Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2703, Section "T" (1)
August 9, 2001
Before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendant, Genuine Parts Company d/b/a NAPA Auto Parts (hereinafter "GPC"), pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion came for hearing on August 1, 2001, without oral argument. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, the exhibits, the record, and the applicable law, is fully advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
The events giving rise to this action began in January 1999, when the Plaintiff, Renita Royal, while employed as a stocker in GPC's Distribution Center in Jefferson, Louisiana, began experiencing migraine headaches. Royal discovered that her headaches were being caused by a tumor on her pituitary gland. After consulting her physician, the Plaintiff elected to have the tumor surgically removed in March of 1999. Royal's last day of work prior to her surgery was Monday, March 15, 1999. Thereafter, she provided the Defendant with a note from her physician, Dr. Richard Corales, indicating that the period of disability resulting from the aforementioned surgery would be temporary. Specifically, Dr. Corales indicated that Royal would be able to return to work within two to three weeks after surgery.
GPC approved the Plaintiff for leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act; additionally, GPC approved Royal's request for leave under the company's Short-Term Disability Leave Plan ("STD Plan"). GPC's STD Plan allowed employees of the Plaintiff's level of seniority thirteen weeks of paid leave at sixty percent of their regular wages. The Plaintiff underwent surgery on March 18, 1999; however, she did not return to her position as a stocker within two to three weeks as initially indicated by her physician. Rather, in a note dated April 16, 1999, Dr. Corales indicated that Royal need to remain out of work for an additional two to three weeks, until approximately May 10, 1999. Nevertheless, Corales reassured GPC that Royal's period of disability remained temporary in nature. Accordingly, GPC extended the Plaintiff's STD leave and utilized temporary workers to fulfill her duties during that period.
In a note dated May 12, 1999, Dr. Corales informed GPC that the Plaintiff remained unable to return to work within the estimated time period. However, Dr. Corales represented that Royal would be able to resume her regular duties as a stocker approximately ten to twelve weeks post-surgery, which would be in early June of 1999. Additionally, Dr. Corales once again indicated to GPC that Royal's disability remained temporary in nature. Consequently, GPC extended Royal's STD leave and continued to employ temporary workers in her position.
On June 1, 1999, Dr. Corales advised GPC that he was releasing Royal to work without restrictions as of June 7, 1999. Royal returned to work on that date and worked as a stocker without restriction for two days. However, on June 9, 1999, Royal called in sick. She returned to work on June 10, 1999, with notes from three different physicians that she had apparently visited while out sick on June 9, 1999. Two of those doctors placed no restrictions on Royal's job duties, but the other physician, Dr. Wendy Jamison, recommended that Royal be placed on "light duty" for a week and then returned to normal duties "if tolerated." GPC found it suspicious that none of these notes came from Royal's treating physician, Dr. Corales.
In light of the note received from Dr. Jamison, GPC attempted to place Royal in a light duty position on June 10, 1999, but there were no light duty positions available on that date. Consequently, GPC sent Royal home on June 10, 1999, and advised her that she would remain on STD leave for the remainder of the week. That week, according to GPC, was to be Royal's last week of coverage under the STD Plan. Royal was instructed to return to her position of stocker the following week.
Royal returned to work on June 17, 1999, but failed to present a physician's note releasing her to return to work. GPC allowed Royal to work on June 17, 1999, with the understanding that she would contact her physician that day to obtain a release. At the end of the day on June 17, 1999, GPC received a faxed note from Dr. Jamison indicating that Royal should be placed on "light duty" in an air-conditioned environment through June 28, 1999. The note further stated that Royal could return to her normal duties as a stocker "if tolerated." According to Peggy Rubio, GPC's Human Resources Manager, GPC concluded that the Plaintiff could not perform her stocker duties due to the "light duty" restriction imposed by Dr. Jamison. Furthermore, Rubio concluded that because the stocker job required the Plaintiff to work all day in the GPC warehouse during the hot month of June, Royal was not capable of performing that position because the air conditioning system in the warehouse was not fully functional and the cargo bay doors were constantly open, allowing additional hot air to enter the warehouse. Moreover, GPC still did not have any vacant light duty positions that could accommodate Royal's restrictions as outlined in Dr. Jamison's note. Therefore, because Royal had exhausted all of her STD leave time and was unable to return to her stocker position, GPC's Human Resources Manager, Peggy Rubio, terminated Royal's employment effective June 18, 1999.
Subsequent to being terminated, Royal filed a claim with the EEOC, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race and alleged disability. Moreover, Royal filed the above-captioned action against GPC on September 12, 2000, alleging that the Defendant discharged her in violation of her rights pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Specifically, Royal brought claims of race discrimination based on her discharge from the employ of the Defendant pursuant to Title VII, 28 U.S.C. § 1981, and 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, Royal brought an ADA claim against GPC, alleging that the Defendant discharged her based on the perception that she was disabled, in violation of her rights pursuant to the ADA.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. The Law on Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court should grant a motion for summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citingSkotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quotingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex. Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. Claims Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment in a Title VII discrimination action, a plaintiff first must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. See Shackelford v. Deloitte Touche. L.L.P., 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the employment position; (3) that she was denied employment or terminated from her position; and (4) that she was replaced by someone outside of the protected class or that the defendant treated persons of a different race more favorably than it treated the plaintiff. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then there is a presumption of discrimination and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See id. at 802-04. If such a showing is made, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's proffered explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination. See Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 404 (citing Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff, an African American woman, is a member of a protected class. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a stocker by GPC as of June 18, 1999. Therefore, the Plaintiff clearly satisfies the first and third prongs of the McDonnell Douglas framework for establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. However, with respect to the second and fourth prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test, the parties are in disagreement as to whether or not the Plaintiff satisfies those requirements for proving a prima facie case of discrimination.
After considering the various arguments of the parties with respect to the second and fourth prongs of the McDonnell Douglas framework, this Court finds that the Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. First, the Plaintiff cannot prove that she was qualified for the position of stocker at the time of her termination. As a stocker, the Plaintiff was required to move, lift, and stock auto parts in various areas of the GPC warehouse. These duties require the stocker to be on his or her feet virtually all day and necessitates that the stocker be capable of lifting up to sixty pounds on a regular basis. See Deposition of Peggy Rubio, pages 12-13, 18; Deposition of Renita Royal, page 23. However, at the time of her termination, the Plaintiff was restricted by her physician to performing only "light duties" in an air-conditioned environment. As Peggy Rubio, GPC's Human Resources Manager, explained, because Royal was restricted to performing only "light duties" at the time of her termination, she could not perform at least one of the essential functions of a stocker, that is, lifting and moving auto parts that weighed up to sixty pounds. See Declaration of Peggy Rubio, page 6, ¶ 14.
Royal argues that her employment history with GPC supports the notion that she was qualified for the stocker position. Royal further argues that the fact that she performed her duties as a stocker without accommodation just prior to her termination supports the notion that she was qualified for that position when she was terminated. However, this Court finds that the note from her physician dated June 17, 1999, makes it clear that Royal was not qualified to perform all of the essential functions of a stocker on that date. While Royal did perform the duties of a stocker just prior to her termination, such was done before GPC received the note from Dr. Jamison outlining the restrictions imposed due to Royal's medical condition. Therefore, this Court finds that Royal has failed to come forth with sufficient evidence to support the notion that she was in fact qualified for the stocker position at the time of her termination. Accordingly, this Court finds that Royal cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII.
In addition to being unable to prove that she was qualified for her position as a stocker at the time of her termination, Royal has failed to provide this Court with sufficient evidence to prove the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework, namely that the Defendant treated persons of a different race more favorably than it treated the Plaintiff. At the time of Plaintiff's employment with GPC, the Jefferson facility employed numerous African-Americans. Specifically, of the twenty-four stockers employed by GPC, one half of them were African-American. See Declaration of Peggy Rubio, page 9, ¶ 22. Accordingly, there is no evidence to support the notion that GPC's hiring practices were more favorable to whites than African-Americans.
