Opinion
KNLCV166027757S
04-24-2017
Jonathan Roy et al. v. The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Robert F. Vacchelli, Judge
This case is an action by the plaintiffs, Jonathan and Melissa Roy, alleging that Jonathan Roy was sexually assaulted, hundreds of times, by Father Paul Hebert, now deceased, from about 1990 to 1996, when Jonathan was an altar boy at The Most Holy Trinity Church in Pomfret, Connecticut. In pertinent part, six counts of the complaint are by Jonathan against the defendants, The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation a/k/a The Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, Bishop Daniel Reilly and The Most Holy Trinity Church alleging negligence, recklessness and breach of fiduciary duty. Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss by the defendants arguing that several specific allegations should be dismissed because they involve matters of religious doctrine and church governance, and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such matters under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, under article first, § 3 of the Connecticut Constitution and under General Statutes § 52-571b. This is sometimes called the ministerial exception to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to the claims in the following paragraphs: Count One, para. 16(g), Count Three, para. 16(g) and Count Four, para. 14(g); Count One, para. 16(h), Count Three, para. 16(h) and Count Four, para. 14(h); and Count One, para. 19, Count Two, para. 19 Count Three, para. 24 and Count Four, para. 17, Count Five, para. 17, and Count Six, para. 20. Otherwise, the motion is denied.
Although the defendants assert rights under the federal and state constitutions and a state statute, their brief only discusses and analyzes the federal constitutional principles. Accordingly, this court only needs to address the federal constitutional principles involved. See Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, 120 Conn.App. 666, 668 n.3, 994 A.2d 212., 120 Conn.App. 666, 994 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d 74 (2010).
I
" A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) R.C. Equity Group, LLC v. Zoning Commission of Borough of Newtown, 285 Conn. 240, 248, 939 A.2d 1122 (2008).
" Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 701, 945 A.2d 927 (2008). Where the ministerial exception is applicable, the case may be dismissed on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 649, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886, 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007).
" [I]n ruling [on] whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader[.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 290, 933 A.2d 256 (2007). " [I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 79, 951 A.2d 514 (2008).
II
The specific allegations in issue are as follows:
Count One, para. 16(g), Count Three, para. 16(g) and Count Four, para. 14(g), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants " failed to adequately evaluate the mental fitness of the Father Paul Hebert, to serve in the capacity of a Catholic priest with its related responsibilities to parishioners, Catholic faithful, and others";
Count One, para. 16(h), Count Three, para. 16(h) and Count Four, para. 14(h), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants " failed to periodically evaluate the mental fitness of the Father Paul Hebert, to continue to serve in his capacity as a Catholic priest";
Count One, para. 16(i), Count Three, para. 16(i) and Count Four, para. 14(i), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants " failed to adequately supervise the Father Paul Hebert, in his interaction with and conduct toward parishioners and, in particular, minor parishioners";
Count One, para. 16(l), Count Three, para. 16(l) and Count Four, para. 14(l), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants " failed to provide training and/or educational programs to the Father Paul Hebert, to inform him of proper conduct toward parishioners, especially minor parishioners";
Count One, para. 16(r), Count Two, para. 16(e), Count Three, para. 16(r), Count Four, para. 14(r) and Count Five, para. 14(e), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants failed or refused " to protect the children of the Catholic faithful, such as the Plaintiff, from sexual abuse, sexual exploitation and sexual assault by the agents, apparent agents, servants or employees of the Defendants after inducing them to entrust their children's moral and spiritual well-being, and safety to priests";
Count One, para. 16(t), Count Two, para. 16(h), Count Three, para. 16(t), Count Four, para. 14(t) and Count Five, para. 14(h), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants failed or refused " to develop and implement a program or policy to protect children within the Defendant Diocese, from the harm associated with pedophile priests, such as by developing information handouts, giving talks and seminars, and conducting educational events addressing the issue of improper sexual conduct by adults in general and priests in particular";
Count One, para. 16(u), Count Two, para. 16(i), Count Three, para. 16(u), Count Four, para. 14(u) and Count Five, para. 14(i), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants failed or refused " to establish, maintain and enforce a policy of reporting, investigating and pursuing members of its clergy engaged in sexual misconduct, including failing to develop and adhere to a policy encouraging the dissemination of information regarding sexual misconduct of priests with children, but rather adhering to a policy of failing to disseminate such information";
Count One, para. 16(x), Count Two, para. 16(m), Count Three, para. 16(x), Count Four, para. 14(x) and Count Five, para. 14(m), which allege that the plaintiff sustained injuries because the defendants failed or refused " to police activities of priests and in particular, the Father Paul Hebert, upon premises it owned and controlled, including failing to provide or enforce a prohibition on clergy having children in bedrooms or private residences and on non-chaperoned trips";
Count One, para. 19, Count Two, para. 19 Count Three, para. 24 and Count Four, para. 17, Count Five, para. 17, and Count Six, para. 20, which allege that as a further result of the defendant's negligence, recklessness or breach of fiduciary duty " the Plaintiff, who was baptized and was a devout and practicing Catholic, has suffered emotional and spiritual loss, substantially affecting his belief in his faith."
