set a hearing to discuss the remittitur and ICWA. At the March 2023 hearing, CFS requested more time to comply with ICWA, and the hearing was continued to April.
At the April hearing, the court instructed CFS to provide an update on ICWA compliance. On May 25, 2023, CFS filed an additional information report stating that on May 16, 2023, CFS spoke to PGGM regarding her Native American ancestry. PGGM stated that her father's death certificate said he was Cherokee, and she believed her family was Cherokee. PGGM provided information regarding her parents and her sister, Susan F. PGGM said she also had a brother but had not spoken to him in many years.
On May 18, 2023, CFS emailed ICWA inquiries to the Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians of Oklahoma, and the Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Montana. On May 19, 2023, the Cherokee Nation requested information on Mother, which was provided on May 23, 2023. Also on May 19, 2023, CFS received calls from Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, stating inquiries must be made by certified mail, which CFS sent on May 23, 2023.
CFS stated in its additional information report that on May 24, 2023, it spoke to the Children's paternal (T.A.) great aunt, Susan F., who stated she was told throughout her life that her family was part Cherokee. She mentioned that her father's death certificate stated he was Cherokee. CFS asked Susan F. if other family members might have additional information. Susan F. said any family members who might have information were deceased. She said her brother would not know anything about their Native American ancestry and she had no contact with him or any contact information for him. Susan F. agreed to continue looking into her family history and agreed to provide any additional information she discovered.
CFS attached to its additional information report copies of email responses, certified mail confirmations, inquiries, and requests. The inquiries sent to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indian and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indian tribes included the name, dates of birth and death of PGGGF, and the names and dates of birth of PGGGM, PGGM, PGM, Father (T.A.), Mother, and the three Children.
CFS filed an additional information report on July 24, 2023, providing an update on ICWA compliance. CFS reported that on May 25, 2023, the Cherokee Nation reported the Children were not members of the tribe nor eligible to become members. On June 8, 2023, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians reported the Children were not registered with their tribes or eligible to register.
At the further review hearing on July 28, 2023, Mother appeared by phone and T.A. appeared in person. A.M. did not appear at the hearing. CFS informed the court that it reached out to various paternal relatives and was advised the Children might have Cherokee ancestry. CFS also inquired of all three Cherokee bands, which responded that the Children are not members of the tribe and are not eligible to become members. CFS believed it had complied with the remittitur and requested the juvenile court to find that ICWA did not apply.
The court asked the parties if there was any objection to finding ICWA did not apply. None of the parties objected. The court then found that ICWA did not apply and that the remittitur was satisfied, with the order terminating parental rights reinstated.
B. Applicable Law
"In 1978 Congress enacted the ICWA to 'protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.' (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The ICWA recognizes that '"the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity with the interest of the parents."' [Citation.] 'The ICWA presumes it is in the best interests of the child to retain tribal ties and cultural heritage and in the interest of the tribe to preserve its future generations, a most important resource. [Citation.] Congress has concluded the state courts have not protected these interests and drafted a statutory scheme intended to afford needed protection.' [Citation.]" (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 253; accord, In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 801-802 (X.V.).)
Therefore, Federal regulations implementing ICWA require that state courts, at the commencement of a juvenile dependency proceeding, "ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child." (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2022).) Under California law, the court and county child welfare department also "'have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child,' who is the subject of a juvenile dependency petition, 'is or may be an Indian child.' [Citations.] The child welfare department's initial duty of inquiry includes 'asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.' (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)" (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 883.) State courts must also "instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child." (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2022).)
Here, Mother seeks reversal based on noncompliance with ICWA's inquiry requirements. CFS argues Mother forfeited her ICWA objection by not raising it at the July 28, 2023, remittitur hearing. Generally, "'[a] party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as "waiver," applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings.'" (In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 385.)
However, "[t]he generally accepted rule in dependency cases is that the forfeiture doctrine does not bar consideration of ICWA notice issues on appeal." (In re Alice M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1195.) But, "[w]hen a case is remanded to the juvenile court for the purpose of curing ICWA notice defects and the parent is represented by counsel at the postremand compliance hearing and counsel raises no objection to new ICWA notices, an exception to the general rule against forfeiture may apply." (In re Z.W. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 54, 64 (Z.W.); see also In re Amber F. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1156; X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) "Balancing the minor's interest in permanency and stability against the tribes' rights under ICWA may require a different result in such a case." (Z.W., supra, at p. 64.)