Nonetheless, Royal argues that GPC was more accommodating to whites than African-Americans with respect to situations in which employees were temporarily unable to perform their typical duties. See Deposition of Renita Royal, page 64-65. Specifically, Royal argues that GPC was more accommodating to whites than African-Americans in providing "light duty" positions to employees who suffered from impairments that precluded then from performing their typical positions. However, the weight of the evidence supports the notion that GPC provided accommodations to both whites and non-whites alike. Specifically, GPC has come forth with evidence showing that at least seven African-American employees were accommodated with "light duty" positions when they experienced medical impairments. See Declaration of Peggy Rubio, page 9 ¶ 23. Furthermore, at the time of the Plaintiff's termination, there were two employees in "light duty" positions due to impairments, one was white and the other was African-American. This evidence supports the notion that GPC's failure to accommodate Royal with a "light duty" position was not racially motivated.
While GPC has presented this Court with specific examples of its equal treatment of whites and non-whites in accommodating employees with temporary impairments, Royal has failed to come forth with anything more than conclusory allegations of racial discrimination on the part of GPC. It is well established in the Fifth Circuit that "an employee's subjective belief of discrimination, however genuine, cannot be the basis of judicial relief." EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Community Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1447 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this Court finds that Royal has failed to prove that GPC treated whites more favorably than African-Americans in providing accommodations to injured employees. Therefore, Royal has failed to prove a prima facie case of race discrimination pursuant to Title VII.
Aside from arguing that Royal cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, GPC argues that even if this Court were to determine that Royal has met her burden under McDonnell Douglas it would still be entitled to summary judgment on Royal's Title VII claim because it can articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her discharge. While it has already been determined that Royal cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination against GPC, this Court, out of an abundance of caution, will address the Plaintiff's arguments that GPC's proffered reason for her discharge is merely a pretext for race discrimination.
In the present case, GPC explains that it discharged Royal because she failed to return to her position as a stocker after exhausting all of her STD leave. Furthermore, GPC could not accommodate Royal with a "light duty" position because there were no such positions available at the time of her termination. See Declaration of Peggy Rubio, page 6, ¶ 15; page 7, ¶ 18. Therefore, because Royal's physician's note indicated that she could not perform all of the essential functions of her position as a stocker, because Royal had utilized all of her STD leave time, and because there were no "light duty" positions available for Royal to fill as of June 17, 1999, GPC made the decision to terminate her employment. This Court is satisfied that such is clearly a legitimate, racially-neutral explanation for Royal's discharge. Therefore, in order to rebut this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging the Plaintiff, Royal must come forth with evidence demonstrating that the articulated reason is merely a pretext for race discrimination. The Defendant argues that this she cannot do.
Royal argues that GPC's reason for her discharge was merely pretextual. In support of this argument, Royal asserts that while GPC insists that she had exhausted all of her STD leave time, such is not the case. Rather, Royal argues that because she reported to work three times during the thirteen week STD leave period, she had not exhausted her full thirteen weeks of STD leave. Royal's last day of work prior to her surgery was Monday, March 15, 1999; therefore, her thirteen weeks of STD leave would have expired on Monday, June 14, 1999, had she been continually absent from work during that period. Although Royal argues that reporting to work on three occasions during the thirteen week period ended her STD leave period, this Court is of the opinion that the three appearances at work during the leave period merely extended the STD period by three days. Consequently, Royal's thirteen-week STD leave actually expired on June 17, 1999. Because Royal was terminated effective June 18, 1999, she had in fact exhausted her thirteen weeks of STD leave at that time. Additionally, as discussed above, Royal merely asserts in a purely conclusory manner that in her opinion GPC treated whites more favorably than African-Americans in providing "light duty" accommodations to injured employees. However, mere conclusory allegations of race discrimination, without more, are insufficient to create an issue of material fact in this case. Accordingly, this Court finds that Royal has failed to prove that GPC's legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for her termination was merely a pretext for race discrimination.
