Opinion
Case No. CV 15-03629 DDP (Ex)
06-06-2016
GREG RYDEEN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
[Dkt. 12]
Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss claims for violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Having considered the parties' submissions, the court grants the motion and adopts the following Order.
I. Background.
On February 25, 2014, Plaintiff was arrested for alleged inappropriate touching of a woman. (Complaint ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was booked, classified, and incarcerated in the general population at the Los Angeles County jail awaiting trial. (Id. ¶ 14.) Beginning in June 2014, while Plaintiff was still incarcerated, Plaintiff alleges that the deputies in charge of the jail told other inmates about Plaintiff's charges. (Id. ¶ 15-16.)
Soon after, Plaintiff was attacked by fellow inmates who knew of the charges against him. (Compl. ¶ 16.) After the attack, Plaintiff was given a red armband and a special classification, but he was still housed in the general population. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was informed that a "green light" had been ordered and that he was a target for other inmates. (Id.) On June 20, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed on a "mainline" with other inmates being transported to court, in violation of his special classification. Id. at ¶ 18.) That same day, Plaintiff was attacked and injured by fellow inmates for a second time. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that deputies did not attempt to help him during the attack. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges causes of action for civil rights violations, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery. Defendant now move to dismiss any constitutional claims premised upon the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. Legal Standard.
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint need not include "detailed factual allegations," it must offer "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely offers "labels and conclusions," a "formulaic recitation of the elements," or "naked assertions" will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679. Plaintiffs must allege "plausible grounds to infer" that their claims rise "above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief" is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
III. Discussion.
Plaintiff's Complaint does not indicate whether he had been arraigned by the time he was assaulted by fellow inmates in June. By that time, however, Plaintiff had been incarcerated for approximately four months. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that he had been arraigned by the time of the assaults, and the court assumes as much for purposes of this motion. The question before the court, then, is whether a post-arraignment detainee such as Plaintiff may bring claims under the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
"The custodial continuum runs through the initial arrest or seizure, post arrest but pre-charge or pre-hearing custody, pretrial detention, and post-conviction incarceration." Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996). The constitutional basis for a detainee's claim will differ based on the plaintiff's status at the time of the alleged violation. See, e.g., Morales v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 13-cv-00414 DAD, 2013 WL 5773121 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013).
In Graham v. Connor, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action for injuries sustained when law enforcement officers used physical force against him during an investigatory stop. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (U.S. 1989). The Supreme Court held that claims for excessive use of force "in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of [plaintiff's] person . . . are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard." Id. at 388. The Court also declined to address whether the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the end of an arrest, while noting that "the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment." Id. at 394-95.
In Pierce, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated her Eighth and Fourth Amendment rights by detaining her for four hours for identification following a citation for boarding a train without proof of payment of fare, and for excessive force during that detention. Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1035. Interpreting Graham, the Ninth Circuit agreed with other precedent that "applies the Fourth Amendment standard to assess the constitutionality of the duration of or legal justification for a prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody." (Id. at 1043 (emphasis and citations omitted)). The court therefore held that the "Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest." Id. at 1043.
In Gibson v. County of Washoe, the widow of a decedent brought a § 1983 claim against the County, the sheriff, and a number of the sheriff's deputies who were on duty at the jail when her husband died from a heart attack while in custody on the night of his arrest. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit looked to Graham and Pierce and held that Graham "explicates the standards applicable to a pretrial detention excessive force claim in this circuit," and that "the Fourth Amendment sets the 'applicable constitutional limitations' for considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention." Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043); see also Lolli v. Cty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003)(holding that "the Fourth Amendment provides the proper framework for Lolli's excessive force claim . . . .").
Plaintiff argues here, essentially, that, notwithstanding the Pierce court's pronouncement that the Fourth Amendment applies "up until the time [a plaintiff] is released or found to be legally in custody" and reference to "pre-arraignment custody," the Gibson court's later statement that the Fourth Amendment applies to claims "during pretrial detention" allows Plaintiff to maintain a Fourth Amendment claim based on facts occurring even after he was arraigned. Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043; Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197.
Several district courts have considered, and rejected, the position put forth by Plaintiff. In 2008, the court in Henderson v. City and Count of San Francisco, the court concluded, after a thorough analysis of Pierce, Gibson, and Lolli, that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment alone governs the use of force against a prisoner during the period between arraignment and conviction." Henderson v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C05 0234 VRW/WAF, 2007 WL 2778682, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007). In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the argument Plaintiff raises here. "If we were to ignore its factual context, Gibson's statement that the Fourth Amendment applies to 'claims of excessive force during pretrial detention' might be read broadly to govern pretrial detention both before and after arraignment. However, such a reading would be inconsistent with Gibson's explicit reliance on Pierce, the language and logic of which clearly distinguished between pre-and post-arraignment detention, and with the fact that Gibson did not involve the post-arraignment use of force." Id. at *2. The court further concluded that "Gibson and Lolli do little to undermine Pierce's suggestion that the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable seizure end once a detainee is 'found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest.'" Id. at *3.
In Leialoha v. MacDonald, the family of a decedent brought a § 1983 claim after a post-arraignment detainee died while attempting to escape a prison transportation vehicle. Leialoha v. MacDonald, No. CIV. 07 00218ACKKSC, 2008 WL 2736020, at *2-3 (D. Haw. July 11, 2008). Referring to Lolli, Gibson, and Pierce, the court stated that "[w]hile these cases stand for the proposition that pre-arraignment, pretrial detainees are afforded Fourth Amendment protections against excessive force, they do not support Plaintiffs' contention that . . . a post-arraignment detainee[] is entitled to those same protections." Leialoha, 2008 WL 2736020, at *6. The Leialoha court noted that other courts, including Henderon, had reached the same conclusion. Id. One of the other cases cited by the Leialoha court, Grinage v. Leyba, involved a plaintiff who testified that he had been in custody for two months at the time of an alleged constitutional violation, suggesting that he was a post-arraignment detainee. Grinage v. Leyba, No. 2:06 CV 0835 RLH-GWF, 2008 WL 199720, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 17, 2008). Thus, the court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment provided the appropriate constitutional framework for the plaintiff's excessive use of force claim. Id. at *4.
Plaintiff here does not address Henderson, Leialoha, Grinage, or any of the other cases applying only a Fourteenth Amendment standard to a post-arraignment, pre-trial detainee's constitutional claims. This court agrees with the well-reasoned decision in Henderson, and, as did the Henderson court, rejects the argument that Gibson somehow expanded the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a point on the custodial continuum beyond arraignment.
Plaintiff does make reference to an earlier Order in the Henderson case, but not the Order in which the court addressed the precise argument Plaintiff raises before this court. --------
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Any amended complaint shall be filed within fourteen days of the date of this Order. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 6, 2016
/s/
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge