Summary
affirming the trial court decision to strike a judgment in a contract action as void because the contract violated provisions of the MVSFA
Summary of this case from Nawrocki v. Faulkner Ciocca Ford of SoudertonOpinion
September 30, 1955.
January 17, 1956.
Motor vehicles — Installment sales — Contracts — Provisions — Terms partially blank — Illegal contract — Striking off judgment — Judgment void on face — Motor Vehicle Financing Act.
1. Section 14 of the Motor Vehicle Financing Act of June 28, 1947, P.L. 1110, provides that an installment sale contract for a motor vehicle must contain the cash price, down payment, the trade-in value, if any, cash balance, insurance costs, finance charges, amount and time of installments, and several other items.
2. Where it appeared that an installment sale contract for an automobile contained only the cash price and the amount and time of the monthly installments and that the spaces for the other information required by law were blank, it was Held that the contract was illegal and that judgment entered on it was properly stricken off.
3. Where refusal to enforce or to rescind an illegal bargain will produce a harmful effect on parties for whose protection the law making the bargain illegal exists, enforcement or rescission, whichever is appropriate, is allowed.
4. The Motor Vehicle Financing Act was enacted for the protection of the purchaser of automobiles against the unscrupulous practices of some motor vehicle dealers.
5. The court may of its own motion strike a judgment void on its face.
Before RHODES, P.J., HIRT, ROSS, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, and ERVIN, JJ.
Appeal, No. 247, Oct. T., 1955, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia County, Dec. T., 1951, No. 4326, in case of Roxy Auto Co. v. Ethyle E. Moore. Judgment affirmed.
Proceeding upon petition of defendant and rules to show cause why judgment entered by confession upon a bailment lease should not be stricken off or opened.
Order entered discharging rule to open judgment but making absolute rule to strike off judgment, opinion by FLOOD, J. Plaintiff appealed.
Morton S. Gorelick, with him Sylvan C. Balder, and Blanc, Steinberg, Balder Steinbrook, for appellant.
Samuel Melnick, for appellee.
ROSS, J., dissented.
Argued September 30, 1955.
Judgment was entered against defendant upon an instalment sale contract for an automobile which she purchased from plaintiff. Defendant had executed two contracts for this purchase, one to a credit agency which was financing part of the sale price, and the other to plaintiff for the balance. Defendant paid the first contract in full and received the certificate of title to the automobile. Plaintiff then entered judgment on the second contract. Defendant filed a petition to open judgment and a petition to strike the judgment. The court below, after depositions were taken, discharged the rule to open, but made absolute the rule to strike, and plaintiff has appealed.
The court below held that the judgment was void on its face because it was in violation of the Motor Vehicle Financing Act of June 28, 1947, P. L. 1110, 69 PS 601 et seq. Section 14 of that Act, 69 PS 614, provides that an instalment sale contract for a motor vehicle must contain the cash price, down payment, the trade-in value, if any, cash balance, insurance costs, finance charges, amount and time of instalments, and several other items. This contract contains only the cash price and the amount and time of the monthly instalments. The spaces for the other information required by law are blank. It is patent, therefore, that the contract is not in compliance with the law. The court below invoked the rule of law that "if refusal to enforce or to rescind an illegal bargain would produce a harmful effect on parties for whose protection the law making the bargain illegal exists, enforcement or rescission, whichever is appropriate, is allowed." Holst v. Butler, 379 Pa. 124, 131, 108 A.2d 740. Phila. v. Rosin's Parking Lots, Inc., 358 Pa. 174, 56 A.2d 207. The Motor Vehicle Financing Act was enacted for the protection of the purchaser of automobiles against the unscrupulous practices of some motor vehicle dealers, so that defendant falls within the category of persons in whose favor the above rule of law may be invoked. Although defendant's petition did not specifically allege the Act as the basis for striking the judgment, the court may of its own motion strike a judgment void on its face. Loprete v. Langcliffe Collieries, Inc., 67 Pa. D. C. 438.
Judgment affirmed.
ROSS, J., dissents.