Additionally, the Court notes that in this case, the person responsible for making the decision to terminate Royal, Peggy Rubio, was the same person that made the decision to hire Royal three years earlier. This Court finds such information to be a further indication that there did not exist a racially-based motivation for discharging the Plaintiff. In the Fifth Circuit, courts apply the "same actor" inference in discrimination cases, which is based on the notion that "`claims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational.'" Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991)). Not only does this inference clearly apply in this case, but it further supports the Defendant's proffered non-discriminatory basis for terminating the Plaintiff.
Therefore, with respect to the Plaintiff's race discrimination claim against GPC pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this Court finds that after reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there does not exist a genuine issue of material fact. First, the Court finds that the Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. However, even if she could have established such a case, the Court finds that the Plaintiff cannot successfully rebut the Defendant's racially-neutral explanation for terminating her employment by showing that it was merely a pretext for race discrimination. This Court is of the opinion that a reasonable factfinder could not infer race discrimination in this case, even after viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, GPC's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Royal's Title VII race discrimination claim shall be GRANTED.
C. Race Discrimination Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983:
In addition to asserting a claim of discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against GPC, Royal asserts that she was subjected to involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Royal brought such claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983. With respect to Royal's Thirteenth Amendment claim, it is well-settled that "[w]here an employee has the ability to terminate his employment relationship, a claim of involuntary servitude does not lie under the Thirteenth Amendment." International Union. U.A.W.A.. A.F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 251 (1949). overruled on other grounds by, Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n., 427 U.S. 132 (1976). In the present case, Royal was an at-will-employee who could have terminated her employment with GPC at anytime. Therefore, she failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for alleged violations of her Thirteenth Amendment rights. Furthermore, the Court notes that race discrimination claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims of race discrimination. See Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000). Consequently, it follows that even if a cause of action existed pursuant to Section 1981, the Defendant would still be entitled to summary judgment on that claim for the same reasons articulated above with respect to the Plaintiff's Title VII claim. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Royal's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim shall be GRANTED.
Finally, the Plaintiff asserts a claim of race discrimination against GPC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to maintain a claim under Section 1983, the Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant deprived her of a right secured by the United States Constitution and that the Defendant committed the alleged depravation under color of state law. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49 (1999). Mere private conduct, whether it is discriminatory or not, is not within the realm of protection afforded by the Constitution. See id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948))). Accordingly, the Plaintiff must make a showing of state action to be successful in maintaining an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Royal cannot do. In the present case, the Plaintiff failed to show that any "state action" occurred giving rise to a valid Constitutional claim. The Defendant is a private entity, and as such, the Plaintiff's constitutional claim against the Defendant is without merit. Furthermore, as stated above, because the Plaintiff was an at will employee, she cannot maintain a claim of discrimination pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's constitutional claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot survive. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Royal's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim shall be GRANTED.
D. Discrimination Claims Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act:
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") is designed to remove barriers that prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. In order to establish a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination. See Taylor v. Principal Financial Group. Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 162 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Daigle v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995)). If the Plaintiff cannot present the court with direct evidence of discrimination, then "the indirect method of proof set for Title VII actions in McDonnell Douglas . . . may be utilized." Id.
Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing the following: 1) that he or she suffers from a disability; 2) that he or she was qualified for the job; 3) that he or she was subject to an adverse employment action; and 4) that he or she was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees. See id. If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination, then courts presume discrimination took place and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. If such a showing is made, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination. See Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 404 (citing Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)).
With respect to Royal's ADA claim, the Defendant argues that Royal cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because Royal cannot prove either that she was disabled or that she was qualified for the position of stocker. In order to qualify as an individual with a disability under the ADA, the Plaintiff must show either: 1) that she suffered from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities; 2) that she has a record of such an impairment; or 3) that the Defendant regarded her as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). In the present case, Royal argues that GPC regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limited her ability to work. See Complaint, ¶ 10. The Defendant, however, disagrees, claiming that it did not regard Royal as having a disability as defined in the ADA.
