Opinion
No. 128514
July 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Facts
The plaintiffs, Christine Roesler, individually, and Christine Roesler, in her capacity as executrix, of the estate of her husband Steven Roesler1 bring this action against the defendants Louis H. Reich, M.D. and Louis H. Reich, M.D.P.C., d/b/a Louis H. Reich, M.D.P.C. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of the defendants' failure to diagnose, medicate and/or hospitalize their patient William Adamson, the defendants enabled Adamson to fatally wound the plaintiff's husband
Hereinafter all references to Christine Roesler in her representative and individual capacities shall be in the singular, the plaintiff.
In count one of a three-count complaint, the plaintiff, in her capacity as executrix of Steven Roesler's estate, alleges, inter alia, that Reich, a psychiatric physician, had Adamson under his care for a considerable period of time prior to Dec. 5, 2001, that Adamson had stated multiple times that he "presented a danger to others" and was "experiencing harmful and dangerous thoughts," and that Adamson killed the plaintiff's decedent with a revolver on Dec. 5, 2001. The plaintiff further alleges that the events of Dec. 5, 2001, were due to the defendants' failure to exercise the degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by psychiatrists by failing to: 1) perform or recommend adequate and proper diagnostic, and psychiatric testing to Adamson's anger and impulse control prior to releasing him from treatment, 2) adequately prescribe medication and encourage Adamson to take the medication, or have Adamson committed as a danger to himself and others if he was not taking medication, 3) hospitalize Adamson when it was required under the circumstances, 4) properly and adequately assess the dangers posed by Adamson to others, including plaintiffs' decedent, 5) have Adamson dispose of the firearm in his possession.
In count two, the plaintiff, in her capacity as executrix of the estate of Steven Roesler, incorporates the allegations of count one and further alleges that the business entity of Louis H. Reich, M.D.P.C., d/b/a/ Louis H. Reich M.D. is responsible for the negligence of Louis H. Reich CT Page 9515-b M.D., via the doctrine of respondeat superior.
In count three, the plaintiff, individually, claims loss of spousal consortium as a result of the defendants' negligence. The plaintiffs seek damages and equitable relief.
On Jan. 28, 2004, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's entire complaint on the grounds that: 1) The complaint fails to state a legal cause of action because the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiff; 2) the plaintiff has pleaded a medical malpractice action absent a physician-patient relationship; and 3) the defendants owed no duty to disclose confidential medical information in the absence of an identifiable victim. As required by Practice Book § 10-42, the defendants have filed a memorandum of law in opposition. On April 7, 2004, the defendants filed a reply to plaintiff's objection to the defendants' motion to strike.
Discussion
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is `to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
The plaintiff alleges in count one of her complaint that the defendants' failure to exercise the degree, care and skill ordinarily exercised by psychiatrists resulted in the decedent's death at the hands of the defendants' patient. The defendants move to strike this count on the ground that no legal duty exists between the decedent and the defendants, and thus, the complaint fails to state a legal cause of action. The defendants further argue that the plaintiff's claim for medical malpractice cannot stand because no physician-client relationship exists between the decedent and the defendants. The defendants also argue they owed no duty to disclose confidential medical information in the absence of an identifiable potential victim. CT Page 9515-c
In count one, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants' negligence in failing to exercise the degree, care and skill ordinarily exercised by psychiatrists resulted in the death of the plaintiff's decedent at the hands of Adamson. The defendants move to strike the plaintiff's complaint and argue more specifically regarding count one that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff's decedent, a third party. They further argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege that the plaintiff's decedent was part of a class of identifiable victims or within the zone of risk to an identifiable victim.
The plaintiff argues in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike that the claim for medical malpractice in count one should stand because the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff's decedent since it was foreseeable that the plaintiff's decedent was an identifiable victim and the defendants knew of dangerous propensities of their patient.
"The essential elements for a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation and actual injury . . . Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact and [is] imperative to a negligence cause of action . . . Thus, [t]here can be no actionable negligence . . . unless there exists a cognizable duty of care." Murdock v. Croughwell, 268 Conn. 559, 566, 848 A.2d 363 (2004).
In Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625, 630, 674 A.2d 811 (1996), the Supreme Court, in the context of a certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, considered the narrow question of "whether a psychotherapist has a duty to exercise control to prevent an outpatient, who was not known to have been dangerous, from inflicting bodily harm on a victim who was neither readily identifiable nor within a foreseeable class of victims." The facts in Fraser are similar to the facts in the present case, and the court's holding addresses a question central to the resolution of the motion to strike now before the court.
In Fraser, a psychiatric outpatient killed the plaintiff's decedent. The plaintiff, the executrix of the decedent's estate, brought an action in federal court alleging negligence against the defendant medical center for their failure to warn others of their patient's violent propensities and their failure to control the patient to protect others. The district court granted the medical center's motion for summary judgment finding that the medical center owed no duty to the plaintiff's decedent. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the medical center owed no duty to warn, but certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question raised by the plaintiff's alternate cause of action premised on a breach CT Page 9515-d of the duty to control. Id., 627.
The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and held that "in the circumstances of this case, the medical center owed no duty to control Doe [the medical center's patient] so as to prevent Doe's attack on Fraser. The medical center neither knew nor had reason to know that Doe would attack Fraser because Fraser was not an identifiable victim, a member of a class of identifiable victims or within the zone of risk to an identifiable victim." Id., 637. The court noted that its decision was premised on the factual circumstances found to exist in the relevant federal court decision, that is, "that the record demonstrated the absence of any objective indicia of [Doe's] propensity to cause harm." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 631.
The Fraser court also explained that it reached its conclusion that the medical center psychotherapists had no duty to exercise control over Doe to prevent him from assaulting Fraser for the following reasons: "1) our decisions defining negligence do not impose a duty to those who are not identifiable victims; (2) in related areas of our common law, we have concluded that there is no duty except to identifiable persons; (3) policy reasons inherent in the psychotherapeutic relationship and in the due process rights of mental patients counsel against imposing expansive duties to exercise control over such patients; and (4) courts in other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly declined to extend any duty to control to encompass harm to unidentifiable third persons." Id., 632.
In the present case, even if the allegations of the first count are construed in the plaintiff's favor, as they must be; see Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra; the plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show the plaintiff's decedent to be an identifiable victim, a member of a class of identifiable victims or within the zone of risk to an identifiable victim. While the plaintiff has alleged in count one that Adamson "stated at various and multiple times that he [Adamson] presented a danger to others and that he was experiencing harmful and dangerous thoughts," these facts are not sufficient to qualify as "objective indica" of a person's propensity to cause harm, as discussed in Fraser. The plaintiff has therefore failed to plead a factual predicate for a duty to warn or a duty to control, and absent a duty there can be no actionable negligence. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike count one is granted.
In count two the plaintiff alleges that "[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior and/or master servant, the Defendant, Louis H. Reich, M.D., P.C., is responsible for the negligence of its employee and/or agent Louis H. Reich, M.D." "[W]here the liability of a principal CT Page 9515-e for a tort committed by his agent is predicated solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a valid release of either operates to release the other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuhna v. Colon, 260 Conn. 15, 19, 792 A.2d 832 (2002). Though the present case does not involve a release, the principle enunciated in Cuhna applies here. If the first count is legally insufficient because it does not allege a duty, the claim pursuant to respondeat superior is insufficient for the same reason. The defendants' motion to strike two is therefore granted.
In count three the plaintiff asserts a claim in her individual capacity for loss of consortium. As noted by the Supreme Court in Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 556, 562 A.2d 1100 (2002), a claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim "dependent upon the legal existence of [a] predicate action . . ." In the present case, the court has granted the defendants' motion to strike count one thereby removing the predicate action for count three. The defendants' motion to strike count three is therefore granted.
For all of the reasons outlined above, the defendants' motion to strike all counts of the plaintiff's complaint is hereby granted.
D. Michael Hurley Judge Trial Referee