Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-0882 SECTION "N"
April 30, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
This matter is before the Court for a determination of what law governs the plaintiffs claims, considering the stipulated facts set forth in the Joint Pretrial Order. Plaintiff David Robinson ("Robinson") and defendant manufacturer American Marine Holdings, Inc. ("American Marine") filed pre-trial memoranda of law addressing the issue of the governing substantive law. The matter was deemed submitted for decision without oral argument. For the following reasons, American Marine's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Robinson's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Court finds that Louisiana law governs the plaintiffs claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robinson, a Louisiana resident, seeks recission of the sale of a fishing vessel due to the alleged redhibitory defects, vices and negligent construction, contending that his new 2000 model Donzi 3250 Express Fish pleasure boat is and was unfit for its intended purpose at all pertinent times. Robinson purchased the pleasure craft, manufactured by Donzi, a division of American Marine, for the price of $150,630.00. Defendant American Marine is a Delaware corporation, doing business in this parish and state, with a principal place of business of Homosassa, Florida. The only other party to these proceedings is the defendant New Hampshire Insurance Company ("New Hampshire"), which at all pertinent times had in effect a policy of commercial general liability insurance issued to American Marine and delivered to it in the state of Florida. None of the parties to this proceeding are either Alabama residents or domiciliaries. The only connection that the state of Alabama has with respect to the subject mailer of these proceedings is that it is the location of the actual sale of the Donzi pleasure craft to the plaintiff, and some of the warranty work performed on the vessel after the sale occurred in Alabama.
See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Applying Louisiana Law to Plaintiff's Case, at p. 1; and Joint Pre-Trial Order at p. 7.
See Joint Pre-Trial Order, at Section 7 Single Listing of All Uncontested Material Facts, at item 1, p. 10.
See Joint Pre-Trial Order, Section 3 — Description of the Parties, atp. 2 (emphasis on the word FLORIDA added).
New Hampshire is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business in Florida.
See Joint Pre-Trial Order, Section 6 — Brief Summary of Material Facts Claimed by Defendant New Hampshire Insurance Company
Plaintiff learned about the boat from a marketing campaign but was unable to locate a dealer in Louisiana that carried the Donzi model. Former Donzi representatives in New Orleans placed Robinson in contact with other retailers, who directed him to Sportsman's Marine, a retailer located in Fairhope, Alabama. From his home in Louisiana, Robinson contacted the retailer in Alabama via telephone. Plaintiff was put in contact with Ken White, a Sales Representative of Donzi/American Marine, and discussed and/or negotiated availability, options, trailer, production and delivery dates with respect to his purchase of the 3250 XF fishing boat.
See Joint Pre-Trial Order, Section 7 — Single Listing of Undisputed Material Facts, item 5. This paragraph does not stipulate that American Holdings has no authorized dealers in Louisiana. Rather the fair import of that stipulation is that no Louisiana dealerships carry the Donzi model. The Court notes that Section 3 of the Pre-Trial order states that American Marine "does business in this parish and state." Id.
See Joint Pre-Trial Order, Section 7, item 2.
Although Donzi vehemently disputes that it had any idea that the pleasure craft with trailer package ordered by the plaintiff was destined for Louisiana, the "cold" record before this Court does not support the defendant's contention in that vein. Defendants do not dispute that all negotiations preceding the delivery/sale in Alabama were conducted via telephone with the plaintiff at his home in Louisiana. Indeed, the parties stipulate that the plaintiff did not travel out of the state of Louisiana in connection with his purchase of the pleasure craft until its construction was complete and the vessel was ready for delivery. after the parties agreed to the terms of the sale in December 1999, a purchase order was faxed to Robinson's home in Kenner, Louisiana. Robinson executed the purchase order in Kenner, Louisiana, and sent the executed form purchase order, along with a $5,000.00 deposit, to the retailer approximately ten weeks prior to sale and delivery of the boat. As time for delivery of the boat drew nigh, Robinson dealt directly via telephone from his home in Louisiana with Chris Woodruff ("Woodruff") of Donzi in Florida. Woodruffof Donzi contacted Robinson directly in New Orleans to explain that production of the plaintiffs boat was delayed due to legal proceedings/orders regarding the production of two other boats, which then had to be accomplished before the plaintiffs order.
See id. at item 3.
See Pre-Trial Order, Section 7, at item 3, 8.
See Deposition of David Robinson, at pp. 118.
Id., at pp. 121-122.