In order to qualify as an individual who is "regarded as disabled" pursuant to the ADA, the Plaintiff must prove one of the following: 1) that she has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities, but was treated by the Defendant as constituting such a limitation; 2) that she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 3) that she has none of the impairments defined above, but was treated by the Defendant as having a substantially limiting impairment. See Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1121 (5th Cir. 1998). In the present case, Royal argues that GPC was aware of her migraine headaches and that GPC believed that said headaches substantially limited a major life activity. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, page 9. Royal argues that GPC was "under the impression that [she] `would be unable to work in any warehouse jobs in light of her restrictions,' which would constitute a broad range of jobs." Id. In sum, Royal contends that she had a physical impairment that did not substantially limit, her major life activities, but that was treated as such by GPC.
GPC, in contrast, first argues that it merely considered Royal's impairment to be temporary in nature, not permanent. Therefore, GPC claims, she was not perceived as disabled under the ADA. GPC cites Royal's doctor's note dated June 17, 1999 as proof that her condition was merely temporary, for not only did the note state that Royal's impairment was merely temporary, but the note indicated that Royal would be able to resume her normal duties after June 28, 1999. GPC further claims that the fact that it hired temporary workers to fill Royal's position during her absence indicates that it regarded Royal's medical condition as temporary, not permanent. This Court finds such evidence convincing. There is nothing in the record to indicate that GPC regarded Royal as being permanently disabled as defined in the ADA.
Furthermore, GPC argues that just because it acknowledged Royal's impairment does not mean that it regarded her as being disabled. In order to show that GPC regarded her as disabled as contemplated by the ADA, Royal would have to prove that GPC regarded her medical condition as substantially limiting one or more of her major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). In this context of performing the life activity of work, "substantially limits" means that the plaintiff's medical condition significantly restricts her "ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the mere "inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1998).
In Sherrod v. American Airlines Inc., supra, the plaintiff suffered a back injury, which she claimed substantially limited the major life activities of lifting and working. See Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1120. The plaintiff in Sherrod attempted to prove a substantial limitation on the life activity of work by producing medical evidence that she was "restricted to lifting forty-five pounds occasionally and twenty pounds frequently." Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, found that the evidence produced by the plaintiff regarding the nature and severity of her injury was insufficient to establish that she was disqualified from performing a broad range or class of jobs. See id. Instead, the court concluded that such evidence only proved that the plaintiff was disqualified from performing the single job of flight attendant. See id.
In Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was discharged after suffering from seizures while on duty as an addiction technician in a hospital substance abuse treatment center. See Deas, 152 F.3d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 1998). Deas sued her former employer under the ADA, claiming that her seizures constituted a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working. See id. at 481. The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed with the plaintiff, finding that the former employer's belief that the plaintiff was "incapable of fulfilling the essential functions of an `addiction technician' in a hospital substance abuse treatment unit" did not establish that the employer "regarded her as being substantially limited in her ability to work in general." Id. The Fifth Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to prove that the former employer regarded the plaintiff "as substantially limited as to anything more than a few, highly specialized jobs." Id. That alone was not enough to establish that the employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled as contemplated by the ADA.
Finally, in Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit upheld a judgment in favor of the plaintiff's former-employer on an ADA claim. See Pryor, 138 F.3d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1998). In Pryor, the plaintiff sued her former employer under the ADA claiming that, among other things, the employer regarded her as having a disability because she suffered from a neck injury that prevented her for performing her job. See id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that even though there was evidence showing that the defendant considered the plaintiff to have a neck injury that limited her ability to perform her particular job, the defendant did not regard her as disabled. The evidence merely showed that there were no jobs available that fit the plaintiff's restrictions at the time of her termination. See id. The Fifth Circuit found that "[t]he jury was entitled to conclude that, even though [the defendant] was aware of [the plaintiffs] medical restrictions and deferred to a doctor's judgment that her position was incompatible with those restrictions, it did not regard her as disabled." Id.
In the present case, this Court first finds that the evidence produced by Royal could not lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that Royal's limitation significantly restricted her ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. The limitations placed on Royal by her physician temporarily required her to perform light duties in an air-conditioned environment. While this limitation precluded Royal from performing a few positions that required heavy lifting in the warehouse, such as her position of stocker, Royal was capable of performing light duty positions in suitably air-conditioned areas of the distribution center. Royal was not restricted in her ability to perform a broad range of jobs; rather, she was incapable of performing merely a few jobs at the GPC facility. Therefore, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to prove that Royal's medical restrictions constituted a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.
Second, this Court finds that GPC's belief that Royal was incapable of performing the essential functions of a stocker does not establish that she was regarded as being substantially limited in her ability to work in general. Just as in the previously-cited cases, the evidence produced by Royal in this case does not support the notion that GPC regarded Royal as disabled such that she was incapable of performing a broad class of jobs. Rather, the evidence presented in this case merely indicates that at the time of Royal's termination there were no jobs available that fit her physician-imposed medical restrictions. Accordingly, this Court finds that Royal cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA because she cannot meet her burden of showing that GPC regarded her as disabled.
In addition to being unable to meet the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Royal cannot meet the second prong of that test because she cannot prove that she was a qualified individual with a disability. In order to be considered a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he or she, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions and requirements of his or her position. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). As discussed earlier in Section IIB, this Court finds that Royal could not perform at least one essential function of her position of stocker because she was limited to performing only light duties at the time of her termination and the stocker position required, among other things, heavy lifting.
Nevertheless, Royal argues that, with reasonable accommodations, she could have performed the essential functions of the stocker position.See Complaint, ¶ 12. With regard to this reasonable accommodation argument, it is well-settled in the Fifth Circuit that "an employer need not provide reasonable accommodation to an employee who does not suffer from a substantially limiting impairment merely because the employer thinks the employee has such an impairment." Newberry v. East Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998). In the present case, Royal sought protection under the ADA's "regarded as" disabled language. While this Court has determined that GPC did not regard Royal as disabled, even if GPC had regarded Royal as disabled, it would still not be required to provide Royal with reasonable accommodations under the ADA.
Furthermore, this Court notes that even though GPC was under no obligation to reasonably accommodate Royal's limitation in this case, it nevertheless attempted to do so by seeking out a light duty position for Royal to fill. However, at the time of her termination, GPC claims that there were no vacant light duty positions for Royal to fill, and Royal has failed to present this Court with sufficient evidence showing that there was in fact a vacant light-duty position available at that time. Since employers are not required to create light duty positions merely to accommodate employees who cannot perform the essential functions of their jobs, GPC made the decision to terminate Royal's employment. See Foreman v. Babcock Wilcox, Inc., 117 F.3d 800, 809 (5th Cir. 2000); Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 620 (5th Cir. 1999). Such a decision was not a violation of the ADA, for in the words of the Fifth Circuit, "[f]or the accommodation of a reassignment to be reasonable, it is clear that a position must first exist and be vacant. Under the ADA, an employer is not required to give what it does not have." Foreman, 174 F.3d at 810. Accordingly, Royal has failed to prove a prima face case of discrimination under the ADA.
Finally, this Court notes that in its Motion for Summary Judgement, GPC has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Royal. However, because it is clear that Royal cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, it is not necessary for this Court to address GPC's explanation for terminating the Plaintiff. Royal has failed to establish both that she suffers from a disability and that she was qualified for her position at the time of her termination; therefore, a presumption of discrimination has not been established that would require the Defendant to come forth with a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its actions.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, this Court finds that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to Royal's race discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Thirteenth Amendment as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983. Therefore, GPC is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those claims. Furthermore, this Court finds that, with respect to Royal's disability discrimination claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, there also exists no genuine issue of material fact, such that GPC is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those claims.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.