III
The ministerial exception invokes protections against state entanglement in religious affairs embodied in the first amendment to the United States constitution. The first amendment provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .U.S. Const., amend. I.
The religious freedoms declared in the first amendment apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). The first amendment established a fundamental and familiar legal " wall of separation between Church and State" in this nation. Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State of Connecticut, 183 Conn. 552, 558-59, 441 A.2d 16 (1981). One of the oldest bulwarks is the rule that civil courts must refrain from adjudicating church disputes that require extensive inquiry into matters of " ecclesiastical rule, custom or law." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall (80 U.S.) 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872) (dispute over control of a church). Thus, in the seminal case of Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited court interference with a church's suspension, removal and defrocking of a Bishop--despite the fact that a lower court had found that disciplinary action to be arbitrary--noting:
[C]ivil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that sense " arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the first amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 713.
Thus, Connecticut courts have prohibited adjudication of particular claims or defenses in employment cases if it would require the court to intrude into a religious institution's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization. See Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 784, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011); Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, 120 Conn.App. 666, 671-75, 994 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d 74 (2010). Similarly, in other cases, the ministerial exception has been applied to bar tort actions where resolution of the case would require review and interpretation of church norms. See, e.g., DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn.App. 865, 878-80, 829 A.2d 38, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 805 (2003), motion denied, 541 U.S. 985, 124 S.Ct. 2059, 158 L.Ed.2d 489 (2004) (church member's negligent infliction of emotional distress claims denied).
The constitution, however, does not immunize every church action from juridical review. " [N]ot every civil court decision . . . jeopardizes values protected by the [f]irst [a]mendment." Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, supra, 393 U.S. at 449. " [C]hurches, their congregations and hierarchy exist and function within the civil community . . . [and] it is acknowledged that they are as amenable as other societal entities to rules governing property rights, torts and criminal conduct." Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1170, 258 Cal.Rptr. 757, review denied, (August 10, 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1135, 107 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1990), citing Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. 732-33. If a court can resolve the dispute by applying only neutral principles of law, however, judicial review may be permissible. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (applying neutral principles of law analysis to church property dispute); New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272, 281, 438 A.2d 62 (1980) (" [i]t is now well established that state judicial intervention is justified when it can be accomplished by resort to neutral principles of law . . . that eschew consideration of doctrinal matters such as the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith"); see also D. Wiesen, " Following the Lead of Defamation: A Definitional Balancing Approach to Religious Torts, " 105 Yale L.J. 291 (1995).Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, supra, 120 Conn.App. 666, 673-74.
Employing these principles, several Superior Court Judges have dismissed certain paragraphs from complaints found to impermissibly require the court to consider and decide disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice. See, e.g., Givens v. St. Adalbert Church, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Doc. No. CV 12-6032459 (July 25, 2013, Sheridan, J.) 56 Conn.L.Rptr. 585, ; Mallory v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Doc. No. X10 CV 07-5007645, (February 24, 2009, Scholl, J.); Cerninka v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Doc. No. X10 CV 08-50008855, (February 24, 2009, Scholl, J.); Noll v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Doc. No. X04 CV 02-4034702 (October 20, 2008, Shapiro, J.) 46 Conn.L.Rptr. 527, .
Based on this precedent and comparing the claims in issue in the instant case with the decisions of other courts faced with similar claims, this court finds that the following paragraphs are barred by the ministerial exception: Count One, para. 16(g), Count Three, para. 16(g) and Count Four, para. 14(g); Count One, para. 16(h), Count Three, para. 16(h) and Count Four, para. 14(h); and Count One, para. 19, Count Two, para. 19 Count Three, para. 24 and Count Four, para. 17, Count Five, para. 17, and Count Six, para. 20. Litigation of those claims would impermissibly entangle the court in matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. Disputes over the rest and remainder can be resolved by applying only neutral principles of law.
IV
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to the claims in the following paragraphs: Count One, para. 16(g), Count Three, para. 16(g) and Count Four, para. 14(g); Count One, para. 16(h), Count Three, para. 16(h) and Count Four, para. 14(h); and Count One, para. 19, Count Two, para. 19 Count Three, para. 24 and Count Four, para. 17, Count Five, para. 17, and Count Six, para. 20. Otherwise, the motion is denied.