When the boat was ready for delivery on March 6, 2000, Robinson traveled to Alabama, tendered the balance owed on the $150,000.00 fishing/pleasure boat, and then trailored the pleasure craft back to Louisiana, via Orange Beach, Alabama. On one other occasion the plaintiff utilized the vessel in Destin, Florida. Otherwise, when operable or not shipped off for warranty work, the vessel plied Louisiana waters and/or sat dormant in Robinson's driveway in Kenner, Louisiana.
See Pre-Trial Order, Section 7, item 11-12. ("The boat was subsequently delivered to Sportsman's Marine's Facility in Fairhope, Alabama, on March 6, 2000. Also on March 6, 2000, Mr. Robinson went to Sportsman's Marine in Fairhope, Alabama, paid the balance owed on the purchase price to Sportsman's Marine, and accepted delivery of the boat and trailer.").
Warranty work was performed on the subject pleasure craft and trailer in Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida. Plaintiff brought the boat to both P S Diesel and Bent Marine in Louisiana for warranty repairs. Bayou Marine Electronics, Inc. on Paris Road in Chalmette, Louisiana also performed warranty work on the plaintiffs Donzi. Warranty work was also performed by Sportsman's Marine in Fairhope, Alabama. Sportsman's Marine arranged for some warranty work to be performed by Cline's Marine in Mobile, Alabama.
See Pre-Trial Order, Section 7, at item 4; see also American Holding's Exhibit 9.
American Holdings' Exhibit 5.
American Holdings' Exhibits 3, 4, 6, and 8.
American Holdings' Exhibit 7.
II. ANALYSIS: Choice of Law
As previously discussed in this Court's prior order denying American Marine's motion for summary judgment, traditional concepts of admiralty law do not suggest or justify treating the plaintiffs frustrating experiences with his allegedly defective fishing boat on and off the trailer as a maritime tort. American Marine does not now claim in the twilight of pre-trial proceedings that maritime law substantively governs the claims of the plaintiff. There is no alleged putative tort committed on navigable water. This case, by and large, concerns plaintiffs suit for recission on account of redhibitory defects in a newly-constructed pleasure/fishing boat and its trailer. Plaintiff seeks recission of the sale, return of the purchase price, attorney's fees, costs, and damages for mental anguish, aggravation, and de minimis physical injury. The entire thrust of the plaintiffs suit is that due to alleged defects in the boat's construction (negligent construction) and the manufacturer's inability to repair the defects, it sits on its trailer in his driveway in Kenner, Louisiana unable to be used for its intended purpose. Suffice it to say, and as explained in this Court's prior order, the incidents complained of can not be seen as falling "within the class of incidents that pose more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping."
See Minute Entry Order dated March 19, 2002 (citing Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 115 S.Ct. 1043, 1049 (1995) [Rec. Doc. No. 34].
In diversity cases, federal courts are obliged to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Accordingly, Louisiana's choice of law rules dictate whether the substantive law of Louisiana or another state applies to Robinson's claims. Although Louisiana choice of law provisions distinguish between contractual claims and those classified as delictual or quasidelictual, Louisiana courts use the same analysis to determine the appropriate substantive law. Both articles require that courts assess which state's "policies would be most seriously impaired if its laws were not applied to that issue" and both articles direct the courts to evaluate the "strength and pertinence of the relevant [state] policies in light of . . . the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties." See La.Civ. Code art. 3542 (delictual actions); and La.Civ. Code art. 3537 (conventional obligations).
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-22 (1941); Marchesani v. Pellerin-Milnor Corp., 269 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2001); and Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2000);
Louisiana Civil Code 3537 sets forth the general choice of law approach for conventional obligations, or contracts, and provides that an issue of conventional obligations is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue. To determine what state's law applies, the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the states are evaluated in light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction, including the place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile, habitual residence, or business of the parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of the contract; and (3) the policies referred to in article 3515, as well as the policies of facilitating the orderly planning of transactions, of promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and of protecting one party from undue imposition by the other.
Louisiana article 3542 sets forth the general choice of law approach for tort and delictual actions, and provides that an issue of delictual and quasi-delictual obligations is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue. That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the involved states in light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the events giving rise to the dispute, including the place of conduct or injury, the domicile, habitual residence, or business of the parties, and the state in which the relationship, if any, between the parties was centered; (2) the policies referred to in article 3515, as well as the policies of deterring wrongful conduct and of repairing the consequences of injurious acts.
The choice of law currently employed in Louisiana follows a two step procedure. First, the court must utilize a "governmental interest analysis" to determine whether a false or true conflict of laws exists. If there is no true conflict, the court then applies the law of the interested forum. If there is a conflict, the court proceeds to the second step and employs the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test to determine the applicable law. Specifically, with regard to contracts, the Louisiana Code instructs courts to assess the relative strength of the relevant policies of the involved states in light of the place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract as well as the location of the object of the contract.
See Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that Louisiana courts follow choice of law rules substantially similar to those in the Second Restatement).
See Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 1999); and Duhon v. Union Pacfic Resources Company, 43 F.3d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1995).
It is surprising, therefore, that the briefs submitted by the parties are completely barren of references to Florida law. Not a single Florida case is cited. Additionally, there is absolutely no discussion directly addressing state policies and whether the comparison of Louisiana and Alabama law presents this Court with what has been termed a true or a false conflict.
A false conflict exists when one state has a legitimate interest in the application of its law to resolve the issue. A true conflict exists when each state has such an interest. To determine whether a state has a legitimate interest in requiring that its laws be applied, one must examine whether "the state's relationship to the dispute is within the scope of the state's policy." If there is a false conflict, one must apply the law of the state with the interest. If there is a true conflict or an unprovided for case in the interest analysis principle, a situation where neither state has an interest, then one must look to the Second Restatement.
Peavey Company v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168, 1171 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Sandefer Oil Gas v. AIG Rig of Texas, Inc., 846 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Company, 276 So.2d 309, 311 (La. 1973) (A false conflict "occurs when it is found that only a single state has an interest in the application of its law, and that the other state has no interest in the application of its law in the case.").
The Second Restatement's "interest analysis" test focuses on the state's contacts with the issues, noting the following contacts as most relevant, to wit: (a) the place of contracting; (b) the place of negotiation of the contract; (c) the place of performance; (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. "Louisiana follows similar comparative choice of law principles to those in the restatement."
See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971).
Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2000)
In this case, American Marine and New Hampshire are neither Alabama corporations nor domiciliaries. Each defendant has a principle place of business in Florida, and is incorporated in a state other than Alabama: American Marine and New Hampshire are incorporated in the states of Delaware and Pennsylvania, respectively. The plaintiff Robinson is a Louisiana resident. Other than the facts that (1) some of the warranty work was performed in Alabama, and (2) that the sale was perfected by payment of the balance of the purchase price and delivery of the pleasure craft in Alabama, that state has no connection with the subject matter of plaintiffs claims. The parties to the instant proceedings include not one Alabama resident or entity. The parties have identified no significant interest that Alabama may have in protecting a non-resident manufacturer's limited warranty and/or denying a non-resident plaintiff his requested remedies. Any legal effect given to the construction of that limited warranty impacts a non-resident consumer and a foreign manufacturer. It is noteworthy that the subject warranty specifically provides that "the selling dealer [i.e., Sportsman's Marine] is not a co-warrantor." The Alabama retailer is not a party to this lawsuit. Moreover, the warranty language itself expressly envisions the consumer purchaser having rights in addition to those stated in its limited warranty, which may vary from state to state.
See Donzi Marine Limited Warranty [American Marine Exhibit 2].
See id. ("This Limited Warranty Gives Purchaser Specific Legal Rights. Purchaser May Have Other Rights Which May Vary From State To State.").
The abbreviated analysis that the defendant American Marine again proposes is unacceptable under Louisiana's choice of law principles, where such a determination is a function of the individual defendants, the plaintiff and the circumstances of the claim. What is required is a comparative analysis of Louisiana law and the law and the policies of each state with which the claim has contacts. Indeed, Louisiana choice of law analysis requires consideration of more factors than merely the location of the actual sale. It requires consideration of whether the foreign law sought to be applied will benefit the interests it was designed to protect. The Court here notes that no party submits that there was any negotiation between the parties regarding the warranties of the manufacturer. All acts and decisions made by American Marine which may be found to constitute either breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligent construction or otherwise, occurred in Florida. Therefore, it cannot be said that Alabama has the most intimate contacts with the facts of the plaintiffs claims. Instead, the facts in dispute insofar as the defendant manufacturer is concerned all center around Florida, where the defendant American Marine made its decisions regarding both the formation of and the alleged breach of any applicable warranties.
As to the defendant New Hampshire, where a Louisiana interest is implicated, Louisiana courts, both state and federal, have consistently applied Louisiana law to effectuate coverage. Louisiana courts have held that Louisiana's interest in protecting Louisiana plaintiffs, Louisiana insured resident tortfeasors, and the general public outweigh a foreign state's interest in protecting its insurance rates.