As the court in X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pages 804-805, explained, "We are mindful that the ICWA is to be construed broadly [citation], but we are unwilling to further prolong the proceedings for another round of ICWA notices, to which the parents may again object on appeal.... We do not believe Congress anticipated or intended to require successive or serial appeals challenging ICWA notices for the first time on appeal . . . '[a]t some point, the rules of error preservation must apply or parents will be able to repeatedly delay permanence for children through numerous belated ICWA notice appeals and writs.'"
C. Analysis
In this third appeal, Mother seeks reversal based on the juvenile court failing to inquire of A.M. regarding his Native American ancestry, as ordered by this court. She also argues CFS failed to fully comply with its inquiry duty by not contacting a paternal aunt and two great aunts. Mother previously raised an ICWA inquiry challenge in her second appeal, and the parties agreed to reversal and remand to allow further ICWA compliance.
Because after remand from the second appeal, neither Mother nor any other party at the July 28, 2023, remittitur hearing objected to the juvenile court's finding that ICWA did not apply, Mother forfeited her ICWA inquiry objection here in this appeal. (Z.W., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 64; see also In re Amber F, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156; X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) After the second appeal, this case was remanded to the juvenile court for the purpose of curing ICWA inquiry defects, and Mother and the fathers, A.M. and T.A., were represented by counsel at the postremand compliance hearing. No one objected to the juvenile court's finding of ICWA compliance. Therefore, the exception to the general rule against forfeiture applies. (Z. W, supra, at p. 64.)
Although in Z.W., the exception to forfeiture was based on successive appeals to ICWA notice challenges, whereas this case concerns successive challenges to ICWA inquiry compliance, the forfeiture exception nevertheless applies here. The circumstances are sufficiently analogous. The appellants in both cases repeated the same type of ICWA objections in successive appeals, and failed to object to any continuing ICWA deficiencies in the lower court before bringing the subsequent appeal. Had the appellant here, as in Z.W., raised her ICWA compliance objections in the juvenile court before bringing the instant appeal, the ICWA deficiencies likely could have been addressed in the juvenile court, thus avoiding another appeal and additional delay. We therefore conclude, as the court did in Z.W., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 54, and In re Amber F., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1152, that the forfeiture doctrine bars mother's ICWA challenge in this appeal.
In re Alice M., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 1189, in which the court held that the mother's ICWA notice challenge was not forfeited on appeal, is distinguishable. In that case, the appeal presented only a single appeal challenging ICWA notice. Unlike in Alice M., this is Mother's third appeal and second, successive appeal challenging ICWA inquiry noncompliance. Mother should have called any and all ICWA inquiry deficiencies to the attention of the juvenile court. "Had an objection been made, the juvenile court could have addressed whatever deficiencies existed before terminating mother's rights." (Z.W., supra, at p. 66.)
California courts should draw the line when parents fail to raise in the lower court the same ICWA objection again at a remittitur hearing on remand, and then appeal again based on the same objection raised in the previous appeal. "A line has to be drawn. At some point, there must be finality to the ICWA noticing process." (Z. W, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 67; see also X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) Balancing the minor's interest in permanency and stability against the tribes' rights under ICWA, in X.V., the court found that, "forfeiture principles preclude a second appellate review in such a case, as further delay harms the paramount interests of dependent children in permanence and stability. The purposes of the ICWA are indeed commendable, but we do not believe Congress envisioned or intended successive or serial appeals on ICWA notice issues when, given a proper objection, they could easily be resolved during proceedings on remand for the specific purpose of determining whether proper notice was given." (X.V., supra, at p. 798.) The X.V. court therefore affirmed the judgment terminating parental rights based on forfeiture. Likewise, under the circumstances presented here, Mother forfeited her objection to ICWA inquiry compliance.
Citing In re Isaiah W (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1 (Isaiah W), and In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426 (Justin S.), Mother argues she did not forfeit her objection to ICWA inquiry compliance "because of the continuing duty imposed by ICWA and related state law to inquire whether a child is a Indian child." Isaiah W and Justin S. do not support this proposition and are distinguishable. In Isaiah W, the court considered whether a parent who failed to appeal from the juvenile court's dispositional order, which included a finding that ICWA notice was unnecessary, could challenge ICWA notice compliance on appeal from an order terminating parental rights. (Isaiah W, supra, at p. 6.) The Isaiah W. court held that the parent could appeal from the order to terminate parental rights.