Willett v. National Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 594 So.2d 966, 969-970 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1992); Francis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 581 So.2d 1036, 1042 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1991); Champion v. Panel Era Mfg. Co., 410 So.2d 1230, 1237 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 414 So.2d 389 (La. 1982); Sutton v. Langley, 330 So.2d 321, 328 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1976) (The foreign state's interest in protecting insurance rates "is minimal when one is dealing with a standard form insurance contract written by an insurer who does business in several, if not all states.").
The recent Fifth Circuit decision in Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2000), is consistent with the conclusion reached in this memorandum opinion on the non-applicability of Alabama law to the elements of the plaintiffs causes of action. Although the Glock decision was decided under Texas choice of law principles, the Fifth Circuit observed that Texas courts use the ALI Restatement's "most significant relationship test" for all choice of law cases except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause." The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that "Louisiana follows similar comparative choice of law principles to those in the Restatement." Glock was a case brought in Texas based upon a design defect in Glock firearms causing them to jam. The guns were designed, and their parts manufactured, in Austria. The parts were shipped to a subsidiary which assembled and serviced them in Georgia, and in turn sent them to distributors all over the United States where they were sold to residents of the various states. The district court certified a national class, ruling that Georgia law would be applied under the Texas conflict rules. Relying on the ALL Restatement, the Fifth Circuit found that Georgia did not have the "most significant relationship" to the dispute in view of the Austrian connection. The Glock court held that the district court's failure to compare Georgia's contacts and the state policies to those contacts with the other interested jurisdictions was error. The Fifth Circuit observed:
Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 310 n. 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 312.
[T]he place of injury was not Georgia, but the place of purchase. The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred is more likely to be Austria than Georgia, at least for the non-fraud claims. Also, the class members are domiciled and likely bought their guns in different states and the District of Columbia. All these 51 relevant jurisdictions are likely to be interested in ensuring their consumers are adequately compensated in cases of economic loss, but many will have different conceptions of what adequate compensation is. Georgia's laws may not provide sufficient consumer protection in the view of other states. Indeed, as the home state of the assembler/distributor, Georgia's policies might tend to favor those interests over consumers.'
Glock, 227 at 313-314.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Walmart, 2000 WL 38844 (E.D.La. 2000), Judge Feldman applied the Louisiana choice of law interest analysis and determined that Louisiana law applied to the plaintiffs' suit filed under Louisiana's redhibition laws and under Louisiana's Products Liability Act. The plaintiffs also sought damages for emotional distress. The plaintiffs, Scott and Shondi Mulkey, bought a power strip made by One Ten Corporation from a Wal-Mart in Oklahoma in 1990. On July 2, 1997, a fire allegedly caused by the power strip damaged the Mulkeys' residence and caused their emotional distress. The district court determined that Louisiana law governed the plaintiffs claims. The Mulkeys filed suit against Wal-Mart, One Ten Corporation, and Power Sentry.
Allstate Insurance Company v. Walmart, 2000 WL 38844 (E.D.La. 2000).
Judge Feldman distinguished R-Square Investments v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 1997 WL 436245 (E.D. La.), noting that in contrast to the R-Square, the case before the court implicated damages other than to just the product itself. Power Sentry argued that Minnesota law governed the plaintiffs' claims because One Ten's assets were in Minnesota, and Power Sentry negotiated and performed the contract to buy the assets in Minnesota. The Mulkeys countered that because the fire occurred in Louisiana and the plaintiffs are Louisiana residents, Louisiana law governs their claims against the defendants, citing Louisiana Civil Code Article 3545. The Court rejected defendant Power Sentry's contention that Minnesota law applied, noting that the defendant misdirects attention to the contract to purchase One Ten's assets. Judge Feldman highlighted the fact that the plaintiffs had no contacts with Minnesota, and in any event, the majority of pertinent contacts were with Louisiana. The court noted that the cause of the lawsuit and the injury occurred in Louisiana to Louisiana residents. Judge Feldman further noted that Louisiana's policy of consumer protection behind its products liability act and redhibition law would be "most seriously impaired if its laws were not applied" to the case.
R-Square Investments v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 1997 WL 436245 (E.D. La.).
Allstate Insurance Company v. Walmart, 2000 WL 38844 (E.D.La. 2000).
The R-Square court applied Louisiana's choice of law principles (Article 3537) and determined that the only contacts supporting the application of Louisiana law were that: (1) R-Square was Louisiana resident; and (2) the Bonanza aircraft was housed, used, licensed, and taxed in Louisiana. The court concluded that "these contacts alone cannot support the application of Louisiana's substantive law." R-Square did not involve a brand new product. It involved a component rebuilt engine which was installed into R-Square's Beechcraft Bonanza. The aircraft was flown to Minnesota precisely for the purpose of its installation. Minnesota was also the place where the engine was rebuilt. Two and one-half uneventful years had passed after the installation of the rebuilt Teledyne engine. The engine "seized" while the aircraft was en route to Baton Rouge, and thus the pilot was forced to execute an emergency landing. The R-Square court found it significant that the record contained no evidence indicating that the engine sold to the independent distributor in Minnesota would be installed in an aircraft that would be housed in Louisiana.
R-Square Investments v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 1997 WL 436245 (E.D. La.).
The case at bar is also distinguishable in pertinent part from R-Square, supra. A plethora of evidence strongly suggests that American Marine was apprised of the fact that the subject pleasure craft was intended for Robinson, a Louisiana purchaser. Indeed, the vessel was made to Robinson's specifications and order via telephone conversation with the manufacturer's representative from Robinson's home in Kenner, Louisiana. But for the fact that Robinson had agreed to purchase the brand new Donzi pleasure craft which is the subject product in the case at bar, it would be safe to assume that American Marine would not have manufactured the specific subject vessel and delivered it to Sportsman's Marine in Fairhope, Alabama, in particular. Based on these predicate facts, the fact that Fairhope, Alabama was the location of the actual purchase and that some warranty work was performed in Alabama is not considered impressive. In this case, the Louisiana resident's agreement to purchase was the object of or the express purpose of the sale to Sportsman's Marine in Alabama.
Warranty work was also performed in the states of Florida and Louisiana. Negotiations with the manufacturer that presaged the sale occurred via telephone with the plaintiff at his home in Louisiana. Plainly, Alabama law does not benefit the plaintiff, a Louisiana resident. Application of Alabama law would bar his recovery of economic damages, as well as causes of action for recission of the sale and redhibition. It would bar these claims of the non-resident plaintiff in favor of a non-resident manufacturer, whose own state law (i.e., Florida) affords no similar protection to a resident manufacturer.
Florida recognizes a strong public policy of liberally construing the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") to provide meaningful remedies to purchasers of defective products. The UCC governs the sale of goods in Florida. An aggrieved buyer may recover consequential damages for a seller's breach of contract. The UCC provisions for revocation of acceptance of goods states in part:
See Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc., 526 So.2d 147, 149 (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1988).
Florida Mining Materials Corporation v. Standard Gypsum Corporation, 550 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla.App. 2nd Dist. 1989).
Florida Mining Materials Corporation, 550 So.2d at 48 (citing UCC §§ 672.713-672.715).
(1) The buyer may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it:
(a) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in the condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
See § 672.608; Fla. Stat.; Frank Griffin Volkswagen, Inc. v. Smith, 610 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1993); Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc., 526 So.2d 147, 149 (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1988) (citing Uniform Commercial Code § 672.608 and noting that it constitutes ample precedent for the buyer of a new vehicle to revoke acceptance if the vehicle manifests numerous defects after the buyer's acceptance, the defects are not satisfactorily repaired by the dealer or manufacturer within a reasonable amount of time, and such defects substantially impair the value of the vehicle to the buyer); and Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So.2d 452 (Fla.App. 2nd Dist.), cert. denied, 267 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1972) (upholding the buyer's cause of action for breach of warranty against Chrysler Corporation as manufacturer based on numerous defects discovered shortly after the vehicle was delivered despite disclaimers contained in the retail installment sale contract).
Additionally, chapter 681, Florida Statutes, the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, known as Florida's "Lemon Law," applies to the purchase of new watercraft. A stated intent of the statute is "to provide the statutory procedures whereby a consumer may receive a replacement motor vehicle, or a full refund, for a motor vehicle which cannot be brought into conformity with the warranty provided for in this chapter."
See § 681.102 (15), Fla. Stat. (2000); Brufsky v. Parker Marine Enterprises, Inc., 1997 WL 158309 (M.D. Fla.) (noting the exclusion of the phrase "and is properly operated over public streets and highways of this state" signifies the Legislature's desire to expand the scope of motor vehicles under the "Lemon Law," and holding that there is nothing in the definition of motor vehicles in Fla. Stat. § 681.102 (14), which indicates that the Legislature intended to exclude watercraft in its definition of motor vehicles); and Gulfwind South, Inc. v. Jones, 775 So.2d 311 (La.App. 2nd Dist. 2000) (recognizing that plaintiffs cause of action for revocation of acceptance of boat against the vessel manufacturer under Florida's "Lemon Law", however, reversing the judgment of the trial court because the finding directly conflicted with the trial court's ruling on Counts Two through Four regarding breach of express and implied warranty and breach of contract).
See § 681.101, Fla. Stat. (2000); and King v. King Motor Company of Fort Lauderdale, 780 So.2d 937, 938 (Fla.App. 4th Dist. 2001).
Redhibition under Louisiana law is the voidance of a sale of a consumer product on the ground that the product has a defect rendering it either useless or so imperfect that the buyer would not have originally purchased it. Generally, Louisiana courts treat such claims as contractual in nature. There appears to be little, if any, conflict between the Florida policy of liberal construction of the UCC's provisions for revocation of acceptance of consumer goods to provide meaningful remedies to purchasers of defective products, the policy behind Florida's Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act ("Lemon Law"), and policy considerations underpinning Louisiana's laws of recission, redhibition, and Louisiana's own "Lemon Law," which also applies to "motor vehicles" sold within the state on or after September 1, 1984, which includes "personal watereraft."
Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999).
See Scruggs v. Minton Equipment Company Inc., 722 So.2d 130, 132 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1998)("Redhibition is based primarily on contract, as it arises from the sellers warranty of the thing sold."); but see Datamatic, Inc. v. International Business Machine, Corporation, 613 F. Supp. 715, 718 (W.D. La. 1985) (citing Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) for the proposition that for purposes of conflicts analysis, redhibition cases have been aligned with tort actions).
See La.Rev.Stat. 51:1941(6) (defining "motor vehicle"); Jackson v. Slidell Nissan, 693 So.2d 1257, 1261-62 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1997)(Louisiana's lemon law enacted in 1984 provides that if a new motor vehicle does not conform to an applicable express warranty, the consumer has rights against the manufacturer to have the vehicle repaired to bring it into conformity or to have the purchase price refunded); and Manning v. Scott-Hixon-Hopkins, Inc., 605 So.2d 233, 234 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1992) (With respect to motor vehicles sold in the state, Louisiana's law of redhibition and lemon law (L.S.A.-R.S. 51:1946 et seq.) provide overlapping remedies often pled in the alternative; Louisiana's lemon law is founded in and subject to the prescriptive period for redhibition).
Whether an actual or true conflict vis a vis Louisiana's and Alabama's laws exists is indeed questionable, and that is because it is difficult to divine a significant Alabama state interest in enforcing its laws to restrict remedies of a non-resident consumer against a non-resident manufacturer. That is at least implicit in the United States Supreme Court's ruling in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, i.e., that economic penalties imposed by Alabama on non-resident manufacturer BMW could only be supported by Alabama's "interest in protecting its own consumers and its own economy." Otherwise, "Alabama would be infringing on the policy choices of other States." It is clear that any ruling by the Court in this case, and any verdict rendered by the jury, will have no direct impact on Alabama's policy interests, its residents or its economy.
BMW of North America, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1597 (1996) (noting that state's powers are constrained by the need to respect the interests of other states and that the Constitution has a special concern for the autonomy of the individual states within their respective spheres).
BMW of North America, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1597 (1996).
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Alabama had some legitimate interest in the subject matter of this litigation, applying the "interest analysis" principles outlined above to the facts of this case, it is clear that Louisiana's policies would be more seriously impaired if its law were not applied to this case and that Louisiana has more significant contacts with the subject matter of the plaintiffs claims. The location of the purchase in this case bears little connection to the plaintiffs claims. Robinson would have suffered the same alleged injury if the pleasure craft had been delivered to any other retailer in any other southern state for immediate resale to Robinson. In the case at bar, even the defendant's principal place of business and headquarters in Florida have more significant connections to the plaintiffs breach of warranty, consumer protection and tort claims than the place of the actual sale. Louisiana, however, has the greatest and most compelling factual connection to the plaintiffs claims.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) American Marine Holdings, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED;
(2) Plaintiff David Robinson's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; and thus, Louisiana's laws govern the plaintiffs claims, whether in contract or tort; and
(3) American Marine Holdings, Inc.'s Request that this Court's ruling be certified for immediate appeal is again DENIED for reasons previously stated.