The Supreme Court in Isaiah W. noted thatX.V., which is procedurally similar to the instant case, is distinguishable because Isaiah W. does not involve a second or successive appeal. The Isaiah W. court said it, therefore, had no occasion to decide whether a parent would be precluded from raising an ICWA notice violation in a second or successive appeal. (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 15.) We therefore reject Mother's contention that Isaiah W. is dispositive here of the issue of forfeiture.
Mother's reliance on Justin S., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, is misplaced as well. It also does not address the issue of forfeiture of ICWA objections raised in successive appeals. In Justin S., the mother was not informed of the postremand ICWA compliance hearing or appointed counsel for the hearing. She therefore was deprived of the opportunity to participate in the remittitur compliance hearing and object to ICWA noncompliance. (Justin S., supra, at p. 1432.) The Justin S. court held that on a limited remand for compliance with ICWA notice provisions, the mother was entitled to notice of the compliance hearing and representation by counsel for that hearing. (Id. at pp. 14351436.)
This case is different. After the second appeal, this case was remanded to the juvenile court for the purpose of curing ICWA noncompliance. This court directed the juvenile court to comply on remand with ICWA inquiry and notice provisions, including the juvenile court inquiring of A.M. as to paternal Native American ancestry and ensuring CFS fully investigated and took reasonable steps to ascertain whether the Children had Native American ancestry. Unlike in Justin S., (1) there were successive appeals objecting to ICWA inquiry noncompliance, (2) this case was remanded twice to the juvenile court for the purpose of curing ICWA inquiry deficiencies, (3) Mother was represented by counsel and appeared at the postremand ICWA compliance hearing, and (4) the parties and their counsel did not object to the court finding that ICWA did not apply. We therefore conclude an exception to the general rule against forfeiture applies here, and Mother thus forfeited her ICWA challenge in this appeal to the juvenile court's finding of ICWA inquiry compliance. (Z.W., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 63-64; X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 794; In re Amber F., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1152; In re N.M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253.)
Mother nevertheless argues this court must again order a conditional reversal because the juvenile court did not ask Ni's father, A.M., about his Native American ancestry, as directed in this court's second appeal disposition. But not only was this objection forfeited by Mother not raising it in the juvenile court, we also reject it because A.M. impeded the court from asking him about his Native American ancestry by not appearing at any of the remittitur compliance hearings.
This court previously directed the juvenile court, upon remand after the second appeal, to ask A.M. about his Native American ancestry. There was evidence in the record that he said he did not have any Native American ancestry, yet there were no personal statements by A.M. in the record confirming this. In March 2021, CFS reported that A.M. denied Native American ancestry. The juvenile court then ordered CFS to obtain a signed ICWA-020 form from him, but the record indicates Father never submitted the form. A.M. again denied Native American ancestry at the 12-month hearing in June 2021.
This court directed the juvenile court in the second appeal disposition: "On remand, the court must inquire of A.M. as to paternal Native American ancestry, and ensure that CFS fully investigates and takes reasonable steps to ascertain whether the Children have paternal Native American ancestry and gives ICWA notices, as appropriate." (Italics added.) Even though the juvenile court did not inquire of A.M. as to his Native American ancestry, as we previously directed, we conclude this does not require a conditional reversal because Mother forfeited the issue and A.M. interfered with compliance.
Furthermore, although we need not decide the issue of ICWA compliance on the merits because Mother forfeited the objection in this third appeal, we note it appears from the record that the juvenile court inquired as to whether the Children have Native American Ancestry and CFS made a concerted effort to investigate the Children's Native American ancestry by contacting the Children's maternal and paternal relatives, and inquiring as to whether the Children have Native American Ancestry. Inquiries were also sent to various tribes and all tribe responses stated that the Children were not Native American tribe members or eligible for membership. In addition, in March and June 2021, A.M. denied Native American ancestry. More likely could have been done to investigate the Children's ancestry, as Mother suggests, but it is unlikely that any additional inquiries would result in information, other than what has already been provided, confirming that the Children are not Native American Children and are not eligible for membership in any Native American tribe.
We are mindful that ICWA is to be construed broadly, but under the totality of the circumstances, we are unwilling to further prolong the proceedings and delay permanence for the Children, for another round of ICWA inquiries, to which Mother may again object by bringing a fourth appeal. "'At some point, the rules of error preservation must apply or parents will be able to repeatedly delay permanence for children through numerous belated ICWA notice appeals and writs.'" (X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804-805.) Because, at this point, the Children's interests in permanency and stability outweigh the tribes' potential rights under ICWA, we affirm the finding ICWA does not apply and reinstatement of the order terminating parental rights.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: FIELDS J., RAPHAEL J.